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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
Sino-Albanian Relations During the Cold War, 1949-1978: An Albanian Perspective 
 
 
by 
 
 
Ylber MARKU 
 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
This thesis is an exploration from the Albanian perspective of the Sino-Albanian 
relations during the Cold War. Based on primary sources, I look at the Sino-Albanian 
alliance in the broader context of the Cold War, and international relations’ system. 
In particular, I explore this alliance as an asymmetric role-based Cold War alliance, 
in which Albania provided political support to China, whereas China provided 
economic and military support to Albania.  
 
As a small country with little political leverage on the international stage, following 
the Second World War Albania became first a Soviet satellite and the Soviet outpost 
in the Southeastern European flank, providing Soviet Union with a strategic position 
in front of the NATO bases in Italy – around forty miles from Albanian coasts. 
Eventually, two factors undermined the Albanian-Soviet alliance: Khrushchev’s 
reformation, reflected in the destalinization process, and the Soviet rapprochement 
with Yugoslavia – by then Albania’s main antagonist. In this context, China emerged 
as the new ideal ally for Albania, for political, ideological, and economic support. 
The Albanian leadership’s decision to intensify relations with Beijing was motivated 
also by the new Soviet leadership’s refusal to assist Hoxha in his economic plans to 
prioritize the development of heavy industry. The combination of the economic 
aspects with those concerning the political reforms after Khrushchev’s model, which 
undermined Hoxha’s Stalinist rule, pushed Albania to seek in China an alternative to 
the Soviet Union. For China instead, following the Sino-Soviet split, Albania became 
the only European country to provide Beijing with support in its claims for 
leadership in the international communist movement, and to support – although not 
fully endorsing – Mao’s domestic policies. Albania, arguably, became the only 
country to provide external support to the Chinese Cultural Revolution, mitigating 
China’s self-imposed isolation. 
 
In the broader context of the Cold War, Albania served as the only European 
platform for China’s power projection in the western hemisphere. It also became the 
 strongest voice in supporting China and Chinese interests on the international stage, 
and international organizations, the most important being the United Nations. In this 
context, for a limited time and for limited tasks, Albania’s diplomatic network, and 
Albania’s foreign policy, was put at China’s disposal. During the 1960s, between 
China and Albania developed a surrogate diplomacy: Tirana, acting on behalf of 
Beijing, provided China with the diplomatic infrastructure Beijing lacked because of 
its underrepresentation.  
 
The Sino-American normalization, however, undermined the ideological axis upon 
which Albania had allied with China. Later, Deng Xiaoping’s reformation era 
reshaped China’s foreign aid principles, reducing also the aid to Albania. Finally, 
towards the end of the 1970s, the Sino-Albanian alliance ended.   
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1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Between 1945 and 1961, Albania passed from being under Yugoslavian protection to 
a Soviet satellite, and then definitely allying with China once relations with the 
Soviet Union soured. Although a country unknown to Albanians prior to 1949, China 
had the greatest impact on Albania during the entire Cold War period. Albanian 
leaders ditched the alliance with Moscow after the coming to power of the new 
leader in Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, who reversed Stalin’s repressive manners 
and reformed the communist system altogether, undermining Albanian leaders’ 
regime. In addition, Khrushchev pursued a policy of rapprochement between the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia which, for the Albanian leaders, by then was deemed a 
threat to national independence.1  In the same period, deep divergences emerged 
between China and the Soviet Union, and so Albania and China offered their 
respective assistance to each other.2 
Albania could offer its ideological and political support on the international 
stage, acting as China’s spokesperson in international organizations where the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) was unrepresented. China, in turn, provided 
Albania with substantial economic and military assistance. By 1961, this peculiar 
alliance had been fully established and it endured until 1978. Following a long-
standing yet tacit national strategy, Albania could continue to rely on a ‘big 
protector’,3  in an asymmetric relationship in which, according to Womack, ‘the 
disparities in capacities create systemic differences of interests’ that make 
asymmetric relations often unstable. 4  Indeed, Sino-Albanian relations were not 
immune from trouble and disputes – sometimes openly and others veiled. Only 
                                                            
1 William E. Griffith, Albania and The Sino-Soviet Rift, (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1963). 
2 For the Sino-Soviet conflict see Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet conflict 1956-1961, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1962); Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist 
World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Mingjiang Li, Mao’s China and the Sino-Soviet 
split: ideological dilemma, (London: Routledge, 2012). 
3 Elez Biberaj, Albania and China. A Study of an Unequal Alliance, (Washington: Westview Press, 
1986). 
4  Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam. The Politics of Asymmetry, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 17; See also Anthony Reid and Yangwen Zheng, eds., Negotiating 
Asymmetry: China’s Place in Asia, (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009). 
2 
following the recent declassification of important documents, mainly in Albania, is it 
possible to analyze more accurately this alliance.5 
The scholarship regarding the Cold War has been broad and extensive. 
However, due to the gradual opening of archives in the former Soviet Union and East 
Europe, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the most fruitful research work has 
been done. Yet most of the historiography has concentrated on the East-West (United 
States-Soviet Union) dichotomy, and historians have preferred, for good reasons, to 
focus more on the macro factors and variables of the Cold War and the role and 
interplay between superpowers.6 This has caused debates among scholars regarding 
even the definition of Cold War: some restricting the term to the East – West 
confrontation with its epicenter in Europe;7 others, without denying the primary role 
of the superpowers’ confrontation, expand their use of the term to include many 
peripheral ‘Cold Wars’;8 and others still focusing on ongoing debating its effects.9 
Recently more studies have been finalized regarding the role of smaller powers 
                                                            
5 The main historical documents regarding the Sino-Albanian relations are at the Central State Archive, 
in Tirana, [Arkivi Qendror i Shtetit – AQSH, hereafter], Party’s Archive [Arkivi i Partisë – AP, 
hereafter], Leading Organs, [Organet Udhëheqëse – OU, hereafter], and relations CCP-PLA, 
[Marrëdhëniet PKK-PPSH/AP-MPKK, hereafter]; Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Arkivi 
i Ministrisë së Punëve të Jashtme – AMPJ, hereafter]– The United Nations Organization, [Organizata 
e Kombeve të Bashkuara – OKB, hereafter]; Archive of the Ministry of Defense, [Arkivi Qëndror i 
Ushtrisë – AQU, hereafter]; File, [Dosje – D., hereafter]; Viti, [Year – V., hereafter]; page, [fletë – f., 
hereafter]. Translation from the original into english is mine. 
6 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War, (London: Allen Lane, 2006); John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: 
A New History, (New York: Penguin Press, 2005); John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries 
into the History of the Cold War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); John Lewis Gaddis, We 
Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Jeremy Scott Friedman, 
Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World, The New Cold War History, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Mingjiang Li, Mao’s China and the Sino-
Soviet Split: Ideological Dilemma, (London and New York: Routledge, 2012); Jussi M. Hanhimäki 
and Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, (Oxford 
University Press, 2004); Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, The Cambridge History of the Cold 
War, (Cambridge University Press, 2010); Odd Arne Westad ed., Reviewing the Cold War: 
Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, (London and Portland, OR : F. Cass, 2000); Walter LaFeber, 
America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2000, 9th ed., (Boston, Mass: McGraw-Hill, 2002). John 
Gaddis view of the Cold War has been recently scrutinized and debated by Geir Lundestad. See Geir 
Lundestad, “The Cold War According to John Gaddis”, Cold War History, Vol. 6, no. 4, (2006): 535–
542. 
7 Federico Romero, “Cold War Historiography at the Crossroads”, Cold War History, Vol. 14, no. 4 
(2014): 685-703. 
8 Pierre Grosser, “Looking for the Core of the Cold War, and Finding a Mirage?”, Cold War History, 
Vol. 15, no. 2 (2015): 245-252; Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions 
and the Making of Our Times, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
9 Vojtech Mastny, “The Cold War in Retrospect: Too Early to Tell?”, Cold War History, Vol. 14, no. 
4 (2014): 487–499. 
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during that period.10 In this context, the Balkans have been at the margins of the 
scholarship, with some exceptions.11 Albania, however, has been almost completely 
neglected.12 Regardless of the definition we give to the Cold War, Sino-Albanian 
relations were a Cold War alliance built upon the divisional lines that the Sino-Soviet 
split created within the eastern bloc. This research will elaborate the role Albania 
played, during its intense relations with China, as a small country with a unique 
position in Europe and the world. It will also explore China’s role in its attempt to be 
an alternative to the Soviet Union’s leadership within the international communist 
front. 
 
An Important but Understudied Alliance 
Scholars thus far have done very little study of Albania’s role during Cold War, let 
alone Sino-Albanian relations. Elez Biberaj has conducted the only extant study on 
the Sino-Albanian alliance in 1986. This remarkable work however, for obvious 
reasons, was mainly based on officially-released documents, public declarations and 
secondary sources. Biberaj’s perspective is that of a political scientist who, among 
others, poses questions to some of which only now is possible to give an answer 
thanks to the recent declassification of archival documentation. Nonetheless, his 
study remains a milestone for any scholar aiming to study Albania’s history during 
Cold War. William E. Griffith has also conducted research on this topic, but his 
                                                            
10 László Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War, 1945-1956: Between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, (New York: Central European University Press, 2004); L. Borhi, “Empire by Coercion: The 
Soviet Union and Hungary in the 1950s”, Cold War History, Vol. 1, no. 2 (January 2001): 47–72; 
János Radványi, Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik, (Stanford, 
Calif: Stanford University, 1972); Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler, eds., The 
Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, (Lanham, Md: Lexington 
Books, 2010). 
11 Laković and Tasić, “The Tito-Stalin Split and Yugoslavia’s Military Opening toward the West, 
1950-1954”; Ivo Banac, With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist splits in Yugoslav Communism, 
(London & Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Jovan Cavoski, “Overstepping the Balkan 
Boundaries: The Lesser Known History of Yugoslavia’s Early Relations with Asian Countries, (New 
Evidence from Yugoslav/Serbian Archives)”, Cold War History, Vol. 11, no. 4,(2011): 557-577; A. A. 
Ulunian, “Soviet Cold War Perceptions of Turkey and Greece, 1945-58”, Cold War History, Vol. 3, 
no. 2 (2003): 35–52; Konstantina Maragkou, “Favoritism in NATO”s Southeastern Flank: The Case 
of the Greek Colonels, 1967-74”, Cold War History, Vol. 9, no. 3 (2009): 347–366. 
12 Elez Biberaj, Albania and China: A Study of an Unequal Alliance, Westview Special Studies in 
International Relations, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); Elidor Mëhilli, “Defying De-Stalinization”, 
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 13, no. 4 (2011): 4–56. These are at the moment the most known 
scholars (if not the only) to have conducted, in different periods, limited research on this topic. 
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study is limited to 1963. The merit of this work was the central position it found for 
Albania in the Sino-Soviet rift.  
My aim is to advance what these scholars have started, in light of accessible new 
sources, and add to our understanding of the Sino-Albanian alliance, China, Albania, 
and Cold War in general. More specifically, this research will try to answer, but not 
limit to, the following questions. First, what were the factors that led to the Sino-
Albanian entente first, alliance later, and split eventually? What was the role of 
political, economic, and ideological factors during the Sino-Albanian alliance? How 
these different factors played a role in different periods of the Sino-Albanian 
relations? Second, what was the role Albania had in China's international relations 
during the “Global Cold War”? What was the role that China played both in 
Albania's international relations and in communist dictator Enver Hoxha's power 
inside Albania? 
One of Biberaj’s main arguments is that Albania sought many concessions from 
China, highlighting Albania’s capacity to convince China that Tirana could play an 
important role. The last part of his argument is corroborated by archival documents. 
They show that Tirana not only convinced Beijing of its capacity to play a role in 
international politics, but really did fulfill its promises, in particular by capturing 
many communist groups and political parties from Europe, Africa, and Latin 
America under Beijing’s sphere of influence. Less true, I will argue, is the rest of the 
argument of Biberaj. China prioritized Albania as a recipient of foreign aid, and no 
other country in times of peace received from China such economic and military 
assistance, proportionate to population, as did Albania. This seemingly corroborates 
and reinforces Biberaj’s cost-benefit analysis, according to which Albania benefitted 
enormously by extracting concessions from China with no guaranteed political 
return. But this analysis neglects the long term consequences of the relationship, and 
is true only in the short term, 1961-1978. 
However, my argument is that this did not come about because of China’s 
generosity, but as a reward for the challenge Albania had posed to Soviet influence. 
In Europe, only Yugoslavia pursued a policy of departure from dogmatic 
communism, and it was backed by the West. Albanian leaders, in order to legitimate 
their decision to not undertake any reformation, challenged the Soviet Union by 
calling on the original principles of communist ideology, for them embodied in 
5 
Stalinism. Moreover, unlike other communist countries, Albania strongly supported 
China’s claim for leadership within the international communist movement, and 
recognized and praised China’s importance and emergence as a global player. On the 
other hand, China’s support for Albania was an investment which did indeed have a 
return. In retrospect, it can be said that China used Albania for political support 
during the “turn left” period of its policy in the 1960s. No country supported China’s 
revolutionary policy with greater conviction than Albania – not even Asian 
communist countries in China’s historical area of interest and influence. In addition, 
Tirana tried and often played an important role regarding Beijing’s integration into 
the international system by continuously bringing attention to China and trying to put 
Chinese issues on the agenda, be it in the United Nations Organization (UN) or other 
agencies. Albania contributed to China’s integration into the international system, 
which China once wanted to disintegrate. On this point, here I try to show how 
Albania’s diplomacy replaced China’s lack of representation, by becoming Beijing’s 
voice in international organizations. In this way, I argue that a surrogate diplomacy 
developed during the 1960s, by which term I mean the use of Albania’s diplomatic 
network for China’s exclusive interests in its international relations, and in pursuing 
China’s agenda in general. China eventually became a global player, while Albania 
turned even more dogmatic and self-isolated. Although for a short time, the Albanian 
regime survived thanks to Chinese economic assistance, the economic projects that 
had been implemented, which largely consisted of poor technological equipment, 
deteriorated quickly and made Albanian industry obsolete. In a way it is possible to 
say that after the 1970s, China moved West, while Albania remained East.  
Biberaj argues that both countries held the same views of Stalin, but documents 
reveal instead that Chinese and Albanian leaders had diverged on Stalin since the 
very beginning of the alliance and that later the Chinese Cultural Revolution brought 
these differences into the open. Another of Biberaj’s arguments is that Albania’s 
alliance with China diminished the former’s maneuverability. However, Albanian 
leaders seem to have thought the opposite. The choice was either to, on the one hand, 
remain an appendage of the Soviet Union, subject to commands from Moscow, with 
national sovereignty limited at best, certainly menaced by the presence of Soviet 
soldiers in the naval base of Vlora, or on the other hand, seek an alliance with 
Beijing. The latter choice allowed Albania to pursue its way of communism more 
6 
easily than it had while cooperating with Moscow. Moreover, Tirana mattered much 
more on the international stage – or at least the leaders there thought so – and gained 
a prominent position for promoting the struggle against Soviet Union’s “revisionism” 
by collaborating with China and actively promoting Chinese interests instead of 
defending Soviet policies.13  
One of my arguments is that Sino-Albanian relations were a Cold War 
asymmetric role-based alliance, wherein Albania served as China’s power projection 
platform in the international communist movement and as a spokesperson in 
international organizations where China was unrepresented. In this way, Albania, to 
a certain degree, mitigated China’s international isolation, in particular during the 
first phase of the Cultural Revolution. China, on the other side, served as an 
economic source for the Albanian regime and, comparatively to other small 
countries, raised Albania to a prominent position on the international stage. Albania 
served as a platform for China’s interests, and for the time these interests were 
common: the struggle against Soviet revisionism, against American imperialism, 
support for Tirana’s fierce struggle against Tito’s Yugoslavia, the assistance to 
communist parties that adhered to rigid ideological principles legitimizing both 
Chinese and Albanian policies. In this sense Sino-Albanian relations were a role 
based asymmetric alliance. Albania supported China politically in international 
forums. In return China supported Albanian efforts to develop its economy and 
provided huge amounts of armaments for Albania’s defense.  
It may be disputed if Albania has to be considered a small power at all since no 
small nation necessarily projects power. However, according to the definition of 
small power given by Robert Rothstein, as ‘a state which recognizes that it cannot 
obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and it must rely 
fundamentally on the aid of other states’, Albania should be considered a small 
power. 14  Biberaj in his study endorses Rothstein’s definition but, perhaps 
unintentionally, ignores Robert Keohane’s refutation of that definition as 
                                                            
13 The term “revisionism” was first used to attack Tito’s Yugoslavia following the Soviet-Yugoslavian 
split in 1948. Following the Sino-Soviet split, and the Albanian-Soviet split, the term was used also by 
Chinese and Albanian leaders to attack the CPSU and the Soviet leaders. 
14 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, (New York and London: Columbia University 
Press, 1968), 29. 
7 
‘anachronistic’, restrictive and vague.15 Keohane has his own definition of a small 
power, ‘a state whose leaders consider it can never, acting alone or in a small group, 
make a significant impact on the international system’. More interesting is his 
definition of middle power, ‘a state whose leaders considers that it cannot act alone 
effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an 
international institution’.16 If one refers to the public discourse of Albanian leaders 
during their friendship with China, often corroborated by archival documentation, it 
seems they did believe they could impact the system by supporting China’s claims in 
the international stage. Whether or not this makes Albania a middle power, this study 
will try to show how much it says of the particular and prominent position Albania 
acquired by cooperating with China.  
In any case, specific definitions aside, I will prefer to call Albania, for the 
purposes of this study, simply what it is: a small country. For David Vital, small 
countries pay a big price for security from big partners ‘in terms of sacrifice of 
autonomy in the control of national resources and loss of freedom of political 
maneuver and choice’.17 I will try to show that Albania, by allying with China, tried 
precisely to avoid constraints that could reduce its autonomy. Indeed, from Tirana’s 
viewpoint, the alliance with China seemed, initially at least, to leave more room for 
political maneuvering on the international stage. This autonomy, although limited, 
nonetheless was comparatively higher than the autonomy Albania had maintained 
within the Soviet alliance. Though this poses another important question – what 
definition, or definitions, can we give to alliance? As Keohane has argued, ‘The 
imprecision of international relations terminology is nowhere more obvious or 
painful than in discussions of alliances’.18 Besides, certain definitions of alliance 
would not fully apply to the Sino-Albanian relations, not at least if we assume that an 
                                                            
15 Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputians” Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics”, International 
Organization 23, no. 2 (1969): 291-310. For Keohane even big states in western Europe could 
possibly be under this category. 
16 Ibid., 296. 
17 David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 5. This work was aimed at the study of unaligned states. 
18 Some of early definitions of “alliance” are given by these authors: Rothstein, Alliances and Small 
Powers; Robert Endicott Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1968); George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1962); George Liska, Alliances and the Third World, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1968). 
8 
alliance would require ‘an arrangement between independent states that involves 
treaty agreements’.19 In this case a treaty of alliance never existed, only arrangements 
in the form of trade agreements, common declarations or joint communiqués. After 
all, China and Albania had a community of interests that ‘so obviously call for 
concerted policies and actions that an explicit formulation of these interests in the 
form of… a treaty of alliance appears to be redundant’, particularly where ‘an 
alliance adds precision, especially in the form of limitation of the concrete measures 
to serve’ these common interests.20 
Contrary to the rhetoric flaunted at the time, and contrary to the perception 
among scholars and observers of Sino-Albanian relations as a solid alliance, 
divergences between Tirana and Beijing were persistent even at the peak of their 
collaboration during the Chinese Cultural Revolution. In the beginning of their 
partnership, both countries based their collaboration on shared communist ideology 
and principles. Both sides thought that adherence to common communist ideals 
would be sufficient to shadow possible differences in their cultures. In fact they were 
wrong, as both China and Albania would come to suffer from a mutual lack of 
knowledge of each other’s past cultural identity, and the respective impacts on 
national identity, which led to grave misunderstandings regardless of shared 
contemporary ideology. These faults showed when China proposed Albania an 
alliance with Yugoslavia, lacking sensitivity to the Albanian national question yet 
unresolved. Tirana, for its part, did not fully understand, nor easily accept, some 
aspects of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, in particular those surrounding Mao’s 
thought, the demolition of political power, and the tabula rasa China sought 
regarding its own cultural heritage.  
On this point it is important to note that another important aspect that emerges 
through archival documents is the previously-unknown fact that once Chinese 
communist revolution turned towards Maoism (a manifestation of Mao’s thought) as 
a further step in the development of socialism, Albania did not receive it without 
resistance. Indeed, I will argue that Albania refused to consider any sort of Chinese 
way of communism that was not Stalinism, no matter the implications this could 
                                                            
19 Paul H. Nitze, “Coalition Policy and the Concept of World Order”, in Arnold Wolfers, ed., Alliance 
Policy in the Cold War, (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), 22. 
20 Hans J. Morgenthau, “Alliances in Theory and Practice”, in ibid. 185–186. 
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have had in its relations with China. This refusal led to an open confrontation which 
almost ended the alliance, but was eventually resolved in the most mutually-
beneficial ways. Both sides managed to conceal their differences very well, in 
particular when China most needed Albanian support – during the first years of the 
Cultural Revolution. 
 
Patterns of the Alliance 
Many were the factors that impacted the Sino-Albanian alliance, the common 
communist ideology undoubtedly among them. Viewing this ideology as the 
common ground upon which the alliance could be built, we also see that to keep it 
standing required other factors as well. Most obviously, the geographical distance, at 
least from a Chinese perspective, made Albania a very unusual ally. Indeed, after 
1949, China had attempted to build alliances mainly with communist countries (and 
with communist parties in non-communist countries) within its traditional area of 
influence: East and Southeast Asia. Historically China’s relations with its neighbors 
in East Asia were hierarchic, where Beijing occupied the central position from which 
legitimacy drifted. Although Mao’s China claimed equality in international relations, 
even more so with communist countries, Beijing’s power could not help but shadow 
its smaller allies making any possible alliance an asymmetric one. In addition to 
considerations of its size, China’s refusal to be an appendage of Moscow’s power 
within the communist bloc, created ipso facto a hierarchic situation between China 
and any smaller communist country it cooperated with. Sino-Albanian relations, as 
mentioned, were certainly asymmetric, but they were also less hierarchic than those 
China could have imposed had the two shared a border, or had Albania been within 
China’s reach.21 More importantly, at least for the Albanian leaders, they were less 
unequal than those Tirana had had with Moscow.  
Not much time after the proclamation of the People’s Republic, China 
established and announced in 1954 its own principles of foreign policy, the so-called 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Although initially aimed at the relations 
between China and Third World countries, not necessarily communists, as Sophie 
Richardson has shown, these principles came to be part of a universal guideline of 
                                                            
21 Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry. The author’s arguments in this 
book cannot easily, if not at all, be applied to the Sino-Albanian relations. 
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China’s foreign policy.22 Nonetheless, although China applied these principles even 
to relations with countries ruled by communist parties, they did not constitute the 
framework of Sino-Albanian relations. China, as Zhou Enlai and other high officials 
often used to say, preferred to put these relations in the category of the ‘special and 
particular relation, different from any other’.23 My impression is that, unlike Chinese 
relations with many other countries, the principles that guided Sino-Albanian 
relations were dealt with on a moment-to-moment, issue-by-issue basis, depending 
on the particular subject of contention or agreement. The fact remains that Sino-
Albanian relations were, in the first place, relations between two communist 
countries, and it is not possible to explain the interstate relations without the 
interparty relations, nor is it possible to separate the two levels since the communist 
parties in both countries led the state and its policies. This leads us to consider the 
importance of the ideology that both countries – though more so Albania – used to 
measure and question the alliance depending on the level of loyalty to the communist 
dogma. But Tirana and Beijing held different interpretations of the communist 
ideology at times. No matter the solidity of the alliance both sides espoused publicly, 
these interpretations caused continuous disputes regarding the very founding 
principles of Tirana-Beijing friendship.  
Agreements or disagreements came about from both visible and invisible factors. 
Some concerned the very rule Albanian leaders and their internal positions. Other 
national factors, on both sides, as economic and political domestic issues, were 
reflected in the two nations’ behaviors towards the alliance. Still others existed 
regarding their respective views on communist ideology, Stalin’s place in history, 
class struggle or which strategy to adopt against Soviet Union. The divergences can 
be comprised into three main sources of conflict, each containing its own variety of 
conflicts of interests: domestic policies and their impact on the alliance; international 
relations and politics; and ideological disputes. Each kind of conflict could be 
understood in terms of both countries’ very different historical and cultural 
backgrounds, which permeated their national identity. Lastly, of course, is the 
geographical dynamic – the distance between Tirana and Beijing that was 
                                                            
22 Sophie Richardson, China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010). 
23 “Notes from the conversation of comrade Rita Marko with comrade Kang Sheng, in Beijing, 11 
September 1969”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1969, D7, f.4. 
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determinant in shaping the alliance. Indeed, Tirana’s distance from Beijing allowed 
great autonomy in dealing with its ally and in disputing eventual policies, but also 
affected Albania in its dealings with closer nations, some of which were perceived 
enemies, capable of threatening Tirana without fear of the great but distant ally. In all 
cases, what seems to be clear is Albania’s stubbornness in most of these situations 
and China’s flexibility towards its small ally.  
Another important aspect is the role played by policy makers and the interplay 
between their economic and security decisions and the existing ideological factors. 
This could explain better when and to what extent the political leaders were moved 
exclusively for reasons of national interest or were idealists, acting according to their 
ideological beliefs. In addition, it is important to see how respective domestic 
policies impacted drastically the alliance because they impacted the respective 
domestic and foreign policies. This is clear, for instance, when the rise of Deng 
Xiaoping in mid-1970s changed China’s approach to foreign aid, consequently 
changing one of the main reasons of Albania’s support for China.24 The same can be 
said of the Cultural Revolution, which had great impacts on the ideological 
dimension of the alliance. Domestic policies, in particular in Chinese domestic 
policies, at times were reflected in Chinese leaders’ attempts to address Albanian 
economic problems, or military issues. This is reflected in many conversations Zhou 
Enlai, Li Xiannian and other Chinese leaders had with Albanian officials. This 
however, did not escalate into any interference in Albanian internal affairs, 
something Chinese officials had learned from Soviets to be counterproductive in the 
case of Hoxha’s Albania, nor did the Chinese even have any interest to interfere. 
Again, Albania, geographically far from China, did not belong to the core area of 
Chinese national interests in East Asia. 
Some years ago, in the bulletin of the Cold War International History Project, 
(CWIH) parallels were drawn between Cuba and Albania’s roles during Cold War. In 
fact, for the authors, from Beijing’s viewpoint: ‘Much as Fidel Castro’s revolution 
                                                            
24 Ming Ruan et al., Deng Xiaoping: Chronicle of an Empire, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1994) This is an account of the period from 1976 onward, focused on Deng’s policies to modernize 
China; Maurice J. Meisner, The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Socialism, 
1978-1994, 1st ed, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996);Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the 
Transformation of China, (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011); 
Alexander Pantsov and Steven I. Levine, Deng Xiaoping: A Revolutionary Life, (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2015);  
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had given the Soviet leaders a highly valuable strategic outpost in the US-dominated 
western hemisphere, Enver Hoxha’s break with Moscow provided the People’s 
Republic a political beachhead at a neuralgic spot on the southern edge of the WPO 
[Warsaw Pact Organization]. Much as Moscow supported the infant regime in 
Havana with generous military and economic aid, Chinese leaders stepped up aid in 
grain, industrial materials and knowhow to the Albanians after the fall-out with 
Khrushchev’.25 Although tactically-speaking, this comparison makes sense, yet in 
strategic terms, Albania did not have the same importance for the Soviet Union that 
Cuba had for the United States. Nor did Beijing even believe that Albania could 
matter so much. On the other hand, as Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali have 
shown, in the case of Cuba ideological issues were less incisive in Castro’s decision 
to embrace the Soviet system. Cuba’s revolution initially was just a revolution, not a 
specifically communist revolution. Castro is even reported to have said that he was 
‘… against communism’, during his Operation Truth travel to the United States four 
months after the political takeover in Cuba. 26  Nixon noted that Fidel Castro’s 
‘primary concern seemed to be to convince me that he was not a communist’.27 
Beyond these considerations, the fact remains that because of Cuba’s strategic 
importance for the United States, two superpowers went to the verge of an atomic 
war. Albania’s split from the Soviet Union, however, did not cause any real military 
escalation between China and the Soviet Union.  
Differently from the Soviet-Cuban alliance, in Albania’s case, ideological 
implications were paramount in building the alliance with China. Hoxha, eventually 
backed by Beijing, had initiated a crusade against Khrushchev over the reformistic 
path he had undertaken, which undermined Hoxha’s rule. Cuba or not, Albania 
offered to China greater presence within the communist camp led by the Soviet 
Union and an opportunity to challenge Moscow from an eastern European spot – the 
Soviets’ core area of interests, power and influence.  
                                                            
25 Ana Lalaj, Christian F. Ostermann, and Ryan Gage (edited and introduced by), “Albania is not 
Cuba”, in CWIH, Bulletin 16, (2007/2008): 183-340, 183. 
26 Aleksandr V. Fursenko and Timothy J. Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and 
Kennedy, 1958-1964, (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co, 1997), 9. For the authors Raul 
Castro, Fidel Castro's brother, was Moscow’s man in Havana. For an analysis of Fidel Castro's 
political background and his eventual lean to Soviet system see pages 5-34. 
27 Jussi M. Hanhimäki and Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness 
Accounts, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 389. 
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Structure and Sources 
To understand the reasons for the alliance between China and Albania it is necessary 
to go back and explain shortly the reasons of the Albanian-Soviet split. So the first 
part of the thesis will be dedicated to explaining this rift and concurrent alliance with 
China. Since both these moments were contemporary, it is interesting to see the 
interaction in the Moscow-Tirana-Beijing triangle and what role Albania played, if 
any, in the Sino-Soviet split. In this part I also try to explain the main patterns of 
Albanian communism, which was Stalinism, as shown by Hoxha’s refusal to 
embrace the reformistic path that Khrushchev promoted. As we will see, these 
patterns – Hoxha’s menacing personal rule and the national security dilemma derived 
from Khrushchev’s rapprochement with Yugoslavia – were the main factors 
instigating the Albanian split with the Soviet Union.  
The second part will be dedicated to the peak of Albanian collaboration with 
China during 1962-1971. During this period, Albania strongly supported the Chinese 
revolutionary path and made great efforts to defend Chinese interests in international 
forums and organizations. Yet, it is also in this time that ideological differences 
emerged, but both countries found a way to solve them and continued to support each 
other. In the same period, at a time when China was going through great economic 
hardship, Chinese economic and military aid to Albania reached the unprecedented 
amounts. In fact, Albania occupied a central place among recipients of Chinese 
foreign aid, ranked third after North Korea and North Vietnam. The third part will 
review the beginning of the decline of the alliance and how both countries began to 
move in opposite directions. China started to open to the West and reform its 
economy in the mid-1970s, although this process would move speedily only after 
Mao’s death in 1976. During this period, ideological considerations in the Sino-
Albanian relations started becoming less important on China’s side, while Albania 
showed signs of intolerance and impatience. This was reinforced by difficulties in the 
implementation of the economic projects China had committed to in heavy industry. 
The last chapter concerns the end of the alliance following the deaths of Mao and 
Zhou Enlai in 1976, and the emergence of a new class of pragmatic reformers in 
Chinese leadership who promoted drastic changes in Chinese foreign policy. These 
changes inevitably impacted the alliance with Albania, reflected in the lack of 
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commitment to assist in its new five-year economic plan. The Sino-Albanian split 
was less dramatic than the Albanian-Soviet split, and did not result in a complete 
interruption of relations. Indeed, diplomatic relations were not interrupted and 
limited economic and cultural exchanges continued. 
The main sources for my research come from the Albanian central state archives. 
In particular the archives of the Party of Labor of Albania. Other valuable sources 
were those coming from the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry 
of Trade, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Culture and Education, and finally the 
Ministry of Defense. In addition a number of former officials and protagonists of that 
time – students, specialists and scholars have contributed with their valued 
interviews and comments. I am confident that these documents may say much of 
China’s competition within the communist bloc. Most part of the primary sources I 
used for this research, consisting mainly on archival documentation, are here for the 
first time revealed. Being the first study based on primary sources, I am sure my 
work will not be exhaustive. Besides, a complete study of this alliance would require 
first of all access to Chinese documents. Unfortunately, in part because of Chinese 
limitations on archival research, and in part because of the limited time, the main 
sources for this research are Albanians. However, I have used some Chinese sources, 
recent publications, and interviews with Chinese specialists that worked in Albania – 
a courtesy of Radio Beijing which had conducted most of these interviews for one of 
their rubrics. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
SHIFTING ALLIANCES 
 
Introduction 
Albania’s security dilemma was the main factor that pushed Albania, and Hoxha, 
from Yugoslavian to Soviet arms. For the same reason Albania embraced China and 
ended Moscow’s support when Soviet leaders undermined his power. The 
destalinization process, undertaken by Khrushchev in Soviet Union, undermined the 
despotic and personalist-style rule of Enver Hoxha. In fact, following the events in 
East Europe in 1956, Albania was the first European socialist country to oppose the 
destalinization process, consequently the first to support China in defying Moscow’s 
leadership of the international communist movement.  
The above points can be explained if firstly, and shortly, traced the national 
security vicissitudes of the Albanian state since its independence in 1912. In fact, at 
the end of the Second World War, Albania’s quest for security was still pending due 
to the expansionist policies of Greece and Yugoslavia. The first entered in a civil 
war, which moved away the possibility for Greece to constitute a real threat for 
Albania. Yugoslavia instead, passed from the main supporter of Hoxha, to his main 
antagonist. Initially the Yugoslavians had thought that Hoxha could be maneuvered, 
and Albania would unite with Yugoslavia, as part of Tito’s plan for a Balkan 
Federation. Tito, working on his plan, to which Albania initially agreed, convinced 
Hoxha to agree to joint economic development. In desperate need to rebuild the 
economy and provide some benefits of their rule to their people, the Albanian leaders 
accepted Yugoslavian assistance in the form of basic equipment and technologies to 
build small factories in light industry, and agreed to a united customs regime.  
The state changed in 1947-48, however, with a series of rapid political 
developments, which would eventually go in Hoxha’s favor. Tito, upon seeing the 
possibility of a Balkan Federation as unrealistic, and the economic integration with 
Albania in serious risk, thought to move towards a fait accompli by deploying the 
army in Albania. In late 1947 he had managed to impose within the Albanian 
Communist Party a purge of any elements against Yugoslavia. In early 1948 
Belgrade pressed Tirana to allow the deployment of the Yugoslavian army in 
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Albania under the pretense of defending it from possible Greek attack. After the 
Second World War the political confrontation in Greece between leftist and rightist 
groups had escalated into a large-scale civil war. 1  Hoxha knew that politically 
conservative parties in Greece did not conceal their animosity towards Albania, but 
he sensed that the real danger now became Yugoslavia instead. This posed the first 
serious threat to the communist regime. The stake was not the survival of the 
communist regime as such, rather than Hoxha’s personal rule and the Albanian 
independence. Fortunately for Hoxha, Tito was too ambitious, and Stalin too 
paranoid. The Soviet leader was unwilling to allow any challenge to the hierarchy of 
power within the communist camp, and saw a Balkan Federation under Tito’s rule as 
a threat to his influence over Southeastern Europe. Tito had shown some autonomy 
in his standing towards Soviet Union, due to the fact that unlike the rest of eastern 
Europe, Yugoslavia was not liberated by the Red Army, and Tito had fought almost 
alone against the Nazi occupation. Consequently he felt less tied to the Kremlin and 
its many commands. Yugoslavian leaders soon discovered that Tito’s plans crushed 
also with Hoxha’s ambitions. Hoxha did not want in fact to become a vassal of Tito, 
but wanted to rule in his own, possibly undisputed by any force, externally or 
internally. Fortunately for him, Hoxha was assisted by historical circumstances 
which made possible his political survival, and made also possible for him to master 
the art of the international politics and take advantage from the confrontation 
between great countries and superpowers. From a marginal leader during the war, to 
the liberation of Albania, which he accredited himself as the partisan’s leader, to the 
undiscussed and absolute leader of Albania, the jump was short for Hoxha. A jump 
that decided the fate of the country for almost half a century. 
 
Albania and its Short Independence 
After the 1912 proclamation of independence, following almost five centuries of 
Ottoman rule, Albania barely managed to survive. In 1913, the Conference of the 
Ambassadors in London – a forum of the great European powers – decided to 
recognize Albanian independence. They imposed a monarchic regime and offered the 
                                                            
1 Philip Carabott and Thanasis D. Sfikas, eds., The Greek Civil War: Essays on a Conflict of 
Exceptionalism and Silences, (Aldershot, Hampshire, U.K. and Burlington, Vt: Ashgate, 2004); David 
Close, ed., The Greek Civil War: Studies of Polarization, (London & New York: Routledge, 1993). 
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crown to Prince William Wied (German aristocrat from Bavaria), who ruled for only 
six months until the outbreak of the First World War.2 Albania’s internationally 
recognized borders, however, included less than half of the Albanian inhabited 
territories, and half of Albanian population. After the end of the First World War, 
Albania proclaimed itself a republic, but the new state remained weak, with an 
extremely poor economy.3 Its security was threatened by its southern (Greece) and 
northern (Yugoslavia) neighbors, which never easily accepted Albanian 
independence.  
In 1928 Ahmet Zogu, a long-ruling and controversial politician, reinstated the 
monarchy. In his new role as “King of Albanians”, after decades of political 
instability and internal conflicts, he tried to consolidate the state, ending the internal 
disputes, and promoting western style laws and systems of state building.4 A process 
of economic restructuring and revitalization began thanks to limited foreign 
investments, which facilitated the emergence of the first true, albeit small, middle 
and working class. It was precisely within this class of people that the communist 
movement took place in the mid-1930s. 5  During this period, a flow of Italian 
specialists, from across many fields entered the country. King Zog tried to balance 
the overwhelming Italian influence by attempting closer relations with Yugoslavia, 
but ultimately Italy prevailed, being able to offer much greater assistance than 
Yugoslavia could – particularly in terms of infrastructure: still today the national 
road network follows that planned and in part built by the Italians. It is thanks to 
Italian architects that Tirana, from a little more than a village, transformed into a 
modern Western-style city in the late thirties. This contributed to the Albanians’ 
                                                            
2 Duncan Heaton-Armstrong, Gervase Belfield, and Bejtullah D. Destani, ed., The Six Month Kingdom: 
Albania 1914, (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005). 
3 Bernd Jürgen Fischer, Albania at war, 1939-1945, (West Lafayette, Indiana: Perdue University Press, 
1999). According to Fischer, at the time of the Italian invasion, Albanian people had the lowest living 
standards in Europe. The country had a non-existent health care system, three fifth of the arable land 
was owned by 150 land owners, the education was very limited with 85% of illiterate population, and 
Albania did not have any university yet. 
4 Bernd Jürgen Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984); Jason Tomes, King Zog of Albania: Europe’s Self-Made Muslim King, (New 
York: New York University Press, 2004). 
5 Kristo Frashëri, Historia e lëvizjes së majtë në Shqipëri dhe e PKSH-së, 1878-1941 [The History of 
the left movement and of the communist party in Albania, 1878-1941], (Tirana: Akademia e 
Shkencave, 2006). 
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perception of Italy as a friendly nation. April 7, 1939, the day Italian troops marched 
into Albania and ended its short independence, would prove them wrong. 
The Italian occupation found the communist movement consistent of only a few 
small groups of young students and intellectuals, mainly in urban areas, who did 
little, and little could do, to become a complete and fully-functional political 
organization. Moreover, due to their limited number, they lacked capacities to create 
a strong field of work to convey their ideas to the peasantry, which at the time 
constituted the most part of the population. To this lack of organization had 
contributed also the monarchic regime and its persecution of the communists, 
pushing many into self-imposed exile. Some, such as Mehmet Shehu, who later 
became Hoxha’s lieutenant and Albania’s prime minister, went to fight for the 
republican cause in the Spanish Civil War. 6  Despite these issues, the Italian 
occupation, and the Second World War, resulted in an historic chance for the 
communist groups to merge into an organized political party. During the war, both 
the British and Americans had sent military emissaries to assist local rebellion in 
their efforts against Fascist and Nazi occupation. 7  They all reported that the 
communists, with their partisan units, were the most active in their struggle against 
the invaders. The war created the ideal conditions for the communists to expand both 
their illegal activities in the country, and the base of their supporters. In the 
meantime, the conflict gave them the opportunity to crush all of their rival groups, 
mainly the nationalists grouped under the National Front. However, not until late 
1943 did the Communist Party emerge on the national stage as a main protagonist in 
Albanian politics – and fierce opponent of foreign occupation – as not until late 
1943, after the fall of Mussolini, was the Italian occupation replaced by the much 
harsher German Nazi invasion. 
                                                            
6 Mehmet Shehu, prime minister of Albania for 27 years and second in command after Enver Hoxha 
in the regime’s hierarchy, he died in disgrace in December 1981 committing suicide. 
7  Peter Lucas, The OSS in World War II Albania: Covert Operations and Collaboration with 
Communist Partisans, (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2007); Bernd Jürgen 
Fischer, Albania at War, 1939-1945; Reginald Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle: The 
Bitter Victory, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991); Julian Amery, Sons of the Eagle. A Study in 
Guerrilla War, (London: Macmillan, 1948). Hibbert and Lucas, who both were sent to Albania during 
the war, offer insights highlighting how the partisans were effective to fight against the invaders, 
while the National Front collaborated at times with the Nazis against the partisans. Amery instead had 
great admiration for the deposed King of Albania, Ahmet Zogu, whom he called ‘the most wise 
person ever met’, but recognized that the biggest effort against Nazi occupation were made by 
communist partisans, not Zogu’s followers. 
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The Founding of the Communist Party in Albania 
The history regarding the founding and the emergence of the Communist Party is still 
subject to disputes in Albania, especially regarding Yugoslavian role therein. 
Regarding the founding of the Communist Party, ‘there is nothing to show that he 
[Communist Leader Enver Hoxha] was one of the organizers’;8 yet his emergence to 
its leadership was most likely due to Yugoslavian support. Some historians have 
argued that the Communist Party of Albania became powerful only after strong 
assistance from Tito, the Yugoslavian communist leader. Tito’s interest was in 
preventing the emergence of a communist leadership in Albania that would demand 
the handover of Kosova (Albanian inhabited territory left under Yugoslavian 
sovereignty) to Albania after the war. This hypothesis is reinforced by the fact that 
many prominent communist leaders – and proponents of a post-war united Albania, 
inclusive of the Albanian territories then under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, today 
Kosova and parts of Macedonia (FYROM) – died under unclear circumstances 
during the war. Others still were purged by Hoxha once he consolidated power 
towards the end of the war. In fact, the initial aim of the communist groups in 
Albania was to liberate the country and rectify historical mistakes imposed by the 
great powers in 1913. They wanted a united Albania, including Kosova. Hoxha 
instead, few historians argue, left the Kosova issue in silence, reinforcing the 
allegations that he had been a Yugoslavian investment within the Albanian 
communist movement.9 If this was the case however, Yugoslavia soon discovered 
that Hoxha was much more ambitious and less maneuverable than they had thought.  
                                                            
8 Blendi Fevziu, Enver Hoxha: The Iron Fist of Albania, ed. Robert Elsie, trans. Majlinda Nishku, 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2016), 43. According to the author, who brings first hand documents and 
testimonials of key protagonists, Yugoslavia played a crucial role for both the founding of the party 
and the rise of Enver Hoxha to the leadership (pages 37-46). Enver Hoxha was the leader (officially 
the “First Secretary”) of the Communist Party, later called Party of Labor of Albania. He ruled the 
country from 1944 until 11 April, 1985, day of his death; Thomas Schreiber, Enver Hodja: le sultan 
rouge,(Paris: J.C. Lattès, 1994). The author focuses more on Hoxha’s life during his long stay in 
France in the 1930s and also on his trips to Moscow and relations with other countries. He, however, 
did not have access to the primary sources Fevziu had instead. 
9 Ana Lalaj, Dosjet e Luftës [War Files], (Tirana: Toena, 2014). She is one of the main historians that 
has broken some taboos regarding Albanian narrative of the anti-fascist resistance. During my talk 
with her, she confirmed her view that the coming of the communist regime was in part due to strong 
Yugoslavian support. In addition, she considers the last phases of the resistance to the Nazi occupation 
as a sort of civil war between communists and other factions, in particular nationalists of the National 
Front; Paskal Milo, Shiptarët Në Luftën e Dytë Botërore. Vëll. I. 1939-1943 [The Albanians in the 
Second World War. Vol. I. 1939-1943, (Tirana: Toena, 2014). The author affirms that is difficult to 
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At the end of the war, because of the communist efforts against Fascist and Nazi 
occupation, Albania sat on the winners’ side at the Paris Peace Conference after the 
Second World War. There, Albania met strong opposition, and even calls for 
exclusion from the conference, from the Greek government. Since the Italian attack 
on Greece in October 1940 had been launched through Greece’s northern borders 
with Albania, the Greek government had proclaimed a state of war with both Italy 
and Albania. After the war, Greece attempted to put Albania in the same ranks with 
Italy, and tried unsuccessfully to undermine Albania’s claim of being a victim of the 
war. Eventually, the Greek declaration of war was removed only towards Italy, and 
never towards Albania, paradoxically being officially in force still today.  
During the negotiations among the three big powers about the post war 
arrangements in Europe, Albania was at margins of the talks and was left as an open 
issue until the end of the war.10 Stalin had agreed to give Churchill free reign in 
Greece and accept 50/50 control over Yugoslavia. They both agreed to an 
independent Albania, but left open the issue of the borders. Perhaps this was due to 
the divergences between the United States and Britain regarding post war Albania; 
where Churchill backed Greek territorial claims, the United States supported 
Albanian pre-war borders.11 And so, Albania’s post war future was ultimately left 
largely to chance. At the beginning of 1946 the Communist Party called a constituent 
assembly and proclaimed Albania a Popular Republic. Since 1945 Hoxha had 
maintained close relations with Yugoslavia. Because of his ideological bent, Hoxha 
was persuaded to rely on Yugoslavia for economic recovery and, most importantly, 
for defensive arrangements towards eventual Greek threats from the south. Hoxha 
knew that Britain would support the Greeks, but he lacked the experience, as 
historian Ethem Çeku puts it, ‘to understand that the United States instead differed 
from the British stand towards Albania’.12 
                                                                                                                                                                             
write the history of the first acts of the founding of the Communist Party of Albania, as the main 
protagonists either did not survive the war or did not survive the regime. However, he affirms that the 
truth most likely is different from the narrative offered by the regime according to which Enver Hoxha 
was the main protagonist of the war against Nazism and Fascism. 
10 James L. Gormly, From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big Three Diplomacy, 1945-1947, (Wilmington, 
Del: SR Books, 1990). 
11 Ethem Çeku, Kosovo and Diplomacy since World War II: Yugoslavia, Albania and the Path to 
Kosovan Independence, trans. John Nash, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2016), 7-12. 
12 Çeku, Kosovo and Diplomacy since World War II, 24–29. 
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Stalin and the End of the Yugoslavian Influence in Albania 
In July 1947, Enver Hoxha visited Moscow where he met for the first time with 
Stalin.13 Hoxha was very anxious to meet the father of the nations, and had great 
expectations regarding the course his country would take. In fact, that same summer 
the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia had encountered a series of difficulties 
and Hoxha looked to Moscow to help find a way out. In the Albanian leadership, 
great concern had been raised over the Yugoslavian attitude towards Albania; 
concerns primarily about the use of the economic resources and the lack of 
Yugoslavian commitment to implement the investments it had promised.14 Yet the 
greater cause of tension was the national sense of resentment. One of the main 
opponents of the ever-strong cooperation with Yugoslavia was Nako Spiro, in charge 
of the supervision of the economic affairs. He was the only outspoken Politburo 
member to state openly that Belgrade’s intentions towards Tirana were not friendly.15 
Keeping to economic affairs, he suggested that without necessarily breaking 
economic ties with Belgrade, the Soviet Union, instead, be the nation with which 
relations must increase. Tito’s plans were to unite Albania with Yugoslavia as a first 
step towards a Balkan Federation that would possibly also include Bulgaria.16 In this 
                                                            
13 Enver Hoxha, Me Stalinin [With Stalin], (Tirana: 8 Nëntori, 1979). The meeting happened on 16 
July, 1947, the second instead was on 23 March 1949. On Stalin see Sarah Davies and James R. 
Harris, eds., Stalin: A New History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Miklós Kun, 
Stalin: An Unknown Portrait, (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2003); 
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context, in July 1946, Albania and Yugoslavia had signed the Treaty of Friendship 
and Mutual Assistance which was the first step towards their full integration.17 
However, Yugoslavian-Albanian relations soon escalated into disagreements 
over economic cooperation, as the agreements signed were not fulfilled by 
Yugoslavia. In this way, discontent emerged within the Albanian communists, as the 
country, rather than recovering, was further impoverished.18 Within the Albanian 
leadership the pro-Yugoslavian man was Koçi Xoxe, an almost illiterate individual 
who had become minister of security for his blind execution of the orders of his boss 
Enver Hoxha.19 Even Spiro feared Xoxe, who had been merciless in the execution of 
the political opponents, or suspected opponents, after seizing political power. Xoxe 
strongly supported the discussed union of Albania with Yugoslavia. In May 1947, 
when Hoxha informed the Politburo of the Yugoslavian request to deploy military 
troops in Albania, to defend it from possible attack from Greece, where a bloody 
civil war was ongoing, Xoxe reinforced Belgrade’s request with information that 
‘…the monarch-fascist Greeks have accumulated troops at the border with us, and in 
order to encircle the [Greek] partisans, they will cross the Albanian border’.20 Hoxha 
did not answer to the Yugoslavian requests, preferring to procrastinate on the issue 
until his visit to Moscow in July 1947. But when Yugoslavia’s leadership was 
informed of Hoxha’s trip to Moscow they promptly reacted by trying to prevent any 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union by instigating a clash within the leadership in 
Tirana, with the conviction that the pro-Belgrade faction would prevail. In fact, after 
some meetings with Nako Spiro, and one with Koçi Xoxe, the Yugoslavians 
managed to inflect the economic problems of Albania with a political color, and soon 
began to criticize Albanian leadership for its irresolute decisions, or lack of decisions 
altogether. Tito’s man in Tirana, Savo Slatiç, referred to the ‘emergence of another 
line’ within the Albanian communist party, reinforced by Xoxe in the meeting of the 
Politburo when he stated that ‘in practice a line of suspicion [towards Yugoslavia] is 
                                                            
17 Çeku, Kosovo and Diplomacy since World War II, 24–28. 
18 Ibid., 34. 
19 Fevziu, Enver Hoxha: The Iron Fist of Albania, 103–115 & 127–142. 
20  “Records of the Politburo, 29 May 1947”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1947, D17, f.1; For the 
Yugoslavian, and in part, Albanian support to the communist party in the Greek civil war see Nikos 
Marantzidis, “The Greek Civil War (1944-1949) and the International Communist System”, Journal 
of Cold War Studies, Vol. 15, no. 4 (2013): 25–54. 
24 
crystallized within our party’ clearly alluding to Spiro and to factions within the 
leadership against Belgrade. During the discussion in the Politburo meeting of July 
1947, Spiro reacted by criticizing the submissive behavior of Tirana and suggesting 
that Albania would soon be relegated as Yugoslavia’s satellite. Apparently the Soviet 
diplomats in Tirana backed Spiro, who was seen going back and forth to the Soviet 
embassy. This emerges from the Politburo records where among others, he reported 
that even ‘Soviet engineers said that Yugoslavians are wrong in their stand towards 
you [Albanians]’. 21  Other prominent members of the Politburo supported Spiro, 
expressing their criticism for the interference of Yugoslavia. But Hoxha would not 
take any side yet, perhaps waiting to hear the voice of Moscow during his planned 
trip in mid-July 1947. 
During Hoxha’s trip to the Soviet Union, Moscow’s stand was ambiguous. 
Economically the Soviets showed readiness to assist Albania, and granted an initial 
loan of six million dollars. In addition, they agreed to provide technical and academic 
education to dozens (later becoming thousands) of Albanian experts in industry and 
the military. They agreed also to send more Soviet specialists to Albania together 
with more equipment for the manufacturing and the building of light industry, related 
to the production of consumer goods.22  Stalin is even reported to have been so 
impressed by the Albanian request for the high number of Soviet experts to have 
wondered if ‘the Albanians will work at all?’23 If this seemed to envisage a new 
perspective for Albania’s economic development, on the other hand, Soviets made 
clear that although ‘your relations with us [Soviets] are good, our assistance for you 
will pass through Yugoslavia, it is with them you will have to deal’.24 Therefore for 
Hoxha it was clear that the way to Moscow would pass via Belgrade. From Albanian 
sources it is not clear if the Soviets informed Belgrade of the talks with Hoxha in 
Moscow, but they thought Stalin would not oppose their plan towards Albania. 
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Almost one year later Stalin is even reported to have wished the ‘swallowing of 
Albania’ by Yugoslavia.25 Back in Tirana, Tito pressed Hoxha to limit any possible 
reticence and remove obstacles to the further integration with Belgrade. On this point 
Hoxha and Xoxe met many times with Slatiç, Yugoslavian emissary in Tirana, in 
November 1947.26 
Afterwards, Hoxha called the meeting of the Politburo. The meeting, which went 
on for three days, 18-20 November 1947, resulted in a dramatic moment in the 
history of the Albanian Communist Party. Hoxha led the Politburo in a positive turn 
towards Yugoslavia and called on Spiro to speak on his motivations against 
Belgrade. Spiro had been establishing a favored channel of contacts with the Soviet 
diplomats in Tirana who were sympathetic to him, but the decision for Albania to 
strengthen relations with Yugoslavia was to be made at the highest level: in Moscow, 
not the Soviet embassy in Tirana. Spiro requested five days of preparations, perhaps 
looking for a signal from the Soviet embassy, but Hoxha gave him twenty-four 
hours. In the Politburo even those who had backed Spiro earlier, now supported the 
pro-Yugoslavian faction. Under great pressure and feeling abandoned, Spiro 
committed suicide on 20 November 1947.27 
Having removed the most serious opponent to the Yugoslavian plan for union 
with Albania, Tito’s representative in Tirana had a series of meetings with Enver 
Hoxha and Koçi Xoxe. Yugoslavia pressed Albania to move forward ‘towards the 
union in a federation’, because, as they claimed, Albania would not survive without 
external assistance.28  To prevent a close up with the Soviet Union, Slatiç asked 
Albania to avoid ‘the implementation of Soviet projects in Albania that are not part 
of the common economic plans [with Yugoslavia]… Nako Spiro has taken 
advantages in the past of Soviet advices’.29 By mid-December 1947, following the 
events in Tirana, Hoxha paid a visit to Belgrade on his way to Bulgaria. He spoke 
with Tito who mentioned the idea of a federative economy between Yugoslavia and 
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Albania. Then would follow the political union, which would eventually include 
Bulgaria as well. Hoxha basically seemed to agree with Tito, but when he visited 
Bulgaria, to his surprise, in Sofia he did not find the same readiness to join in a 
Balkan Federation. On the contrary, Bulgarian leaders seem to have suggested to 
Hoxha that they wanted closer relations with Soviet Union instead.30 
Events took a turn when an alarming report was delivered to Hoxha by a general 
of the Yugoslavian army, whose name in the documents is deleted. He reported of an 
imminent Greek attack on Albania. To face the possible attack, Tito sent a message 
to Hoxha asking to deploy two military divisions in Southeast Albania, to which 
Hoxha initially agreed.31 Regarding this issue, some years ago Svetozar Rajak has 
stated that ‘Tito’s alleged unauthorized deployment of two Yugoslav divisions to 
Albania was nothing more than Belgrade’s willingness to consider Albania’s request 
for military assistance’. 32  Unfortunately Rajak brings no evidence to prove this 
statement, whereas Albanian documents, (here above mentioned, but also others 
more) show that Albania never requested such assistance. On the contrary, it was 
precisely because of Belgrade’s request to deploy two military divisions in Albania 
that Hoxha was suspicious of the alarmistic information given by the Yugoslavians, 
and decided to inform also the Soviet diplomats in Tirana. To his surprise, the 
Soviets replied that they had no information of such Greek plans, nor had they been 
informed by Yugoslavia of this move. Hoxha decided to put the Yugoslavs on hold 
and intensified his contact with the Soviets.33 In February 1948, Stalin met with 
Yugoslavian leaders (not Tito) and attacked Belgrade’s foreign policy bringing as an 
example their actions towards Albania. So followed months of reciprocal accusations 
between Belgrade and Moscow, which at the end of June 1948 resulted in the 
expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform.34 Tito’s split with Moscow made Hoxha’s 
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decisions easier and finally in July 1948 Albania interrupted the relations with 
Yugoslavia.35 
According to Ivo Banac, the main reason behind Moscow’s split with Belgrade 
‘was Stalin’s fear that Yugoslavia was beginning to see itself as a regional 
communist center, with all the possibilities for mischief in relations with the West 
that such a role implied’. 36  This view is reinforced by Soviet archives which 
‘…indicate that the main reason for the conflict was Stalin’s dismay when Tito 
continued to pursue an expansionist foreign policy agenda towards Yugoslavia’s 
neighbors, especially Albania…’.37 Regardless the real motivations, Tito and Stalin’s 
falling out provided an opportunity for Stalin to establish a stronger position in the 
Balkans by making Albania the only Soviet bridgehead in the Adriatic coast. This 
was a departure, in Stalin’s favor, from his informal agreement with Churchill to 
concede partial control of the western Balkans. Stalin saw the Yugoslavian-Albanian 
split as an opportunity to thwart Tito’s ambitions and plan for a Balkan Federation, 
and stood on Tirana’s side to prevent the possible annexation of Albania by 
Yugoslavia. This made Stalin an idol and point of reference for Hoxha for the next 
forty years; and it made Stalinism the non-negotiable model of communism for 
Albania. Another way to see the Soviet-Yugoslavian split is that Stalin might have 
used Hoxha and Albania to outmaneuver Tito once he lost control of Yugoslavia, 
provided that he ever had it fully. This hypothesis, however, remains to be proved. 
The fact remains that Albania became the Soviet Union’s bridgehead in the 
Southeastern European flank. In turn Soviets provided Albania with political, 
military, and economic support.  
 Once out of the Yugoslavian yoke, Albania became the strongest ideological 
opponent of Tito and a fierce bridgehead of Stalinism in the Balkans. Following the 
Tirana-Belgrade split, Hoxha purged Koçi Xoxe – who was shot later – and 
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rehabilitated ex post Nako Spiro. A huge campaign was launched in the country to 
denounce the “revisionist” policies of Yugoslavia. Unlike in any other European 
communist country, in Albania, Stalin was cherished and celebrated as much as in 
the Soviet Union, if not more. Enver Hoxha, more than any other leader, was 
personally dedicated to promoting of Stalin’s cult. For him, love for the Soviet Union 
became a guiding principle of the Albanian people; Stalin represented a great leader, 
‘the genius38 … a milestone in the entire people’s [Albanians’] life and future’.39 
Hoxha co-opted Stalin’s policy towards Yugoslavia purely to legitimize his own 
policies, because he probably knew well that Stalin may not have even truly cared 
about Albania, let alone been the one to save it. Nonetheless, this furthered the split 
between Stalin and Tito, and furthered Stalin’s ambition to maintain Soviet influence 
in the Balkans.40 
 
CONTACTS WITH CHINA AND A NEW LEADER IN MOSCOW 
The further re-alignment towards Moscow forced Hoxha to pay more attention to 
international affairs. There is no evidence of any contact between Chinese 
communist officials and Albanian authorities prior to October 1949. Even after this 
date, Tirana’s contacts with Beijing were only through Moscow. Immediately after 
the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a note dating October 1st 
1949 from Zhou Enlai was sent through Moscow to all European communist 
countries inviting them to recognize the PRC. But, with the explanation that Moscow 
received it late from Beijing, it was delivered to Albania only in January 1950.41 
Albania recognized the PRC before receiving the letter, though it was the last of the 
eastern European countries to do so, in November 1949.42 It is not clear why this 
happened; there may be no specific reason beyond the fact that, in that period, not 
                                                            
38 Tirana, 30 October 1952: “Report of Enver Hoxha on his participation at the works of the 19th 
Congress of the CPSU”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1952, D25, f.2. 
39 “Report of Enver Hoxha at the Second Plenum of the PLA First Congress, 28-30 April 1949”, in 
AQSH, F.14, OU, D1, f.5. 
40 Charles G. Stefan, “The Emergence of the Soviet-Yugoslav Break. A personal View from the 
Belgrade Embassy”, Diplomatic History, 6, (1982): 387-404; Halperin, The Triumphant Heretic. 
Tito’s Struggle Against Stalin. 
41 “Report of the Albanian Legation in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tirana, 6 January 
1950”, in AMPJ, Kina, V. 1949, D51, f.1-4. 
42 Records of the Politburo, 15 November 1949, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1949, D63. 
29 
many issues regarding Asia were high on Albania’s agenda. Tirana did not have 
diplomatic missions in any Asian countries, and clearly China was not a priority yet. 
So, in a few words, this delay perhaps was simply due to neglect, which nonetheless 
raised many discussions in the diplomatic circles in Moscow.43 The fact that not until 
1954 did the two countries establish diplomatic missions in their respective capitals 
shows how far away China, and Asia in general, remained from the attention of 
Tirana.  
In April 1951 Enver Hoxha visited Moscow again. By this year, a number of 
loan agreements, (barter agreements), were signed between the Soviet Union and a 
number of East European countries in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(COMECON), which Albania had joined in February 1949. These agreements, which 
would fund the first Albanian five-year plan (FYP) from 1951-55, totaled 254 
million rubles. The lion’s share was the Soviet Union’s grant of 83 million rubles, 
followed by Poland’s 46 million, Czechoslovakia’s 55 million, the German 
Democratic Republic’s (GDR) 50 million, and Romania’s 20 million.44 The most 
important conditions of these agreements were the obligations they imposed on 
Albania. Some countries, East Germany and Czechoslovakia specifically, put clauses 
in the agreements which had penalties in case Albania did not meet quotas of exports 
of raw materials as part of the barter agreements. Another aspect was their focus on 
the investments in consumer goods and light industry in general and the refusal to 
invest in the Albanian plans of developing heavy industry.45 In addition to these 
investments, Albania needed specialists, which began to arrive en masse. 
Interestingly, the Soviet Union and the other East European countries asked Albania 
to ‘treat them [the specialists] with other criteria [than the locals]: the best wages for 
them and their families, and the best living standards’.46 All this shows that despite 
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the public narrative of brotherhood, none of the eastern European countries, nor 
Soviet Union, were sensitive to Albania’s situation.  
Enver Hoxha, in order to build a base from which to legitimize his policies 
created a myth around Stalin, portraying him as the savior of Albanian independence. 
He knew that Stalin did not know anything of Albania before 1948. In fact, it had not 
been a Soviet mirage but a historical coincidence that Albania became an ally of the 
Soviet Union. Nonetheless, he could all but have expected the turn Khrushchev gave 
to Stalinism in the Soviet Union and East Europe.47 The destalinization process and 
Albania’s close up with China are two inseparable processes precisely because the 
latter hardly would have occurred without the first. It is with the destalinization and 
the Hungarian upheaval that followed that the Chinese and Albanian vicissitudes 
came to overlap enough to make possible the collaboration which eventually resulted 
in an alliance.  
When Stalin died in March 1953, Hoxha called for national mourning such that 
Albania would not see again until Hoxha’s own funeral more than three decades 
later. On 9 March 1953, the day Moscow was holding Stalin’s funeral, in Tirana, 
Hoxha together with thousands of citizens in a public ceremony bowed in front of 
Stalin’s statue and made the oath to follow Stalin’s line.48 This would perhaps be the 
promise he most faithfully kept until the day of his death.49 Soon after, in June 1953, 
Enver Hoxha, together with a lengthy entourage, paid a visit to Moscow, but did not 
meet with Nikita Khrushchev who had not yet risen to leadership.50 Hoxha’s visit 
was preceded by a report courtesy of the economic adviser of the Albanian embassy 
in Moscow, who wrote of the difficulties they had encountered regarding the trade 
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agreement for that year. 51  Despite the fact that Hoxha’s main interlocutors in 
Moscow were still the old guard of the Kremlin, Beria, and Molotov, there was a 
new attitude in Moscow. Both of them strongly criticized Albania’s economic 
course: they mainly opposed Albanian state apparatus inflation, neglect of agriculture 
in favor of heavy industrialization, and the situation of the peasantry. This criticism 
was understandable in the context of the East German turmoil that year, with the 
workers’ strikes demanding better living standards.52 But a similar critique had been 
applied to Hoxha, by Stalin himself, in 1951 when he had sought to ‘devote serious 
attention to the industry, but insufficient attention to agriculture. Soviet institutions in 
charge of agricultural issues almost never receive any request from Albania 
regarding agriculture’.53 In addition, for Moscow, economically it did not make sense 
to invest disproportionally in a country of around one and a half million people, 
when Soviet attention was focused on assisting countries strategically more 
important for Moscow. Furthermore, they told Hoxha that one third of the army was 
composed of enemies, which was a sign that the party ‘was not in the right course’.54 
Basically Soviet leaders were asking Hoxha to purge the army of the old [Stalinist] 
elements. Most importantly, to Hoxha’s surprise Molotov suggested ‘a revision of 
your relations with [neighbors] … and Yugoslavia’, because Soviet Union would 
improve them too.55 If Stalin had come to Hoxha’s aid in his dispute with Tito, now 
Molotov asked Hoxha to make a complete reversal of his foreign policy. Hoxha did 
not oppose in principle, but he was surprised and did not take any concrete steps to 
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enforce Soviet directives. He could not easily accept a rapprochement with Tito, so 
he awaited new leadership in Moscow with the hope it would bring better times. A 
hope that soon fell in vain.  
In fact, ‘Khrushchev wanted Yugoslavia to integrate itself back into the alliance 
which the Soviet Union had built with other eastern European countries’.56 At the 
end of May 1955, Khrushchev visited Belgrade and blamed the past mistakes of the 
Soviet Union, thus excusing Tito, for the Soviet-Yugoslav split. Albanian leaders, in 
a meeting with Peng Zhen in Tirana a few years later, claimed to have sent a letter to 
Khrushchev just before his departure for Belgrade, requesting that before his trip to 
meet Tito, ‘it should first be discussed Yugoslavian position with all the parties’ 
including, of course, Albania.57 If this letter really was sent then in hindsight it is 
possible to say it was ignored. This did not have immediate repercussions in Soviet-
Albanian relations, as Albania did join the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) that 
same year, but the new Soviet course in eastern Europe and the Balkans was clear. 
Curiously, the WPO was founded just days after the Soviet disarmament proposal – 
the proposal was issued on 10 May 1955, and four days later the WPO was 
founded.58 
 
China’s Approach to Albania 
In September 1954, China invited an Albanian delegation to Beijing to participate in 
the celebrations of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the PRC. The small 
delegation headed by the Albanian minister of foreign affairs, Behar Shtylla, who 
later served as Ambassador in Beijing, did not have great expectations since the visit 
was intended to be merely for formalities. Instead, unexpectedly, they were 
impressed by the ‘particular regards’ China showed for them. After the celebrations, 
just when Shtylla was about to leave, Zhou Enlai called him for a short informal 
conversation and asked him about the economic situation. Chinese leaders ‘had 
already discussed about Albania earlier’, and probably they knew the shortages of 
consumer goods for the population. China most likely was informed, although not by 
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Albania, about the attrition between Tirana and Moscow. Zhou Enlai, to the surprise 
of the Albanian minister, asked him ‘what are your main urgent [economic] requests 
to make’ as China felt obligated, Zhou said, to help a communist country.59 Although 
the Chinese move was a way to engage more with Albania, at this stage this step did 
not harm Albania’s relations with Soviet Union. China too was enjoying a 
‘honeymoon’ with Moscow, which would endure until 1956-57.60 Albania was not 
yet thinking of China as a replacement for the Soviet Union, but perhaps a 
complementary source of aid for projects the Soviets did not support. China itself 
was benefitting from substantial Soviet economic assistance. While the Albanian 
delegation was in Beijing, Khrushchev expanded Soviet assistance to China further 
than even Stalin had done.61 After all, China’s readiness to meet Albania’s still 
modest requests was within the global readiness China was beginning to show 
towards many other countries.62 
But in light of the mutating situation with the Soviet Union, Shtylla immediately 
took the chance and asked Zhou Enlai, to whom he did not explain the difficult talks 
Hoxha had had with Beria and Molotov in Moscow, if they could possibly provide 
assistance for the coming second FYP of 1955-60. Zhou Enlai confirmed without any 
hesitation China’s readiness ‘to help… for the FYP as well’.63 By mid-November 
1954, the Politburo in Tirana made a request for a loan of 50 million rubles.64 
                                                            
59 “Report of the minister of foreign affairs, Behar Shtylla, at the Politburo in Tirana, 03 November 
1954, about his visit to China on occasion of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the PRC”, in, 
AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1954, D39, f.11-14. The minister reported that “the entire leadership, except 
Mao, came to meet us at the train station, something they had not done for other eastern European 
delegations”. 
60 Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959: A New History, 
The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 101–131. The 
authors call the two years from 1954 to early 1956 the ‘honeymoon’ of the alliance because were the 
most cooperative among the two countries. 
61 Shu Guang Zhang, Beijing's Economic Statecraft during the Cold War, 1949-1991, (Washington, 
D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2014), 59–71; Shu Guang Zhang, “Sino-Soviet Economic 
Cooperation”, in Odd Arne Westad, Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 
1945-1963, (Stanford University Press, 1998), 189–226; Sergei Goncharenko, “Sino-Soviet Military 
Cooperation”, in ibid., 141–164. 
62 John Franklin Copper, China’s Foreign Aid: An Instrument of Peking's Foreign Policy, (Lexington, 
Mass: Heath, 1976), 19–40; Shu Guang Zhang, Economic Cold War: America's Embargo against 
China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1963, (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2001), 
153–156; Zhang, Beijing’s Economic Statecraft during the Cold War, 1949-1991, 97–121. 
63 AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1954, D39, f.14. 
64 “Reports, decisions and records of the Politburo, 13 November 1954: On the request of a loan from 
the PRC”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1954, D40, f.69 & f.99; “Politburo, Tirana, 13 November 1954: 
34 
Following the visit of Behar Shtylla, the first agreement between China and Albania 
regarding the trade between the two countries was signed.65 The first aid China 
provided, however, was a collection of basic goods that came as a donation, not part 
of the loan.66 It was the first in a long list of donations China would offer during the 
two decades to follow. Chinese signals were reinforced again in 1955 when Deng 
Xiaoping reported to Hoxha that he had criticized the Yugoslavian ideological course 
during the conversation with two members of the Yugoslavian leadership.67 This step 
was in a direction opposite that which the Soviet Union was taking. Furthermore, in 
July 1956 China granted an additional loan of 30 million rubles to Albania, for an 80 
million rubles sum of Chinese aid for the second Albanian FYP.68 
 
1956 AND ITS AFTERMATH: LEANING ON CHINA’S SIDE 
In early 1956 Enver Hoxha visited Moscow again, this time to participate in the 
works of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) in 
February 1956 – a turning point in the history of the communist camp.69 To his 
dismay, there he heard the famous speech delivered in secret, in which Khrushchev 
revealed Stalin to have been a criminal who had caused tremendous suffering to his 
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people over the long years of his regime. 70  Curiously it was Beria – a known 
contributor of Stalin’s purges – who led the first investigations into Stalin’s actions 
and whose conclusions were eventually reflected in Khrushchev’s speech.71 It is not 
clear if Hoxha adopted what he had read and heard of Stalin’s rule as a guideline for 
his rule in Albania, or was shocked as many in attendance were.72 Yet he did not 
comment on the report, he merely informed the communist establishment in Albania 
of its content while prohibiting any press releases or discussion with the people.73 
During the congress Khrushchev outlined Moscow’s new line on international 
relations which was comprised of three notions: peaceful coexistence, peaceful 
transition, and peaceful competition.74 On the relations within the socialist camp, 
Khrushchev stated that ‘the rift with Yugoslavia had been an unnecessary and 
shameful mistake’.75 Hoxha also heard Khrushchev advocating multiple (national) 
ways of transitioning to socialism, an authorization to undertake reformistic paths 
which Hoxha, preferring Stalin’s manners instead, would avoid.76 To the further 
denunciation of Stalin, in April, Khrushchev disbanded the Cominform, less than ten 
years after Stalin had founded it.  
Not long after Hoxha’s return from Moscow, in Tirana in April 1956, came the 
local party conference. Inspired by the events in the Soviet Union, and the speech of 
Khrushchev in particular, the conference turned into open criticism of Hoxha’s 
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totalitarianism, with many participants asking Hoxha to cease his repressive 
measures and reduce the gap in the living standards between the leadership and the 
people.77 Hoxha, for the last time in his long rule, allowed the emergence of critical 
voices; later, he purged all those that had so criticized him. Frightened by the 
prospective of losing control, Hoxha had some executed and others detained for 
many years. Personally, he still avoided giving any assessment of Stalin or of 
Khrushchev’s speech. However, he did not conceal his suspicion that behind the 
transgressions at Tirana’s party conference was Yugoslavia. Hoxha was among the 
first eastern European leaders to face an internal challenge to the Stalinist-style rule 
after Khrushchev’s speech, but also the first and the last to react by strongly 
reaffirming it.78 
At first, Chinese leaders did not entirely dispute Khrushchev’s evaluation of 
Stalin and his cult. 79  What they eventually disputed was the way Khrushchev 
delivered it.80 Even years later, Soviets held that the Twentieth CPSU Congress ‘was 
of exceptionally great importance for the further improvement of Soviet-Chinese 
relations. It created an atmosphere of… amicable exchanges of candid views’.81 
Perhaps too candid, as on 5 April 1956, Renmin Ribao published the article ‘More on 
the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat’, which was personally 
supervised by Mao and marked a veiled departure from the Soviet Union regarding 
Stalin’s position. As Roderick MacFarquhar has argued, the article defended Mao, 
without explicitly mentioning him, on the one hand, with the argument that he had 
not pursued his cult, and on the other hand reappraised Stalin ‘by assigning him 
credit for achievements which entitled him still to be described as “an outstanding 
Marxist-Leninist fighter” [although] acknowledging that he had committed a number 
of major errors’.82 For MacFarquhar communists may have looked at the article as a 
‘first attempt at establishing Peking as a fount of doctrinal guidance on at least an 
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equal footing with Moscow’.83 A similar point is also affirmed recently in the work 
of Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia. Although they see the Chinese reaction to the issues 
that emerged during the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU as contradictory, to them it 
is clear that, for Mao at least, the doctrine of peaceful transition to communism was 
hard to digest.84 In fact they have argued how ‘the CCP felt that violent revolution to 
gain political power was a proud example of CCP’s emulation of the Russian 
October Revolution and CCP’s contribution to the world revolutionary process’.85 
Regarding the peaceful coexistence however, Chinese foreign policy was already 
acting based on its own ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, which had been 
announced in 1954.86 Later on, as Chen Jian has argued, ‘With the radicalization of 
China’s political and social life in 1957-58… he [Mao] had no intention in opposing 
personality cult in general and his own in particular’.87 For Benjamin Schwartz, ‘the 
entire previous history of Marxism-Leninism, from Lenin to Mao, had somehow 
demanded the creation of space for the notion of transcendent leader, and for the cult 
of personality’.88 In Mao’s eyes was also correct Stalin’s model of development 
based on heavy industrialization, and for the former, the mistakes of the latter were 
limited to methods rather than the model. 89  Thus China came to reconsider 
destalinization in the light of a new assessment of Stalin which concluded that 
Stalin’s merits overshadowed his mistakes.90 
Hoxha visited Moscow again in May-June 1956. By now, Khrushchev knew 
Hoxha’s sensitivity towards Yugoslavia and to show fairness between Tirana and 
Belgrade he accepted Hoxha’s invitation to visit Albania three years later. More 
importantly, he summoned Hoxha to inform him of the talks he had had with Tito in 
Moscow. Khrushchev’s standing apparently was contradictory. On one hand, he 
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claimed to have blamed Tito for not being cooperative with Albania. Khrushchev had 
reminded Tito that ‘…you have turned the Yugoslav Legation in Tirana into an 
espionage center against Albania… your agents organized the Conference of Tirana 
to overthrow the leadership’.91 On the other hand, Khrushchev was critical of Hoxha 
too. He asked Hoxha ‘to put an end to the past [with Yugoslavia]’ and seek 
reconciliation.92 Hoxha agreed out of necessity rather than conviction, but did not 
take concrete actions towards that end. This was the second time the Soviet leaders 
urged Hoxha to improve relations with Yugoslavia. 
In September 1956, when China invited a delegation from Albania to attend the 
CCP Eighth Congress, Hoxha decided to pay his first (and last) visit to China. This 
was clearly intended to show that Albania prioritized increasing collaboration with 
Beijing. The visit came after China had not shown particular enthusiasm about 
Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin; this was not lost on Albanian leaders, who 
were well informed of, and themselves read, articles in the Chinese press. On the 
way to Beijing Hoxha and his entourage also visited North Korea. Hoxha and Kim Il 
Sung had in common a Stalinist ruling system and rejection of destalinization.93 But 
contrary to Hoxha, Kim eventually managed to find balance between Beijing and 
Moscow. 94  Hoxha was impressed by the Soviet Union’s generosity towards 
Pyongyang when he was told the amounts of economic aid the latter had received 
from all eastern European countries.95 This contrasted with the hesitations of the 
Soviet Union and East Europeans to back Hoxha’s plans of industrialization, which 
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in comparison, he thought to be modest. If for Mikoyan ‘without bread, butter and 
meat there is no socialism’, for Hoxha without industrialization there was no working 
class, and consequently no communist base.96 Due to more than just ideological 
considerations, Hoxha’s plans for industrialization came as a consequence of his 
belief that making use of the rich natural resources he thought Albania possessed 
would have contributed to economic self-reliance. In fact, Hoxha’s plans for heavy 
industrialization were based on the projects that had in-part existed before the war 
and were drafted mainly by Italian engineers who had attempted to conduct careful 
research regarding Albania’s underground resources. Their conclusions were very 
promising.97 
In his speech to the CCP’s congress Hoxha praised ‘China’s emergence in the 
international arena as a big power’.98 In Beijing, Hoxha found great rapport with 
Mao Zedong about international issues of common interest, and had confirmed 
China’s availability to assist Albania, as ‘one hand helping the other’.99 After all, as 
Zhou Enlai said, satisfying Albanian requests was going to be ‘nothing but a very 
small thing’. 100  Significantly, in his meeting with Hoxha, Mao wanted to know 
Hoxha’s opinion on some of the most preoccupying issues for Albania. On the tense 
relations between Albania and Yugoslavia, Mao stated that ‘…it is neither your fault 
nor Yugoslavia’s, the big mistake was made by the Cominform’, clearly alluding to 
the Soviet Union.101 He also asked what the Albanian leader thought of Stalin. Hoxha 
answered in a Chinese way: he appreciated Stalin’s contribution but also admitted 
some minor mistakes. Mao appreciated that Khrushchev’s speech had not been 
published in Albania, in a way marking the difference but also indicating a link 
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between denouncing of Stalin and the first strikes in East Europe.102  Finally he 
endorsed ‘the right course of the [Albanian communist] party’: a statement quite 
different from what Hoxha had been hearing recently from Soviet leaders. Most 
importantly, China’s political endorsement put Hoxha in a stronger position in his 
uneasy situation with Khrushchev. In fact, not long time before Hoxha’s visit in 
Beijing, Khrushchev met with Tito. For Hoxha, China’s support became a card to 
play in the possible case of disagreements with Moscow. This trip definitely laid the 
basis for further intensifying ties between Tirana and Beijing.103 
But in Beijing, in meetings with other delegations from Europe, Hoxha also 
spoke of the complicated situation within the Hungarian leadership. During a 
conversation with Mikhail Suslov, member of the CPSU Presidium, he was told of 
Yugoslavian possible involvement in the situation. Of the Yugoslavian activities of 
espionage complained also the Romanian leader, Gheorghiu-Dej, to whom the events 
in Hungary would later teach a lesson.104 When Hoxha had visited Moscow earlier in 
June 1956 he had stopped one night in Budapest on the way back to Tirana. Received 
by many members of the Hungarian Politburo, he had heard that ‘intellectuals, and 
members of the party want to take possession of the thesis of the Twentieth Congress 
of the CPSU’ and undermine the communist rule. 105  The suggestion was that 
Khrushchev, by denouncing Stalin, had unleashed a spread of reformistic sentiment 
that could potentially cripple the authority of the communist establishments 
throughout East Europe – those same regimes Stalin had imposed and supported. 
Hoxha had seen such sentiments in Tirana. His fear of losing control in this new 
environment was further reinforced when he heard about the workers’ strike in 
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Poznan, Poland.106 This possibility seemed especially real when, in October 1956, 
events in Hungary escalated into a popular uprising against the dictatorship and the 
Soviet Union such that Moscow had to send the army to re-establish the local 
communist party’s control.107 The drama of the events in Hungary reached its peak 
when Imre Nagy, the Hungarian communist leader, once supported by Soviets, 
joined the protesters and announced in early November 1956 the neutrality of his 
country and withdrawal from the WPO.108 This provoked a second Soviet military 
intervention which dismissed Nagy and definitively put an end to the revolution. 
 
The Hungarian Uprising: A Turning Point for the Sino-Albanian Entente 
With the events in Hungary, China passed from being a passive actor to an active 
protagonist in the affairs of East Europe. Later, Mao would blame Khrushchev for 
his attack on Stalin, which, to some, is a reason for the Sino-Soviet split, but at the 
beginning of the events in Poland and Hungary, his standing was not clear. 109 
Initially China’s eagerness for economic and cultural exchanges, which increased 
from 1949 to 1957, pushed Beijing to support Khrushchev’s relaxation and openness 
in East Europe because ‘only after Stalin’s death Sino-East European relations 
intensified’.110 
Actually, China’s relations with the Soviet Union, and Mao’s with Stalin, had 
been controversial, if not tense at times because of Stalin’s hierarchic perception of 
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China as a Soviet appendage, as most visibly manifested in Stalin’s hesitations to 
support China’s intervention in the Korean War.111 As Mercy Kuo has pointed out, 
Stalin’s death allowed China ‘to reach an equal footing with Moscow which raised 
concomitant issues of independence, sovereignty, autonomy… matters which in 
effect emboldened the East European communist leaders, namely Poland and 
Hungary, to contend for the independence of their own country’.112 Scholars have 
also connected the events in Poland and Hungary in 1956 with the Hundred Flowers 
Campaign launched by Mao during that year.113 In fact, during the workers’ strikes in 
Poznan, many in Poland – in particular students and intellectuals in the universities – 
thought that China was on their side, as reported by Chinese ambassador in Warsaw 
Wang Bingnan.114 Although initially Mao called on people to speak out without fear, 
when, in early 1957, this eventually happened, as many scholars have argued, 
China’s Hundred Flowers Campaign was proven to be a well-orchestrated trap by 
Mao to draw out critical voices and then crush them for good.115 In October 1956, 
just before the uprising in Hungary, Mao is even reported to have expressed his 
support for Poland in the possible case of Soviet military intervention. 116  Shen 
Zhihua and Yafeng Xia report how ‘it was rumored that China, Poland and 
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Yugoslavia would form an anti-Soviet united front’.117 However, as argued by Shen 
Zhihua, China played no role in the Polish strikes during summer 1956.118 Poland in 
all cases avoided Soviet military intervention because its leader Wladyslaw Gomulka 
assured Moscow sufficiently that they would not allow any subversion of political 
order. 
In Hungary, however, the course of events went differently. At the beginning of 
the conflict, Chinese leadership lacked clear information about the situation, due 
perhaps to the difficulties in communication between the Chinese ambassador in 
Budapest, Hao Deqing, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing.119 Yet in 
Hungary, Mao clearly saw how political dissent could easily transform into “counter-
revolution”. As Lorenz Lüthi argues, Mao since 1955 ‘had promoted policies similar 
to those of Stalin from a quarter of century before… So Khrushchev’s criticism of 
Stalin’s mistakes was potentially dangerous to Mao… [because] destalinization 
threatened to undercut Mao’s domestic position’.120 Yet it will be the Great Leap 
Forward campaign a few years later to weaken ‘for the first time the Chairman’s 
leadership of the party and state’.121 Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and other Chinese 
leaders were in Moscow, invited by Khrushchev for consultations, when the crisis in 
Budapest erupted. In continuous communication with Beijing, they were first 
instructed by Mao to suggest to Khrushchev the extension of the five principles of 
peaceful coexistence to the interstate relations within the communist camp, thus 
suggesting equality among states and, most importantly, non-interference in internal 
affairs. Only when the situation seemed to escape the local communist party’s 
control were they instructed by Mao to solicit a firm Soviet military intervention in 
order to prevent further instability within the bloc.122 Not long after, a connection 
was posited between Tito and the uprising. Indeed, as Csaba Békés has argued, ‘the 
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Yugoslavian model of non-aligned communism was appealing to many Hungarian 
communists who were seeking reformism within the socialist regime’.123 
Hoxha took this event as a chance to attack Tito and to show the Soviets how 
dangerous Tito was to the communist camp. Moreover, some participants at the 
Tirana communist party conference in April 1956 who had attacked the cult of 
Hoxha, attempted to escape to Yugoslavia.124 For Hoxha, it was becoming clear that 
Khrushchev had wrongly judged the political situation in Hungary, especially in that 
he had permitted Yugoslavian interference. But what Hoxha saw as a Soviet 
recognition of the Yugoslavian way of communism, Khrushchev instead saw it as 
‘…provisional concessions and gestures… to sweet-talk Tito back into the 
communist community, including Yugoslavia’s entry into the WPO’.125 News of 
Tito’s involvement, combined with the lack of official information from Moscow 
alarmed the Albanian leadership. For Hoxha the moment when Tito attempted to 
overthrow him and unite Albania to Yugoslavia in 1948 was still recent. In short, 
Tito and Yugoslavia had become Hoxha’s primary concern. Most importantly, 
Hoxha was trying to use these events to convince the Soviet Union of a step 
backward in the rapprochement with Yugoslavia Khrushchev had promoted. With 
the Belgrade-Moscow axis re-established, Albania’s position was marginalized in the 
Soviet geostrategic policy, and Hoxha’s position vulnerable. 
Only when events in Hungary became internationally known did the Soviet 
ambassador in Tirana meet with Hoxha. The meeting came after Hoxha had been 
personally and publically attacked by Tito as an opponent of reformism and example 
of tyranny: ‘Where are these roots? In the bureaucratic apparatus, in the methods of 
leadership and the so-called one-man rule… in various Enver Hoxhas… who are 
resisting the democratization of the decisions of the 20th Congress and who 
contributed a great deal towards strengthening Stalin's system and who are working 
today to bring it back to life and power – here are the roots which must be 
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corrected’.126 The Soviet ambassador delivered to Hoxha the letters between Moscow 
and Belgrade regarding the events in Hungary. Hoxha reacted angrily to the fact that 
Soviet leaders had not informed him of the crisis in Poland and Hungary until it 
became evident.  
First, Hoxha was reported to have noted to the Soviet ambassador that the 
Soviets did not even criticize Tito’s attack, although Tito was in part responding to 
the attacks Hoxha had made through Pravda in the first place.127 Second, Hoxha was 
surprised that the Soviets had preferred the ascent to leadership of Hungary of János 
Kádár, whom Hoxha had called, in his meeting with the ambassador, a ‘betrayer of 
communism’, because initially Kádár had supported Imre Nagy. 128 From the 
documentation, is not clear if Hoxha knew of the meeting between Khrushchev and 
Tito in the Yugoslav island of Brioni in the night between 1 and 2 November 1956, 
at which the Yugoslavs clearly stated their preference for János Kádár.129 Hoxha 
certainly would have preferred to see the rise of Matyas Rakosi in Budapest, known 
to have been the most Stalinist Hungarian leader.130 The fact that Hoxha accused 
Kádár of ‘collaboration with Yugoslavia and Tito’, means that he was suspicious of 
Tito’s role in his emergence as a leader of Hungary and noted that Albania gave this 
issue maximum priority and concern. Hoxha had already sent word to Moscow 
through the ambassador in Tirana that he suspected of Tito’s involvement in the 
events in Hungary. Therefore he noted to the ambassador that ‘…the CPSU knows 
very well that in addition to the imperialists [West] our party is convinced that Tito 
also is hundred percent involved in the counter-revolution in Hungary. We say this 
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because it is Tito who is defending Nagy’.131 Hoxha was furious of the fact that the 
Soviet Union had completely neglected Albania with regards the events in Hungary. 
He had preferred some consultations between Moscow and Tirana before the 
contacts with Tito. On this point he had to say that ‘Marxism-Leninism does not 
consider the size of a country when it comes to [communist] principles… Thus we 
think we should have been informed of these events, because they are strictly related 
to the very defense of our party. The CPSU knows very well that we accuse Tito of 
interference in our internal affairs and that he wants to overthrow the rule of our 
party’.132 
Hoxha’s concern was that Albania, a full member of the WPO, had been left at 
the margins, its interests towards its neighbor ignored, and the ideological 
legitimation of the regime undermined. Hoxha told Krylov that ‘…we could go 
public and explain to our people this entire situation’, implying an exposure of the 
Soviet position. Hence the message was for Soviet leaders to reconsider Soviet 
relations with Tito in light of the recent events, because otherwise ‘Tito tomorrow 
may act against us with still more force’.133 Hoxha certainly feared for his own 
personal future as leader, but he disguised this as a worry about the ‘compromising 
of the unity of the communist camp’. Therefore, he claimed that for Soviets the best 
to do was to rectify their policies of the last several years.134 Furthermore, from the 
Albanian viewpoint, the recent Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation did not result in any 
better position for the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Tito had been left with more 
room to maneuver, and in Tirana it did not pass unobserved the fact that during both 
meetings between Tito and Khrushchev in May 1955 and June 1956, Tito, as Zoltán 
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Ripp puts it, ‘did not trade concessions in its international position for 
normalization’.135 
The Soviet ambassador, perhaps unaware he would further aggravate the 
situation, asked Hoxha about the fate of Dali Ndreu, a critic of Hoxha who had 
attempted to escape to Yugoslavia but was arrested and later executed. Hoxha noted 
in the Politburo that the fate of a dissident was of no concern to the Soviets. This, 
together with the fact that Ndreu had tried to escape to Yugoslavia, reinforced 
Hoxha’s suspicion that Tito was involved in supporting dissidence during the Tirana 
conference earlier that same year. The ambassador’s remark would be later 
interpreted as proof that Moscow too was behind the Yugoslavia’s supposed attempt 
to challenge Hoxha’s personal position. The rise to power of Kádár in Hungary – a 
Yugoslavian preference – together with the fact that Khrushchev supported him, 
strengthened Hoxha’s fear of a similar scenario playing out in Albania. If the Soviets 
backed the Yugoslavian choice for Hungary’s leadership, what would impede 
Moscow from supporting Tito’s choice for the leadership in Albania if there was a 
chance? Having to do with his own position, Hoxha noted to the Soviet ambassador 
that ‘…the interests of Albanian people require us to defend the unity of our 
party…’. He reinforced that ‘…in this situation we have not acted wrongly… and we 
do not agree with you’.136 For the first time Hoxha did not comply with the Soviet 
course, but openly disagreed with it instead.  
When Mao advocated resolute Soviet military intervention in Hungary, he did 
not realize that China had taken a decisive step towards become the new lighthouse 
for Hoxha, who had begun to see himself as one of the increasingly few opponents of 
destalinization. Hungarian events convinced Hoxha that Khrushchev’s denunciation 
of Stalin had contributed to the emergence of political turmoil and so, from his point 
of view, his refusal of destalinization, and the purge it went with, was correct. 
Consequently, Albania’s mounting divergence with Moscow pushed Hoxha to seek 
new allies. For Albania, it was now China, rather than the Soviet Union, which 
advocated and upheld the unity of the bloc. With its unexpected involvement in the 
events in Hungary, China had risen to a prominent position within the socialist camp. 
Although Chinese leaders claimed to support Soviet leadership within the camp, they 
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well realized that China could claim to co-lead, if not lead, the socialist camp. 
Albania would be the first to support it. From this moment onward, Albanian 
archives show how it is because of the events in Hungary that, for the first time, the 
correspondence between Tirana and Beijing drastically intensified, which explains 
the increasing coordination of political positions between Beijing and Tirana that 
followed. 
China’s position as an advocate of the unity of the socialist camp was reinforced 
when, in January 1957, Khrushchev invited Zhou Enlai to Moscow to mediate 
between the Soviet Union and Polish and Hungarian governments. In what is called 
Zhou Enlai’s shuttle diplomacy, he visited Moscow, Budapest, and Warsaw, for two 
weeks with the intention, according to Shen and Xia, to ‘consolidate the socialist 
camp on a new basis… the modification of leadership principles in the international 
communist movement, that is, the transition from “the Soviet Union as the head” to 
“joint Sino-Soviet leadership” of the movement’.137 During his stay in Europe Zhou 
stressed the importance of the unity of the bloc under Soviet leadership, but in the 
meantime stressed his desire to avoid intervention in internal affairs, avoid Soviet 
hegemonic tendencies, and also ‘…avoid great-nation chauvinism’.138  In fact, in 
Moscow, Zhou did not conceal his criticism of the Soviet Union, while in Budapest 
and Warsaw he advocated unity under Soviet leadership, which for him was not to be 
understood as the right of Moscow to interfere in domestic issues nor the obligation 
for other parties to take orders from Moscow.139 Nonetheless, his trip was a success 
in that it accredited Beijing as a reliable partner within the communist bloc and 
opened to China new channels in East Europe – once Moscow’s exclusive domain.  
At the same time that Zhou Enlai was pursuing his shuttle diplomacy, Peng 
Zhen, as the head of a Chinese parliamentary delegation, was paying a visit to 
Albania, in a trip that ended in Belgrade. Albanian leaders greatly appreciated the 
fact that Peng had chosen to go to Albania first and then to Yugoslavia. To meet him 
in Tirana was Premier Mehmet Shehu and the Politburo member Hysni Kapo – one 
of the most important ideologues of the PLA. In Tirana, the leadership knew of Zhou 
Enlai’s visit to Moscow. When they met with Peng Zhen on 16 January 1957, the 
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main topic of the conversation was the situation in East Europe in the aftermath of 
the Hungarian upheaval. Kapo told Peng that they would like to discuss issues 
regarding Albanian-Yugoslavian divergences. Mehmet Shehu, in a very 
straightforward language, started with pointing out that ‘for Albania the most 
important issue is the relation with Yugoslavia… and these relations have not just a 
local character but are an important issue of principles [communist] … whoever 
wants to assess properly the political and ideological position of the Yugoslavian 
leadership, should study the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia’. The 
message for China was that the Soviet Union on this point had ignored Albania, and 
that any friendship with Albania underscored a lack of it with Yugoslavia. In fact in a 
more direct way Shehu told Peng how in May 1955, they had tried to persuade 
Khrushchev that before visiting Belgrade it would have been better to hold 
consultations with other communist parties, in particular Albania, ‘because we know 
better [than the Soviets] the Yugoslavian leadership’.140 
In a long speech, Shehu explained to Peng the historical roots of the 
disagreements between Albania and Yugoslavia. When explaining the Albanian 
position about Yugoslavian involvement in recent events, Shehu stressed how Tito 
‘was involved in a plot in Tirana on the same grounds Hungarian counter-
revolutionaries organized one in Budapest’, in an attempt to overthrow the leadership 
in Albania in April 1956 with the collaboration of local communists. Shehu also told 
Peng that, ‘yet based on our own experience we are convinced of the Yugoslav 
involvement in the counter revolutionary actions in Hungary’, although he admitted 
that he had no evidence of this. Peng, who mostly listened in silence the long 
explanation of Shehu, affirmed that he too ‘personally’ thought Yugoslavia was 
involved ‘but we have no evidence of such intervention’. Nonetheless, Shehu said 
that such evidence could be found in the statement of the Yugoslav minister of 
Defense to the Soviet ambassador in Hungary that if the Soviet Union would have 
not intervened militarily then Yugoslavia would have. This meant for Shehu that 
‘Tomorrow Yugoslavia might consider to intervene militarily also against 
Albania’.141 
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Peng and the Albanian leaders also discussed problems that perhaps more 
directly concerned China – issues related to the international communist movement. 
It is significant the position regarding Stalin. Shehu stated that ‘we are completely in 
agreement with you… about the fact that Stalin should be assessed with both his 
negative and positive aspects … [yet] it should be highlighted first of all his positive 
aspects and only then perhaps mention some negative’. Regarding the class struggle 
in the transitional phase from capitalism to socialism, contrary to the principle of 
peaceful transition announced by Khrushchev, Shehu stated that the ‘Soviet Union 
perhaps is in another situation because socialism there is consolidated, but different 
instead is the situation in other socialist countries where class struggle is needed to 
resist counter revolution, as Hungarian events showed’. Shehu then accused Tito of 
completely denying class struggle while pursuing the ‘national way of socialism’, 
which for him was against the principles of Marxism. On all these issues, Shehu 
emphasized not only the difference between Yugoslavian revisionism and the 
Marxist course, but also the fact that ‘Albania will always take into account the 
CPSU and CCP standing towards Yugoslavia’ and related issues. This meant that for 
Albania, China was already on equal footing with the Soviet Union. Peng Zhen 
assured Albania that China would avoid the ‘great nation chauvinism in dealing with 
all countries’, a way to affirm that the size of the country was not a criterion in 
Chinese relations with Albania. 142  It was also a way to mark the difference in 
principles between China – which claimed to base its foreign relations on the 
principle of equality – and a Soviet Union that often was guilty of great-nation 
chauvinism, as Zhou Enlai was remarking in the same moment during his trip in 
Moscow. Finally, Albania found a common understanding with China regarding 
these issues. Nonetheless, at this point rather than opening the divide with Soviet 
Union, China called and worked for unity. 
 
Albanian Official Assessment of the Events in East Europe  
To further assess the recent events in light of the positions of the actors implicated, in 
Tirana was called a plenum of the PLA in February 1957. The report of Enver Hoxha 
to the Plenum was centered upon issues that had emerged since the Twentieth 
                                                            
142 Quotations of the paragraph in ibid., f.25 & f.28. 
51 
Congress of the CPSU. 143  In this plenum, Hoxha wanted to seal definitely his 
Stalinist line of opposing any and all reformation, and he needed legitimation 
through a formal act of a party institution which would give the semblance of a 
collegial decision. 
Some aspects of this long report are very important. First, it reinterpreted the 
recent events, from destalinization to the Hungarian upheaval, in a way analogous to 
China’s public assessment and placed China in a central position in his analysis. 
Second, it highlighted the importance of struggling against revisionism – embodied, 
from the Albanian perspective, in the Yugoslavian course. Third, it shut down any 
possible rapprochement with Yugoslavia, in light of the Yugoslavians’ presumed 
involvement in recent events. Fourth, and most importantly, it stated, in open but 
careful language, an association between Khrushchev’s policies and the events in 
East Europe.144 Regarding the Hungarian leadership, Hoxha briefly mentioned Imre 
Nagy as the main internal cause, and praised and supported Janos Kádár whom 
Hoxha had earlier attacked in front of the Soviet ambassador. The report gave great 
merit to the Soviet Union for having repressed the counter revolution, and it 
criticized the Yugoslavian interpretation of the events as ‘a popular revolution of all 
the working people’. For Hoxha, it was instead a counter revolution of all the 
reactionary classes that had survived the proletarian dictatorship. 
Regarding Poland, there was mention that the ‘nationalist elements took 
advantage of some true mistakes of the Soviet Union in its relations with Poland’ – 
alleging clearly to the Soviet Union’s great national chauvinism that Zhou Enlai had 
mentioned in January. Hoxha disputed the Polish rehabilitation of many political 
prisoners, the purging of old revolutionaries from leading positions in the army and 
the party, and the freedom (limited) of the Catholic clergy that Gomulka had 
allowed. The point he aimed to make was that Soviet intervention in Hungary had 
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reestablished the full control of the party, while the lack of intervention in Poland 
had left room for an autonomous path which could be dangerous for the unity of the 
camp. Hoxha appreciated that Zhou Enlai’s recent visit to Warsaw had contributed to 
improving the relations between Poland and the Soviet Union – clearly appraising 
China.145 It is significant that when analyzing the events in Poland and Hungary 
Hoxha did not even mention Khrushchev by name, but referred to the Soviet Union 
in general. But his criticism of Yugoslavia was also a veiled critique of Khrushchev 
for the trust he initially had placed in Belgrade. Hoxha strongly emphasized that with 
its ‘revisionist course’ Yugoslavia was the most direct menace to the socialist unity. 
Belgrade, Hoxha said, denied the class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat and 
the leading role of the communist party ‘using as a mask the struggle against 
Stalinism’. This ‘came immediately after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU… 
which opportunist elements used to discredit socialist countries, the communist 
parties and their leaders… But our party acted correctly… we learned important 
lessons from the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and took all the measures to fight 
against those that in the conference of the communist party of Tirana, backed by 
Yugoslavia using the pretext of “struggle against the cult of individual”, wanted to 
push our party out of the Marxist-Leninist path’.146 
Hoxha affirmed that within the international communist movement the leading 
role belonged to the Soviet Union for historical reasons: it was the fatherland of the 
October Revolution and consequently the first country to have experienced 
socialism, and it had the merit to have defeated Nazism and Fascism in the Second 
World War. The factors mentioned all occurred under the reign of Stalin, and so in a 
way he was affirming that the leading role was subject to the return to the old values 
of Stalinism. To this point, he also quoted Stalin to affirm the necessity of defending 
the Soviet line. To affirm the leading role of the Soviet Union, Hoxha quoted parts of 
the article “More on the Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship” published 
on 29 December 1956 by Renmin Ribao in China. So Hoxha was again endorsing 
and following China’s analysis. Significantly, the quotation he cited did not refer to 
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the Soviet Union as the leader of the socialist camp but as its center – which implied 
less hierarchy, if not equality, among socialist countries.  
Regarding Stalin, Hoxha stated that, ‘We do not agree with those that liquidate 
the revolutionary side of Stalin and see only the dark side. He should be assessed on 
the right light…’ After extolling Stalin’s merits, Hoxha did mention some of his 
mistakes, but exonerated him because ‘his tragedy lays in the fact that even when he 
made mistakes he thought they were necessary for the sake of the revolution.’ Here 
he also emphasized how ‘Hungarian events show again… how dangerous it is to 
disorient the working class with the theory of denying the class struggle’ in the 
transition from capitalism to socialism. Clearly he alleged that Khrushchev’s theory 
of peaceful transition had undermined the ideology at the base of the class struggle. 
Further yet, ‘The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU considered that was wrong 
Stalin’s thesis that with the building of socialism it escalates also the class struggle… 
some liberal elements in some countries interpreted in an opportunist way the thesis 
[of the 20th Congress] that the class struggle does not escalates… they made a 
distorted analogy between the Soviet Union where socialism is consolidated, and 
their countries where it is still in the transitional phase’. Ultimately, contrary to what 
he had affirmed to the Soviets but in light of the events in Hungary, Hoxha stated 
that ‘we do not want to have any interparty relations with Yugoslavia, although we 
will try to have friendly relations with the Yugoslavian people’.147 Hoxha used the 
tension of 1956 in East Europe to legitimate his decision not to improve relations 
with Yugoslavia, and not undertake any internal reformation. On the contrary, for 
him these events were reason to strengthen his personal rule. All of this report, which 
was a clear re-assessment of the Khrushchev line since 1953, came only after Beijing 
had emerged as a possible safety net with which Hoxha might defend his course. 
In order to outline more clearly Albania’s position on all the controversial issues 
within the bloc, as well as to find common understanding with Beijing, just after the 
plenum, in early May 1957, a delegation of PLA officials headed by Rita Marko 
(among which Nexhmije Hoxha, wife of Enver Hoxha and member of the Politburo) 
visited China. But when they met with Liu Shaoqi, Liu told them that it was perhaps 
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a mistake, in 1948, when China had considered Yugoslavia an enemy of 
communism, and invited Albania to make efforts to improve relations with 
Belgrade.148 To Albanian officials, this statement seemed contradictory. In a ciphered 
telegram to Hoxha that day, Marko noted that ‘the view of Liu Shaoqi [on this point] 
seemed to me very similar to that of the CPSU’.149 In their meeting with Mao, 
Yugoslavia was not even mentioned. Mao focused more on Albania’s relations with 
the western countries, particularly the communist parties of the western countries.150 
He suggested that Albania extend its diplomatic network towards African, Arabic 
and other countries. 151  Furthermore, he said that the African countries, and the 
developing countries in general, have good potential to lean on the communist side – 
China had been one of the main promoters of the Bandung Conference in April 
1955.152 It seems that Mao wanted to know if Albania had any potential to be a 
channel of communication through its diplomatic network with communist parties in 
countries where China lacked recognition.  
The most important meeting during this visit, which might explain the attitude of 
Chinese leaders towards Yugoslavia, was perhaps the one with Peng Zhen, who 
informed Marko of his visit to Yugoslavia in January, just after his visit to Albania. 
His motivation for going to Belgrade, parallel to that of Zhou Enlai with regards to 
the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary, had been to convince Yugoslavia to join the 
                                                            
148  “Notes from the meeting of the Albanian parliamentary delegation headed by the Politburo 
member Rita Marko that visited China, with vice Chairman of the CCP Liu Shaoqi, 9 May 1957”, in 
AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1957, D2. 
149 “Radiograms of the correspondence between comrade Enver Hoxha and comrade Rita Marko 
during the visit to China of the parliamentary delegation….”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1957, 
D5, f.3. 
150 “Short resuming of the conversation of the Chairman of the CCP of the PRC Mao Zedong with the 
parliamentary delegation of the PRA headed by Rita Marko in Beijing, 12 May 1957”, in AQSH, F.14, 
AP-MPKK, V. 1957, D3. 
151 Joseph E. Khalili, Communist China’s Interaction with the Arab Nationalists since the Bandung 
Conference, (New York: Exposition Press, 1970); China and Enlai Zhou, eds., China and the Asian-
African Conference: Documents, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955); Had been Israel the first 
Middle East country to recognize the PRC, see Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign 
Policy, 1949-1977, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 21. 
152 Richard Wright, The Colour Curtain, a Report on the Bandung Conference, (London: D. Dobson, 
1956); Christopher J. Lee, Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political 
Afterlives, (Athens: Ohio University Press, c2010); Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada 
Boškovska Leimgruber, eds., The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-
Belgrade, (Abingdon, Oxon and New York, NY : Routledge, 2014); Robert B. Rakove, “Two Roads 
to Belgrade: The United States, Great Britain, and the First Nonaligned Conference”, Cold War 
History, Vol. 14, no. 3, (2014): 337-357. 
55 
conference of the communist parties in Moscow. Tito would not agree to sign any 
document wherein the Soviet Union was described as the head of the communist 
camp and so eventually he refused to participate. At the same time, according to 
Peng, Tito had expressed the will to improve relations with Albania, but in the 
context of improving relations with all other socialist countries.153 What is clear at 
this stage is China’s efforts to contribute to the unity of the socialist camp, which 
inspired the invitation for Albania to try improving its tense relations with Belgrade. 
The Soviet Union also sent a signal to Tirana by approving most of Albania’s 
economic requests in 1957 and seemed to leave behind any attrition there had been 
over political and economic issues. 
 
The Conference of Moscow, 1957 – A Brief Moment of Unity 
As Niu Jun has argued, ‘the relationship of leading (Soviet Union) and being-led 
(China) that had been created during the formation of the alliance [Sino-Soviet] 
could not be sustained after the shock of the revolts in Poland and Hungary in 
1956’.154 Yet both Soviet and Chinese leaders at this point seemed to want cohesion 
within the socialist camp. These efforts to re-strengthen unity resulted in the Moscow 
conference in November 1957 – the meeting of sixty-four communist parties from 
throughout the world. For some Chinese scholars the conference was a Chinese 
initiative, and Mao personally played a great role in its successful outcome. For 
others however, it was an initiative of CPSU, and China was involved only after 
Khrushchev failed to convince Yugoslavia to participate. Clearly this confirms that, 
if nothing else, China participated in the conference ‘on an equal footing’.155 
Moreover, regarding the transition to communism in capitalist countries, Mao 
successfully managed to convince the Soviets to include in the declaration, next to 
the principle of peaceful transition, also the revolutionary option. At the end, two 
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declarations were issued: the first was the Peace Manifesto, signed by all parties, 
Yugoslavia included, and the second and more important was the declaration of the 
ruling parties that Yugoslavians refused to sign. This final declaration came to be 
ambiguous and vague on many issues upon which the ruling parties did not reach a 
full agreement – Polish communists in particular had opposed many aspects since the 
very beginning. Consequently, after the conference this declaration was interpreted 
by all parties in their own way, becoming little more than a useless piece of paper. 
Yet following the conference the unity of the camp seemed to be assured for a short 
period.  
But it was short indeed. In 1958-59 Mao launched two campaigns that signified 
a dramatic shift in his domestic policies: first the Great Leap Forward campaign in 
1958 with the task to surpass the industrial production of western countries, first the 
United Kingdom, and in a longer period the United States.156 The real goal of the 
Great Leap, however, according to Shen and Xia, was to surpass the Soviet Union by 
establishing the People’s Communes as new units of Chinese society ‘as a result of 
the merging of the industry, agriculture and the army’.157 Initially the Soviets assisted 
China in its industrial production but later Khrushchev attacked the Chinese People’s 
Communes’ experiment as a return to the dark time in history when, in the Soviet 
Union under Stalin, similar communes had caused such great suffering. For Lüthi, 
the Great Leap Forward was not necessarily a campaign addressed against Moscow; 
rather, it was the first domestic mass movement Mao launched after the political 
takeover, when ‘all elements (charismatic leader, salvational mission, mass 
mobilization, and an illegitimate authority structure as the target of the struggle) of 
Mao’s continuous revolution merged’.158 Similarly Chen Jian argues that ‘China’s 
alliance policy towards the Soviet Union was always an integral part of Mao 
Zedong’s grand continuous revolution plans designed to transform China’s state, 
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society, and international look’.159 Then, once the Great Leap Forward resulted in a 
disaster, which in turn resulted in the purging of Peng Dehuai and his followers who 
had criticized it, subsequently Mao launched another anti-rightist campaign in 
1959.160 
Although Mao was promoting a left turn in domestic policies, the real attrition 
with Moscow was the Soviet hesitation to collaborate with China in developing its 
atomic arsenal. Furthermore, with an attitude similar to that which Moscow had 
previously taken regarding satellite states in East Europe, Khrushchev demanded a 
joint military radio transmitter station co-led by Moscow on Chinese soil, and a joint 
submarine fleet under a  similar scheme. Mao reacted angrily to this proposal 
because he understood it as a Soviet attempt to limit China’s military 
maneuverability towards Taiwan, as Moscow was pursuing a policy of relaxation 
with United States.161 Khrushchev had to rush and visit Beijing secretly in order to 
settle these misunderstandings, and eventually agreed with Mao to give up the joint 
submarine fleet. Less than a month after this meeting, Mao provoked a crisis of 
international dimensions when, in August 1958, the People’s Liberation Army 
bombed Jinmen Island in what is known as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.162 For 
MacFarquhar with this crisis ‘the Chinese were responding to external events: the 
Middle East crisis and the Soviet failure to take a strong action’.163  For Lüthi, 
instead, the main aim of this crisis was to boost Chinese people’s enthusiasm in order 
to increase steel production in the Great Leap Forward campaign, but also as a 
protest against the lack of progress during Geneva ambassadorial talks from 1955-57 
on Taiwan.164  
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This left turn was reflected also in the Beijing-Belgrade-Tirana triangle, when in 
April 1958 China transmitted to Albania the correspondence between the CCP and 
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), wherein was reflected China’s 
refusal to participate at the Seventh Congress of the LCY. The CCP considered many 
of the theses of the project drafts to the congress as ‘non-conform with the Marxist 
theory and in contradiction to the Moscow declaration’.165 This for Tirana, was the 
most desirable turn of Chinese policy towards Yugoslavia, which contrasted with the 
conciliatory tones towards Belgrade Liu Shaoqi had adopted with Albanian officials 
in May 1957. Furthermore, the rapprochement between Tirana and Beijing was made 
stronger yet when in late 1958, despite the fact that the failure of the Great Leap 
Forward had become clear since October 1958, yet China granted to Albania a loan 
of 55 million rubles (barter agreement) for its third FYP 1961-65.166 To inform about 
this campaign, Chinese officials summoned the ambassadors of the socialist 
countries at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early June 1958 where Bo 
Yibo had a long talk explaining the Great Leap Forward, and mentioning goals and 
the first results which seemed very optimistic regarding China’s industrial 
production.167 In fact his speech was concentrated on the economic implications of 
this campaign, highlighting how the steel production had increased. In Tirana, this 
campaign was interpreted as proof that China would soon reach the level of Soviet 
economy, and possibly surpass it. Therefore, China could possibly replace Soviet 
economic assistance to Albania, if necessary. 
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Khrushchev’s Visit to Albania 
Between the end of May and early June 1959 Khrushchev visited Albania for the 
first (and last) time in a run from north to south, meeting people and giving speeches 
for around ten days. During the visit, Khrushchev largely ignored the most important 
political and ideological issues Albania had been concerned with in recent years. 
Indeed, as shown in the records of the Politburo in Tirana, before his visit, Albanian 
leaders did not even expect to have long talks on their main concerns, which at this 
moment were the economic requests they would present to Khrushchev. Although 
the visit of the Soviet leader was not aimed at negotiating economic agreements, for 
Albania it was a chance to introduce him to the plans for long term investments in 
heavy industry.168 In fact, Hoxha was seeking a political endorsement of his national 
policies. 
At first, the Soviet leader praised Albania’s political and ideological 
developments, what Hoxha called, ‘a fist to the revisionist Yugoslavs… because we 
are with them in an open war [ideological]’.169 Regarding economic issues, contrary 
to Albanian expectations, Khrushchev made clear that he ‘did not come here to talk 
about these issues’, and then criticized and demolished most part of the Albanians’ 
plans for developing the heavy industry. The communist regime in Albania wanted at 
all costs to fill the gap – which was a gap with the course of history – and develop 
their heavy industry to exploit the national resources. But Khrushchev questioned the 
economic profitability of these industrial projects – for instance he reminded that 
Albanian oil had high sulphur, which made its quality low. Yet he left room for 
‘further studies’ and possible revision in the near future. On the other hand, 
Khrushchev suggested a full concentration on agricultural projects and perhaps light 
industry with focus on the production of consumer goods. Already in 1956, he had 
suggested to Hoxha a complete concentration of the economic efforts on agriculture 
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with priority on wheat, citrus, cotton, and cattle breeding. Now, that position was 
further cemented when he was most impressed by Albanian climate and its 
geographical position. Now, he suggested ‘to make treasure of your land, sun and 
water’ to produce products to sell in foreign markets – firstly, of course, the Soviet 
Union.170 Khrushchev audaciously also asked to revise the Albanian policy towards 
Yugoslavia. Hoxha responded passively to the Soviet demands, since he did not have 
much choice.  
Agriculture was not the only focus, however, of Khrushchev’s visit. He was very 
impressed by the southern coast of the country, particularly Vlora bay and the nearby 
island of Sazan, where the mountains descend steeply onto the Adriatic coast – with 
the clear sky it is possible to see the Italian coast just around forty miles on the other 
side of the Adriatic Sea. There he committed to build a joint naval military base – 
which Hoxha claimed to have requested in Stalin’s time.171  Eventually the base 
would pass to Albanian control once it was properly equipped and the Albanian army 
properly trained. From a Soviet point of view, this base was Moscow’s bridgehead in 
Southeastern Europe, which could be used as leverage towards NATO and the West. 
In fact, it was precisely during this visit in Albania that Fidel Castro was 
consolidating his political power in Cuba, which eventually leaned to the Soviet side, 
opening the door to one of the most dangerous crises of Cold War history. But Soviet 
attention to faraway places such as Cuba also pushed Moscow to rationalize its 
foreign economic assistance, and Albania had to pay its price – which explains in 
part the Soviet Union’s refusal to back Albania’s expensive plans for the developing 
of the heavy industry.  
At the time of his visit to Albania, Khrushchev knew of Hoxha’s increasing ties 
with China and might have interpreted it as a tactic to get concessions from Moscow. 
Khrushchev however, did not cede. Either by declining or procrastinating on 
Hoxha’s requests for support, Khrushchev perhaps wanted to study the Albanian 
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situation with Beijing. An additional blow came later for Hoxha when in February 
1960 Albania requested from the Soviet Union, and other East European 
governments, a loan of 500 million rubles exclusively in consumer goods, in addition 
to the possible loans of the FYP 1961-65. Hoxha argued that ‘the request comes due 
to the low level of living standards of Albanian people, [and] … it should be modest 
if compared with the Soviet possibilities’. 172  Khrushchev turned down Hoxha’s 
request by the end of April 1960 in a very short letter which did not even mention 
what Albania had requested, but instead granted a delay of fifteen years of the 
repayments of the instalments of previous loans Soviet Union had provided. 
Khrushchev, ironically, argued ‘you can use those resources to increase the living 
standards of your people’.173 For Albania, Soviet doors in Moscow were closing. 
In this situation, Hoxha, who had mastered the skill to march along parallel 
roads, looked for other options. In January 1959, a barter agreement of 55 million 
rubles between Albania and China was signed in Beijing for the FYP 1961-65, and 
aimed at increasing investments in industry.174 Only a month before the visit of 
Khrushchev in Albania, Hoxha had sent to China his most faithful lieutenant, Hysni 
Kapo, with the task of ‘studying the Chinese experience in building socialism’.175 It 
is significant how, for Hoxha at this point, China had emerged as a model regarding 
domestic policies. In fact, he had always followed a model, but he remained faithful 
only to the model that better assured his power: the communist party had been 
founded with the Yugoslavian model in mind. When Belgrade undermined Hoxha’s 
leadership, he changed course and adopted Stalin’s model until Khrushchev ditched 
it. And now Mao’s model had emerged. Kapo’s reports of his talks with Chinese 
leaders – which were not confined to economic problems, the expressed aim of his 
visit – were impressive, in particular when compared to those Hoxha had in Albania 
with Soviet leaders. For Mao’s turn left policy, the year 1959 was a difficult one, and 
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he needed allies. First, when an uprising erupted against the Chinese regime in spring 
1959, in Tibet, Soviet standing came as a shock to Beijing. The Dalai Lama and part 
of the Buddhist clergy of Tibet, together with thousands of people, fled to India. 
India openly accused China of repression in Tibet. The crisis later in 1962 escalated 
into border clashes between China and India regarding the McMahon line. The 
Soviet Union initially showed solidarity with Beijing, but soon declared neutrality in 
this matter, for fear of pushing India towards the western camp.176 For China, this 
was a gift to the United States ahead of the planned visit of Khrushchev, as for ‘the 
first time, United States became a major issue in the evolving Sino-Soviet 
disagreements’. 177  In summer 1959, Peng Dehuai, Chinese minister of defense 
questioned, effectively so, the economic results of the Great Leap Forward, and he 
praised the Soviet economic system instead. He was purged after a dramatic 
conference in Lushan in August 1959, and materials on this issue were relayed to 
Albania.178 
In this context, while Soviet leaders showed resistance and reticence regarding 
Albanian economic development, Chinese leaders in Beijing instead told Kapo that 
their economic principle is ‘to walk with two foots [sic], which mean develop in 
parallel the industry and the agriculture, the heavy industry and the light industry’. 
Significantly, Zhou Enlai told Kapo that ‘you have requested to us very few things… 
our assistance to you is not a big deal for us’.179 The most important aspects here 
were Zhou Enlai’s remarks regarding Albania’s ideological standing. He stated that 
‘China knows well your position… we stand on the same side, we are a united front 
against revisionists’. In this sense, ‘your [ideological] struggle against Yugoslavia is 
absolutely right’ as you are encircled by dangerous enemies.180 This position was 
reinforced by Mao as well. In his meeting with the Albanian delegation in mid-May 
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1959, Mao praised ‘the bravery with which you stand against Titoism and 
Yugoslavian revisionism’. Mao endorsed Albania’s political struggle against 
Yugoslavia again in June 1960, when meeting an Albanian delegation, telling them 
that ‘Albania is not alone [against Yugoslavia], behind you stands all the socialist 
camp’.181 Mao however, mentioned also the Soviet assistance to both China and 
Albania, and the fact that, at that moment ‘we are tied to the Moscow declaration’.182 
A tie that was soon broken. 
 
Conclusion 
Enver Hoxha had thought that Albania would have a central role in Soviet Union’s 
policy towards Southeastern Europe. Albania’s inclusion in the WPO, and the 
subsequent construction of the military base in southern Albania, spoke in this sense. 
He also thought that because of this role, Soviet Union would include Albania in the 
making of the Soviet agenda in issues regarding the socialist camp. Khrushchev, not 
only did not consult Tirana on such issues, but he undermined Hoxha’s rule by 
promoting both, the destalinization process, and the rapprochement with Yugoslavia. 
It was this latter step that definitely jeopardized Hoxha’s trust in Moscow. 
Khrushchev in fact prioritized the rapprochement with Yugoslavia, in order to 
reintegrate Belgrade within the communist camp. Between Albania and Yugoslavia, 
from a strategic point of view, Khrushchev had seen correctly that Belgrade was 
fundamental for Moscow’s control of the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea, which 
was also the Southwestern flank of Soviet Union’s area of influence in Europe. In 
this way, Khrushchev would have recovered what Stalin had lost by expelling 
Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948. This removed that centrality that Hoxha’s 
Albania had acquired in that area by acting as a counterbalance, under Soviet 
leadership, of Tito’s Yugoslavia. 
The events in Hungary further convinced Hoxha that Khrushchev did not regard 
Albania as a strategic point as had been considered by Stalin. Furthermore, Tito 
initially had been a supporter of the reformers that caused the turmoil in Hungary. 
Hoxha feared that Yugoslavia might foment similar policies in Albania. He became 
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even more convinced of this by the fact that the Soviet Union completely bypassed 
Albania in its talks with Yugoslavia regarding the Hungarian events. The Soviet 
leaders did so even when Albania asked to have a say on these issues. In this context, 
China emerged rapidly as the new chance for Hoxha to reassure the legitimacy of his 
regime. Chinese leaders, after initial hesitations, considered Khrushchev’s criticism 
of Stalin, and the reformism in general, as an open door for counter-revolution to 
emerge. Mao praised Hoxha, and Albania’s standing towards the events in eastern 
Europe. In this way China gave the space Hoxha had expected to have from 
Khrushchev. But most important, Mao emerged to be the new defender of Marxism 
that Khrushchev instead, in Hoxha’s eyes, had seriously undermined. In this way, 
both countries found to be on the same line against the full reformism of 
Khrushchev, and to defend Stalin. For China, Albania emerged as a golden 
possibility to challenge Khrushchev from a European position, central area of Cold 
War division. The last factor that determined Hoxha’s close up with China, in 
addition to ideological considerations, was China’s readiness to assist economically 
Albania. Indeed, China not only showed availability to provide assistance to Albania, 
but it did encourage Albania to prioritize the industry. This says much of how China 
had understood Hoxha’s sensitivity to the developing of the industry. Perhaps 
something they later regretted, considering how insatiable Hoxha became in the 
coming years towards China.  
 Therefore, for Hoxha, China emerged as an alternative to Soviet Union 
regarding both, ideological and political axis, and economic model. This even more 
after that in 1959, contrary to the expectations of Hoxha, Khrushchev during his visit 
in Albania reaffirmed his disagreement with Hoxha regarding the relations with 
Yugoslavia, asking to improve them, and regarding the economic model, asking to 
concentrate in the agriculture. For Hoxha, who had had enough of Khrushchev’s hold 
over his country, China was the opportunity he was waiting for to end the alliance 
with Soviet Union, which by now had become inconvenient if not an obstacle to his 
plans for Albania’s future. The events that followed, shows how Hoxha managed to 
find a way out from the Soviet joke without risking a Soviet intervention which 
could have possibly ended Hoxha’s rule. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
BREAKING AN ALLIANCE, BUILDING AN ALLIANCE, 1960-61: 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE UNITY OF THE COMMUNIST CAMP 
 
Introduction 
There were three forums during 1960 at which the Sino-Soviet split manifested with 
great evidence, which also collectively and definitively sealed the alliance between 
China and Albania. First, the meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU) in Beijing at the beginning of June. Second, the meeting of the communist 
parties at the Eighth Congress of the Romanian Workers’ Party in late June, and 
third, the Moscow Conference of eighty-one communist parties in November the 
same year. Though these meetings alone did not entirely bring about the Sino-Soviet 
split, they effectively ditched Soviet-Albanian relations. For those few scholars, here 
above mentioned, who earlier have conducted research on this alliance, it was in 
these events that lays the foundations of the Sino-Albanian alliance. As shown in the 
previous chapter, the foundations of the Sino-Albanian entente lays in the aftermath 
of the Twentieth CPSU Congress, followed by the destalinization process and the 
East European turmoil. I instead, argue here, that the period 1960-1961 is a 
conclusive process of both the Soviet-Albanian split, which had begun with the 
disagreements since the rise to the leadership of Khrushchev, and his undermining of 
Hoxha’s regime, and of the establishing of the Soviet-Albanian alliance. Related to 
these arguments follows the other: paradoxically Albania’s best entente with China 
was precisely in the period 1956-61 – when the alliance was not yet established – 
contrary to the later period when attrition would be continuously persistent. The 
destalinization process and its immediate consequences pushed Beijing and Tirana to 
build a united front in opposing the reformation process that Khrushchev had 
instigated. Therefore, in this chapter I show how the events during these two years 
were tactically used by Hoxha as an opportunity to pursue his strategy of 
disengagement from the cumbersome Soviet ally. In the same time, he skillfully 
frustrated the Soviet leaders pushing them to fully expose their positions towards 
Albania, for then give to Hoxha arguments he used internally to convince his 
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Politburo that the Soviet Union had become a threat rather than a protector. It is 
through these events that he channeled his uneasiness with Moscow, and established 
the alliance with Beijing instead. Contrary to Soviet Union’s standing towards 
Albania during the turmoil in East Europe, when Moscow had avoided consulting 
with Hoxha, China, on the other hand, either coordinated, or informed Hoxha of all 
the steps and the backstage of the Sino-Soviet disagreements. 
The process of the split with Moscow, however, would not be easy for Hoxha 
and his leadership. In fact, part of the Albanian leadership was known to be strong 
supporters of Soviet Union. In addition, after Hoxha’s request, which dated before 
Stalin’s death, Khrushchev had started the building of the WPO military base in 
Vlora bay, in southern Albania. Although a WPO base, yet the soldiers stationing in 
Vlora, in addition to the Albanians, were all Soviets, managing powerful weapons. 
Albania’s disengagement with Soviet Union would be potentially difficult also 
because of a large number of cadres and Albanian officials of all ranks that for years 
had attended Soviet academies. Documents shows that Soviet Union looked for the 
possibility to open a breach within the Albanian leadership, precisely counting on 
those Albanian officials that had been educated in Soviet Union. Therefore, Hoxha’s 
challenge to the Soviet leadership, and his subsequent decision to ditch the alliance 
with Moscow, could have been a risky step. Yet Hoxha used skillfully the 
combination between many factors: China’s support for him; the Soviet difficulties 
in international relations after Moscow’s intervention in Hungary; Albania’s 
geographical position, which would have made possible but undesirable any Soviet 
military intervention to overthrow Hoxha; Soviet attention to the emerging Cuban 
issue. 
 
The Meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Beijing 
To participate in the meeting, which was scheduled to begin on 31 May 1960, 
Albania sent a delegation headed by Gogo Nushi, representing Albanian trade 
unions. Another delegation from Tirana, apparently unrelated to the first but 
travelling in the same time and headed by Liri Belishova and Haxhi Lleshi, all old 
comrades of Hoxha since the war, toured China. The delegations landed in Beijing 
on May 30, and Nushi prepared the matters drafted prior, and slated for discussion 
the following day: the international situation and the role of the unions, and their 
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contribution in the struggle against colonialism. In the meeting, according to 
Albanian accounts, there were to be at least 300 delegates from all over the world – 
mainly from the communist bloc. To the surprise of many, however, the meeting did 
not begin the next day. Despite the fact that Albanian leaders knew of the Sino-
Soviet divergences, it was in Beijing where they witnessed for the first time how 
serious they were.1 
On 1 June 1960, Chinese officials informed Albanian delegates that the delay 
was due to disagreements between China and the Soviet Union regarding the draft of 
the report to be submitted to the conference of the unions. Liu Ningyi, the Chinese 
representative of the unions, asked to amend parts of the draft, which his Soviet 
counterpart did not agree. These disputes – at least as the Chinese told the Albanians 
– were caused by the Soviets’ lack of acknowledgement of the Chinese achievements 
during the Great Leap Forward campaign, which Soviets had criticized heavily. 
Trying to understand both sides, the Albanian representative of the Unions asked to 
meet also with Soviet representatives, who instead told him that the disputes came 
about from Chinese views on issues such as the peaceful coexistence (that China 
refused), peaceful transition, or the general disarmament. The Soviet Union promptly 
sent a letter on June 2 to the ruling parties, and others, inviting them to discuss the 
international situation during the works of the Romanian Workers’ Party congress 
scheduled twenty days later. The meeting in Beijing eventually began on June 5, and 
the Albanian delegation noted how in the days before the meeting, ‘Chinese officials 
met with many delegations trying to bring them on their side’.2 That same day some 
seventeen delegations were invited to have dinner with the Chinese leaders, 
including Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi. The aim of the dinner, 
according to Zhou, was ‘to inform you of the disagreements we have with Soviet 
Union on issues of line and principles concerning our epoch’.3 Then Deng Xiaoping, 
in more than an hour long speech, explained how, contrary to the Soviets, China 
                                                            
1 “Radiograms between the PLA First Secretary Enver Hoxha and comrade Gogo Nushi: On the delay 
of the meeting and the suggestions of the Chinese representatives on the reports to be discussed at the 
Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1960, D4, f.1-6 
and the report of Gogo Nushi once back in Tirana, f.6-15. 
2 “Radiograms between the First Secretary Enver Hoxha and comrade Gogo Nushi, June 1960”, in 
ibid., f.9. 
3 Ibid. Participated mainly those from socialist countries, but also from France, Italy, Indonesia, India, 
Uruguay, and others. 
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‘considers our time the last stage of imperialism and capitalism… an epoch of the 
proletarian revolution’. 4  After that, Zhou Enlai took to the floor, but many 
delegations, among which the Soviet, opposed the continuing of these discussions 
because ‘these issues should be discussed in a bilateral meeting among the CPSU and 
the CCP’. Zhou Enlai accepted but argued that ‘we only want to clarify all the Soviet 
objections to the Great Leap Forward and other Chinese domestic policies’.5 The 
next day, Zhou Enlai met with the Albanian delegation and told them that China 
considered ‘impossible the peaceful coexistence with imperialism’. He added also 
that divergences with the Soviet Union ‘already existed, but now they are becoming 
visible’. The Albanian delegates in Beijing noted ‘a marked anti-Soviet tone in 
Chinese standing’. Albanian leadership showed extreme interest in the emerging 
Sino-Soviet disputes, but also a calculated caution before taking any position. Hoxha 
instructed his comrades to ‘avoid any comment’, and not to take sides in the dispute.6 
Ultimately, China renounced the plan to include its views in the final 
communiqué of the meeting, a step that Andropov, some days later in Bucharest, 
attributed to Albania’s refusal to sign a document that did not reflect unity between 
the Soviet Union and China. 7  Although ideologically leaning towards Chinese 
leadership, Enver Hoxha decided to advance without openly supporting Beijing, as 
shown by the letters sent to Belishova in China, suggesting not just caution, but ‘to 
emphasize the decisive role of Soviet Union’.8 His closeness to China instead, was 
shown by his praise of the Chinese position on the issue of peaceful coexistence, 
                                                            
4 “Notes of the conference organized by the CCP CC on 05 June 1960 with some delegates of the 
World Federation of Trade Unions”, in ibid., f.16-20. 
5 In AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1960, D4, f.10. On similar terms this meeting is accounted also by 
Lorenz Lüthi in The Sino-Soviet split, 167-68. 
6 “Urgent: Telegram of Enver Hoxha to Gogo Nushi in Beijing, 07 June 1960” in AQSH, F.14, AP-
MPKK, V. 1960, D4, f.4. 
7 “Telegram of Hysni Kapo from Bucharest sent to Enver Hoxha, 21 June 1960, informing of the 
meeting he had with the Soviet representative of the CPSU, Yuri Andropov, on 20 June 1960, who 
informed Kapo of the divergences surged between China and the Soviet Union, in “Correspondence 
during the year 1960 between the PLA First Secretary, comrade Enver Hoxha, and comrade Hysni 
Kapo who headed the Albanian delegation at the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers Party and 
the meeting of the communist and working parties in Bucharest”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, Mbledhja e 
Përfaqësuesve të Partive Komuniste e Punëtore në Bukuresht[Meeting of the Representatives of the 
Communist and Workers’ Parties in Bucharest] – Qershor 1960, D1, f.10. 
8 “Telegram of Enver Hoxha, 04 June 1960, sent to Liri Belishova that was in Beijing, instructing her 
on the content of her speeches with Chinese leaders in Beijing”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1960, 
D2. 
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‘because otherwise how communists could assist the countries struggling for national 
liberation’ if they would have to commit to the peaceful relations with imperialism. 
Liri Belishova however, who among the Albanian leaders was the most pro-Soviet, 
interpreting Hoxha’s messages as support for the Soviet side, reported to the Soviet 
ambassador in Beijing what Chinese leaders had told her about the disputes.9 For this 
reason, once the Soviet-Albanian split became evident a few months later, she was 
the first to pay the price, being condemned and expelled from the party and from 
political offices. In Beijing, however, China had reached its objective to bring to the 
world’s attention its position on the most important questions regarding the 
international communist movement. In the Politburo in Tirana, Hoxha analyzed the 
situation, and officially maintained equal distance between Beijing and Moscow. 
From the records of the Politburo has emerged that Hoxha was informed by the 
Soviets that disagreements between Moscow and Beijing persisted on, and were 
limited to, issues concerning the international relations between camps. Yet he 
preferred to ‘see carefully how they [Soviets and Chinese] pose these issues in detail 
and then we will say our opinion’.10 In this sense Hoxha sought to first see the road 
ahead in its entirety, in order to better calculate his steps. To this aim, when Beijing 
informed Albania that most of their members did not wish to attend the Bucharest 
meeting, Hoxha strongly urged the Chinese part to participate.  
 
Bucharest, June 1960: A Twofold Split 
The great convergence between China and Albania, and the great divergence 
between China and the Soviet Union, and between Moscow and Tirana emerged very 
clearly at the meeting of the representatives of the communist parties that 
participated in the congress of the Romanian Workers’ Party in Bucharest.11 In a 
letter sent by Soviets in early June (Albania received it on 4 June 1960), the Soviet 
Union mentioned the necessity for consultations among the communist parties on the 
international situation, in light also of the disagreements between the Soviet Union 
                                                            
9 Ibid., f.8-9. 
10 “Records of the Politburo, 06 June 1960”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1960, D14, f.3, f.9. 
11 For the first account of Albanian role during these events see William E. Griffith, Albania and the 
Sino-Soviet Rift, (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963). 
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and the United States.12 The meeting eventually took place between 24 and 26 June 
1960, right at the margins of the Third Romanian Workers’ Party Congress (20-25 
June). Soon, however, this letter was interpreted, at least in hindsight by Albania, as 
a duplicitous means of convening the communist parties to discuss the Sino-Soviet 
divergences.13 In fact, for Albania it had become clear that Soviet intentions from the 
beginning were to turn the Bucharest meeting into a forum of revenge against China 
for its attempt to gain support from the communist parties during the WFTU in 
Beijing just days earlier. 
Immediately after the Albanian delegation’s arrival in Bucharest, Yuri 
Andropov, head of the CPSU’s CC International Liaison Department, together with a 
member of the Romanian government, Alexandru Moghioros, met with Kapo for the 
first time on 20 June 1960. 14  But instead of mentioning disputes regarding 
international relations, as mentioned in the letter of invitation, Andropov repeated all 
the Sino-Soviet disagreements since 1956.15 Moghioros reinforced Andropov’s point 
by labelling Mao ‘a warmonger’ for not accepting the peaceful coexistence; he 
accused China of taking the ‘wrong course’ and of disloyalty, referring to the events 
in Beijing earlier.16 Albania’s official position had not changed from Beijing and so 
Kapo had instructions to take no side, but reminded Andropov how harmful these 
divergences were for the unity of the socialist camp. The fact that almost all the 
leaders of the communist countries of eastern Europe were participants in Bucharest 
                                                            
12 “Records of the Politburo, 06 June 1960”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1960, D14. 
13  “Report on 11 July 1960 of the head of the Albanian delegation, comrade Hysni Kapo, who 
participated at the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers Party, 20-22 June, and the meeting of the 
representatives of the communist and workers’ parties in Bucharest 24-26 June 1960”, in AQSH, F.14, 
OU, Mbledhja e Përfaqësuesve të Partive Komuniste e Punëtore në Bukuresht [Meeting of the 
Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties in Bucharest] – June 1960, D8. 
14 “Telegram of Hysni Kapo sent to Enver Hoxha, 20 June 1960, informing him of his talk with Yuri 
Andropov and Alexandru Moghioros, where they informed Kapo of the disagreements with China”, in 
AQSH, F.14, OU, Mbledhja e Përfaqësuesve të Partive Komuniste e Punëtore në Bukuresht [Meeting 
of the Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties in Bucharest] – June 1960, D1, f. 4-12. 
15 “Letters of the CCP to PLA informing of the disagreements between CCP and CPSU”, in AQSH, 
F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1960, D7, f.1-93 (in Chinese language), and D7/a, f.245-361; “Records of the 
talks between the CCP and CPSU delegations in Moscow, 17-22 September 1960, relayed to Albania”, 
in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1960, D9, f.1-140. 
16 In AQSH, F.14, OU, Mbledhja e Përfaqësuesve të Partive Komuniste e Punëtore në Bukuresht 
[Meeting of the Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties in Bucharest] – June 1960, 
D1, f. 4-12 Andropov mentioned, among many issues, Sino-Soviet divergences on China’s standing 
against the peaceful coexistence with the capitalist camp, Chinese refusal of the peaceful transition 
from capitalism to socialism, and Chinese policy of pursuing the cult of individual. 
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reinforced Albanian suspicion that this meeting had been prepared in advance, that 
its aim differed from that stated in the letter, and that Albania once again had been 
left at the margins by the Soviet Union. In fact, in Bucharest, Hoxha was almost the 
only leader absent – which had been his decision. But the fact remains that he had 
just received a short letter in which no information was provided on the nature or 
content of this meeting except Soviet-American disagreements. Since the discussion 
switched to problems that had emerged after the Twentieth CPSU Congress – issues 
on which Albania was now closer to Beijing – Hoxha eventually choose to abort his 
plans to attend the meeting he saw as a Soviet maneuver to isolate Beijing. Most 
important, he wanted to survey of the situation and be well prepared to defy Moscow 
only after full exposure of its position. Nonetheless, he remained continuously 
informed through intense correspondence with Hysni Kapo, head of the Albanian 
delegation. On this point, based on the Selected Works later published by Hoxha, 
Lüthi states that ‘the Albanian party was struggling over how to respond to the 
situation’.17 On the contrary, what apparently seemed to be a struggle was actually a 
calculated tactic to frustrate the now inconvenient partner, so as to force and test 
Soviet leadership’s determination, or lack thereof, to interfere with China and 
Albania, indicated by the correspondence between Hoxha and Kapo as Albania 
awaited China’s seeking a more definitive alliance with Albania. 
Regarding the Soviet attempt at bringing Albania to its side on key issues, which 
had undermined his very rule since 1956, Hoxha instructed Kapo to respond firmly 
by rejecting the third portion of the meeting, Moghioros’ ‘…lessons of the right or 
wrong course of China. Moghioros can go and sell his goods in another market, not 
to Albania’.18 More specifically, on the Sino-Soviet quarrel, Hoxha’s tactic since the 
very beginning consisted in taking no side – no matter how the situation evolved. But 
Albanian refusal to unconditionally support the Soviet Union was already a challenge 
to Moscow, and did not pass unobserved as the Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov told 
                                                            
17 Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, 171. 
18 “Top-Secret: Telegram sent by Enver Hoxha to Hysni Kapo, 22 June 1960, informing Kapo of his 
views on his meeting with Andropov and on the issues he had raised”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, Mbledhja 
e Përfaqësuesve të Partive Komuniste e Punëtore në Bukuresht [Meeting of the Representatives of the 
Communist and Workers’ Parties in Bucharest] – June 1960, D1, f.19-26. 
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Kapo that ‘you Albanians do not agree’, with Moscow.19 Indeed, the statement was 
true. When the Chinese and Soviet views became a matter of public contention in 
Bucharest, Albania took the chance to criticize the way Moscow and Beijing were 
dealing with these disputes – a criticism that per se was addressed to the Soviet 
Union as the provocateur of the situation. In his interventions, Kapo, after 
disapproving of China’s maneuver earlier in Beijing, affirmed that before involving 
other communist parties in resolving disagreements, Moscow and Beijing should 
have established bilateral talks in order to settle their disputes.20 Even when other 
parties (and parts) were involved, for Albania, ‘both sides were trying to explain to 
others their position through gossip, by word of mouth, in informal talks, from ear to 
ear’, thus jeopardizing the unity of the camp.21 The Soviet Union instead challenged 
Albania, trying to force it to take a position. During those days, Mikoyan had spoken 
to two Albanian diplomats in Moscow, and mentioning Sino-Soviet disputes, had 
stated ‘I am surprised that the leadership [Hoxha] did not inform you of these 
disputes’. He was referring to the conversation of Mikoyan with Hoxha and Shehu 
on the Sino-Soviet disputes in May.22 Furious at this statement, Hoxha instructed 
Kapo to remind Andropov that since it had been Mikoyan who had asked Hoxha to 
keep secret the conversation, then ‘our party keeps always its given word, and does 
not treat these issues as a public gossip’. The most important point for Hoxha was 
that ‘Albania notes two dangerous tendencies in the Soviet standing: first, 
underestimation for revisionism [Yugoslavia], second, the tendency to blame the 
                                                            
19 “Telegram of Hysni Kapo from Bucharest sent to Enver Hoxha, 21 June 1960 at 9pm, informing of 
the short conversation he had with the Bulgarian leader Todor Živkov, during an informal meeting and 
informing of the speech of Khrushchev and the reactions to it”, in ibid., f.14-16. 
20 “Speeches of the head of the Albanian delegation to the Bucharest meeting of the representatives of 
the communist and workers’ parties, 24-26 June 1960”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, Mbledhja e 
Përfaqësuesve të Partive Komuniste e Punëtore në Bukuresht [Meeting of the Representatives of the 
Communist and Workers’ Parties in Bucharest] – June 1960, D3. At the beginning Kapo expressed 
Albanian disagreement with China for how Beijing had seized the opportunity to talk of these issues 
in Beijing in an event that apparently was not related. 
21 “Top-Secret: Telegram sent by Enver Hoxha to Hysni Kapo in Bucharest, 22 June 1960, expressing 
Albanian view on the Sino-Soviet disputes and instructing Kapo of the Albanian standing on this 
issue”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, Mbledhja e Përfaqësuesve të Partive Komuniste e Punëtore në Bukuresht 
[Meeting of the Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties in Bucharest] – June 1960, 
D1, f.19-26. 
22 Rather than a conversation it was a short briefing where Hoxha did not expose any of his views on 
the matter. 
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[Albanian] leadership’ by insinuating secrets between the leader and the Politburo 
members.23 
Contrary to their letter of invitation, the sixty-eight page document that the 
Soviets distributed in the afternoon of 23 June, just one night before the meeting of 
all parties, focused on issues concerning Chinese domestic policies, such as the Great 
Leap Forward or the Hundred Flowers campaign.24 In fact, the next day, Peng Zhen 
wondered rhetorically, in the presence of Khrushchev, whether the aim of this 
meeting was, ‘to exchange views on international issues, or judge and accuse our 
party? [for its domestic policies]’.25 Peng Zhen had known already by 17 June of the 
document – although not its content – during his stopover in Moscow on his way to 
Bucharest. There he had ‘battled over international politics’ with Kozlov, a CPSU 
Presidium member, who warned him of issues ‘that we will discuss… after we have 
arrived in Bucharest’.26 The document was urgently sent to Albania, where Hoxha 
noted his views in handwriting over the draft.27 In Hoxha’s handwritten notes, he 
clearly stands on China’s side. For instance, to the Soviet remark that ‘we cannot 
agree with Chinese declarations such as “we should not fear war”’, Hoxha noted that 
‘to imperialists we should show firmness not flatteries’, rejecting the Soviet claim 
and embracing Chinese view. To the Soviet affirmation of the possibility of peaceful 
coexistence between countries with different social systems, Hoxha wondered ‘how 
should the class struggle develop then’. Regarding the general world disarmament, 
Hoxha noted that ‘for me this is quite an illusion’, as China had also affirmed. He 
                                                            
23  Top-Secret: AQSH, F.14, OU, Mbledhja e Përfaqësuesve të Partive Komuniste e Punëtore në 
Bukuresht [Meeting of the Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties in Bucharest] – 
June 1960, D1, f.20-21. 
24 “Informative material distributed by the CPSU in the meeting of Bucharest, 21 June 1960:“On the 
different views that exists between the CPSU and the CCP on important issues of foreign policy, on 
the ideological front, and on the building of socialism”, and others”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, Mbledhja e 
Përfaqësuesve të Partive Komuniste e Punëtore në Bukuresht [Meeting of the Representatives of the 
Communist and Workers” Parties in Bucharest] – June 1960, D2. 
25 “The meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers’ parties in Bucharest, 24 June 
1960”, in “Records of the meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers’ parties in 
Bucharest, 24 -26 June 1960”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, Mbledhja e Përfaqësuesve të Partive Komuniste e 
Punëtore në Bukuresht [Meeting of the Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties in 
Bucharest] – June 1960, D7, f.1. 
26 Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, 169–70. 
27 In AQSH, F.14, OU, Mbledhja e Përfaqësuesve të Partive Komuniste e Punëtore në Bukuresht 
[Meeting of the Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties in Bucharest] – June 1960, 
D2. Hoxha outlined with the red pen the most important points, and next to them in the blank page 
wrote his opinions. 
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reinforced, some pages later, that this was a soviet ‘lie… is this not but a 
propagandistic issue?’. When, in the report, the Soviets mentioned how they had 
always defended the right course of the Marxist line, citing their ‘unmasking of the 
Yugoslavian revisionism’, Hoxha noted how the Soviet position towards Belgrade 
‘has been opportunistic’ instead.28 Clearly, Hoxha at this point was ideologically on 
Beijing’s side. Yet, officially he refused to declare his position. 
The next day, 24 June 1960, after receiving another telegram from Hoxha, Kapo 
met with Andropov, to whom he transmitted Hoxha’s message for the Soviets: that 
Albania did not take lesson of right and wrong [referring to Moghioros affirmation 
that China was wrong], and that they stood firm on the decision that these 
divergences should be discussed in Sino-Soviet bilateral talks. This came 
immediately before the Soviet attack on China on that day, in the meeting of the 
twelve ruling parties. To Albania’s suggestion of bilateral Sino-Soviet talks, 
Andropov answered that this was not a bilateral issue, but a matter of all the 
communist parties, because Beijing had violated the Moscow declaration (of 1957). 
Andropov pressured the Albanians, implying this meeting may have been their 
possible last chance to align. He mentioned that regardless of the coming conference 
in Moscow, since all parties were already in Romania, it was there they wanted to 
resolve these issues for good. After this meeting, Hoxha instructed Kapo to not sign 
any document or communiqué that was not first studied by Tirana – in fact he wanted 
to see if Beijing would sign it first. He also authorized Kapo to make known to others 
‘what you have told Andropov’.29  
But the situation was evolving rapidly, and with the intention of bringing 
participants to the Soviet side, Khrushchev wanted the parties to speak in the meeting 
just some hours after they had received the material. According to Kapo, ‘the way 
things are evolving here are quite strange… I told Andropov that we don’t agree with 
this situation… The fact is that the other socialist countries, their leaders, must have 
agreed before on everything… The Soviets are concerned if we will speak against 
                                                            
28 “Informative material distributed by the CPSU in the meeting of Bucharest, 21 June 1960: On the 
different views that exists between the CPSU and the CCP on important issues of foreign policy, on 
the ideological front, and on the building of socialism, and others”, in ibid., f.17-40. 
29 “Top-Secret: Telegram sent by Enver Hoxha to Hysni Kapo in Bucharest, 24 June 1960”, in AQSH, 
F.14, OU, Mbledhja e Përfaqësuesve të Partive Komuniste e Punëtore në Bukuresht [Meeting of the 
Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties in Bucharest] – June 1960, D1, f.36-37. 
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China or not. They have organized everything in the way that others must speak 
against China’.30 It is not clear if Peng and Kapo discussed this issue – years later 
they affirmed to have not31 – but it is significant that a telegram with similar content 
was sent by Peng to Beijing.32 Among the European socialist countries, and among 
all the other world communist parties, Albania was the only one that did not support 
the Soviet Union.33  The North Korean and Vietnamese representatives, although 
refusing to attack China, remained in silence.34 To persuade Albania, Khrushchev 
sent Andropov again, around midnight of 24 June, to speak with Kapo before the 
opening of the next session. He told Kapo that ‘Khrushchev is very concerned of 
Albania’s consideration that these disputes are first of all between the two parties… 
the issue is that China has gone against the Moscow declaration’. Kapo reported that 
‘the point is that they [Soviets] want to know which side we will take’.35 Kapo 
repeated to Andropov the official standing of Albania. At the plenary meeting next 
day, Kapo delivered an official speech that reflected Hoxha’s instructions, which 
moved the attention to procedural issues such as the necessity of CPSU-CCP 
bilateral meetings, and the necessity for the unity of the camp. Albania’s stubborn 
position to not support officially any side was frustrating for the Soviet leadership. 
Khrushchev exacerbated the situation when he exposed publically his frustration 
and disappointment with the Albanian standing. Khrushchev spoke at the end, and 
when attacking China he turned towards Kapo, wondering aloud ‘[do you share my 
view] or not, comrade Kapo?’. Kapo, who had been instructed to respond firmly ‘to 
                                                            
30 “Telegram of Hysni Kapo sent to Enver Hoxha, 24 June 1960, 4pm, informing of the situation in 
the meeting of Bucharest”, in ibid., f.39; “Remarks regarding the meeting, 29 June 1960”, in AQSH, 
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33 China was attacked by most of the participants, including the African, Asian and Latin American 
delegations: “Records of the meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers’ parties in 
Bucharest, 24-26 June 1960”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, Mbledhja e Përfaqësuesve të Partive Komuniste e 
Punëtore në Bukuresht [Meeting of the Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties in 
Bucharest] – June 1960, D7, f.1-85. 
34 Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, 171. 
35 “Telegram from Bucharest sent by Hysni Kapo to Enver Hoxha, 24 June 1960, midnight, informing 
of his meeting with Yuri Andropov”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, Mbledhja e Përfaqësuesve të Partive 
Komuniste e Punëtore në Bukuresht [Meeting of the Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ 
Parties in Bucharest] – June 1960, D1, f.40. 
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possible accusations’ (and provocations), promptly took the floor, trying to calm 
Khrushchev by saying ‘please, I just have expressed the view of our party’. The 
quarrel followed with Khrushchev affirming provocatively ‘[since] I don’t get to 
understand the Chinese comrades, perhaps we should send you [Albanians]’.36 Kapo 
replied in a polemic tone that he considered this an accusation against his party. In a 
menacing tone, Khrushchev replied that ‘then I want to express the point of view of 
our party. We have taken note of your standing, but you do not want to take note of 
ours instead’.37 Therefore, the meeting on the Sino-Soviet disputes resulted into a 
Soviet-Albanian quarrel.38 Kapo responded to Khrushchev by affirming again the 
official standing of Albania, but took the chance also to remind him of issues that 
revealed part of reasons of the real dissent between Tirana and Moscow. Kapo 
pointed out that Moscow did not have a clear standing against Yugoslavia, ‘which 
only in the last years has sent 194 spies to our country… and you know very well 
that Belgrade sells to United States every possible information it can collect from our 
camp’. At the end he affirmed the need for a conference of communist parties and 
stated in a tone, also menacing, that ‘there our party will state clearly its view’.39 
Curiously after this polemic, Kapo’s telegrams to Hoxha denoted an ironic standing 
towards Khrushchev, who is mentioned as ‘the big’ which in Albanian can 
sardonically mean “the boss”. 40  At the end all the parts decided to appoint an 
Editorial Board, (consisting of the twelve ruling parties and fourteen largest parties 
of the non-communist camp), which would convene in Moscow in early October, 
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and draft the documents to be discussed at the conference of the communist parties in 
Moscow, eventually taking place in November 1960. 
 
The Road to Moscow 
William Griffith wondered in 1963, ‘when and how Albanians took their final 
decision to defy Khrushchev and ally with Peking’?41 The answer is that Albania had 
defied the Soviet Union on two unpublicized occasions: the meeting with the Soviet 
ambassador in November 1956, and the plenum in February 1957, both here above 
analyzed. More recently, for Lorenz Lüthi ‘It was only the outcome of the Albanian 
intraparty struggles in late summer [1960] that triggered a clear pro-Beijing line in 
Tirana’s stance’. Relying on Griffith and Biberaj, who wrote of the events in 1963 
and 1985 respectively, Lüthi concludes that ‘Ultimately, Hoxha’s pro-Chinese policy 
was not the result of ideological concord but intraparty struggles and Khrushchev’s 
strong-arm tactics’.42 On the contrary, the archival documents suggest that the events 
in 1960 were not determinant, but rather consequential of a process of estrangement 
between Moscow and Tirana that had begun shortly after Stalin’s death.  
Moreover, we now know, by 1960, no such intraparty struggle within the 
Albanian leadership was strong enough to challenge Hoxha’s position. Even when it 
seemed so, he prevented further escalation by purging, after 1956, many party 
members and high officials. Khrushchev’s denouncing Stalin and the events in 
Hungary had eroded further Albania’s ties with Moscow. Now, it was not a matter of 
if, but when and how the split would occur. With Khrushchev’s last steps, he gave 
this opportunity to Hoxha to move forward towards denouncing the alliance with 
Moscow. Yet in Bucharest Albania pursued caution rather than confrontation, and 
Hoxha’s instructions to Belishova to praise Soviet leadership of the communist camp 
during her stay in Beijing were just a calculated contradiction in Hoxha’s policy. In a 
way he was waiting for the best offer, and fully maximize the benefits, from the 
Sino-Soviet split. Meanwhile, his caution was a way to prevent Moscow from 
stretching relations with Belgrade – which could possibly have happened in case of 
Albania’s conflict with Moscow. The road to Moscow’s Conference went through a 
summer of intense contacts between Tirana, Moscow and Beijing. Clearly Albania 
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was on the verge of a break with the Soviet Union, but the leadership in Tirana 
waited for an opportune moment for the official split. In fact, the situation was not 
easy for Hoxha. In the military base of Vlora, hundreds of Soviet soldiers were 
stationed after the agreement reached in 1959 to build the joint military base. 
Moreover, Albania was tightly tied to the WPO and to a series of agreements with 
the Soviet Union and the East European bloc in general.  
Yet from Tirana’s viewpoint, the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev personally, had 
directly undermined Hoxha’s rule by not supporting his policies. Additionally, the 
Soviet Union had impeded Hoxha’s economic plans, thwarting his projects of 
industrialization, which in turn undermined the communist regime’s long term 
project for the country’s development. But the one issue stronger than any other in 
causing the Albanian-Soviet split, was Khrushchev’s contradictory standing towards 
Yugoslavia. First courting Tito, then blaming him for the Hungarian events, and then 
again pursuing a pragmatic policy towards Belgrade, Khrushchev pushed Hoxha to 
think that the time might return when Tirana’s road to Moscow must pass through 
Belgrade. For a short period in 1959, Hoxha thought that Khrushchev, by stretching 
even further the relations with Albania, he wanted to balance Tito. Khrushchev’s 
visit to Albania in early 1959, and more importantly, the decision to build the naval 
base of Vlora, were interpreted in Tirana in this sense. At a time when Khrushchev 
had accused Tito of intervention in Hungary, Hoxha believed the military base of the 
WPO in Albania would provide a clear and definitive protection to Albania against 
any Yugoslavian interference, or possible expansionist ambitions that Belgrade may 
have retained. On the other hand, the existence of the naval base in Vlora could have 
also turned in a boomerang for Hoxha – Soviet direct intervention to overthrow him. 
But to avoid a permanent Soviet presence, Hoxha had been farsighted enough as to 
stipulate in the length of the Soviet army’s stay in his country – the time necessary to 
build the infrastructure and train Albanian soldiers with the new technique. His plans 
designed that the base would become and remain a WPO naval base, managed and 
directed by Albania. The base had the advantage of giving Albania its first military 
advantage in a key area, with the most modern Soviet equipment, enabling Albania 
to exercise control over Otranto channel, the strip of sea where Albanian and Greek 
coasts face the Italian, and where the Adriatic and the Ionian Sea meet. Only through 
this channel could Yugoslavia access the Mediterranean Sea. Hoxha labelled years 
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later the base as the key to the Adriatic Sea through which ‘not even the Soviet fleet 
could pass’.43 
The events during summer 1960 reinforced Hoxha’s conviction that the alliance 
with the Soviet Union under Moscow’s conditions had come to an end. In fact, 
Moscow used the time between the Bucharest and Moscow conferences to pressure 
Albania, rejecting its economic requests. This came after a formal agreement had 
been reached in April 1959, when the Soviet Union granted a loan of 300 million 
rubles for the period 1961-65, but they had left to further negotiations to decide the 
annual barter agreements.44 But, during summer 1960, when Albania, due to drought, 
struggled to provide the necessary amount of wheat for the population, two letters 
with request for assistance, one to the Soviet and the other to Chinese government 
were sent in mid-July by Albanian authorities. Only Beijing replied, providing fifty 
thousand tons of grain, which paradoxically China purchased in part from the Soviet 
Union.45 China argued that this was a good way to thank Albania for its support in 
Bucharest.46 Soviet rejection was a hard blow for Albania, especially if it was true, as 
Hoxha claimed sometime later to have been told by the Soviets: ‘the grain Albania 
needed was nothing but the amount the mice eat in Soviet warehouses’.47  
Moreover, when Albania asked to conclude the agreements on the annual quotas 
of exports for the FYP 1961-65, the Soviet government wanted the Albanian 
economic delegation to visit Moscow in November 1960, concurrent with the 
meeting of the communist parties – a way to test, and pressure Albania. In Moscow, 
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the Albanian delegation was left behind the door for more than two months before 
the Soviets decided to receive them. Even once talks started, there were continuous 
obstacles put in place by the Soviets, further delaying the talks.48 Ultimately, instead 
of concluding agreements for the entire FYP 1961-65, Soviet authorities insisted that 
the talks only regarded possible assistance for the year 1961. Albania agreed to sign 
the agreement, but understood that it was a Soviet signal to Tirana to conform to the 
Soviet course, and therefore only one year of time to see if Albania would submit. 
During June-October 1960, different telegrams from Albanian diplomats abroad 
noted the cold attitude of Soviet diplomats towards Albania.49 In October 1960, one 
of the directors at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, named Pisarev in the 
document, told clearly the Albanian ambassador in Moscow that ‘you are against the 
CPSU and against Khrushchev’.50 In Moscow, Albanian generals of the general staff 
of the army, met in mid-October 1960 to discuss the Soviet military assistance. In the 
reception given by Andrei Grechko, commander in chief of the WPO forces, the 
Soviet minister of defense, Rodion Malinovskij stated that ‘Albanian people are 
going away from the friendship [with Soviet Union] because of some personal 
standing which lead to the individual cult [of Hoxha]’.51  The next day, general 
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Grechko went further yet, menacing that ‘your party is going far from the CPSU and 
it would be better if you think about this before it is too late’.52 The last time the 
WPO members assisted Albania with military equipment was in March 1961, mainly 
spare parts of armaments that were already becoming obsolete or needed 
maintenance.53 In Albania instead, a letter that the Albanian ambassador in Moscow, 
Mihal Prifti, had received from Tirana, informed of the ‘provocative Soviet 
interfering in the internal affairs of Albania… the Soviet ambassador Ivanov went so 
far as to ask to some Albanian generals, to who is loyal the army?...’.54 All this 
leaves room for the hypothesis of a Soviet search for a breach within the Albanian 
leadership.  
In fact, from the Soviet viewpoint, the possibility must have been real. Within 
the Albanian establishment, a large number of cadres had been educated in the Soviet 
Union, including the Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, the minister of defense Beqir 
Balluku, the members of Politburo Ramiz Alia and Liri Belishova, and nearly all the 
commanders of the general staff of the army.55 That summer, Hoxha purged Liri 
Belishova, the most pro-Soviet of the Politburo who in all cases never displayed any 
serious opposition to Hoxha’s disputes with Moscow. Her fault was to have reported 
to Soviet diplomats in Beijing of the conversation she had had with the Chinese 
leadership about the Sino-Soviet divergences during her trip in early June in China. 
Her purge captured the attention of Soviet diplomats. In Pyongyang, the Soviet 
ambassador asked the Albanian ambassador ‘why have you purged Liri Belishova?’, 
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and to the Albanian response that she was against the party’s line, he added ‘but what 
if she was right instead?’.56  
In a lower level hundreds of officials in the army had passed through Soviet 
military academies, and a large number of the intelligentsia had been educated in 
Soviet universities, where many of them had also encountered their partners. No 
Soviet soldier had passed through Albania during the Second World War, so 
Albanian people did not experience any of the horrors East Europeans went through 
when the Red Army marched to Berlin.57 Moreover, the Albanian people in general 
had been imbued for more than a decade, through the official propaganda, to 
appreciate the Soviet Union and to love it as the fatherland of the revolution. On the 
other hand, the economic relations with China were not very assuring for many 
Albanians. Although China had made clear its decision to assist Albania, the first 
Albanian delegations had noticed how poor China was compared to the Soviet 
Union. Some wondered how they could expect help from a country they perceived 
poorer than Albania. Even Hoxha in his trip in 1956 had noted China’s 
backwardness, in particular within the working units, because he had seen the lack of 
machinery. From the economic perspective, it was objectively difficult to imagine 
China as an alternative to the Soviet Union. In this context, Hoxha had a difficult 
situation to manage. But considering not the best for his country, but for himself, he 
found the choice with ease. 
The Sino-Soviet situation was evolving at this time as well. In July, the Soviet 
Union withdrew all the specialists from China, interrupting around 200 projects.58 
Soon followed the mediation work of Ho Chi Min – who aimed to put both sides on 
the same table of negotiations in bilateral talks, hoping that by November 1960, they 
could come to the Moscow meeting with at least closer positions.59 So, in August the 
CPSU invited the CCP for bilateral talks, with the aim to find a common 
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understanding and settle the issues in advance of the conference. 60  A long 
informative document was sent from Beijing to Moscow, on 10 September 1960, just 
before the bilateral talks took place, outlining the CCP’s line on all the issues arisen 
since Khrushchev’s secret speech until the recent confrontations in Bucharest.61 
Significantly, Hoxha’s notes in handwriting, praised China’s answer to the CPSU, 
and commented negatively on the Soviet position instead – Chinese and Albanian 
standing definitely converged, if not merged. The CCP-CPSU bilateral talks 
eventually took place in Moscow, in mid-September, and ultimately concluded 
unsuccessfully, with the two parties still holding their previous positions. 62  The 
Soviet Union promoted bilateral talks also with Albania. Initially they invited Enver 
Hoxha for vacations, where they hoped to convince him to support Moscow. After he 
refused, by 13 August, they sent a letter to the PLA inviting a delegation for talks, to 
which again Hoxha refused, ‘because we could not go there and talk behind CCP’s 
back’.63 
In October 1960, Chinese and Albanian delegations appointed teams, headed by 
Deng Xiaoping and Hysni Kapo respectively, to participate in the Editorial Board of 
the Moscow Conference. They met twice in Moscow, with the clear purpose to 
coordinate their standing and action. In their meeting on 2 October 1960, Deng 
Xiaoping told Kapo that ‘your ideas [on all the issues] are correct’, and encouraged 
him to ‘speak out openly during the conference’. He reinforced further, ‘because 
certain issues are vital for the communism… like the problem of the metallurgic 
industry in your country… certain problems require a long struggle, at least ten 
years, no matter if we are the minority, with us is ninety percent of the world’s 
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population that wants revolution’.64 But the most important meeting between Deng 
and Kapo was on 23 October 1960. Deng first reported that conciliation with 
Khrushchev would be impossible, and then spoke of the talks he claimed to have had 
with Khrushchev regarding Albania. Khrushchev, according to Deng, told him that 
‘to Albania we have given everything and now they spit on us… Now our relations 
with Albania will be the same as with Yugoslavia [tense]’. On the bilateral issues, 
Deng claimed to have been told that ‘you defend Stalin, and Molotov, why you don’t 
just take to China Molotov… Gao Gang [purged by Mao] was my friend… if you 
want to rise high Stalin we will do the same with Gao Gang’, and accused Kang 
Sheng to be ‘China’s Ežov [Nikolaj Ežov, the head of the NKVD who led Stalin’s 
purges in the late 1930s before being shot]’.65 On Soviet-Albanian disagreements, 
Deng said that ‘it is clear that yours and our party’s divergences with Soviet Union 
are the same’.66 By this time Albania had accumulated a number of documents that 
Beijing had relayed, and on the other hand the CCP was also informed of the 
Albanian position on each and all issues of dispute. This was the moment of major 
agreement between China and Albania. 
 
Moscow Conference, November 1960: Hoxha’s Attack on Khrushchev 
Enver Hoxha decided to lead the Albanian delegation to Moscow, where eighty-one 
communist and workers’ parties met in November 1960. When the possibility to 
participate in Bucharest had been mentioned – after the meeting had begun – Hoxha 
refused to go with the excuse that had not been prepared any summit, and did not fall 
into to the Soviet traps. Now, after digesting pros and cons all summer, re-assessing 
years of relations with the Soviet Union, and thinking of his personal future and rule, 
he had prepared enough to face Khrushchev and to ditch the alliance with the Soviet 
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Union. Beijing’s reassurances of political and economic support were further 
determinants in Hoxha’s decision. 
Hoxha until this moment often had been called “Commander” for his 
participation in the war. However, beyond the official propaganda narrative, his 
name does not appear in the records of a single battle, and his lieutenants knew this.67 
By contrast, those under him, beginning with the prime minister, but also most of the 
Politburo members, had fought on the front line in the mountains. Hoxha knew that 
this contrast could discredit him, and used the visit to Moscow as a chance to show 
bravery to the Albanian people and the party officials some. The split with 
Khrushchev, displayed in front of hundreds of world communist parties’ leaders, 
where Hoxha claimed to defend Marxism from revisionism, was a marvelous 
spectacle that he knew would increase even further his credibility, and his cult, 
among his people.  
The Albanian delegation arrived in Moscow in early November 1960, in time to 
participate in the annual celebrations in honor of the October Revolution and the 
military parade on 7 November. To attend Hoxha and his entourage, to the airport 
went Frol Kozlov, member of the Soviet Presidium. The next day, Soviet officials 
relayed to Albania the Soviet response to the CCP’s letter in September, where at a 
certain point were listed all the socialist countries, except Albania. In that response, 
Albania was also mentioned as an example of tyranny where the democratic 
centralism and party’s democracy had been ignored, ‘as the expulsion of Liri 
Belishova shows… and for what? … for being friends of the Soviet Union’. Hoxha 
accused Khrushchev of pressuring Albania, when he had mentioned to Deng 
Xiaoping that ‘we will treat Albanians the same as Yugoslavians…’ and 
congratulating Deng because now ‘we lost an Albania, and you gained an Albania’. 
Under such conditions Hoxha refused to meet with Khrushchev on 9 November 
1960, because ‘there were no equal conditions after these accusations against 
Albania were distributed to eighty one parties’. An attempt, on that same day, to talk 
with Hoxha was made by Maurice Thorez, head of the French communist party, who 
reminded Hoxha in a three hour long speech of the ‘dogmatic line’ of the CCP and 
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also of the great Soviet assistance to Albania.68 Thorez was interested in the Sino-
Soviet unity, because his party ‘struggled to preserve an identity that was 
revolutionary without the Chinese type of “adventurism”… and orthodox without the 
heavy Soviet bureaucracy’.69 His talk failed to change Albanian leadership’s final 
position, but convinced Hoxha to meet with their Soviet counterparts. Over the next 
three days, the Albanian delegation met three times with Soviet leaders, the last 
meeting being on 12 November 1960 with Khrushchev. According to Albanian 
accounts, in the first meeting, the Soviets asked ‘what do you want in exchange of 
improvement of your relations with us’, to which Hoxha reminded them of all the 
incidents that had happened during the summer: the Soviet attempt to undermine the 
Albanian leadership’s unity; the comments on political dissidents; the incidents in the 
military base of Vlora between Albanian and Soviet soldiers and officials; and 
others. At the end, Hoxha asked them ‘to accept, condemn and not to repeat such 
actions in the future’.70 He was asking them for an endorsement and to accept his 
way of ruling without questioning it. The Soviets rejected the Albanian demands, and 
affirmed that in Albania ‘an anti-Soviet spirit has been put in place’. The second 
meeting on 11 November 1960 did not change the position of the two sides.  
It was the meeting between Hoxha and Khrushchev that better revealed the real 
divide between Tirana and Moscow. In both Soviet and Albanian records it is well 
documented how this meeting contributed to the further deterioration of the relations 
rather than their improvement. After the formal greetings Khrushchev said that ‘I do 
not understand what has happened since my visit to Albania in 1959. If you have 
been unhappy with us since then, I must be very dense and naïve not to have 
understood this’. Hoxha was very nervous, showed by his passionate tone and replied 
that, ‘We have had disagreements before, such as about the Yugoslavs, but the 
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change in attitude happened after Bucharest, and it is all coming from your end’. 
Khrushchev answered ‘that we have had different views on this issue is news to me. I 
hear it for the first time. We have held talks in Albania [Khrushchev’s visit in 1959] 
and you never raised this issue… The Yugoslav matter, which you consider as 
contentious between us, we may set aside for the moment. That is not a principal 
issue’.71 But for Hoxha this was indeed a principal issue, one which Khrushchev had 
neglected to understand for long time. Hoxha then blamed Khrushchev for the 
deterioration of the relations after Bucharest. But Khrushchev realized correctly that 
‘The issue seems to be that even before Bucharest you have not been in agreement 
with us… The fault with all this rests with me for having trusted you too much’.72 In 
fact Shehu reminded Khrushchev that the Soviet Union had clearly ignored Albania 
in dealing with Yugoslavia since 1955. Then they exchanged very animated 
accusations regarding the possible Soviet support for recently expelled prominent 
Albanian leaders such as Liri Belishova. On this point Khrushchev attacked Hoxha 
for ‘expelling a strong woman like Belishova in a Stalinist way’, and reminded also 
that the Albanian minister of defense Beqir Balluku had accused Khrushchev of 
being not a Marxist on many occasions. Then, the already-tense conversation 
switched to the issue of the military base of Vlora, to which Hoxha showed particular 
attachment. To Albanian accusations of Soviet officials’ quarrels with the Albanians 
within the base, Khrushchev said ‘if you want we can remove our base’, and retold 
how Albania’s membership in the WPO had been opposed by Molotov, who had 
wondered why the Soviet Union should fight for Albania.73 Hoxha took this as a 
provocation intended to pressure Albania and replied that ‘this issue should be 
discussed in the meeting of the WPO’. For Hoxha, however, the message was clear: 
the Soviet Union was not reliable as Albania’s partner in its tense relations with 
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Yugoslavia. The meeting continued with reciprocal accusations until the Albanians 
literally just left the room.74 
Unlike in Bucharest, this time the Albanian leadership had gone to Moscow 
prepared to take a side on all issues that had emerged in the Sino-Soviet divergences. 
Hoxha had approved a report in the end of October 1960 to be read in Moscow.75 
Consulting with the Chinese party, Hoxha endorsed Chinese consideration of the 
present as a revolutionary period, wherein the decolonization process was but part of 
the broader struggle for the people’s emancipation from exploitation. In this sense he 
interpreted and supported Mao’s affirmation that ‘the east wind prevails on the west 
wind’.76 Both sides, China and Albania, made great efforts to convince other parties 
to bring them to their side, but the success was minimal. Nonetheless, unlike at the 
Bucharest meeting, when China had been left almost completely alone, in Moscow, 
some parties, mainly from Asia, agreed in part or completely with the Chinese 
thesis. 77  Albania’s real dissent with Moscow was however, on issues, regarding 
Albania’s national security – possible conflicts with neighbors – and issues regarding 
the legitimation of Hoxha’s personal rule. In this sense Hoxha reminded his Politburo 
that ‘we have disagreed with the Soviets since 1955… on the relations with 
Yugoslavia… when they ignored the Cominform [in fact ignored Hoxha]… they 
took unilateral actions and rehabilitated Tito’s cliqué’. He continued that ‘we have 
been in disagreement with Soviet comrades also regarding their evaluation of the 
Hungarian events, with their hesitations to intervene resolutely to eliminate counter-
revolution and their hesitation to condemn and unmask Yugoslavian interferences in 
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this’. Furthermore, ‘our party has disagreed also with some issues emerged in the 
Twentieth CPSU Congress… criticism of Stalin, and Stalin’s cult…. because this 
was done with no prior consultations with other parties… ignoring that Stalin had 
been not just Soviet Union’s leader but also the leader of the world proletariat’. 
Hoxha mentioned also the intervention of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of 
Albania, ‘in issues such as the problem [Soviet support] of the party’s enemies such 
as Liri Gega and Panajot Plaku, [all purged by Hoxha]’. The final aim of Soviet 
leaders ‘was to undermine the leadership’s rule, divide the people and the party, and 
as a way to establish a new leadership’.78 Hoxha was going to Moscow with the 
intent to defy the Soviet Union, eventually becoming the only WPO member to do so 
after the failed Hungarian upheaval. This would accredit him as the most reliable 
partner for China with which to eventually create a united front against Soviet Union. 
At the meeting, Khrushchev’s opening speech ignored the disputes with Albania 
and China and Moscow’s attitude to Beijing seemed to be conciliatory, yet China 
assumed a conflictual position. 79  The conciliatory attitude is reflected also in 
Hoxha’s report from December (after his return from Moscow), although he did 
sustain that Soviet concessions were due to China’s and Albania’s struggles. In fact, 
he stated that ‘of the 175 pages of amends to the draft, our delegation had 20 pages 
and China 40 pages… none of our arguments was rejected, although not all was 
included… nonetheless the draft changed drastically, growing from 36 to 52 
pages’.80 Most importantly for Hoxha, the final declaration included a paragraph 
which condemned the ‘Yugoslavian revisionism’. Some days later, Deng Xiaoping 
delivered his speech, which was less neutral than Khrushchev’s, as he criticized the 
events of Bucharest. Although less passionate than Hoxha, who spoke later, Deng 
reminded the Soviet Union that ‘not because Soviet Union provides assistance to 
Albania, gives to it the right to interfere in Albanian internal affairs… The CPSU in 
its letter of 5 November to the CCP goes so far as to support anti-party elements in 
Albania, calling them friends of Soviet Union’.81  
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The tone of confrontation reached a crescendo on 16 November 1960, when 
Hoxha delivered his fiery speech, certainly that which provoked the most negative 
reactions – intentionally so, if the speech’s title is any indication.82 He began by 
praising the Soviet Union’s leadership in the communist camp and its aim for 
peaceful coexistence. But on this he added that ‘some [Khrushchev] even go so far as 
to assert such absurdities as China and Albania are allegedly opposed to peaceful 
coexistence. Obviously, such harmful and erroneous views should be rejected once 
and for all… But this does not imply, as the modern revisionists claim that we should 
give up the class struggle’.83 Then, however, Hoxha exploded in personal attacks 
against not only Khrushchev, but the Italians, Bulgarians, Polish, Hungarians, and 
other communist leaders. Disputing peaceful transition and the parliamentary system 
as viable means for the communist parties of the capitalist countries to achieve their 
goals, Hoxha asked rhetorically: ‘Will they do this by violence or by the peaceful 
parliamentary road? This question has been clear and it was not necessary for 
Comrade Khrushchev to confuse it in the 20th Congress, and do so in such a way as 
to please the opportunists’. He rallied further against Soviet leadership, ‘They say 
that we are in favor of war and against coexistence. Comrade Kozlov has even put to 
us, Albanians, these alternatives: either coexistence, as he conceives it, or an atomic 
bomb from the imperialists, which will turn Albania into a heap of ashes and leave 
no Albanian alive. Until now, no representative of American imperialism has made 
such an atomic threat against the Albanian people. But here it is and from a member 
of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union’. Then he attacked Bulgarian leadership for promoting complete disarmament 
in the Balkans, which they had mentioned in correspondence with the Greek 
government. Then he attacked the economic relations among socialist countries, in 
particular the Soviet assistance. For Hoxha, before assisting India or other countries, 
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the Soviet Union should have assisted its fellow communist countries – and he did 
not conceal that Albania deserved more support for its economic plans. He attacked 
also the Polish leader Gomulka for his proposal in the United Nations to not expand 
further the military bases between camps. On this point he posed, ‘why should China 
not have the atomic bomb?’.84 Hoxha strongly emphasized the tense relations of 
Albania with the ‘revisionist’ Yugoslavians and ‘chauvinist’ Greeks, both among 
which he rejected any peaceful coexistence.  
In Moscow, Hoxha condemned the Bucharest meeting as an ‘anti-Marxist Soviet 
trap’, where Khrushchev had accused China ‘without any fact… in that case our 
party thinks that Soviet leadership made grave mistakes towards China’. He followed 
by accusing Khrushchev directly for having pursued in Bucharest a tactic of dividing 
the communist camp. 85  Moving on, he addressed issues such as the Hungarian 
upheaval, about which he restated publically what he had affirmed in the plenum of 
his party in Tirana in February 1957. However, back in Tirana, in order to blame the 
Soviet Union for the split with Albania, Hoxha had lied to the plenum when he said 
that ‘Bucharest signed the beginning of the irritation between the Soviets and us’.86 
Hoxha would also claim that the divide between Moscow and Tirana had started to 
develop in 1955, but he only made this statement after showing Albania’s standing in 
Bucharest to be correct and decidedly Marxist. The situation Hoxha wanted to 
portray was one in which the PLA had done exactly what a communist party should 
do, following and defending the Marxist line, so as he put it, Albania had been 
attacked unjustly by the Soviet Union and could be blamed for nothing. Continuing 
his speech in Moscow, Hoxha attacked Soviet leadership for having rejected the 
Albanian request for grain, for having tried to undermine Albanian leadership, and 
all the other issues for which Albania and the Soviet Union had been quarrelling in 
the last year. The final major issue for Hoxha was the revisionist assessment of 
Stalin. On this point he claimed that: ‘The Party of Labor of Albania solemnly 
declares that it is opposed to these acts and to these assessments of the work and 
person of Joseph Stalin’. Throughout his speech Hoxha carefully attacked only the 
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current leadership of Soviet Union, not the country, which he praised many times in 
the long speech.   
Outrage at Hoxha’s speech came from all directions. It began with Dolores 
Ibarruri, the leader of the Communist Party of Spain, who labelled it ‘the most 
shameful speech during the long years of the communist movement’.87 She went so 
far as to call Hoxha ‘a dog who bites the hand that feeds it’.88 The Polish leader, 
Gomulka, found it to be a ‘disgusting speech’.89 Similar reactions were expressed by 
western communist parties and almost all the European ruling parties.90 
Eventually all parties approved the final declaration, which did not settle any of 
the issues, and was similar to Moscow’s declaration of 1957 – another useless piece 
of paper that all the parties would interpret it in their own way. Before leaving 
Moscow, some members of the Albanian delegation in Moscow, namely Mehmet 
Shehu and Hysni Kapo, met with a Soviet delegation, Kozlov and Mikoyan, on 25 
November 1960. The meeting was a total failure, with each repeating the previous 
accusations against the other. The Soviets, however, made clear two important 
points: first, they intended to discuss the issue of the Vlora base in the meeting of the 
WPO; second, they would be more reticent to assist Albania economically. For 
Albania the result was that in a disunited camp, between Moscow and Beijing, 
Hoxha clearly embraced Beijing. In Tirana, Hoxha warned that the Soviet Union 
might reinforce it's assertive policy towards Albania, but in Moscow Chinese leaders 
had assured them that ‘regarding economic issues, do not worry, we will assist you 
unconditionally’.91 At the same time, Chinese leaders suggested that Albania remain 
pragmatic, and try to maintain good relations with the Soviets, at least formally – 
Hoxha would later ignore this suggestion. On the last day of 1960, Hoxha decided, in 
a meeting of the Politburo, to go public in Albania about Albanian-Soviet 
disagreements and discuss them in all the local party’s committees.92 
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The Final Break with Moscow, 1961 
After their return from Moscow, Albanian leaders were invited back in December 
1960. In fact the invitation was the response to Albanian requests to close the barter 
agreements that had been left to further negotiations. But Hoxha understood that the 
Soviet Union actually wanted to open talks in Moscow on issues regarding the 
Soviet-Albanian divergences. In their letter, the Soviets did not make mystery of 
their intention when they stated that, ‘the economic issues are directly related to the 
normalization of the relations, which under present conditions should be discussed at 
the highest level of the parties and governments’. 93  Thus, Hoxha rejected the 
invitation. He was also working in parallel with China, in order to assure the FYP in 
case of Soviet withdrawal. To this aim, vice Prime Minister Spiro Koleka paid a visit 
to China, in January 1961. By early February, following the letter he had received 
from Koleka, Hoxha could inform his plenum that ‘the plan [FYP 1961-65] has not 
just been assured in case Soviet Union provides anything [loan], but even in case all 
the socialist countries provides anything’.94 Furthermore, China assured the quantity 
of grain and wheat for the coming five years, and the support for the industrial 
projects that the Soviet Union had refused to support. By the time of these 
agreements the disastrous economic outcomes of the Great Leap Forward had been 
known to Chinese leaders – making Chinese loans to Albania even more valuable, 
and showing how important Albania’s support for China had become.  
During this time, the Soviet Union decided to withdraw some of its specialists 
from Albania – the experts of oil extraction.95 More important to Albania, though, 
China provided a loan of 500 million rubles for the Albanian FYP 1961-65, with two 
thirds of it dedicated to industrial projects.96 To seal conclusively the new course of 
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Albania, Hoxha called in February 1961 the Fourth Party Congress. Now the only 
step left was the definitive break with Soviet Union, which by now had become a 
cumbersome partner. China was looking forward to this split, which Mao used ‘to 
radicalize the domestic political discourse’.97 Hoxha’s speech to the congress was 
conciliatory towards the Soviet Union, perhaps because the message that Li 
Xiannian, head of the Chinese delegation, brought from Moscow on his way to 
Tirana, affirmed that Soviet leaders wanted this to be ‘the congress of the friendship’ 
between Albania and the Soviet Union. 98  In fact, its leading role within the 
communist movement, in Hoxha’s report to the congress, was praised and 
highlighted. However, the struggle against revisionism was outlined throughout the 
report, together with the need to fight against Titoism. Khrushchev was never 
mentioned.  
Hoxha’s stubborn refusal to go to Moscow drew a Soviet delegation to the 
congress to seek a meeting with Hoxha. In a way, it would replace the talks Moscow 
desired between Hoxha and Khrushchev. In Tirana, Hoxha received Piotr Pospelov, 
Yuri Andropov, and the Soviet ambassador in Tirana Josif Shikin at the end of the 
congress, on 20 of February 1961. Unfortunately this meeting was as futile as all the 
meetings between Albanian and Soviet leaders since the confrontation in Bucharest 
the previous year. Here, the Soviets made a point of reminding Hoxha of 
Khrushchev’s role as their leader – and that to improve relations with the Soviet 
Union meant Hoxha would have to improve his relations with Khrushchev.99 Hoxha 
on the other hand, stated that ‘Albania wanted to move forward with the issue… 
resolve these relations in a gradual and long process… only through a Marxist way, 
not other ways’.100 Significantly, Hoxha said it was with the current leaders that 
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Albania would possibly improve relations, naming Khrushchev first, prompting 
Andropov to mention for the first time that the Soviet Union too ‘wants that this 
friendship be with comrade Hoxha, comrade Shehu…’.101 In this way, Soviet leaders, 
out of necessity, were endorsing Hoxha’s leadership. To the Soviet insistence on 
Hoxha’s visiting Moscow to re-discuss economic issues, for which agreements 
existed already, Hoxha refused on grounds that were the conditions of the agreement 
to be violated, the Soviet Union would be responsible. So, the meeting resulted in 
another stalemate, the Soviet half-endorsement came too late, and without sufficient 
sincerity, for Hoxha. 
Khrushchev again invited Hoxha and Shehu to visit Moscow only one month 
later, to attend the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the WPO.102 
Hoxha and Shehu refused to participate, ‘for health reasons’, appointing the minister 
of defense Beqir Balluku, and the minister of foreign affairs Behar Shtylla as their 
delegates.103 In the meeting between Balluku and Grechko on 28 March 1961 in 
Moscow, both parties accused each other of provocations in the military base of 
Vlora. To Albania’s insistence on the fulfillment of the agreements to provide the 
base with the military equipment, Grechko replied, ‘our relations have changed, we 
don’t know in which hands this equipment will be… you have removed 
Khrushchev’s photos everywhere and you would like to have him overthrown… if 
you strengthen the friendship [with Soviet Union] as it was in the past, then 
everything will be fine’.104 Grechko affirmed the necessity to send a commission of 
the WPO to Albania to study the military issues of dispute and report to the 
respective leaders in Albania and the Soviet Union. Balluku agreed, but on condition 
that the commission reported also of the violations of the agreements by the Soviet 
Union towards Albania. Eventually no commission was sent. 
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Another issue emerged in this meeting, which aggravated the Albanian position 
in the WPO. The Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, asked ‘why Albania did not 
inform the WPO regarding the Yugoslavian-Greek plot’.105 What he was referring to 
was Hoxha’s speech to the PLA congress the month earlier and his conversation with 
the Soviet leaders in Tirana, where he had affirmed that the ‘Governments of Greece 
and Yugoslavia, in collaboration with internal reactionary enemies, agents, and the 
sixth American fleet, had organized an attack on Albania’.106 On this point Gomulka 
accused Hoxha of ‘fabrication of such facts’ and attacked him for ‘undermining the 
unity of the entire communist camp’.107 At the end Khrushchev proposed to remove 
the naval base from Albania, or ‘have a sole command of the base in Soviet hands, 
without Albanian interferences, and the military vessels should have only Soviet 
crew’.108 This meant total revision of the status quo agreed upon in 1959 – the 
warships would have mixed Soviet-Albanian crews, and a common command. So the 
plot Hoxha announced in the congress turned into a boomerang, against which 
Balluku, in Moscow, had to go on the defensive, reconsidering the magnitude of the 
plot, and reducing it from ‘an organized attack against Albania’ to ‘the arrest of 
internal conspirators before the organizing of the attack against Albania’.109 Finally 
the Soviets, imposing their authority, approved a document according to which 
‘Albania has violated the articles 3 and 5 of the WPO by having provided no 
information on the alleged foreign attack… [Furthermore] the situation in the naval 
base in Vlora has become unsustainable… [consequently] is approved the [Soviet] 
proposal that the warships in Vlora bay should be served only by Soviet crew and 
their command should depend on the Commander of the WPO forces [Soviet 
general]’. 110  Alarmed by these decisions, Albania promptly replied with a letter 
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rejecting all the accusations against it, and explaining better the supposed foreign 
attack by reassessing it in the sense expressed by minister Balluku in Moscow. Most 
important, to avoid further Soviet interferences, which could possibly escalate into 
clashes involving the WPO, Hoxha affirmed that ‘Albania will create all the 
necessary facilities for the evacuation of Soviet forces from the naval base’ if it is 
decided to remove it.111 
The situation in the Vlora base was very tense, and Hoxha sensed that could not 
be sustainable for long. In a voluminous document, information was collected about 
the tension between the Soviet and Albanian crews, which nearly escalated to 
physical confrontations. 112  Between May and June 1961 the Soviets decided to 
withdraw the vessels, but had to leave those already in the hands of Albanian crews 
because Albania claimed all the vessels as its own – in accordance with the 
agreement. The base was eventually built with Chinese assistance in the coming 
years. In August, another invitation came from East German leader Walter Ulbricht, 
who informed Hoxha of the meeting of the WPO members to discuss the Treaty of 
Peace with Germany and the Berlin issue – in fact, the meeting was to discuss the 
building of the Berlin Wall.113 To Moscow, Hoxha sent Ramiz Alia, one of his 
lieutenants who spoke fluent Russian, who was denied to take the floor, because 
‘Albania was under-represented in the meeting, and the invitation was for the first 
secretaries of the parties’.114 Only China, which participated as observer during all 
these WPO meetings, defended Albania, because it was also a chance for Beijing ‘to 
sever the institutional links of the People’s Republic with the WPO’.115  
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However, what saved Hoxha from possible, and feared, Soviet intervention was 
the international situation. It is not the case that Hoxha actively decided to aggravate 
relations in 1961, knowing that Khrushchev’s international attention was elsewhere, 
tackling issues such as the Berlin Crisis. In this same year, the situation in Cuba grew 
into a military collaboration between Havana and Moscow – which led to the missile 
crisis the following year.116 Furthermore, Albania had not been part of the Yalta 
division of Europe; therefore the Albanian-Soviet split did not challenge post-war 
European division. Hoxha realized that the Soviet Union hardly could afford another 
crisis in its already large list of confrontations with the West, with countries, and on 
issues, much larger than Albania. Soviet intervention in the Adriatic Sea ‘would have 
required a major naval operation… to which America could not have remained 
indifferent. This in turn would have affected the build-up of missile capability in 
Cuba’.117  In August 1961, the Soviet ambassador left Albania, officially for the 
holidays, but never to return. During the rest of the year followed an intense 
correspondence of accusations between Albanian and Soviet leadership, ending what 
little was left of the Soviet-Albanian entente.118 In October 1961, during the Twenty-
second CPSU Congress, Khrushchev ‘criticized [attacked] Enver Hoxha by name’, 
whom only Zhou Enlai defended.119 Finally, in early December 1961, the Soviet 
Union interrupted all diplomatic relations with Albania.120 
Although formally a full member of many of the eastern bloc’s organizations, 
following the interruption of the relations with Soviet Union, Albania either refused 
or was not allowed to participate in all international forums of the eastern bloc led by 
the Soviet Union such as the WPO and COMECON. Albania, the smallest and 
weakest of the European socialist countries had defied the Soviet Union, the greatest 
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and most powerful socialist country in the world. Albania urged China instead to 
become the leader of the international communist movement. It was the only country 
to offer such a crown to China, and was ready to struggle for it. It cannot have been 
easy for Khrushchev to digest such defiance, as several initiatives to bring Albania 
within the ranks were undertaken between 1961 and early 1962 – most likely 
instigated by the Soviet Union. Ho Chi Minh’s initiative, in summer 1961, to mediate 
talks between Albanian and Soviet leaders was the first. Although Ho Chi Minh said 
it was his personal initiative, most likely he had been persuaded by Moscow. This 
seems to have been suggested also by both the Albanian and Chinese leaders. 
Eventually neither Beijing nor Tirana welcomed his initiative. Albania refused even 
to receive him in Tirana, and his planned trip to Albania was simply postponed sine 
die.121 Furthermore, when the Soviet ambassador in Beijing, Chervonenko, told Liu 
Shaoqi that the Soviet Union would like to invite Albania to participate in the 
Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU scheduled in October 1961, Hoxha refused 
the invitation – although Chinese leaders welcomed this initiative.122 During the 
CPSU congress, Zhou Enlai discussed with Khrushchev the problem of Albania, and 
defended his ally against the attacks Khrushchev had made in his speech. For Zhou, 
‘regardless many Albanian mistakes…’ it had been unjust to interrupt the assistance 
to Albania. 123  However sincere the attempt to ease tension between Tirana and 
Moscow may have been, Zhou Enlai’s allegations of Albanian ‘mistakes’ to 
Khrushchev sounded unpleasant when they reached Hoxha’s ears. When the Chinese 
ambassador in Tirana, Lo Shigao, informed Hoxha of Zhou Enlai’s meetings in 
Moscow, Hoxha reacted by denying any ‘mistakes’ in relation to the Soviet Union. 
The Chinese ambassador retreated, stating that the document had been translated 
wrong.  
In December 1961 another attempt was made, this time by the Indonesian 
communist party, to convene a meeting of all the communist parties, after the model 
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of the last Moscow conference, intending ‘to discuss the Soviet-Albanian 
disputes’.124 Similar initiatives were undertaken also in the first months of 1962, 
when letters from communist parties of New Zealand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Sweden, 
and England, were sent to China calling for a meeting of the international communist 
movement to settle the Soviet-Albanian disputes. China did not oppose in principle 
and relayed to Albania the correspondence with the Soviet Union. China remained 
convinced that these parties had not been after Moscow’s support.125 But Hoxha 
firmly opposed, posing unacceptable conditions to the Soviet Union, such as the 
public admittance by Khrushchev of his alleged mistakes towards Albanian 
leadership, the revival of all interrupted economic and military agreements, and 
rectification of Soviet policies in international relations with particular reference to 
the policy of peaceful coexistence.126 Hoxha’s strategy had become clear: accredit 
Albania as an undiscussed and exclusive ally and supporter of China. In turn, 
Albanian leaders expected China to prioritize the economic and military assistance to 
Albania, even at the expense of other countries if necessary. On this point, when Li 
Xiannian visited Albania in February 1961, meeting with Enver Hoxha, had clearly 
outlined the roles of the two countries in their alliance: China provided Albania with 
economic assistance, whereas ‘you [Albania] supports us [China] in the political 
field’.127 
 
Conclusion 
Although officially Albania protested the Soviet interruption of diplomatic relations, 
Hoxha – we can say in hindsight – must have enjoyed very much the end of Soviet 
influence over Albania. Now his hands were free of any regional or continental 
alliance system which could have been used against him, as Yugoslavia first and 
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later the Soviet Union had done. In this sense, China’s geographical distance was 
highly advantageous. Hoxha tied himself to China also for reasons concerning the 
very nature of the allies’ political power. After Stalin, Khrushchev had showed to be 
more flexible and less ideological. Biberaj argues that it was economic necessity 
rather than ideological affinity to push Albania towards China. 128  This is only 
partially true; ideology was of equal importance to economic necessity – if not more. 
The events since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU showed that it was Soviet 
undermining of the ideological legitimacy, not only the lack of Soviet economic 
support that eroded Hoxha’s power. To Hoxha, Khrushchev’s leadership could not 
guarantee continuous support because it depended on factors others than ideology – 
and consequently, was unpredictable. On the contrary, China was ruled by a single 
man, Mao, who yet retained unquestioned control, and who showed a Stalinist-style 
zeal for the communist cause which permitted solid legitimation of Hoxha’s rule. In 
1960-61, Hoxha tried to play the ideology card to accredit himself as the true 
upholder of the banner of Marxism, so as to align himself with China and distance 
himself from Khrushchev. Once he successfully played this card, and his hands were 
free of ties to the Soviet Union, the ideological considerations became less important, 
and economic construction could be prioritized. In fact, China was so geographically 
distant, if necessary he could afford to take from it only in part Mao’s own ideas of 
socialism, still pressuring to get as many concessions as possible for his model of 
economic development. Yet, if from 1956 to 1961 the ideology was paramount to 
Hoxha’s hold on his power, after that period, ideology and economy became equally 
important. However, this policy did pose limitations: Hoxha’s room to maneuver 
ideologically, and take from Mao’s ideas whatever suited him the most, became 
larger, but his economic hands were tied very strongly to China, and eventually this 
became one of the biggest limits and failures of Albanian socialism.  
                                                            
128 Biberaj, Albania and China, 40. 
 
 
102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART TWO 
 
 
ALLIES, 1962 – 1970 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
103 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
A RESTLESS ALLIANCE 
 
Introduction 
The alliance between China and Albania came only after the estrangement of both 
Tirana and Beijing from Moscow that had begun in the mid-1950s. Albania emerged 
as the only ideologically-similar ally of China in Europe. Similarly, Mao Zedong, for 
Albania, emerged as the upholder of the right line of Marxism and possibly the new 
leader of the international communist movement. In this way, China was greatly 
appealing to Hoxha. First, it was a great country, with a long revolutionary tradition 
forged in the war against Japan, which, for the public narrative in Albania, was very 
important. Second, Mao was indisputably a leader, who claimed adherence to the 
orthodox dogma of communism. This was important to the legitimation of Hoxha’s 
personal initiatives in Albania. Third, China, albeit poor, was also perceived as a 
resourceful country, at least in Hoxha’s eyes, capable of replacing the Soviet Union’s 
economic and military assistance to Albania. In addition, China’s ideological rigidity 
would be a reason for Albania to strongly support China internationally, though the 
alliance remained informal. In opposing Khrushchev’s reformism, Tirana and Beijing 
had come to form a common front in an unexpected way, and once the partnership 
was established, China and Albania coordinated their actions on the international 
stage – whenever common interests were at stake. 
Initially, it was beneficial to both countries to maintain an informal system, 
which allowed both sides to take their own steps towards problems on a case by case 
basis. Although no treaty was ever signed between Beijing and Tirana, joint 
communiqués were released on certain occasions to affirm the countries’ unity. 
These could be used as official propaganda in Tirana to challenge the image of 
Albania as an isolated country – the most isolated in Europe. The other benefit of 
these communiqués was that they accredited Albania worldwide as a supporter of 
China and vice versa, consequently making Tirana an important interlocutor in the 
attempt to bring other small communist parties and revolutionary groups to China’s 
side. The intention was to build an alternative international communist movement, 
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which tried to challenge the Soviet Union’s leadership of communism. Eventually, 
all this became part of what is known as Global Maoism – a form of internationalism 
opposed to that of Soviet Union. Another factor that made a formal treaty of alliance 
superfluous was the geographical distance. However strong the Chinese will to 
support Albanian security and sovereignty might have been, the obstacle of 
geographical distance rendered impossible Beijing’s implementation of any 
obligations deriving from a formal treaty. When Albania invited China to sign a 
formal treaty of friendship in 1964, it was also the geographical factor that Beijing, 
among many factors, cited in refusing the offer. China was not willing to commit to 
expensive operations that did not guarantee political return, as Albania was outside 
the core area of China’s security – which was (and is) East Asia. Moreover, Chinese 
refusal of a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance was intended to discourage 
possible provocative actions of Albania in the region, especially when considering its 
tense relations with Yugoslavia during the sixties. Eventually, the Sino-Albanian 
alliance’s informality was entirely overshadowed by its substantial outcomes.  
Yet the alliance began with attrition because China tried to seat Albania in talks 
with Moscow, and seemed to show a conciliatory attitude towards the Soviet Union. 
Later, with the Khrushchev’s dismissal from office, China had the illusion of a 
possible improvement of the relations with the Soviet Union. Both these moments 
negatively impacted Hoxha’s image of China. He, in fact, perceived Chinese 
standing often weak, contradictory, and ideologically not as solid as he had expected 
Beijing to be. It is in this period, however, that the Sino-Albanian efforts to capture 
small communist parties worldwide intensified, and the collaboration with them 
became systematic. It is also during this period that strong efforts were made by 
Albania to defend Chinese interests on the international stage, which made of 
Albania China’s spokesperson in issues such as the Sino-Indian border clash in 1962, 
the issues of Tibet in United Nations, and other important issues. 
 
Disagreements Between Tirana and Beijing 
Following the interruption of the diplomatic relations between Tirana and Moscow, 
to further advance the alliance with Beijing, an Albanian high political delegation 
headed by Hysni Kapo visited China in June 1962. The visit was at the invitation of 
the CCP and was significant because of the political issues that the two sides 
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discussed. Kapo met six times with Deng Xiaoping; their long conversations entirely 
centered upon ideological issues, and on both the Sino-Soviet disputes and the 
Albanian-Soviet split. Deng, from the first meeting to the last tried unsuccessfully to 
convince Albania to participate in a possible meeting of the world communist parties, 
which among other issues would try to settle the Soviet-Albanian disagreements.1 
More specifically, what Deng had in mind was the Soviet proposal, submitted to 
China at the beginning of March 1962 by Soviet ambassador Chervonenko, ‘to mend 
relations with Albania and set aside Sino-Soviet differences’.2 Then with another 
letter, delivered at the beginning of June 1962, the Soviet Union proposed to have a 
meeting of the communist parties in Moscow that same month, just before the World 
Congress for Disarmament and Peace, scheduled in Sweden, 9-15 July 1962.3 
In Chinese correspondence with Soviet Union, Khrushchev had listed Chinese 
support of Albania as one of the causes of the Sino-Soviet split – at least this is what 
Deng Xiaoping told Kapo.4 Finding it impossible to bring Albania to talks with 
Soviet Union, Deng changed his position and reinforced instead the divide with 
Soviet Union, affirming that Moscow had made mistakes of ‘great state chauvinism’ 
with both China and Albania. Deng tried to accredit China as a supporter of Albania 
against the Soviets, and also defended Stalin against Soviet attacks. Moreover, he 
claimed that the Soviet Union ‘pursues a tactic of convincing China… to marginalize 
Albania’ and then normalize Sino-Soviet relations.5 Deng was affirming that China 
was paying a certain price to maintain its support for Albania. But Kapo returned the 
favor the next day affirming that ‘you well know that our relations with Soviet Union 
begun to deteriorate after the Bucharest meeting’, although the affirmation was only 
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partially true as Soviet-Albanian relations had deteriorated before Albania’s 
sympathy for China in Bucharest.6 Deng, however, insisted on participating in the 
meeting of the world communist parties, where China, he argued, would have to give 
its opinions on issues that it had been prevented from giving in the past. In particular, 
he referred to the Soviet consideration of Yugoslavia as a ‘socialist country’, and to 
the defining of the concept of dogmatism for which China had been attacked by the 
Soviets, and other related issues. In this sense, Peng Zhen reinforced Deng’s 
arguments affirming that a meeting after the Moscow Conference would be an 
opportunity to speak to communist parties from within capitalist countries, ‘where 
China has no diplomatic representation’. 7  At the same time that the Albanian 
delegation was in China, the CPSU sent a long letter, relayed to Albanian delegation 
on 10 June 1962, inviting the Chinese to defend the unity of the communist camp. It 
explained to the CCP all the reasons why, according to the Soviets, Soviet-Albanian 
relations had deteriorated. The letter was full of accusations against the Albanian 
leadership, but was friendly to the CCP. With the intention to open a breach in the 
Sino-Albanian interparty relations, the Soviets eventually wished that ‘the Albanian 
question should not be a reason for the Sino-Soviet tension’, and for not promoting 
an international meeting of the world communist parties.8 
But Albania’s position remained irremovable. Beijing was inclined to support 
the meeting of the communist parties after the model of the previous Moscow 
conferences, whereas Tirana, fearing the forum would further isolate Albania, did not 
want such a meeting to take place. In this sense, Kapo argued how Albania had 
already become a reference point for communist parties in the West, pointing to the 
Italian Communist Party [Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI], and Pietro Secchia, an 
Italian communist who had come to Albania asking Hoxha for support and 
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suggestions on the possible split with the PCI – eventually no split took place.9 
Knowing the passionate public discourse of Albanian leaders against Soviet Union, 
which could be counterproductive, Deng noted ‘the necessity to say always the truth, 
act in our benefit, and be moderate’ in the ideological struggle against Soviet 
Union.10  Albania instead wanted an open and firm polemic through the parties’ 
propaganda channels (press and diplomatic contacts) to ‘unmask Khrushchev’. This 
could be pursued through both ‘the press… and capturing the revolutionary groups 
within communist parties’. 11 Hoxha’s instructions for Kapo also included 
underscoring the Yugoslavian revisionism, and fostering resistance towards it – 
because during Kapo’s visit to China, Khrushchev was in Bulgaria, praising 
Yugoslavia. 12  Hoxha sought also to establish an air route between Beijing and 
Tirana, which he deemed ‘absolutely necessary… regardless of how expensive it 
could be for Beijing’, but the issue was postponed by Chinese leaders.13 
Chinese moderation and Deng’s initial attempt to persuade Albania to participate 
in a meeting of communist parties were interpreted as a “sway” of the CCP. 
Moreover, Hoxha thought that Deng’s arguments were ‘weak’ and China ‘fears too 
much to be isolated in the international communist movement’. In this way China 
‘underestimates the capacity of resistance of the revolutionary forces in the world, 
and overestimates the Khrushchevian influence… they [Chinese leaders] seek a way 
out by claiming that the struggle [against revisionism] would be long’. Deng’s 
suggestion to temper the polemic against the Soviets was deemed ‘a wrong tactic, 
unacceptable for us’. For Hoxha, the first and the best way to deal with the Soviets 
would be ‘the revolutionary struggle against revisionism’. The other options would 
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be either Chinese participation in communist parties’ meetings, but not Albania’s 
participation, or ‘going all us to the meeting and getting out of it exhausted’ – 
disregarding China’s choice, ‘we [Albania] will choose the first way… and in all 
cases never the last [Albanian participation in Moscow meetings]’.14 Hoxha also 
rejected Deng’s argument that since Khrushchev used the Soviet diplomatic network 
to convey Moscow’s positions to other communist parties, a meeting of world 
communist parties would be a proper forum for China and Albania to talk to these 
parties. For Hoxha ‘this position is absolutely baseless… do our friends [Chinese 
leaders] think that after such a meeting the Soviets will not try to push other parties 
against us? ’Such a view was noted also in Hoxha’s personal diary, where he 
affirmed that ‘Chinese friends fear to be accused by the Europeans of interference in 
internal affairs’ if they openly assisted Marxist parties in these countries.15 Hoxha 
instructed Kapo to make clear that Albania considered this a primary issue of 
principle for the international communist movement, because ‘had we taken into 
consideration the economic and political potential of Khrushchev [Soviet Union]… 
then we should have not opened any dispute with him for two centuries to come… 
but our position has to be avant-garde, not behind the lines’.16 Eventually, Deng 
retreated, affirming in the third meeting with Kapo that China would not participate 
in any meeting of world communist parties to which Albania was not invited, nor 
would they go without guarantees of equality among all parties. On this issue, 
however, Albania’s position was ‘clearly opposed to Chinese standing’.17 
In 1962, several events further motivated Hoxha’s refusal to talk with the 
Soviets. First, a Czechoslovakian newspaper attacked the Albanian leader, and in 
mid-June of that year, Walter Ulbricht, the East German leader, also attacked 
Albania and the CCP, concluding that he would not participate in any meeting to 
which Albania was invited.18 In each case, Hoxha’s decision was not to participate in 
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any meeting, unless Soviet leaders ‘accept publically all the mistakes they have made 
to us’. Chinese efforts to convince Albania to participate in possible meetings of the 
international communist movement were for Hoxha ‘contradictory… with a strong 
mark of opportunism’. But the impact of Hoxha’s refusal on Sino-Albanian relations 
was well calculated because Hoxha thought that China ‘will not go without us 
[Albania], as this would be… a political loss in the eyes of the communist 
revolutionary parties’.19 Hoxha informed Kapo also that soon he would open the new 
session of the parliament with an attack on Soviet revisionism – a step that went 
against Deng’s suggestion about being moderate in the polemic towards the Soviets. 
Finally, despite the stubbornness the Albanian delegation displayed with Deng 
Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai tried to convince Albania to participate in the proposed 
meeting of the communist parties, but to no avail. Then Zhou informed the Albanians 
that it would not be possible to implement most of the important industrial projects 
China had agreed to build in Albania for the ongoing FYP, reducing the commitment 
from 29 to 10 such projects. The reasons given were Chinese ‘internal economic 
difficulties’, and the lack of foreign currency to purchase equipment from other 
countries.20 The meeting with Zhou took place after the long conversations between 
Hysni Kapo and Deng Xiaoping. Leading Kapo to assume, ‘these economic 
problems are connected with the others [political issues discussed with Deng]’.21 
More likely, the decision to back out of these projects came as consequence of the 
failed Great Leap Forward. 22  But neither Zhou Enlai nor other Chinese leaders 
elaborated upon it, leaving Albanian leaders with room for speculation. In times of 
hardship for China, Albania was proven to be an expensive ally.  
The period 1961-1962 was characterized by marked contradictions in Sino-
Soviet relations. In a brief period of relaxation in 1961, China left the door open on 
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possible improvement in its relations with the Soviet Union.23 Lüthi argues that Mao 
did not really want any rapprochement with the Soviet Union, but lacked consensus 
from other Chinese leaders, bringing as an example Liu Shaoqi’s affirmations that 
the Soviet Union was ‘central to the socialist camp’, and how ‘harmful to essential 
Chinese interests would be’ a split with Moscow.24 But then in 1962 the Sino-Indian 
border clashes, particularly Khrushchev’s neutrality on the issue, stoked Chinese 
distrust of Moscow. Eventually, in 1962, the Soviets gave China the promised 
designs of the Mig-21 fighter plane, but after that such planes were also offered to 
India.25 Not long after, widespread dissent broke out in Xinjiang among the non-Han 
population. There ‘the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations led to the mass flight 
of 67,000 people’ to Soviet Union.26 In this context the Chinese attempt to bring 
Tirana to the table with Moscow is not to be understood as an attempt to push 
Albania towards rapprochement with Moscow. Beijing clearly knew that political 
tensions between Tirana and Moscow were too extreme to be settled; but Beijing also 
knew that Tirana would not abandon China politically. Nonetheless, Albania’s 
possible re-establishment of relations with the Soviet Union could have potentially 
given Hoxha access to Soviet economic resources by establishing normal trade 
relations. In this way Albania would have been politically supporting China but 
economically relying less on it, dividing efforts between Moscow, East Europe, and 
Beijing.  
Another way to explain Deng’s attempt to seat Tirana and Moscow together is to 
look to the Chinese internal dynamics in that period. The negative outcomes of the 
Great Leap Forward had divided Chinese leadership. Their differences had 
manifested at the Lushan Conference in 1959, and led to the Seven Thousand Cadres 
Conference of January-February 1962, which was a ‘watershed in the post-Great 
Leap Forward process’.27 During the Thousand Cadres Conference Mao and Zhou 
admitted that some of their recent policies had caused economic hardship. Liu 
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Shaoqi, in his report ‘supervised by Deng Xiaoping’, although praising Mao’s 
leadership, also gave to ‘human errors’ and to the ‘practical implementation’ some of 
the blame for the economic problems, clearly alleging to the leadership’s directives.28 
The divide was between people like Peng Dehuai, Zhang Wentian (both purged in 
1959), Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, Wang Jiaxiang, and to a 
certain extent Zhou Enlai, who were more prone to the economic development of the 
Soviet model, and Mao, who took mass mobilization as a way to boost economic 
production. The first, with a different tone, had opposed the Great Leap Forward, 
although eventually they also contributed so as to mitigate its effects. 29  Wang 
Jiaxiang had gone so far as to ‘advance the three conciliations and one reduction: 
conciliate with the imperialists (United States), conciliate with revisionists (the 
Soviet Union), conciliate with the reactionaries (India), and reduction of aid to the 
world revolutionary forces’.30 It was now possible to envisage two different agendas 
within the Chinese leadership. In case Albanian leaders would have accepted a 
rapprochement with the Soviets, in particular one regarding economic relations, it 
would have been a clear political message of disagreement with Mao’s policy, giving 
political credit to those within Chinese leadership who had disputed the chairman’s 
chosen course. The timing of such a message would have been opportune, as just two 
months after the Kapo-Deng meetings, Beijing hosted the Beidahe Conference, and 
later in September 1962 the Tenth CCP Plenum, where opposite views regarding 
China’s economic path came once again to the fore. 31  Furthermore, the re-
establishment of Tirana-Moscow contacts would have lessened the tension between 
China, Albania and the Soviet Union.  
Eventually, two events brought China and Albania to a common front again in 
late October 1962. First, on 20 October 1962 Chinese and Indian troops clashed at 
                                                            
28 Ibid., 137-181. 
29 Kenneth Lieberthal, “The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan'an Leadership, 1958-65”, in 
Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng, 2nd ed, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997, c1993), 87–147. 
30 Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heavens, 28; Niu Jun, “1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China’s 
Foreign Policy”, 28-34. 
31 Lieberthal, “The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan’an Leadership, 1958-65”, in Roderick 
MacFarquhar, ed., The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng, 122-125. 
112 
the border in the disputed areas along the McMahon line. 32  Chen Yi, Chinese 
minister of foreign affairs, promptly informed the Albanian ambassador of the 
events.33 Albania revealed to be a good ally in these times of need as it firmly 
defended the Chinese position in the United Nations’ General Assembly, refuting 
attacks from other countries following the military confrontation. The Albanian 
delegation was instructed to ‘defend China with great force, and condemn the 
aggressors’.34 Albania attacked India, blaming it for having rejected a presumed 
Chinese plan for resolution. This face-to-face confrontation between Albania and 
India even drew the attention of New York Times, which published the polemics.35 
Albania, using documents provided by China, made a long presentation of the causes 
of the conflict, explaining how China always ‘made efforts to resolve the border 
disputes with India only through negotiations’. Nevertheless, despite China’s efforts, 
‘it was not possible to achieve an agreement reciprocally acceptable because of 
Indian insisting in putting conditions’ to eventual talks.36  Albania blamed India, 
because it was ‘the Indian troops who first attacked China’s border’37 instigating the 
conflict.38 It is interesting that the language used in the Albanian speeches differs 
from that in the Chinese documents relayed to Albania before the session. China’s 
language was softer, more pragmatic, diplomatic and practical to the issue to be 
discussed. Albanian diplomats however, acting on behalf of China in the UN, took an 
inflammatory tone, attacking the United States’ leaders as ‘warmongers’ and 
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‘blackmailers’, their policy as ‘submerged into sludge’, and their actions as 
‘shameful’.39 In November 1962, the general secretary of the UN, U Thant (Maha 
Thray Sithu U Thant), called the Albanian representative in UN, Halim Budo, to ask 
what Albania thought about possible mediation he might attempt regarding the Sino-
Indian conflict. U Thant knew very well that by speaking to Albanian representative 
on this issue, he was in fact talking to Beijing.40 Instructed by Beijing, Albania 
rejected the mediation and insisted on a solution based on Sino-Indian bilateral 
talks.41 For China, since Beijing was not allowed to have its legitimate seat in UN, 
then the mediation of the head of this organization was non-sense. On this occasion, 
Albania and Soviet Union were antagonists rather than collaborators. When the 
Albanian foreign minister Behar Shtylla delivered his speech, the Soviet delegation 
left the hall, although the speech did not attack the Soviet Union. On the contrary, 
Albania supported the Soviet position on the Berlin issue, and on the issue of peace 
treaties between the Soviet Union and both East and West Germany.42 The Chinese 
position was defended also by the Soviets, but Khrushchev’s transgression had been 
calling for Sino-Indian talks instead of pledging full support for Beijing.43 This event 
reinforced Mao’s animosity towards the Soviet Union. At the same time, China 
defended Albania from attacks during the congresses of the ruling parties of East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary during November-December 
1962.44 
The second event was the Cuban missile crisis only two days after the Sino-
Indian border clashes. Chinese leaders ‘disapproved of Khrushchev’s policy of 
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placing missiles in Cuba’, but both China and Albania disapproved also 
Khrushchev’s proposed solution to the crisis. 45  For both Beijing and Tirana, 
Khrushchev “lost” the confrontation, betraying in the process Fidel Castro and his 
communist regime46 – although Khrushchev claimed the resolution of the crisis as a 
‘triumph’ for the Soviet Union.47 Because of Khrushchev’s attention to Cuba, he 
‘almost completely neglected Soviet interests in Asia, where China’s influence grew 
remarkably at Soviet expense’.48 Following the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev 
seemed eager to pursue the unity of the communist camp. In this direction should be 
read also his initiative in February 1963 to hold bilateral talks between the CCP and 
the CPSU.49 With the proposal of bilateral talks came also the Soviet invitation to 
cease the open polemics – basically to stop the propaganda articles in China and 
Albania that continuously, with different tones, attacked Soviet revisionism. Mao 
underlined Soviet contradictions on this point: just when the Soviets made their 
request, Khrushchev attacked China at the congress of the Socialist United Party of 
East Germany. Eventually Mao welcomed the bilateral talks, and China stopped, for 
a short time, their polemics against the socialist and communist parties that had 
offended it.50  
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Mao, meeting the Soviet ambassador in Beijing, also touched upon two 
important issues for Albania. First, he told Chervonenko that there would not be a 
united socialist camp without Albania. Second, that China, in line with Albania, did 
not consider Yugoslavia as part of the communist camp.51 Regarding the first point, 
the Soviet Union feebly attempted a solution following the Mao-Chervonenko 
meeting. In early March 1963 the Czechoslovakian embassy in Tirana contacted the 
Albanian leadership. On behalf of the Soviet Union, they informed Albania of the 
letter they had sent to the CCP regarding CPSU-CCP bilateral talks, and relayed also 
a short letter addressed to Albania, calling for talks before those of CPSU and CCP. 
But this, at least to Albanian leadership, implied that the Soviets saw Albania as an 
appendage of China. Consequently, Albania refused to attend any talks under such 
‘unequal’ conditions.52 
Despite some disagreements, Sino-Albanian relations intensified in 1963. At 
least six Chinese delegations from different fields visited Albania during the second 
half of 1963, and the visit of Fang Yi, vice president of Chinese State Planning 
Commission was among the most important.53 On 31 December, 1963, Zhou Enlai 
made his first visit to Albania.54 This was after he had toured ten African nations, 
where he ‘convinced them more in the struggle against American imperialism and 
less in that against Soviet revisionism’.55 During the first meeting between Enver 
Hoxha and Zhou Enlai, Hoxha accredited Albania as a strong interlocutor with 
parties and countries where he saw possible to foment sympathy for Sino-Albanian 
Marxist cause. He indeed affirmed, that ‘especially addressing Arab countries is our 
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duty to create a fertile terrain for the political aims of our countries [China and 
Albania]… because we are a small and Muslim country… let alone our people’s 
revolution and socialist building’.56 Then Hoxha delivered a long prepared speech 
attacking American imperialism, all East European revisionist regimes, and the 
Soviet Union and its leadership. On this issue, Hoxha privately had considered 
Chinese hesitations, at times, as a sign of weakness, and he defended his position by 
stating that the polemic against the Soviet Union ‘was always for the sake of the 
socialist camp and the international communist movement’. Furthermore, for Hoxha 
‘it is imperative to further strengthen and organize the struggle of communists 
worldwide’.57 Regarding Albania’s relations with the neighbors, in particular the 
relations with Yugoslavia and Greece, he depicted a dark situation, but Hoxha also 
committed to ‘pay attention to develop with Italy and Yugoslavia normal interstate 
relations based on the principle of the peaceful coexistence with countries with 
different systems, and make all efforts to avoid tension’.58 Zhou Enlai recognized 
Albania’s important role as ‘the upholder of the banner of Marxism in Europe against 
imperialism and revisionism, giving a great contribution to the socialist camp… 
which is made even greater by the small size of your country’.59 Then Zhou praised 
Hoxha’s remarks on all the points he had mentioned during the first meeting. He 
pointed out how China and Albania could use in their favor four existing 
contradictions in the world: contradictions among imperialists, between imperialist 
and socialist camp, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and between 
imperialist and oppressed nations. Zhou fully endorsed Hoxha and also gave a long 
speech attacking Khrushchev and Soviet Union.60 Then Zhou urged and endorsed 
Albania’s will to be active in its contacts with the Arab and African countries and 
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communist groups. Regarding Latin America Zhou seemed to rely more on Cuba, 
although he had to admit that Castro could not ‘openly’ oppose Soviet Union.61 
In his fifth meeting with Zhou Enlai, Hoxha focused on explaining that ‘the 
center of revisionism is in Europe, consequently the struggle against it there is more 
difficult’. Even though ‘our party has some authority over the European communists, 
yet the role of China is and remains decisive in assisting revolutionary Europeans’. 
Therefore Hoxha asked for ‘more coordination… as we have embassies in France, 
Italy and elsewhere where you do not, you instead have in Soviet Union where we do 
not’. To this aim he proposed to China to create a unit at the Chinese embassy in 
Tirana, which would stay in ‘close collaboration’ with the Albanian authorities in 
coordinating the assistance for the revolutionary groups. Interestingly, Hoxha 
mentioned that in Poland there existed at least 30 groups which opposed Gomulka’s 
revisionist regime, and that even a coup d’état had been prepared but eventually was 
not implemented.62 All this data provided by Hoxha was aimed at increasing China’s 
perception of Albania’s role in Europe as important, and consequently increasing 
Chinese assistance. Moreover, Albania was testing how far the Chinese could go in 
the ideological struggle against Soviet Union, since only some months earlier Zhou 
himself had tried to convince Albania to talk to the Soviets. This time in Tirana, 
however, Zhou Enlai came to be supportive of the Albanian determination to fight 
with firmness against Soviet revisionism. China also launched a campaign of 
polemics (nine articles) against Soviet Union from September 1963 to July 1964, 
which was a reflection of Mao’s radicalism rather than Albania’s influence.63 
 
The Fall of Khrushchev: Attrition Between Tirana and Beijing 
In October 1964, through a soft coup in the Soviet power’s cupola, Khrushchev lost 
his power.64 The event was received with mixed feelings by both Soviet and Chinese 
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leaders regarding the Sino-Soviet relations, which soon came to a stalemate. 65 
Hoxha, on the other hand, was convinced that Khrushchev had been removed by his 
close comrades, who were just as revisionist and who would not change the course of 
the Soviet Union for the better. In hindsight, perhaps he was right. Immediately after 
the removal of Khrushchev, Zhou Enlai took the initiative, without consulting 
Tirana, to promote a close up between Tirana and Moscow. Zhou asked the Soviet 
Ambassador in Beijing to pressure his government to invite an Albanian delegation 
to Moscow, for the celebrations of the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution.66 
Zhou Enlai then personally invited Hoxha to re-establish links with Moscow. When 
Hoxha was informed of the Chinese actions, he became furious. In meeting with his 
close comrades, he stated the need to reconsider all relations with China, because, for 
him, China was taking a renegade path. The Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu went 
further still, revealing to the Politburo that Albania had prepared a secret plan to deal 
with the possibility of being completely isolated without any assistance from any 
other country [China], but only normal trade ‘with those that still wants to trade with 
us’.67 
Hoxha called the diplomatic representative of China in Albania, and through 
Ramiz Alia asked China officially to not take any initiative on behalf of Albania.68 
The Albanian leadership continued imposing conditions for rapprochement with the 
Soviet Union. These conditions were impossible and humiliating for the Soviet 
Union: a complete rectification of the line followed by Khrushchev since the 
Twenty-second CPSU Congress; the rehabilitation of Stalin; the calculations and 
eventual repayments of the damages to the Albanian economy caused by the 
interruption of the Soviet aid; the end of the talks on the disarmaments with the 
West; the reconsideration of the peace treaties with Germany, and the retaking of 
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severe attacks towards Tito. 69  Certainly, these were merely intended to justify 
Hoxha’s lack of will for any bilateral talks with the Soviet Union. For Hoxha, 
highlighting the divergences with China regarding such rapprochement had only 
internal implications, to reinforce his rule and reaffirm a sense of autonomy for 
Albania. He knew that China was in great divergence with the Soviets, and he was 
perfectly aware that those disputes were not easy to settle even with the change of 
leadership in Moscow.70 Hence, his refusal to approach Moscow could not have had 
serious implications for Albania’s relations with China. Eventually, during the mid-
1960s – early 1970s, China came to understand that Brezhnev was no better than 
Khrushchev – if not worse. In the same time, however, China’s repeated attempts to 
bring Albania to talks with the Soviets eroded Hoxha’s perception of Chinese 
position as rigid and irremovable towards the revisionist Soviet Union. 
 
FORMING THE “ANTI-REVISIONIST” FRONT: 
CHALLENGING THE SOVIET UNION’S LEADERSHIP OF THE 
COMMUNIST MOVEMENT 
The Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955 (known as Bandung Conference) 
was the first attempt at forming an alternative bloc of the emerging world outside the 
East-West confrontation.71 Its failure, shown most clearly by the Sino-Soviet border 
clashes, pushed China to seek other ways to make space for its ambition as a global 
player. Coinciding with the domestic radicalization following the Sino-Soviet split, 
China sought to be a model for the revolutionary forces in the emerging world, in 
particular in those countries where the national struggle for independence on the 
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wave of the decolonization left room at least for revolution, if not necessarily 
communist revolution. 72  This required a twofold struggle for China: against 
imperialism, embodied in the United States, which for China had ‘replaced German, 
Italian and Japanese fascism as the principal enemy of the people of the world’, and 
against Soviet revisionism.73 If the Soviet Union’s struggle to gain support in the 
Third World came from a logic of Cold War division of spheres of influence74 – with 
its borders that outside Europe were fluid – Chinese struggle instead had to focus 
more, and at times primarily, against the Soviet revisionism and its powerful political 
machine. This was made even more difficult by China’s lack of economic means 
compared to Soviet Union. 
During his meetings with Hysni Kapo in Beijing in June 1962, Deng Xiaoping 
had affirmed the necessity ‘to make long efforts to create a revolutionary nucleus in 
the international communist movement’.75  Deng emphasized the need to open a 
breach within the world communist movement and bring to the Sino-Albanian side 
the many revolutionary parties and communist groups of the Global South, namely 
Latin America, Asia and Africa. Nonetheless, China had begun to create some space 
for such manoeuvres, even before relations with Moscow sank, as the case of 
Guinea, in Africa, shows.76 Khrushchev some years earlier had mentioned Albania as 
‘a precious gem that would attract the rest of the Muslim world towards communism, 
especially in the Middle East and Africa. That’s what our intentions were and the 
kind of policy we were pursuing’.77  
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On this same line, Deng invited Albanian leaders to overcome apparent 
prejudices towards these parties, some of which had attacked Albania during the 
Moscow Conference in November 1960. Deng stated that their attack on Albania 
came due to Soviet pressure, ‘but in deep heart they admire the PLA’s struggle for 
the Marxist cause’.78 Deng was interested also in the West European communist 
parties, for which Albania could have more knowledge given its proximity and 
diplomatic relations with some of these countries. Hysni Kapo affirmed that Albania 
had already received ‘numerous letters from communist parties and groups from 32 
different countries’.79 Kapo stated that the ruling parties in the eastern European bloc 
had experienced great difficulties which left space for groups within these parties to 
emerge against revisionism. The same he affirmed for the communist parties of the 
western Europe, where the situation was even easier for the creation of new 
communist groups. Regardless the accuracy of Kapo’s affirmations, he was trying to 
argue for the lack of necessity for any close up with the Soviets as the breach within 
the communist movement led by the Soviets had already occurred. Albania’s 
strategy, elucidated by Kapo, was to promote an open international struggle against 
Khrushchev’s revisionism.  
It was not the first time that the leading role of Soviet leaders in the international 
communist movement was challenged. Even in the early 1930s, Trotsky had been the 
first to challenge the Soviet (Stalinist) model of communism by forming what then 
he called International Left Opposition.80  More consistently, during 1960 on the 
wave of the Sino-Soviet disagreements, some communist parties had supported 
China, although not as openly as Albanians.81 The deterioration of China’s interstate 
relations with Soviet Union further motivated both China and Albania to try to 
capture the sympathy of the small leftist groups or communist parties. This was not 
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pursued for purely ideological reasons, but also in solidarity with the Third World’s 
struggle for emancipation. From this perspective, China and Albania did not make 
much distinction between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The 
world, for them, was trapped into the American “imperialist” and Soviet “revisionist” 
struggle for world supremacy. Therefore, however low the potential to project 
effective power worldwide, Beijing tried to accredit itself as an alternative to the 
Soviet Union for the newly emerging world.82 But ‘China’s other rival in guiding the 
Third World in the struggle against “imperialism” was East Germany’, the Soviets’ 
most powerful and dedicated protégé.83 Tirana tried to play for Beijing the role that 
East Germany played for the Soviet Union, but with less power. 
In early July 1963, Hysni Kapo met in Tirana with the Chinese ambassador Lo 
Shigao, and asked a pledge of joint support for all those groups in the world that 
would join the Sino-Albanian struggle against both ‘imperialism’ and 
‘revisionism’.84 The moment he chose showed Albania’s willingness to test Chinese 
leaders’ intentions. Albanian leaders knew of the Sino-Soviet interparty bilateral 
talks, which started in Moscow the same day Hysni Kapo met in Tirana with the 
Chinese ambassador. The Albanians perhaps were correct to doubt the Chinese 
conviction against the Soviet Union as the Chinese response to Albanian initiative 
came on the last day of the Sino-Soviet bilateral talks in Moscow.85 Chinese leaders 
kept all of their options on the table, waiting to see the outcomes of these talks before 
taking any step in opposing Soviet Union. For Radchenko ‘the word “talks” is 
perhaps inadequate’ to describe Sino-Soviet talks, as they were more ‘heating 
exchanges’. 86  Eventually they resulted in a complete stalemate, with both sides 
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holding their positions on all the issues which had been matter of contention between 
Soviet Union and China since the 1950s, ‘with the only benefit that… each side had 
the opportunity to explain its position in full’. 87  As Lüthi has stated, ‘Mao’s 
comeback in the late summer 1962 provided the impetus for renewed ideological 
radicalism in China’s foreign policy… only a complete ideological surrender of one 
side could save Sino-Soviet relations’.88 Therefore, ‘it was impossible for the Sino-
Soviet relationship to develop as long as the ideological disputes continued’.89 The 
Soviet Union asked to stop the open polemic, and wanted a communiqué in this 
sense, but China refused. The Soviet Union reiterated again its invitation at the end 
of November 1963 to stop the polemics in the press. China instead challenged 
Moscow by calling for a meeting of the communist parties of all East Asia, New 
Zealand, Australia and Albania to be held in early 1964.90 Eventually the meeting 
was postponed, as Zhou Enlai later told Hoxha that this meeting ‘does not present 
any immediate necessity’.91 
In autumn 1963, the roles of China and Albania in support of revolutionary 
forces were better outlined. To China, together with the Albanian minister of defense 
Beqir Balluku, went also Pirro Bita, Head of the PLA Directorate for Foreign 
Relations (International Liaison Department) – a man that would play a crucial role 
in the years to come in the contacts between the PLA, CCP, and the revolutionary 
                                                            
87 MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 3: 352; The CCP relayed to Albania a 
copy of the Transcript of the talks. In, “Records of the meeting between the representatives of the 
CCP and the CPSU in Moscow, 06-20 July 1963, and the information of the Albanian Charge 
d’Affaires in China, Vasil Skorovoti, about his meeting with the Chinese vice director of the 
International Liaison, 27 July 1963, where he relayed to Skorovoti these materials regarding the talks 
between the CCP and the CPSU regarding important issues of today’s world development, the 
international communist movement and the Sino-Soviet relations (among which they talked about the 
causes of the emergence of the divergences [Sino-Soviet], Moscow’s declarations of 1957 and 1960, 
the 20th and the 22nd  CPSU congresses, the issue of Stalin, Yugoslavian revisionism, the Albanian-
Soviet relations, etc)”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1963, D23-23/8. 
88 Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, 244; For Mao’s radicalization in this period see also, Niu Jun, “1962: 
The Eve of the Left Turn in China’s Foreign Policy”, 1-36; Mingjiang Li, “Ideological Dilemma; 
Mao’s China and the Sino-Soviet Split 1962–1963”, Cold War History, Vol. 11, no. 3 (2011): 387 – 
412. 
89 Niu Jun, “1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China’s Foreign Policy”, 22. 
90 “Letter of the CPSU sent to the CCP, on 29 November 1963, asking to stop the opened polemic, 
among other issues. Correspondence between the CCP and the PLA, regarding the possibility for a 
meeting of 12 communist parties in China”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1963, D12. 
91 Tirana, 02 January 1964. “Minutes of Conversation between comrades Zhou Enlai, Head of the 
Council of State of the PRC, vice Chairman of the CC of the CCP, and leaders of the Party and the 
State of PR of Albania. Second session in the afternoon of 02 January 1964”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-
MPKK, V. 1963, D25-25/1, f.39. 
124 
groups worldwide. In Beijing he met many times with officials of the CCP 
International Liaison Department who told him of the Chinese role in Asia, and 
informed him of the Asian communist movements. 92  The Albanian minister of 
defense Beqir Balluku also had long conversations with Deng Xiaoping with focus 
on the international communist movement and the strategy to be adopted by China 
and Albania to build a united front against revisionism.93 For this purpose, China 
committed also to building a foreign languages’ publishing house in Albania and a 
powerful radio station.94 Liu Ningyi told Bita that China needed a base in Latin 
America, and Bita promptly mentioned Albania’s embassy in Brazil.95 China had 
attempted to establish contacts in Brazil even before Albania, when ‘the Brazilians 
dispatched to China, shortly after the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU, a group of 
cadres for six months of indoctrination’.96 But following the military coup in Brazil 
in April 1964 in which nine Chinese citizens were arrested, eventually accused of 
plotting a communist revolution, Chinese contacts became more difficult. The 
Chinese citizens were sent back in China after one year of imprisonment, but this 
case caused the interruption of the diplomatic talks between Brazil and China until 
1974.97 
From 1964 onward, that assistance for the revolutionary forces became 
increasingly systematic and intensive. The Albanian leadership established in June 
1964 the first monetary fund (named solidarity fund) to assist Marxist and 
revolutionary parties – a fund which would continue to exist until 1990. Hoxha 
appointed two of his most faithful comrades, Hysni Kapo and the head of the PLA 
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International Liaison Department Pirro Bita, to run this program.98 A document of 
March 1966 states that the fund was created with an initial Chinese and Albanian 
contributions of 500,000 USD, and 200,000 USD, respectively.99 In 1967 the fund 
reached almost one million American dollars, with an annual Chinese contribution of 
half a million.100 Financing the activities of these groups continued for many years, 
in particular the South American and European groups taking the lion’s share of the 
fund. To the solidarity fund was added also the political and military training offered 
by the party’s school in Tirana and by the Albanian army.101 Regarding the last 
aspect, it is interesting to note that most of the groups that came to Albania for 
military training were from Latin America and Africa. Some members of the OLP 
(Organization for the Liberation of Palestine) also came. On this point, according to a 
recent Albanian publication by a former journalist of the Albanian army, groups from 
eleven countries received military training in Albania from mid-1960s to mid-1970s, 
among them were people that later would become famous such as Lula da Silva from 
Brazil, who later became president of his country, Laurent Kabila from Congo, Abu 
Jihad, who was Yasser Arafat’s right hand, and many others.102 Albania’s regime 
established relations with dozens of parties and revolutionary groups worldwide, 
including groups from at least sixteen African countries, eight parties from Latin 
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American countries, sixteen from Asia, two from Oceania, still others from the 
Middle East, the West, and (limitedly) East Europe.103 
The activities of these groups consisted mainly of publishing and publicizing 
propaganda that China and Albania continuously provided. The aim was to promote 
China and Albania and attack Soviet Union (revisionism) and the United States 
(American imperialism). In Africa and Latin America though, many of these groups 
were involved in illegal activities. In particular in Latin America, the political 
repression against the leftist movement made difficult and dangerous even simple 
political activities such as distribution of pamphlets or meetings in university circles. 
But these were also years of revolutionary fervor which affected most of the so 
called Third World, therefore making fertile terrain for political activities. 104  In 
Albania, for the first time in 1964, came also a limited number of political asylum 
seekers from Africa. For instance the president of the revolutionary committee of the 
People’s Union of Cameroon, Ndeh Mtumazah, asked in November 1963 to house 
his family in Albania, after that they had escaped to Ghana.105 His wife and his three 
children reached Albania in April 1964, but their stay was short as in October 1964 
they were authorized to leave Albania and go to East Germany where her husband 
had gone after ‘becoming an instrument of the Soviet revisionists’, as an Albanian 
report stated.106 By 1970 the number of African students increased to twenty, many 
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of them children of rebels who passed their whole childhood alone in Albania.107All 
the foreign communist activists staying in Albania were provided a monthly salary, a 
house or apartment, and education for children.108 Many of them became successful 
doctors, or engineers after completing university in Tirana, and in a few cases 
remained in Albania for their entire lives. All these activities were in coordination 
with Chinese officials, as indicated by hand written notes from Hoxha. 
 
The Anti-Soviet Front: Two Examples of Sino-Albanian Internationalism 
In February 1966, an Albanian ship carrying special cargo was about to leave from 
the Polish port of Gdansk. Two men, one diplomat and the Albanian trade attaché in 
Poland, had organized the embarkation. Their task was to take out of Poland two 
leaders of the new Polish Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), [PCP (m-l)], Dajti 
and Drini (Albanian pseudonyms) who had organized illegal activities opposing the 
ruling party in Poland.109 It was a covert operation that, if discovered, could have 
repercussions on diplomatic relations between Albania and Poland which had already 
deteriorated after the Soviet-Albanian split in 1961. Polish authorities later 
discovered the operation, and the Albanian embassy in Poland was closed for some 
time. One of the men that Albanian authorities helped to exile to Albania was 
Kazimierz Mijal. Born in 1910, he had been active with the communists during the 
Second World War. After the war he served as a minister in Poland, as Mayor of the 
city of Lodz, and occupied other offices. But when Khrushchev reshaped Soviet 
policy denouncing Stalin’s crimes, Mijal colluded with the ruling Polish United 
Workers Party (PUWP), and in 1964 illegally founded his own communist party. 
Since Mijal was not unknown to Polish authorities, organizing his exile from Poland 
was a matter of both concern and pride for the Albanians. Eventually the operation 
was a success, and Mijal reached Albania on 18 February 1966, where he would stay 
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for more than a decade, establishing the Polish section of Radio Tirana, and trying to 
organize activities in the capacity of general secretary of the PCP (m-l).110 
Once safe in Tirana, Mijal’s concern was how to expand the network of 
connections in Poland, in the vain hope of undermining Wladyslaw Gomulka’s rule. 
From Tirana, Mijal managed to distribute his party’s communiqués to some factories 
in Warsaw. As a result, the Polish authorities had many arrested, and the Politburo of 
the PUWP criticized the minister of internal affairs, who is reported to have admitted 
that they had not surveyed enough.111  For Mijal’s task the Chinese embassy in 
Warsaw was as helpful as the Albanian embassy. Not unlike a great spy movie, the 
Chinese embassy collaborated with the Albanian diplomats in Poland to confound 
the secret police tasked with keeping an eye on them.112 Albanian authorities tried to 
use Mijal’s party as a possible nucleon of further actions in other East European 
countries. Albanian authorities sent instructions to the embassies in Budapest, Berlin 
and Praha asking to establish contacts with Polish citizens that lived in these cities.113 
Poland was the biggest (and important) East European country, and Mijal was the 
most experienced man among those supporting the Sino-Albanian cause in all East 
Europe.  
The Chinese embassy also worked to create contacts between Mijal and others, 
including a professor at Warsaw University, Stefan Matuszewski.114 According to the 
information given by the Chinese embassy in Warsaw, following the self-imposed 
exile of Mijal, the Polish authorities had arrested many political dissidents, many of 
whom were members of the newly born PCP (m-l). In addition, the Albanian 
embassy in Poland told of Polish police continuously following the movements of its 
diplomats and staff. Back in Tirana, Mijal proposed reducing the contacts for some 
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time to only one person in Poland: the ‘lady with glasses’. A woman from the 
Albanian embassy could meet her at the cinema, once the light were off, they could 
exchange the bags, but had to avoid speaking, ‘not a single word’.115 In the bag there 
would be correspondence and materials to spread among a restricted number of 
people in Warsaw. It is interesting that most of the recipients were bureaucrats and 
state employers, including a former deputy chief of the post-war Polish parliament. 
The work of Mijal proved difficult, dangerous, and even deadly, as information 
arrived in Tirana that an assassin had been sent for him, although this is unverified 
and most likely from an unreliable source.116  In Poland, the illegal activities of 
communist groups had been taking place since 1964, with Albanian and Chinese 
support. Radio for communications, pamphlets for illegally distribution, and money 
for operations had all been provided by Tirana. Enver Hoxha seems to have had great 
enthusiasm and expectations for Mijal’s role in Tirana. Not long after Mijal arrived, 
Hoxha organized a reception for him, and promised him assistance.117 Hoxha also 
advised Mijal to select five Polish comrades with which to reinforce the Polish 
section of Radio Tirana, and he suggested building up a section of the PCP (m-l) in 
Paris, considering the large Polish diaspora in France. Moreover, Mijal was told to 
collaborate with Jacques Grippa, the head of the Belgian communist party, another 
party which was receiving assistance from both Albania and China. 
The second case regards West Europe, that of Jacques Grippa in Belgium, who 
among all the western communists was the first to establish a party that supported a 
hard line against the Soviet Union. Jacques Grippa was also an experienced man, as 
much as Mijal, and seriously committed to the communist cause. He had been part of 
the resistance against Nazism in Belgium. Arrested by Gestapo in 1943, he was 
tortured, and then sent to the concentration camp of Buchenwald. But he had the 
fortune to survive and return to Belgium, where he became a known official of the 
Communist Party of Belgium. The work with the West European communist groups 
was easier. Their leadership did not have to work in exile, their meetings with the 
people, and their propaganda were not suppressed, although in some cases, other 
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forms of repression were used, in particular against the distribution of pamphlets that 
called for the rebellion and overthrow of the democratic regimes in West Europe. 
After the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, Grippa supported Mao, becoming one 
of the most known supporters of Maoism in Europe. In 1963, he was expelled from 
the Communist Party of Belgium, but soon he founded the new Belgian Communist 
Party, Marxist – Leninist [BCP (m-l)].118 He was important for Albania and for 
China because of his extended contacts with communist parties worldwide. He 
personally claimed to be in contact with as many as sixty communist parties and 
groups.119 And initially, he supported even more strongly than Mijal the Chinese 
struggle against the Soviet Union.  
Therefore, for Hoxha, these two men were precious keys to establishing a strong 
network of communists in Europe, which could be faithful to China and Albania. 
Grippa collaborated with Albania from Brussels, and published documents of Mijal’s 
party, such as the declaration of the PCP in La Voix de Peuple, (People’s Voice), the 
official party press of the Belgian Communist Party, although they censored the 
comments on Jews and other issues. Grippa proved hard to deal with, and it seems 
that in 1966 he was behaving very selectively towards the Marxist groups. He 
disagreed with the Albanian leaders about a Spanish communist party, recently 
founded, and its illegal activities. Then, in Spain, followed the founding of another 
communist party. Albania established contacts with both parties, although just one of 
them was deemed fully Marxist. Grippa did not agree with the fact that Albania was 
helping both of these groups, preferring to assist only the party led by someone 
called Valera.120 Perhaps Grippa accredited himself as the reference, as a filter, for 
the Albanian and Chinese contacts with the western European communist groups, 
and claimed a certain role. He might have felt bypassed, therefore he blamed Albania 
for assisting many groups that often were in conflict with each other. However, 
considering that most of these parties and groups were small, and almost none of 
them had consolidated power, Albanian leaders thought that having more options on 
the table was better than having none left. Grippa, on the contrary, thought that, 
given the limited resources, it was wiser to concentrate their efforts only towards 
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those parties that had toed the right line. He looked, for example, at France, where 
two groups, one in Marseille and the other in Paris had been assisted, where only the 
groups of Paris truly shared their ideology. Kapo and Alia accepted that in the case 
of France, Albania had been mistaken, and reminded Grippa to address his criticisms 
to the PLA, and not its Chinese comrades, whom Grippa had also blamed.121 These 
groups were also competing for resources, and Grippa could have had concerns 
regarding the use of these resources. China, not Albania, had been the first to assist 
Grippa in building his new communist (m-l) party, after his expulsion from the 
Communist Party of Belgium in 1963. Beijing not only recognized the new party, but 
assisted them materially and received Grippa in Beijing. In 1964, divergences about 
the tactic and the approach to new European communist groups emerged between 
China and Grippa, as Beijing wanted to establish relations with any possible 
communist group that diverged from the Soviet Union, while Grippa remained 
selective, using ideological boundaries and practical performances as his criteria for 
evaluation.122 
Beyond the propaganda narrative, neither Beijing nor Tirana were promoting 
revolution – not at least in Europe. They wanted cells of Marxist-Leninists within, 
but mostly outside, the communist bloc to provide legitimation for their split with the 
Soviet Union. Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, many political parties in 
the West had been taking the side of China, including groups within the European 
big communist parties such as in France, Belgium, and Italy. In addition, these 
groups could be useful as a bridgehead for further expansion of Mao’s, and 
eventually Hoxha’s, thought. The work in the West, however, would not be easy. In 
western Europe, the leadership of the communist movement was in the hands of the 
largest communist parties of the western camp, the Italian Communist Party and the 
French Communist Party. Both had strong ties with the Kremlin, which even the 
United States found difficult to cut, as shown recently.123 They shadowed almost 
every attempt by leftist movements to gain political influence. Moreover, the 
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economic growth in West Europe reached its peak during mid-1960s, in what is 
known as the “Trente Glorieuses [The Glorious Thirty]”, the time of thirty years 
1945-75 of economic growth after the Second World War.124 This undermined the 
power base of the revolutionary forces. In this context, China and Albania could only 
proselytize among extra-parliamentary leftist groups, which opposed both the 
parliamentary left and the right.  
These political communist groups were notable for the division amongst 
themselves at this time. Each country had many groups that supported the Sino-
Albanian alliance, but none were strongly collaborative with each-other.125 There are 
at least three reasons for this. First is the fact that many of these groups claimed to be 
the real communists in their country and they wanted to be recognized as such by 
others. The second factor is their competition for resources, as they knew China and 
Albania would support those most adherent to rigid ideological principles. The third 
factor concerns the Albanian and Chinese strategy to not prioritize or even pursue 
unity in these groups – because, in the case of betrayal by one group or party, they 
could have other available groups to support their policy. Another significant aspect 
of this assistance concerned the armed struggle, or lack thereof. No evidence has 
emerged to suggest that China and Albania supported armed struggle in any 
European country. This is likely due to the fact that, among other reasons, both 
Beijing and Tirana had correctly seen that conditions for communist revolutions in 
West Europe remained far from being ripe. Therefore, when asked to provide 
military equipment, Hoxha was quite categorical in denying the western European 
groups, as in the case of an Italian communist group. One Chinese concern about the 
assistance provided to European groups was to avoid being accused by any European 
country for intervention in internal affairs. Hoxha, in his personal diary in 1965, 
criticized China for fearing too much. It seems, however, that China, although not 
explicitly, was content to leave the “dirty work” of directly intervening on behalf of 
these European groups to Albania, and in turn Beijing provided the financial and 
material assistance.  
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Regarding Latin America and, in particular, Africa, both China and Albania 
thought there could be good chances for these revolutionary groups to assume 
political power. Perhaps they were right, because following the decolonization 
process, in many African countries’ leftist groups seized, or nearly seized, authority – 
demonstrating in the process that these revolutions were more than just remote 
possibilities. The same could be said of the Latin American groups. As the economy 
in these countries was in the hands of oligarchies, with great support from United 
States, and the political power was mostly in the hands of corrupted and authoritarian 
military regimes, both China and Albania believed communist revolutionary parties 
could gain support from the masses.126 In a visit to Albania in January 1964, Zhou 
Enlai affirmed that ‘the revolutionary flame… exists today in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America, countries where there is ongoing national revolutionary upheaval, there are 
revolutionary conditions’.127 Their concern in this case was not the oppression of the 
authorities, but the Cuban hold on these groups. They deemed Cuba revisionist, 
although they both supported Castro.  
 
CHINA’S ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT FOR ALBANIA 
Unlike Kim Il Sung, Hoxha did not seek economic advantages from both China and 
the Soviet Union – by playing Beijing and Moscow against each other.128 Although 
during the party congress in February 1961, Hoxha mentioned to Kozlov and 
Andropov that the Soviet call for peace would remain unanswered until complete 
implementation of the economic assistance according to the agreements; Hoxha did 
not push for further negotiations. From documents, it is clear that Hoxha prioritized 
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the Chinese economic assistance, regardless of his eventual relations with Soviet 
Union. This is shown by his conversation with the Soviet delegation in Tirana, which 
focused more on the cause of Soviet-Albanian disagreements, rather than looking for 
a way out of the stalemate.129 In fact, Hoxha’s position towards the Soviets was even 
stronger by then, backed by the political and economic support of Beijing.130 After 
all, Albania was not in the same position as North Korea, and a fight to control 
Albania hardly would have occurred between China and the Soviet Union. 
Chinese leaders actually contributed quite directly to Hoxha’s hostility towards 
Moscow. For instance, Li Xiannian told Hoxha in February 1961 in Tirana, that 
China would not provide as much military assistance to Albania as it received from 
the WPO members.131 This left Albania at the mercy of Moscow’s conditions, but 
since Moscow was providing no assistance by that time, Hoxha could not choose to 
stay between Moscow and Beijing. Of course, he fully embraced China. Therefore, 
when, between December 1960 and January 1961, an Albanian economic delegation 
headed by Spiro Koleka, member of the PLA CC and vice head of the State Planning 
Commission (a powerful state institution that used to plan and supervise the FYP), 
visited China, their aim had not been to request a complementary loan, but 
substantial assistance to replace the Soviet planned aid for the entire FYP. 
Eventually, China approved a loan of 500 million rubles for the Albanian FYP 1961-
1965. Although Albania formally was tied to agreements with Soviet Union for the 
same FYP, the lack of Soviet implementation of these agreements made Albania 
economically a client state of China. This came also as a consequence of the 
continuous assurances China made to Albania, regarding its support, which as they 
said, was going to be ‘unconditional’. As the events that followed would show, this 
statement was not entirely true.  
China’s promise was functional to both the Soviet-Albanian split, and to the 
Sino-Soviet split. Other factors may have played a role as well. Chinese leaders knew 
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that the Albanian quarrel with the Soviet Union resulted in Albanian quarrels with all 
the other eastern European countries, and negatively impacted their economic 
assistance to Albania. Hoxha personally had contributed to this situation by attacking 
one by one nearly all the eastern European leaders during the Moscow Conference in 
November 1960. Once relations with Moscow further deteriorated, and Albania was 
isolated by the Soviet East European bloc, China perhaps was confident to persuade 
Albania to give up at least some of its requests for assistance in developing their 
heavy industry, and follow Chinese suggestions to prioritize light industry and the 
production of consumer goods. This seems to have been the case when, in January 
1961, in Beijing, Zhou Enlai confirmed China’s readiness to assist Albania, but also 
asked for revisions to the Albanian plan. Zhou’s demands were similar to those 
Khrushchev had made a few years earlier. China had confirmed the loan of 500 
million rubles to Albania, which signed the beginning of many years of Chinese 
assistance to the Albanian economy and to its FYPs, and replaced entirely the once-
promised Soviet assistance.132 However, Zhou did not agree with the Albanian plans 
of building sixteen industrial projects for the period 1961-65. Although he eventually 
ceded to their requests, he made three criticisms: first, of building large, complex 
industrial projects while the agriculture was still backward, because ‘…if there is no 
progress in the agriculture then there are also obstacles to the development of the 
industry…’; second, of the manpower required for these industrial projects, 
manpower that Albania’s small population – then around 1.6 million – could not 
muster; and third, of the difficulties posed for China in providing products that 
required advanced chemical processes, both for agriculture and industry.133  
Zhou Enlai, knowing that Albania had run out of alternatives, thought he could 
push Albanian officials to revise the FYP. In fact, only 100 out of 500 million rubles 
of the Chinese assistance, less than one third, was addressed to agricultural 
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investments. But Hoxha’s firmness withstood Zhou’s attempts. Significantly, Zhou 
affirmed that his suggestion to focus on agriculture and light industry came ‘from our 
[Chinese] experience’.134 By now the consequences of the Great Leap Forward had 
been clear for Chinese leaders, and its outcomes had reduced China’s capacity to 
project abroad the economic power they had planned when they launched it in 1958. 
Zhou Enlai did not mention the Great Leap Forward explicitly, however, and there is 
no evidence that Albanian officials came to know of its real consequences. On the 
contrary, Li Xiannian told Albanian leaders in Tirana in February 1961 an outright 
lie, affirming that Chinese economy ‘has been growing speedily… the industry has 
developed greatly, in particular in the last three years’.135 Li Xiannian, who seems to 
have been in contact with Beijing during his stay in Albania, was the first to propose 
to send Chinese experts to Albania, and committed to assist as much as possible in 
all fields. Despite the hardship in China, Beijing committed also to provide Albania 
with the necessary wheat for the coming five years, part of the grain would have to 
be imported from Canada.136 
 
Finally Developing the Industry 
Following the interruption of all relations with the Soviet Union, in early 1962 
Albania asked China to revise the agreements regarding the FYP reached less than a 
year earlier, to increase the investments in heavy industry. Albania had three 
priorities: first, building a strong metallurgic sector; second, considering the 
existence of a large number of rivers, the construction of a network of powerful 
hydroelectric power plants; third, utilization of the oil fields. Another priority was 
the building of plants for the production of chemical fertilizers to help boost 
agricultural production. From December 1961 to January 1962, the Albanian head of 
the State Planning Commission, Abdyl Këllezi, paid a visit to China. He re-
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negotiated the agreements of the FYP 1961-65 in the light of the recent interruption 
of economic credits to Albania from the Soviet Union and East European bloc. China 
accepted the requests for an additional loan of 30 million rubles (33 million USD), 
and moreover, agreed to provide the technology (tubes) for the oil extraction – one of 
the most important raw materials in Albania and a possible source of foreign 
currency – by purchasing them directly from western countries in foreign 
currency.137 In this new agreement, in total Albania was approved assistance of an 
additional 29 industrial projects for a total loan of 151.9 million rubles138 (168.609 
million USD).139 The two countries also decided to create a joint shipping company.  
Zhou Enlai mentioned that Albania was one among more than 22 countries 
China was then assisting.140 Unlike the Soviet Union, China had great problems with 
its technological capabilities, forcing it to import technology from West Germany, 
Canada, and Japan.141 For Albanian leaders this was not much of a concern as far as 
‘all our plan is assured’, as Këllezi reported in Tirana.142 Zhou Enlai stressed that 
Albania’s share of Chinese foreign aid was even larger than that of North Korea.143 
                                                            
137 Records of the Politburo, 31 January 1962: “Report of Abdyl Këllezi on the work of the economic 
delegation that visited PRC”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V.1962, D5, f.94-107. In January 1961, when Spiro 
Koleka had requested the same equipment for oil extraction, China had rejected it because unable to 
produce such equipment. 
138 According to Shu Guang Zhang the aid for the five-year plan was 112 million rubles. In Zhang, 
Beijing’s Economic Statecraft during the Cold War, 1949-1991, 197. Instead, according to the 
Albanian documents the total amount of the loan reached almost 152 million rubles. 
139 The official exchange rate was 1 rubles=1.11USD Converted into today’s value would be around 
1.35 billion USD.  
Data retrieved: http://www.saving.org/inflation/inflation.php?amount=100&year=1960 (last access, 
08/03/2017). 
140 Including not communist and not Asian countries. Indeed the first Chinese assistance (credit) to an 
African country had been an aid of 5 million USD to Egypt during the Suez crisis in 1956. See Bruce 
D. Larkin, China and Africa, 1949-1970: The Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of China, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 25. 
141 At the beginning China imported grain, mainly from Canada, later instead the trade included also 
some technologies. See Chad J. Mitcham, China’s Economic Relations with the West and Japan, 
1949-79: Grain, Trade and Diplomacy, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 49; Julian Gewirtz, 
Unlikely Partners : Chinese Reformers, Western Economists, and the Making of Global China, 
(Cumberland: Harvard University Press, 2017). 
142 AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1962, D5, f. 97. 
143 In October 1960 China and North Korea signed an agreement for a loan of 96 million rubles for the 
period 1961-64, which makes the Chinese assistance to Albania higher than the aid to North Korea, 
but China had granted another loan of 42.5 million USD in 1958. After 1964 seems that Chinese 
economic assistance to North Korea went decreasing. See Karoly Fendler, “Economic Assistance 
from Socialist Countries to North Korea in the Post-war Years: 1953-63”, in Han S. Park and 
Dongwha Research Institute, eds., North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: 
Prentice Hall, 1996), 168. 
138 
Perhaps that was partially true, but differently from Albania, North Korea was also 
(and mainly) receiving assistance from Soviet Union. In addition, the total economic 
aid granted to Albania was a long term loan, whereas before 1960 China had 
provided to North Korea free aid totalling 1.6 billion rubles.144 Later, China granted 
North Korea another long term loan of 420 million rubles for the years 1961-64.145 
The fact remains that Albania was among the top beneficiaries of Chinese foreign 
aid, on the same level as Vietnam and North Korea.146 In the 1960s, following the 
Great Leap Forward, China was forced to re-assess its assistance to the African 
countries, reducing that share of its efforts to the ‘minimum resources’ possible.147 In 
return, China, in competition for influence with the Soviet Union, offered more 
ideological assistance, scholarships for students and Chinese experts abroad. 148 
Significantly, because Albania was the only European communist ally of China, it 
was not affected by the Chinese reduction in foreign aid, but for the losses of others, 
it now enjoyed the lion’s share of Chinese foreign assistance. This came about as 
China’s bordering countries, after the 1960s, as mentioned above, chose to stay 
mainly under Moscow’s umbrella, politically and, consequently, economically, as in 
the cases of North Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam.149 
The negotiations for this new agreement were not as easy as Albania had 
expected. In fact, due to its own economic hardship, China seemed to step back in its 
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commitment towards part of Albania’s industrial projects. At a certain point, Zhou 
Enlai told Këllezi that it was impossible for China to ‘assume the entire burden they 
[Soviet Union and other European countries] had assumed for you’. 150 China’s 
hesitation to commit to building the Albanian heavy industry projects was received 
with astonishment in Tirana, because China had initially offered to provide 
‘unconditional’ assistance. A stunned Këllezi told Zhou that ‘you have assumed the 
responsibilities to overcome our difficulties’, to whom Zhou Enlai replied that ‘only 
in part’.151 For Zhou, it was better to speak less about the economic and more of 
political collaboration, stressing the political importance of the alliance. For Albania, 
however, economic survival was as important as the political – though the latter did 
not depend as much on the alliance, or non-alliance, with China. From the Chinese 
perspective, Albania had opposed the Soviet conditional economic assistance 
because it found in China an alternative to Moscow’s interference. To the Chinese, 
Tirana seemed desperate, in a position of tied-aid, and without any clear alternatives. 
Therefore, when China made the same criticism the Soviets had to Albania, it 
seemed possible to persuade the Albanian government not to undertake an economic 
path that could prove burdensome for China (despite official rhetoric sustaining the 
opposite) and prove neither efficient nor profitable for Albania. This was a 
miscalculation, for Albanian leadership was determined to decide in full autonomy 
the economic course of their country. It was precisely this determination that had tied 
Albania to China, not simply the lack of alternatives, which Beijing did not 
understand immediately.  
On the other hand, the Chinese objection to Albania’s plans of prioritizing heavy 
industry was coherent with the lessons China learned from the outcomes of the Great 
Leap Forward. This experience changed China’s model of foreign aid, by 
emphasizing ‘the light industry and agriculture in the early stages of 
development’.152  Albania, however, doggedly pursued the heavy industrialization 
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that the Soviets had first promised (then denied), which had become an obsession for 
Hoxha. Zhou Enlai blamed the Chinese struggles in part on the Soviet Union, which 
had withdrawn all of its specialists from China, abandoning the joint industrial 
projects. In this way, Zhou argued that China was going through a period of 
economic difficulties and thus could not play the economic role it had planned had 
the Great Leap Forward’s outcomes been according to the expectations.153 
Among the many complex industrial projects Albania wanted to build was 
achemical fertilizer plant, inclusive of a unit for the extraction of gas from oil. China 
did not have the adequate technology for the plant, but was willing to enter into 
negotiations on behalf of Albania with “Montecatini”, one of the biggest Italian 
companies specializing in chemical products. China was interested in acquiring 
advanced foreign technologies. 154  This was a chance to do exactly that, in 
conjunction with Albania’s needs. Albania also requested the necessary technical 
assistance from China to study, plan and eventually transform the Drini River, in the 
North, into a hydropower cascade. At that stage, China agreed to study the idea, but 
preferred (and suggested) using oil to generate electricity instead. But for Albanian 
leadership, which were farsighted in this case, the oil extraction and processing was 
much more complex, requiring technology and capital that Albania did not have, 
whereas the Drini would be a reliable source of clean energy. During the 
negotiations, China conceded the investments for nearly all of the heavy industrial 
projects – neglecting, at Albania’s behest, agriculture and light industry.  
But in its economic relations with China, Albania neglected (or preferred to 
ignore) the technological gap between China and the rest of the communist camp, not 
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154 Bruce H. Billings, China and the West: Information Technology Transfer From printing Press to 
Computer Era, 1st ed (Long Beach, CA: Intertech Press, 1997); Douglas B. Fuller and Murray A. 
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to mention the advanced capitalist nations. Despite the sincere efforts of Zhou Enlai 
to convince Albania not to rely too heavily on China, because of this lack of 
development, Albania trusted more in China’s potential than even China did. In their 
second meeting, on 31 January, 1962, Zhou reaffirmed to Këllezi that China would 
assist Albania without hesitations, but suggested that the leadership in Tirana should 
not assume that China could resolve every problem, because ‘if then this plan is not 
implemented, the people would lose its trust in the leadership’, warning that the plan 
might not be implemented according to the schedule.155 In short, Albanian leaders 
simply thought their country ‘was never a big cost for China, and the exaggerated 
requests were a test of our alliance with Beijing’. 156  Furthermore, the Chinese 
assistance was not direct financial aid to Albania but a loan to be repaid through 
exports after barter agreements were negotiated.157 
In June 1962, Hysni Kapo accepted an invitation to visit China. In January 1962, 
Zhou Enlai had told Këllezi that China was committed to help as much as possible, 
now in June 1962, only six months later, he confessed to Kapo that some of the 
industrial projects for which China had offered its assistance would need to be 
postponed to the next FYP, but that China remained committed to provide to Albania 
whatever they could produce.158 Kapo eventually posed this problem directly to Mao 
when the two met on 29 June, 1962, in Wuhan, but Mao showed less interest in 
economic issues than political and ideological ones. Most of the projects began late, 
as the blueprints came from China only after gathering the necessary information in 
Albania.159 These delays were also a tactic China used to discourage Albania from 
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making further requests. Eventually this proved ineffective, as a tireless Albania 
increased its requests, believing that the more it asked, the more it got. One form of 
aid that did reach Albania at this time was the Chinese specialists in charge of 
planning and implementing the industrial projects.160 
In 1963, the flow of Chinese aid had greatly increased Albania’s trade deficit, 
exacerbated by the Chinese refusal to import anything Albania proposed to export.161 
By the end of 1963, the bilateral trade reached 53 million rubles, compared to 1960 
when it was only around 8 million rubles. Due to the increasing trade, the embassy in 
Beijing was reinforced with a staff and trade representative with the main task of 
following and supervising the delivery from China of the equipment for the industrial 
projects. Of the 24 industrial projects China committed to build in Albania for the 
FYP, only a small number of them had begun construction in 1963.162 More than 
likely, the delays were due to the lateness of agreements reached with China, after 
the withdrawal of the Soviet assistance, and, for some, also for the technological 
problems in China. Around 284 Chinese specialists went to Albania at this time to 
help with the implementation of these agreements, with particular regard to the 
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161 “The talks that Beqir Balluku had with Zhou Enlai in Beijing on 07 and 30 September 1963. First 
meeting, 07 September 1963”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1963, D6, f.13 
162 “Reports and information of the trade office of the embassy in Beijing to the Government, on the 
state of the implementation and decisions to be taken on the building if the industrial combines 
imported from China, 26 March 1963”, in AQSH, F.503, V. 1963, D300. In this file there is detailed 
information of each of the factories and plants, and the updates on the construction. 
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building of 19 out of the 24 projects. In this first period, 104 Albanians also went to 
China to acquire expertise in building and managing complex industrial combines.163 
During his visit to China in September 1963, the defense minister of Albania, 
Beqir Balluku, in a time when it was impossible to implement fully even the 
agreements of the 1961-65 plan, asked Zhou Enlai to assist Albania with the FYP of 
1966-70. China committed to this FYP but Zhou stressed that Albania should ‘base 
the development on its own forces’.164 The goal of a self-reliant economy was one of 
the principles of China’s foreign aid, which for Beijing marked the difference with 
the Soviet assistance. 165 As Jeremy Friedman argues, the Chinese model of 
development concluded in economic autonomy, not necessarily meaning a socialist 
economy. 166 This principle, although explicitly manifested in African (non-
communist) countries, did not correspond with the Albanian plan to pursue the 
socialist economy at all costs. This was reinforced further by Balluku, who expressed 
the intention of his government to rely on China for future economic development, as 
‘Albania cannot implement its FYP ’66-70 without the assistance of the PRC’.167 
At the end of 1963, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited Albania for the first 
time, and celebrated the New Year in Tirana. China had first shown readiness to 
assist Albania, but once the Soviet-Albanian split was definitive, Tirana met some 
resistance in Beijing over the promised ‘unconditional assistance’ it had expected. 
The visit of Zhou, therefore, was a chance for Hoxha to personally address this issue 
with his Chinese counterpart. Although Hoxha promised to pay more attention to 
agriculture, in his conversation with Zhou, Hoxha emphasized three sectors for 
which he stressed the importance of Chinese assistance, none of them agriculture.168 
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Zhou received a number of drafts of studies of Albania’s economic 
perspective.169 The documents given to Zhou Enlai were anticipations of the future 
FYPs, trying to engage China in a long term aid agreement. Although through these 
documents Albania sought to accurately depict the situation to Zhou, their main 
purpose was to highlight the potential yet unrealized. It would have not been easily 
possible to convincingly exaggerate their situation, because hundreds (later 
thousands) of Chinese specialists were staying in Albania at that time, and Albanian 
officials knew that they had reported diligently to their home country. Zhou visited 
Albania after announcing, during his African tour, the eight principles of Chinese 
foreign assistance:170 1. China always follows the principle of equality and mutual 
benefit in providing aid to other nations; 2. China never attaches any conditions or 
asks for any privileges; 3. China helps lighten the burden of recipient countries as 
much as possible; 4. China aims at helping recipient countries to gradually achieve 
self-reliance and independent development; 5. China strives to develop aid projects 
that require less investment but yield quicker results; 6. China provides the best-
quality equipment and materials of its own manufacture; 7. In providing technical 
assistance, China shall see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully 
master such techniques; 8. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special 
demands or enjoy any special amenities. Some of the principles that guided China’s 
cooperation with Africa underlined the neutrality and ‘non-alliance’ of those 
countries, in a postcolonial logic of relationship.171 During Sino-Albanian summits 
these principles were not mentioned as a guideline in the economic cooperation 
between Albania and China. The application or not of the eight principles to Sino-
Albanian economic collaboration was marginal to the major ideological and 
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geostrategic principles that guided the alliance. To Hoxha’s gratitude for the 
generous Chinese assistance, Zhou Enlai emphasized the reciprocity of the aid. 
Moreover, in proportion to Albania’s population, ‘you should not thank us on the 
contrary, we should thank you more’ Zhou said.172 At the end, he reaffirmed China’s 
commitment to assist Albania’s economy.  
In 1964, China pushed forward the implementation of many industrial projects, 
and also approved an additional loan of 6.5 million rubles for the remaining year 
1964-65.173 Soon, however, some technological problems emerged, in particular in 
the construction of a steel plant (Kombinat) in the city of Elbasan, 30km southeast of 
Tirana. The problems began even before putting the first stone in its foundations.174 
The Chinese experts’ laboratory tests were inconclusive regarding whether the 
Albanian mines yielded the right minerals for producing the steels they wanted.175 
Meanwhile, the preparation for the next FYP, 1966-70 had already begun, and in 
January 1965, the Albanian Government sent a letter to the Chinese Government 
with a long list of requests for the FYP.176 Some of the Albanian requests for the new 
plan were considered by Chinese officials unreasonable – perhaps rightly so. For 
instance, while the construction of the metallurgic combine in Elbasan was still in its 
initial phase, Albania already asked to enlarge its processing capacity from 100 
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thousand tons to 300 thousand tons per year. The total loan for the FYP they planned 
to ask was 250 million rubles, mainly focusing on the industrial projects.177 
In late March 1965, Zhou Enlai visited Albania for the second time.178 The 
occasion came after his attendance, in Bucharest, of the funeral of Romanian leader, 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. Zhou had taken initiative of visiting Tirana in order to 
settle the Chinese disagreements with Albania that had emerged after Khrushchev’s 
removal. Zhou considered this visit a good chance to reduce the gap with Tirana 
regarding the views of the two parties over international issues, in particular those 
concerning the communist camp. For Hoxha and Shehu instead, it was a good chance 
to discuss again with Zhou about the forth FYP, 1966-1970, and for which a 
delegation was about to visit China. While Hoxha began his talks with the economic 
collaboration and the need for Chinese assistance, Zhou, instead, started with the 
political issues, underscoring that the important issues over which the two parties 
were somehow in disagreement were political, not economic. 179  Regarding the 
economy, Zhou Enlai reaffirmed repeatedly the Chinese commitment to assist 
Albania in order to for the latter better play its role on the international stage – the 
role for which China was providing support.180 
During April-June 1965, an Albanian economic delegation visited China to 
discuss the unfinished projects of the FYP 1961-65, and to negotiate the FYP 1966-
70. The talks with Zhou Enlai and Li Xiannian revealed some difficulties.181 What 
mostly displeased Chinese leaders was Albania’s request for large quantities of grain, 
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something China had to purchase in foreign currency from other countries such as 
Canada.182 Chinese officials repeated to Albanians that the living standards were 
higher in Albania than in China, therefore Albania could not claim that it did not 
have enough food for its own population. This contrasted with massive Albanian 
efforts to develop industrial projects which for China were often even of doubtful 
profitability. 183 Two factors influenced China’s almost unfriendly response to 
Albania’s demands for crops: first, China’s difficulties since the failed Great Leap 
Forward; second, the Vietnamese requests for food supplies were deemed to be far 
more urgent.184 China responded by making great efforts to supply huge quantities of 
food to Vietnam – a country then in a bloody conflict.185 Eventually, China and 
Albania reached an agreement on the total amount of the loan for the FYP 1966-70, 
and on the list of industrial projects.186 China provided a total loan of 170 million 
rubles, 82 million of which went for 18 new industrial projects, for a total of 45 
industrial projects.187 Despite the confrontations with the Albanian delegation about 
the request for crops, China approved 400 thousand tons of grain for the five year 
period. China also agreed to help Albania to build its first major hydroelectric power 
plant, with a dam 60 meters tall, in the city of Vau i Dejës. Beijing also postponed by 
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ten years the Albanian repayment of the instalments for the previous loans. 188 
Undoubtedly, Albania was proving to be a costly ally.  
 
Chinese Military Assistance and Albania’s War Doctrine 
There is perhaps no other field where Albania benefitted more from Chinese 
assistance than in the military cooperation. This can be explained by the fact that 
since the establishment of the PRC, China had faced many military challenges, such 
as wars in Korea and Vietnam as well as the Sino-Indian clashes, which obligated 
Beijing to build its own military industry. Even more so after the Soviet interruption 
of military cooperation with China, and the technological transfer that went with it. 
In this context, however high the Albanian requests were, they were still a minor 
request compared to the amount of armaments China was producing and transferring 
to Vietnam or North Korea. For the first time since winning its independence, 
Chinese assistance allowed Albania to build a relatively modern and potent 
professional army that could face any regional threat – at least this is what Albanian 
leaders sustained. At the beginning of the 1960s, however, China had made clear its 
position that it would assist only if the Soviet Union would interrupt its military aid 
to Albania. When the Soviet Union isolated Albania in the WPO, China answered 
Tirana’s call for aid.189 As confirmed by Hoxha’s talks to his officials, not only was 
China going to help, but their (economic and military) assistance was going ‘beyond 
the expectations’.190 Chen Yi, then China’s foreign minister, said in 1961 that the 
Albanian requests ‘are a small thing, not a heavy burden for China’.191 According to 
the Albanian ambassador’s report, Chen Yi said to him that ‘we provide military 
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assistance to Laos, Cuba, Algeria, and UAR (United Arab Republic: Egypt and 
Syria)… we provide almost the entire military needs of Korea and Vietnam… To us, 
your military requests don’t represent a burden at all’.192 If not all the economic 
requests for the FYP 1961-65 could be satisfied by China, the military demands, 
instead, ‘were fully accepted, and the supplies will be delivered exactly as we 
asked’.193 China provided Albania with the type of armaments and the techniques 
that the Soviets had promised, and with ‘whatever China can produce for itself’.194 
Soon in Albania arrived also the Chinese military experts in order to train the 
Albanian army in the use of the new techniques.195 Since the very beginning, the 
Albanian requests were, in the eyes of Chinese officials, disproportionate to its small 
territory and population. Albania asked for hundreds of tanks, aircrafts, and jets, all 
supported by an official narrative that portrayed Albania as the westernmost outpost 
of communism, completely besieged by imperialist and revisionist countries. 
Whereas the economic assistance was offered as long term loans that Albania 
had to pay back in the years to come, either in foreign currency, or (and mainly) 
through exports of raw materials, the armaments received from China were 
completely free of charge, as shown by the protocols signed each year.196 Regarding 
this point, it seems that Chinese leaders thought differently after signing the 
agreement. In summer 1965, Zhou Enlai raised the question of including the 
materials for military constructions as a part of the economic loans. He was not 
talking about the armaments, but only construction materials that Albania had 
requested to build the tunnels and bunkers for its army.197 At Albania’s insistence, 
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Zhou had to step back. Eventually Albania received military aid from China so large 
that it had ‘no comparison [in quantity] with that received from the Soviet Union’.198 
The fortification of the country, through the construction of tunnels and bunkers, 
took a real and successful leap forward with great Chinese assistance. By the end of 
1964, more than 150km of tunnels were built, these did not include the tunnels in the 
inhabited areas, but only those for storing the armaments, and to be used by the 
soldiers in case of war.199 
In 1963 the Albanian leadership decided to send the minister of defense, Beqir 
Balluku, to China to discuss political, ideological, and military issues with the 
Chinese leaders. 200  The minister had to make some additional requests for new 
armaments. The whole strategy, expressed to Zhou by Balluku, was based on the use 
of heavy artillery to reject the first wave of a possible attack. This would require 
artillery powerful enough to face a large-scale attack. Hence the request for heavy 
armaments. There were two main arguments behind this doctrine: first, Albania, the 
minister affirmed, was ‘completely isolated and surrounded by enemy states… which 
are drafting plans to annihilate Albania… because we stand firmly in our position of 
Marxism-Leninism’; second, in case of war, it ‘will fight in conditions of inferiority 
to the enemy, and under complete siege’.201 The Albanian minister argued that in 
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case of war Albania did not want to give up at the first battle, retreating into a 
guerrilla war in the mountains. It wanted instead to break the first wave of attack by 
facing the strategic supremacy of the adversaries with the tactical and operational 
maneuverability of Albanian troops, and by using in their favor the terrain.202 He 
then explained that since the enemy would have the air supremacy, the construction 
of tunnels and bunkers all over the country was a necessary defensive measure, in 
order to conceal the armaments and to protect the people from air strikes. It is 
interesting to note who he believed might become the aggressors. For the minister, if 
China would provide the requested weapons, Albania could face without any 
hesitation, and defeat any attack, coming separately from any of the neighboring 
countries, Yugoslavia, Greece, and even Italy. But Albania feared a coalition of these 
countries, or the military alliances of NATO or WPO. Albania feared an alliance of 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as this ‘could provoke Albania to create incidents, 
pushing the WPO to turn Albania into a second Hungary’.203 
Albanian leaders knew that they could not realistically defend against all those 
depicted as their enemies, but the strategy was to transform a hypothetical war into 
an international conflict, so that eventually NATO would play a role of deterrence, as 
the Albanian coasts are just in front of Italy. It was a concern of gaining time, the 
time necessary to transform any eventual war against Albania in an international 
issue, guaranteeing to any enemy that an invasion of Albania would not become a 
fait accompli on the international stage. The obstacle to this strategy would be a 
treaty of non-aggression between NATO and WPO, which would transform Albania 
into an easy target for the Soviets. Such a hypothesis was not remote, as during the 
Geneva talks on disarmament in February 1962, the Soviet delegation had proposed a 
treaty of non-aggression between NATO and the WPO.204 Balluku, in fact, did not 
conceal Albania’s fear that Soviet Union ‘might use the WPO for aggressive 
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purposes against Albania’.205 Fortunately, for Hoxha, such a treaty between NATO 
and WPO did not find any support, yet the Soviet Union and United States signed the 
Partial Ban Test Treaty at the end of July 1963. Both China and Albania, for different 
reasons, firmly opposed it. 206  China was not against the ban of atomic tests in 
principle, but understood this treaty as an attempt to prevent the Chinese from 
developing an atomic arsenal. For China, it would not be enough to stop specific 
tests, rather, all atomic arsenals in the world should be eliminated. Albania, however, 
saw it as the first step of a larger understanding and consensus between the Soviet 
Union and the western camp, which would leave more room for Khrushchev to 
maneuver and close the ranks within the socialist camp.207 
 
Albania’s Proposal of a Treaty with China 
It was in this context that Albania, through its minister of defense, proposed 
discussion with China on the possibility of signing a treaty of mutual friendship and 
assistance between China and Albania, or, alternatively, a treaty of collective defense 
that would include China, Albania, North Korea, and Vietnam.208 Chinese leaders 
also had ‘planned to construct an alliance system with neighboring socialist countries 
including Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam’.209 From documents, however, 
it is not clear if Albanian leaders knew of such plans. A formal alliance with China, 
in case of any sort of conflict, would mean for Albania to have on its side a large and 
powerful country, which could have exerted significant influence in Albania’s favor 
among the big powers, although militarily, this would make no difference. The 
Albanian minister too stated that such a treaty would ‘be a political act’ and nothing 
more. 210  China, however, was not willing to sign such a treaty. First, as Deng 
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Xiaoping said to Balluku in their third meeting, it was highly unlikely that NATO 
and WPO could come to terms for a mutual non-aggression treaty, because ‘there are 
many complicated issues, especially Germany… the positions of the Soviets and 
Americans are different also regarding the banning of the nuclear tests… the Soviets 
might be very interested in a treaty, but United States would ask for a high price in 
turn’.211 The second and more important motivation was China’s existing military 
assistance to North Vietnam and North Korea, making it impossible to similarly 
assist Albania. Any formal treaty could not offer more to Albania than it was already 
receiving from China.  
By rejecting this treaty, China was admitting that beyond the propaganda, it 
could not assist Albania directly in the event of a war. Albania’s position was unlike 
those of North Korea and Vietnam for Chinese national security. Albania was simply 
a precious political ally far away, which had to be satisfied with the supplies it was 
receiving. Deng Xiaoping denied the presumed threats Albanian leaders claimed they 
would possibly face. To the Albanian claim that the United States and NATO could 
attack the country, Deng replied that America was even avoiding a war with Cuba, 
which is only some miles from American coasts, and had no interest at all in 
attacking Albania. Only Yugoslavia, Deng admitted, could potentially threaten 
Albanian security, but would an attack on Albania ‘be in their best interest?’, he 
wondered. Deng also considered that an eventual attack from the Soviet Union would 
come only if NATO or the United States attacked Albania, but since this probability 
was low, the Soviet threat was also less imminent. Deng also suggested that Albania 
should not exit the WPO, but stay as a member for tactical reasons. He expressed 
doubts about Albania’s necessity for the heavy armaments it had requested, repeating 
that would be ‘better to concentrate on the agriculture and construction’.212  But 
Balluku insisted on his point, reducing the threats to a more realistic dimension – 
Albania’s neighbors. He reminded Deng of the fact that Albania did not have 
diplomatic relations with Greece, which had been in a state of war with Albania since 
the Second World War.213 
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Albania asked that at least 90 thousand tons of military equipment be delivered 
as soon as possible, and requested to update some armaments, replacing them with 
new, more modern and powerful technologies that China might have developed by 
then. 214  Regarding the transportation of these materials from China to Albania, 
according to Rrahman Parllaku, a general of the army who visited China on three 
occasions, the armaments were disguised as civil goods, and some of these 
armaments, such as airplanes and tanks, were dismembered before loading, and 
reassembled in Albania.215 The costs of shipping were paid half by China and half by 
Albania.216 At this stage the army was provided with land-air missiles, and the Navy 
was also reinforced.217 
During Zhou Enlai’s visit in December 1963-January 1964, Enver Hoxha, in his 
first meeting with the Chinese minister, alluded to the WPO as a threat to Albania, 
and again explored the possibility of collective defense with China. Hoxha had to 
admit that Yugoslavia was avoiding border incidents, but was still ‘…calling openly 
for the overthrow of the Albanian leadership’.218 Zhou said that he was sending a 
message to Yugoslavia by visiting Shkodër, a city bordering Yugoslavia. The 
presence of Zhou and the Albanian minister of defense at the border area was ‘a 
warning to them [Yugoslavia]’.219 Zhou Enlai reinforced Deng’s idea that the United 
States was concentrating more on the struggle and competition with the Soviet Union 
in other regions and was less interested in escalating tension in Europe – due also to 
the American involvement in Vietnam. Throughout the talks, Zhou Enlai stressed 
that the imperialist countries and in general ‘our enemies have not prepared the 
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conditions to move to war’.220 In this way, he rejected Albanian claims that their 
country was under siege and about to face an attack.  
Enver Hoxha, instead, reaffirmed the Yugoslavian threat, drawing some parallels 
between Tito’s indirect involvement in Hungary in 1956, and a similar scenario for 
Albania. He emphasized his point by providing information from the State Security 
(the secret police at the time, known in Albanian simply as “Sigurimi”), according to 
which, in Yugoslavia ‘there are three centers [of espionage] against Albania, with 
eleven outposts, involving a hundred officials…’.221 The Soviet secret services were 
reported to be collaborating with the Yugoslav espionage to gather information about, 
and undermine, Albania. The same was reported of Greece, which the Americans had 
supposedly used as their base for espionage against Albania. These countries were 
allegedly gathering mercenaries, mainly Albanian exiles, ‘2000 in Greece, 1800 in 
Yugoslavia’, trying to organize incursions in Albania, in order to foment rebellions, 
and overthrow the regime.222 It is not clear how reliable the information was, or if it 
was fabricated in order to persuade Chinese officials to support the Albanian requests. 
But it was no secret that although Albania did not openly claim Kosova, they 
supported the claims of the Albanian population in Yugoslavia for greater autonomy, 
possibly self-governance. This, Hoxha believed, was another reason Tito opposed 
Albania and its leadership.223 
Zhou Enlai reiterated his view that Albania should not leave the WPO, but 
should wait for when the alliance would violate its rules, providing an excuse for 
Albania to denounce it. Hoxha agreed, but still saw the alliance as dangerous, as if 
one of Albania’s neighbors were to attack it, then this alliance, instead of defending 
the country, would give license to the Soviets to intervene, officially to defend 
Albania, but actually to occupy it. In that case, the WPO would be an obstacle to any 
sympathy from the West towards Albania, officially a member of the alliance.224 
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Zhou Enlai reconfirmed China’s commitment to help Albania’s army, and stated that 
China ‘will send the supplies according to the plan… in case of new advanced 
armaments we will send them without waiting for a request, albeit not in big 
quantities… for the tunnels and fortifications it would be better if you send someone 
to Korea to see and get experience’.225 This visit revealed to Hoxha that although 
China would provide Albania with armaments, it would not commit to a formal 
military alliance. China indirectly warned Hoxha not to provoke any tension in the 
region. As a result of the new equipment from China, one of the main problems that 
surfaced was the lack of manpower to manage the armaments. In 1964, the army had 
only 16 generals, and only around 120 colonels.226 The military schools were trying 
to solve the problem by accepting more students each year, but these problems 
persisted until 1970.227 With Chinese assistance, Albania could enlarge its navy from 
a single base, in Vlora, to three – covering the entire coast. Moreover, the Chinese 
armaments enabled reorganization of the entire army, adding for the first time new 
branches, such as a unit against chemical attacks, and restructuring the chain of 
command. With the new organizational structure, the army could mobilize a 
contingent ‘twice larger than the previous structure’.228 
In 1965, when an Albanian delegation visited China, Zhou Enlai firmly opposed 
Albania’s defense strategy, recommending guerrilla warfare instead.229 Zhou brought 
the example of Vietnam, but the Albanian minister argued that Vietnam was an 
occupied country that had no choice but to fight accordingly, whereas Albania was 
an independent country with a regime in power, controlling the entire territory and in 
case of attack had to make efforts to defeat the aggressors. Zhou Enlai’s remarks 
most likely were also a reflection of a similar debate in China about Chinese military 
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strategy.230 That debate was mainly between those who were in favor of a strong 
professional army, like Luo Ruiqing, and those who emphasized more political 
preparation and peoples’ war, such as Lin Biao. 231 Luo defended building a 
professional army ‘able to use conventional weapons’ to oppose the enemy. Lin, on 
the other hand, prioritized ‘political preparations, and Mao’s Thought’. 232  Mao 
favored Lin’s argument, but many years later, after Mao’s’ death, Luo was 
rehabilitated and reinstated, after he had been purged during the Cultural Revolution. 
Albania did not draft its first official document regarding a war strategy until 
1967. The first document possible to track in the archives regarding the defense 
strategy was drafted under the supervision of the Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu. In 
November 1967, the Council of Defense discussed the draft and apparently there 
were no disputes among the Council members about the document. However, some 
discrepancies emerged between Shehu and the defense minister Balluku regarding 
their idea of war. For Shehu, the partisan war (guerrilla tactics) should be considered 
auxiliary to a frontal clash as Albania was building up a modern army. Balluku 
instead wanted to emphasize in the document those aspects regarding the preparation 
of a partisan’s war. Decisively, Hoxha offered his more support to Shehu.233 
 
Conclusion 
The period that preceded the alliance were years of great convergence between 
Albania and China, owing to their corresponding interests and mutual opposition to 
the destalinization process. Once the alliance was established, however, and 
Albania’s economic support was exclusively in China’s hands, the relations became 
more complexed. Contrary to the perception, Sino-Albanian alliance begun with 
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attrition. Hoxha, in supporting China against the Soviet Union, had successfully 
gambled on a positive outcome, which in fact resulted in the peaceful end of 
Albania’s relations with the Soviet Union. This, from Hoxha’s perspective, was a 
political and strategic victory. He, however, wanted China to believe that for Albania, 
the split with Soviet Union was not only a Tirana-Moscow issue concerning only 
Albanian regime’s security. Hoxha made efforts for China to see Albania’s struggle 
against Soviet Union as a struggle concerning the communist principles that Moscow, 
for Hoxha, had betrayed. Related to this, the Albanian leaders claimed to have 
defended Chinese interests by opposing Moscow, as far as those interests 
corresponded with their interpretation of the communist ideology. Consequently 
Hoxha did not expect any reversal of the policy towards the Soviet Union. With 
China’s attempt to convince Albania to seat on the same table with the Soviets, 
Hoxha discovered that Beijing’s policy towards Soviet Union was not as linear as 
Tirana’s policy. For Hoxha keeping away from any rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union was paramount. But was also fundamental for him that China keeps equally 
distant from any rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Both, interstate and 
interparty close relations between Moscow and Beijing were two undermining 
factors for his regime who had built a huge propagandistic narrative of the Sino-
Albanian common struggle against the Soviet Union – attacking it as a “revisionist” 
country.  
On the other hand, China perhaps had neglected Hoxha’s determination to 
continue firmly his opposition to the Soviet Union. If China found impossible to 
convince Albania to normalize relations with Soviet Union, or even just with East 
European socialist countries, it thought instead it could have a say regarding 
Albania’s economic policy. In fact this was more related to practical issues involving 
China’s foreign aid. But on this point too Albania’s stubborn standing and Hoxha’s 
determination to pursue the heavy industrialization were difficult to overcome by 
Beijing. At the end China and Albania continued their antagonism towards Moscow, 
and Beijing also accommodated Albania’s economic and military requests. Yet, 
Beijing refused to establish a treaty of alliance (for defensive purposes) with Tirana, 
turning down Albania’s request which in a way was a message to Tirana that China’s 
assistance to Albania had also limits. One unknown aspect of the Sino-Albanian 
relations during this period is their common effort to challenge Soviet power within 
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the international communist movement, by trying to bring on their side communist 
parties and Marxist and leftist movements which supported the Chinese course. More 
specifically, if China’s rivalry with Soviet Union, among others, because of Beijing’s 
claims of equal footing with Moscow in the communist camp, is an established fact 
for the historians, less established, if not known at all, is that part of China’s design 
to acquire a prominent position, alternatively to the Soviets within the international 
communist movement, was Beijing’s use of Tirana in this sense. In fact China saw in 
Tirana a solid ally in promoting China’s claim for leadership in both, the 
international communist movement, and the so called Third World. As the next 
chapter shows, Sino-Albanian coordination and common action further intensified 
during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, which although initially received with 
reticence in Tirana, eventually the Albanian leadership strongly supported.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
TURBULENT TIMES, 1966-1970: 
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON THE 
SINO-ALBANIAN RELATIONS 
 
Introduction 
The Chinese Cultural Revolution was a moment of great instability in Chinese 
history; one that left its mark on Chinese attitudes towards the world, creating similar 
instability in China’s international relations. Those with Albania were no different. 
When the Cultural Revolution started in 1966, almost all Chinese ambassadors 
abroad were called back to Beijing for ‘education’ and disputes emerged in ‘more 
than thirty out of roughly forty countries with which it [China] had diplomatic 
relations’.1 Though Albania was not among the countries that openly disputed the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution, it feared the effects this turmoil could have on its 
alliance, and the benefits thereof, with China.  
Initially, Albanian leadership attacked the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and in 
private, secret debates rejected its main patterns as anti-Marxist. Eventually, though, 
Albania ended up promoting also its own form of Cultural Revolution, which was 
not motivated by any internal political necessity – there were no lines of dispute 
within the leadership – but it served to strengthen the alliance with China and further 
consolidate the party’s control over the Albanian society. Through his own Cultural 
Revolution, Enver Hoxha achieved three important objectives: first, Albania gained 
more economic and military aid from China, as a reward of the support for the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution; second, the Albanian Cultural Revolution removed 
within Albania, through controlled mobilization of the masses, any obstacle to the 
complete dominance of the party over all aspects of the Albanian society – mainly 
religion; third, it was a further step towards the emancipation of women.  
By the time of the beginning of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the 
communists in Albania had already been ruling the country for twenty-two years, and 
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the country was in a state of relative welfare, owing almost entirely to China’s 
economic assistance. The Chinese Cultural Revolution came unexpectedly for 
Albania, and its leaders were caught by surprise and were confused about its nature, 
its aims, and the possible outcomes. To gather more information, from April 1966 to 
September 1967 Hoxha sent many delegations to China, until he was assured that 
this revolution could be a political and economic opportunity for Albania if he 
supported China. Albania’s support, however, did not come immediately: instead, 
when Hoxha first called a meeting in the Politburo in October 1966, he attacked the 
‘chaos’ in China and the cult of Mao which for him had reached a ‘disgusting level’. 
Despite the fact that from documents emerges a Hoxha able to make very lucid 
analyzes of Chinese (and international) politics, he and the PLA, thought it 
unconceivable that a political crisis like China’s could be induced by its leaders 
themselves. Therefore, he did not fully understand, nor consequently accept, that the 
top of the pyramid of an established system like the CCP, could decide to shake its 
own foundations, making the Chinese Cultural Revolution a ‘unique’ revolution.2 
Later, to sweep away doubts, Hoxha received Zhou Enlai and, importantly, Kang 
Sheng, who definitively convinced him that supporting the Cultural Revolution 
would be the right choice. Gradually, what started as a nightmare for Albania became 
a great opportunity for the regime.3  
 
Perceptions of the Chinese Cultural Revolution 
The Cultural Revolution in China is one of the most debated events in the second 
half of the Twentieth Century. The historical narrative about it is mainly negative, 
that of a great calamity and a dark period in China’s history.4 Recently, however, 
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new research has been conducted which, without denying the violence unleashed 
during those years, also reveals overlooked aspects of the Cultural Revolution.5  
In the mid-1960s a line was drawn within the CCP, leading to a confrontation, 
the line was between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi.6 The first signs of the struggle 
within the CCP had appeared during the Great Leap Forward, in the late fifties, early 
sixties.7 Among many, three moments here above mentioned were indicative of the 
coming clash: first, the Lushan conference in 1959, then both the Beidahe 
conference, and then also the Tenth Plenum of the CCP in 1962. The economy was 
the main concern over which the so-called rightists, later called revisionists, and 
leftists, the group supported by Mao, argued until they reached an open 
confrontation. According to Gao, before this happened, both sides ‘did not object to 
the idea that something had to be done in China in order to avoid events like those in 
Budapest in 1956 happening in Beijing’ too. 8  Mao and Liu, however, saw the 
problem from different perspectives. For Liu the problem was grassroots corruption 
by elements outside the party.9 Mao, instead, thought that the problem was inside, 
and was not organizational but ideological.10 Mao wanted to prevent any deviation 
like that of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union, and he thought revisionism could be 
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prevented only by suppressing within the CCP those that might have similar 
temptations. By doing this, he wanted to avoid any challenge to his power within the 
party. Indeed, at a certain point, at the beginning of the sixties, Mao thought he had 
no authority over the party. The Cultural Revolution became a formidable weapon in 
his hands to regain the total control of the party and the country. But this weapon 
could not be developed or used without great turmoil and many casualties. 
When the Cultural Revolution became known to the Albanian embassy, 
diplomats sent a radiogram from Beijing proposing open support for the Cultural 
Revolution.11 The embassy was running too fast. Uncertainty dominated perception 
abroad about Chinese events, and the embassy’s will did not correspond to the 
official stance in Tirana, where the party lacked an official position regarding the 
events in China. Consequently, Albania decided to proceed with caution. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tirana stated that, ‘…what is happening there is 
China’s internal affair’, and emphasized the fact that it was too early and not 
necessary to either support or deny it.12 As has been explained by scholars, the 
Cultural Revolution was mainly (not only) a struggle within the leadership of the 
CCP, not aimed at becoming a world revolution.13 China, more desperately than 
ever, needed foreign friends, in particular due to the Cultural Revolution’s impact on 
China’s diplomacy and foreign affairs.14  
In April of 1966, the Chinese government officially invited an Albanian 
delegation to visit China, and the Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, led it personally.15 
The Albanian leaders were anxious to know more about the events, and expected this 
visit to be fruitful in this sense. During his visit, which began on 29 April 1966, 
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Shehu and his delegation were warmly welcomed with a rally of one million people 
in Beijing, the equivalent of half of the Albanian population at the time.16 The fact 
that Liu Shaoqi, President of the PRC, received them in person, did not belie the 
struggle to occur within the Chinese political system in the coming months, when 
Liu would be one of the main victims, perhaps the most notable, of the Cultural 
Revolution. The delegation toured China for two weeks, until 11 May, 1966, but 
there are no reports showing that they had any conversations focused on the Cultural 
Revolution. Mainly they spoke of economic collaboration and ideological and 
political coordination, issues Albania and China had long been discussing. Only in 
his meeting with Mao did the Chairman allude to unpredictable events, when he said, 
‘…we must prepare, it can happen that revisionists enter Beijing and our comrades 
can happen to transform into revisionists. This is one of the possibilities’.17 There 
was no explicit mention of the Cultural Revolution, but Mao expressed his idea that a 
cleansing campaign was necessary in China, where he suspected highly ranked 
officials to be revisionists. Mao stated that since there were counter-revolutionaries, 
there must be revolution, ‘where leftists are, there are rightists too’ For Mao 
therefore, to act against them was necessary.18 He then asked Shehu if there was 
bamboo in Albania, because, Mao added, with revisionists should be as with bamboo 
‘…it should be removed the bamboo layer… while keeping only the center, the good 
part of it… we have removed the layer [of the party] like in bamboo, Gao Gang, 
Peng Dehuai, Peng Zhen, etc. This is what we will do with those still undiscovered 
that are sleeping next to us yet’.19 Shehu did not get the point on ‘revisionists in 
Beijing’ and Mao did not elaborate. The revisionists for Mao were precisely those 
receiving Shehu, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping.20 Shehu did not understand, nor 
did the other leaders in Albania, the dynamics of Chinese politics in those years, that 
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identifying a potential danger within the party did not always lead to an immediate 
purge.  
Even though the CCP had fewer years in power in China than the PLA in 
Albania, it had a longer tradition of political internal debates.21 If, in Albania, the 
political power of the communist party was reduced to the personal power of Enver 
Hoxha, the CCP instead had a long tradition of collegial deliberations, some tracing 
back to its foundation in 1920s.22 Therefore, unlike Albania, in China the purges 
often were preceded by a process of analyzis and assessment of effective power 
because in China political power was less concentrated than in Albania. Nonetheless, 
as scholars have outlined, of the fifty-seven founders of the CCP, eventually only 
two survived purges.23 
During his visit, Mehmet Shehu also had talks with Deng Xiaoping regarding the 
ideological and political issues that concerned, united, or divided both parties. What 
most divided them was the issue of the existence of the bourgeoisie as a class in an 
established socialist society. For Deng ‘even after the revolution and the taking of 
power… capitalism or revisionism can still restore to power.’24 This was Mao’s 
position too, but in Albania, this possibility was not worthy of consideration because 
they claimed that in a truly socialist country, only the communists held power, and 
what was left was perhaps only remnants of the bourgeoisie, but not the class as a 
political entity. The response of Mehmet Shehu predicted just how the Albanian 
Cultural Revolution would evolve in the following years. Shehu said that ‘your 
experience is very valuable for us… [Yet] … we take from it what is appropriate for 
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the conditions of Albania’.25 When Shehu met Liu Shaoqi, unexpectedly for Shehu, 
Liu expressed many critiques of Stalin’s, listing his major mistakes. These included: 
Stalin’s claim that socialism had won in Soviet Union, lowering the Soviet people’s 
vigilance against internal enemies; Stalin had underestimated the masses by relying 
primarily on the party’s bureaucrats, and he had denied class differences between the 
peasantry and the proletariat.26 Shehu reported that for Liu, ‘these are the reasons 
why revisionism has emerged in the Soviet Union’.27 In addition, Liu alleged that the 
Soviet Union was imperialist in its attitude towards China, with regard to border 
disputes regarding territories that once formed part of the Chinese Empire. 28 
Although Shehu avoided entering into discussions on this issue, he deemed 
Khrushchev, not Stalin, responsible for the birth of revisionism. 
At the end of this visit, the two parties decided to prepare and release a joint 
communiqué. This revealed the oft-disputed ‘question of classes in the socialist 
society and the causes of the emerging of revisionism and restoration of 
capitalism…’.29 Shehu complained about the fact that Chinese comrades did not 
accept the Albanian formulation that ‘the class struggle exists between two lines, the 
socialist and capitalist, but not between socialist and bourgeoisie’. For Albania, after 
communist rule had been established, the bourgeoisie as a class should have been 
extinguished otherwise the communists would have not accomplished a key task: 
overthrowing the bourgeoisie class. Instead, the Chinese comrades considered that 
‘during… the socialist era, in the socialist countries, there exist the bourgeoisie class 
too and [only] based on this [assumption] the class struggle is between proletariat 
and bourgeoisie’.30 Neither party renounced its position, and in order to agree the 
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joint communiqué, both agreed to general declaration regarding socialist society and 
the necessity of class struggle.31  
Another explanation of these differences rests in the different natures of the 
communist revolutions in China and Albania. In Albania, the revolution had been 
organized by a restricted group of middle class people, formed in the urban areas of 
Albania, and in some cases educated in western Europe. In China, instead, although 
‘the CCP had little concern for rural matters during its first few years’ 32  from 
foundation, the peasantry had a central position in forging the identity of the Chinese 
communist revolution.33 In China the delegation received a “top-secret” document 
from the CCP regarding the Politburo’s dismissal of the group of five persons in 
charge of the Cultural Revolution.34 The document is mainly the discussion, and 
decision, to dismiss Peng Zhen and his group that had been ‘totally’ wrong for (not) 
criticizing “Hai Rui Dismissed from Office”.35 The criticism of this literary work was 
one of the first stage curtains to open on the Cultural Revolution in China and made 
Peng Zhen its first target and victim.36 Mao wanted an open and strong criticism of 
this piece but Peng Zhen, Mayor of Beijing and member of the Politburo, did not 
have the same zeal and tried to protect the author, Wu Han, who was the deputy 
mayor of Beijing.37 
On 24 June, 1966, Zhou Enlai returned to Albania, on a tour of many countries. 
In the meantime, the Cultural Revolution became rougher and this captured the 
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attention of the Albanian leadership. Shortly before Zhou landed in Tirana, page 
three of People’s Voice included Albania’s first article about the Cultural Revolution 
in China. 38  In a regime where details were often symbols transmitting political 
messages, it is worth noting that the first article mentioning the Cultural Revolution 
was not front page news. The event was described only in general terms such as a 
‘…vital part of the further and broad socialist revolution’, against remnants of the 
bourgeois culture and against the possibility for revisionists to take the political 
power.39 There was nothing on battles between factions, red guards, work groups, 
struggle sessions, or any violent action. In retrospect, this article seems like Albanian 
authorities’ wishful thinking. The visit of Zhou Enlai could have been useful to 
remove the uncertainties the Albanian leadership still had about the Cultural 
Revolution, but not even Zhou could, at that stage, know what was to come.  
In his political diary, Enver Hoxha wrote nothing of this visit, mainly because he 
considered that nothing relevant came into the open with Zhou Enlai’s visit, as ‘not 
even Mao’ could have predicted the evolving of the situation.40 His expectations to 
understand better, however, were great, as he told the Chinese, ‘…you are running a 
great revolution of extraordinary importance’.41  In his welcoming speech, Enver 
Hoxha expressed his deep gratitude for Chinese assistance in his country and his 
‘solidarity with Mao’s thought’. But Hoxha also made clear that Albania would not 
faithfully adhere to the Chinese path. For Albania to ‘learn very much from you 
[China]… we adopt [and adapt] to the real [specific] conditions of our country’ the 
policies promoted in China. For reasons concerning Albania’s national security and 
independence from Yugoslavia, Stalin always remained for Hoxha the central figure 
in world communism, and this was a good chance to respond to the criticism of 
Stalin that Liu Shaoqi had addressed in meeting Mehmet Shehu earlier that year. For 
Hoxha, any attempt to use the Cultural Revolution to attack Stalin was rejected. In 
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his long experience, Hoxha said, ‘…our party has no documents... that allow us to… 
determine any responsibility of Stalin… [Therefore]… the line followed by Stalin… 
has always been a Marxist-Leninist line, a revolutionary line’.42 Then, in talking to 
Zhou Enlai, Hoxha followed up with a long explanation on why, according to him, 
Stalin had made no mistakes regarding either political power concepts, the theory of 
class struggle, or any of the other issues discussed in Beijing a few months earlier. 
Hoxha alleged that if the Cultural Revolution in China was aimed at the substitution 
of Stalin’s position, as a great figure of international communism, with Mao, and 
substitution of the Stalinist way with the Maoist, using Mao’s thought, then Albania 
would not follow the same path.  
Enver Hoxha was anxious to explain to Zhou Enlai another point that had been 
cause for dispute in Beijing between Shehu and Liu; the existence of the bourgeoisie 
class in a socialist country. He stressed Albania’s specifics and why there were only 
remnants of the old classes, but no class other than proletariat which had retained 
political power. Albania, for Hoxha, had always been a poor country and that did not 
allow the emergence of a class of capitalists and bourgeoisie. Therefore, the 
bourgeoisie lacked conditions to become a powerful class and remained small. 
Moreover, after the liberation, the communists could immediately solve the problems 
of political power and the class struggle by violently overturning the other classes, 
leaving them no chance of survival. Hoxha praised his party’s proletarian 
dictatorship, which through public trials and merciless campaigns had eliminated 
almost all its enemies. In Albania, definitely, the only class in power was the 
proletariat. Nevertheless, a merciless class struggle was necessary and it mainly 
served to suppress the remnants of the overturned classes, their ideologies, religion, 
and old traditions.43  
In his intervention, Zhou Enlai ceded nothing, and repeated the same criticisms 
of Stalin that Liu Shaoqi had expressed in Beijing to Mehmet Shehu. Zhou stated that 
if current leaders assessed Stalin’s merits and mistakes and gave him a grade, ‘we 
can say he has three mistakes and seven merits’.44 He also said to Hoxha that maybe 
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in Albania the antagonist class remained small, but ‘in China we are speaking about 
sixty million people, and for sure we cannot just eliminate them’.45 Zhou’s visit 
certainly did not clarify any parts of the Cultural Revolution, as Hoxha hoped it 
might. On the contrary, the visit left more confusion and room for speculation. 
After Zhou Enlai’s visit, the bilateral correspondence between the parties 
intensified, probably because China sensed Albania’s confusion, and possible 
misperception, of Chinese events. Among many documents, the PLA received the 
official communiqué released after the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee of 
the CCP, simply known as Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress held in 
Beijing on 1-12 August 1966.46 For Albania, it was important that this document 
expressly deemed Soviet revisionism as dangerous as American imperialism.47 That 
is, by identifying Soviet Union as one of the targets of the Cultural Revolution’s 
struggle, Chinese leaders were identifying a target in common with Albania, at least 
one target that the Albanians would not miss. The CCP passed to the PLA other files, 
in order to ‘exchange the experience’, regarding the ‘socialist education campaign in 
the countryside… the campaign for the four cleansings movement’, and other 
documents of this nature.48  
The People’s Voice still wrote on the importance of the Eleventh Plenum 
Communiqué, albeit without much zeal, by publishing an article that emphasized 
how this revolution was ‘…the best evidence of the class struggle in the actual period 
in the People’s Republic’.49 By saying ‘in the People’s Republic of China’, they 
inferred that the Cultural Revolution was still a Chinese phenomenon. Mainly, the 
People’s Voice used Xinhua – the Chinese official news agency – as the source of its 
information and published Xinhua’s articles, or parts of them. Indeed, another article 
reported much of what Xinhua had officially published regarding a rally Mao held 
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Beijing with one million students and teachers on 15 September, 1966.50 It is worth 
noting that People’s Voice reported only some parts, those appropriate according to 
them for the Albanian reality, and not the entire space Xinhua had given to the event 
in Beijing. The events in China were becoming too important and an intervention of 
Hoxha that could orientate the restricted group of high officials of the party was 
necessary. 
 
Condemning the Chinese Cultural Revolution 
In his diary, published after the Sino-Albanian split in 1979, Enver Hoxha wrote 
about his first impressions of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.51 Published once the 
relations with China were interrupted, with the purpose of sharing his thoughts 
regarding Chinese politics, this diary is not reliable. Nevertheless, in many of its 
passages it is possible to observe a certain coherence between the diary and the 
archives, in this way motivating those voices that see his political diary written ex 
post intending to rewrite history in Hoxha’s favor after the split with China.52 The 
first issue about the Cultural Revolution that Hoxha touched upon was the cult of 
Mao, which Hoxha considered unacceptable. Mao, Hoxha said, was venerated in 
China as a God. The Chinese, by so doing, were diminishing the role of the masses 
and the role of the communist party, ‘...they are turning the cult of Mao into a 
religion’.53 Hoxha did not see Mao as the successor to Stalin. For he saw himself as 
the most loyal follower of Stalin, the only one to be internationalist, leading the only 
‘communist castle in the Adriatic coast’. Hoxha emphasized with pride that ‘…we 
[Albanians] are, in fact, the only ones defending the figure of Stalin’.54 
Besides, Mao had criticized Stalin and therefore, in Hoxha’s eyes, did not 
deserve the same consideration. For Hoxha, raising the cult of the individual was to 
subordinate the role of the CCP to that of Mao. He argued that the party should be 
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the protagonist, instead of relying on Mao’s figure. Mao, in contrast, challenged the 
limits of the party and became a leader above the CCP. There is no doubt that the 
political leadership in Albania was conscious of China’s great international 
importance, they even would often publically and openly deem Beijing a protagonist, 
but for them this was only a consequence of China’s size and vast resources. In 
Hoxha’s view, China was important because it was China, not because it was ruled 
by Mao. The point, however, concerned Albania’s autonomy from China. If Mao had 
to become the new personification of world communism, then Hoxha was pressured 
to follow Chinese path. The experience with the Soviet Union under Stalin was 
significant in this regard. Hoxha wanted to maintain autonomy from China, because 
Chinese policies were not fully endorsed by Hoxha, and autonomy of action for him 
was paramount. Hence came his criticism of Mao’s cult.  
On 10 October, 1966, Enver Hoxha, in a meeting of the Politburo, commented 
for the first time on the Chinese Cultural Revolution. 55  After reminding his 
colleagues of the secrecy of his speech, Hoxha blamed China for the lack of 
information in his hands, so it was not easy to analyze the Cultural Revolution. For 
Hoxha, China, as so big a country, was very important for the communist cause, and 
the events in Beijing resonated internationally. He warned to not confound his 
criticism of this revolution with the many other criticisms coming from three 
different directions; from the capitalists, revisionists, and real Marxist-Leninists. 
Despite the fact that Albania was among the real Marxist friends of China, it feared 
that it would be a ‘great mistake if our Chinese friends confound these three 
directions… In that case, they would lack Marxist objectivity’. Hoxha was not alone 
in criticizing the Cultural Revolution, though alone in doing it secretly, as the 
‘revisionist’ countries, Soviet Union, and its allies ‘will use the words of Marx and 
Lenin to criticize the Cultural Revolution’. By so doing, our criticism, he argued, will 
‘be in the same form but not the same purpose with these betrayers’… [Therefore] 
Chinese comrades have the heavy burden of distinguishing friends from foes’.56 
Hoxha intended his criticism to be constructive, and not a challenge to his best, and 
only, ally. This was also an occasion for him to remind the party’s cupola members 
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of some of the issues that had motivated dissent with the CCP. Therefore, eventual 
disputes on the Cultural Revolution would not be the only reason for a hypothetical 
split with China.  
Hoxha resumed all the disputes that had emerged between Albania and China 
during the visit of Shehu in Beijing, and the visit of Zhou Enlai in Tirana earlier that 
year: Chinese leaders never showed enough firmness against Yugoslavian 
revisionism, and they did not ‘have clear idea of Tito’s betrayal’ of communism;57 
‘Chinese comrades did not realize how dangerous Khrushchev’s line was... Despite 
the fact that they did not openly accept Khrushchev’s defamation and slander on 
Stalin, within them they believed it… they even strengthened their thoughts with 
alleged [Stalin’s] mistakes’;58 the different assessments of Stalin’s figure, emerged 
between Hoxha and Zhou Enlai during Zhou’s visit to Albania in June 1966 when 
Zhou had had a long conversation with Hoxha. Regarding Stalin’s rise to power, 
Zhou tried to convince Hoxha that Stalin was not infallible. Hoxha listened to Zhou, 
‘but he did not convince us at all’. Regarding the Chinese ‘soft tactic’ in the 
propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union, during which China ‘tried to 
convince us to dismiss the open polemic [with the CPSU]’. Hoxha decided that ‘the 
Chinese comrades… had few illusions and a punishable attitude’. And regarding 
Albania’s dissent with China on the ideological controversy, over ‘the existence of 
feudal bourgeoisie class as the class that fights us from a position of power’. Finally, 
Enver Hoxha understood that ‘factions within the [CCP] leadership should be very 
deep… dangerous enemies stay in the Central Committee and inside the Politburo’.59 
Before taking any side in the struggle within the Chinese leadership, Hoxha decided 
to wait and see who would win and who would lose before risking standing on the 
wrong side.  
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Then Hoxha showed interest and concern in the CCP leadership’s changes as 
‘Lin Biao came out being the second after Mao [Eleventh Plenum], and comrades 
like Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De pass to be eighth or ninth in the list… how?… we know 
nothing’. Hoxha attacked the Red Guards that had been formed before the plenum 
was held, and attacked the ‘cult of Mao… which is reaching a disgusting level’. 
Some issues, therefore, were clear, but in general, there remained many uncertainties 
as ‘we do not see clear orientations of this revolution’. Hoxha could not see what 
truly comprised this revolution. At this stage the Cultural Revolution consisted in, 
and was veritably reducible to, the actions of Red Guards that ‘change the names of 
the streets… raid and loot the people’s homes… spreading the feeling of the 
arbitrariness… and what’s even more dangerous, attack the party’s committees, burn 
libraries and destroy old monuments. It is very difficult to call this revolution a 
cultural one’.60 He attacked also the policy of making tabula rasa with the past, like 
the Cultural Revolution, he said, seemed to attempt. On this point, one scholar 
recently had to say that ‘The Cultural Revolution destroyed China’s traditional 
culture in a way that the most iconoclastic reformers of the twentieth century could 
not have imagined’.61 Other scholars instead accredit to that period the conservation 
of old monuments, and new discoveries such as the famous Army of Terracotta.62 
Hoxha did not approve of the fact that in China the party seemed to leave every 
initiative in the hands of young people that were not workers but students. This 
caused him to wonder where the proletariat was in the event, and why these masses 
had gotten so out of control. Probably because Chinese comrades, ‘have drawn the 
conclusion that all these problems will be resolved by red guards… This is… a way 
of anarchy… This revolution, I think, is nothing but a rectification of the party’s 
line’. He warned that ‘our purpose and great care is, and should be, to avoid falling 
into error’, thus in Albania a similar path now was foreclosed.63 For Hoxha, all this 
data was enough to decide that the experience of the Chinese Cultural Revolution at 
least should not be imported tout court in Albania.  
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This speech is extremely important as it shows the feelings that the Albanian 
leadership truly had towards the Chinese Cultural Revolution. It proves equally the 
vacillation of the pro-China policy in Tirana, because while this speech was full of 
resentment towards some aspects of Chinese politics, only one month later, came 
strong support for the Cultural Revolution – although they did it for strategic reasons. 
This is comprehensible because the situation in China was changing so rapidly that 
any definitive assessment would have been misleading and likely belied by future 
events. At the same time, in the People’s Voice, the space dedicated to the Cultural 
Revolution was limited. The decision to keep a low profile about the Cultural 
Revolution in this early stage came from the top leadership. In Hoxha’s words, 
‘…our press does not speak about the Cultural Revolution in a manner and the same 
way Chinese propaganda does’.64 In the spirit of this phrase it is possible to denote a 
certain defensive attitude. The CCP tried to persuade Albania to offer open support 
to the Cultural Revolution but it seems that Hoxha decided to wait for a better time. 
Hoxha, before supporting it, was waiting for political assurances and of economic 
benefits. He was hopeful that the Chinese delegation for the PLA Fifth Congress in 
Tirana, in November 1966, would be able to clarify his many doubts. Fortunately, 
Kang Sheng would do exactly that. 
 
Kang Sheng’s Visit and Albania’s Support for the Cultural Revolution 
In November 1966, the PLA organized its Fifth Congress. In late October of that 
year, the Chinese delegation led by Kang Sheng arrived in Tirana. In his first 
meeting with Enver Hoxha, on 28 October, 1966, Kang explicitly asked for stronger 
coordination between the two parties in the struggle against imperialism and Soviet 
revisionism. 65  Kang did not mention immediately the Cultural Revolution until 
Hoxha pressed him to do so, but he reserved the right to later comment on it, after the 
congress.66 
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At the reception in honor of the Chinese delegation, held on 30 October, 1966, 
Enver Hoxha confirmed general support for the Chinese ‘revolutionary actions’. In 
turn, Kang Sheng emphasized that when all revisionist parties and imperialist 
countries were defaming the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Albanian comrades were 
among the few parties that supported China and that this was greatly appreciated by 
Mao. Kang appreciated the fact that Albania ‘in its own way, is carrying out a proper 
Cultural Revolution’.67 This proclamation, however, seemed premature, as Albania 
had not yet announced any such initiative, unless we consider the Albanian political 
public discourse in which the term “revolution” described nearly every policy and 
action in the country. What, indeed, Albanians had done, was to call for a stronger 
and larger mobilization of the masses for a further and deeper “revolutionization” of 
socialist life throughout the country. In practice, this meant participation by the 
party’s officials in the production of goods and volunteer work by the youth: building 
dams, roads, and railways. It also meant reinforcement of the ideological education 
in the schools, and winning a stronger hold of the party, through the political 
commissars, as well as over the army. These steps were already adopted at the 
beginning of the year and Albanians did not associate these actions with any official 
“cultural revolution”. In his salute to the congress, Kang announced the decision in 
China to carry on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution with the ‘main objective 
to struggle against a group of people that hold high positions in the party and follow 
the path of capitalism’. 68  Kang gave no further explanations on the Cultural 
Revolution.  
In his speech to the congress, Enver Hoxha, on the other hand, used ambiguous 
terminology to refer to recent events in Albania, be they a Cultural Revolution or 
mere continuation of existing policies. He called for less bureaucratization, more 
ideological work, and deeper class struggle – an oft-heard call to the Albanian ear. 
New in this speech, though, were the terms “further” and “less”. A new extent and 
level of the struggle were the outcomes of his speech to the congress, together with a 
deeper struggle against religion and more efforts for the emancipation of women.  
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At Hoxha’s solicitation, Kang Sheng had a long conversation with Hoxha and 
other important leaders, almost entirely about the Cultural Revolution in China. Until 
this moment, the Albanian leadership had been only scarcely informed of it, mostly 
by those who had become its targets: Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Consequently, 
Kang Sheng dispelled many doubts about the main aims of the Cultural Revolution. 
According to Kang, first of all the Cultural Revolution’s aim was to ‘…destroy the 
social bases for capitalistic restoration’. He then explained how the struggle had been 
mainly against the Beijing faction, meaning Peng Zhen, and how it had started in 
early June 1966 with the first Dazibao and the mobilization of the masses that led to 
the ‘reorganization of the party’s committee in Beijing’.69 This, in Hoxha’s eyes, was 
the reason why Zhou Enlai could not provide any exhaustive information during his 
visit in June the same year. It was because even Zhou could not have predicted how 
violent and destructive the movement would become. Kang Sheng emphasized that 
Mao himself was leading this revolution and was strongly supporting the Red 
Guards. Hoxha in his diary had been very harsh in judging the Red Guards, whose 
only ability was to ‘…defend Mao Zedong and cheer him to the sky, to regard him as 
a God’.70 Now he was told that Mao supported them because they were fighting the 
revisionists within the party. Mao, Kang said, was so enthusiastic about the Red 
Guards that he decided to endorse them as ‘a revolutionary movement… all over 
China’.71 
Kang then listed the main characteristics of the Cultural Revolution in China. 
First, this revolution was a step in the ‘class struggle, a necessary step in the socialist 
revolution’. Second, and most important, it ‘was aimed to fight those that, holding 
high positions within the party… want to take the capitalist and revisionist road, like 
Khrushchev in Soviet Union’.72 Kang thus was saying that the Cultural Revolution 
intended to eradicate what Hoxha feared most, the rise of revisionism within the CCP 
that would look for appeasement with Moscow, undermining the Sino-Albanian 
alliance. Third, the Cultural Revolution was trying to improve proletarian democracy 
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through the introduction of criticism and self-criticism among the masses. Fourth, the 
Cultural Revolution was laying the foundation of a class of intellectuals who would 
show solidarity with the workers and the masses, representing them and their efforts 
better. Fifth, through the Cultural Revolution it was possible to improve productivity 
and increase economic production. He then explained that those revisionists within 
the party, in addition to the Beijing group and Peng Zhen, were Liu Shaoqi and Deng 
Xiaoping. It was possible, Kang added, that still other members within the party 
would need to be purged. He also told that a committee for the Cultural Revolution 
(Cultural Revolution Small Group), which he himself was part of, had been 
established and was headed by Chen Boda. His explanation, however, was more 
about the events, targets, and first results of the political struggle during this early 
stage of the Cultural Revolution. He omitted every analysis regarding the historical 
roots of these confrontations within the CCP, concentrating more on the effects – 
how the Cultural Revolution pursued the socialist education of the masses and how 
this improved the struggle against revisionism and imperialism – rather than 
explaining the real point – the radical confrontation between the lines of Liu Shaoqi 
and Mao Zedong. This, however, was all of little import to Hoxha. He knew that 
Kang would never reveal the full truth of the Cultural Revolution. Hoxha gleaned 
two important points from all that Kang did and did not say: China was struggling 
against revisionists, and Mao was leading this struggle. Now, for Hoxha it was clear 
which side to support, Mao’s anti-revisionist line as represented by Kang Sheng.  
After Kang’s speech, the first step for Albania was to begin openly supporting 
the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and to learn more about it. Hoxha could learn, as he 
stated, from Kang Sheng’s gift to him, a book of Mao’s quotations – in French, no 
less, ‘the language of the Parisian communards’. 73  Enver Hoxha expressed his 
happiness to be in the same standing with China and with a bit of sarcasm he 
expressed his disappointment with the CCP’s leniency towards the revisionists. He 
said, in Albania instead, ‘those like Peng Zhen we kick them out [shot them] of the 
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party’.74 Hoxha never fully accepted the “leniency”, according to him, that the CCP 
sometimes reserved for Chinese officials. Following the visit of Kang Sheng, 
stronger support for the Chinese Cultural Revolution was possible but had to be 
under the party’s strict control. In November 1966, the Albanian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs sent via radiogram its official standing towards the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution. It stated, ‘…Regarding the Chinese Cultural Revolution read and study 
the speeches of comrade Enver, Mehmet and Ramiz during the congress.75  The 
Cultural Revolution has the purpose to fight the remnants of revisionist bourgeois 
ideology… revisionism and capitalism, and for a definitive victory of the socialist 
system’.76 
The detailed speech of Kang Sheng constituted a turning point for the Albanian 
leadership’s perception of the Cultural Revolution, but passed unnoticed by the great 
mass of the people which continued to be informed through People’s Voice. After 
Kang Sheng left Albania, on 13 November, 1966, the first article of People’s Voice 
regarding the Red Guards was published, and it explained their ‘oath to… Chairman 
Mao’.77 On 28 November 1966, in a reception in Beijing, Petro Dode, the head of the 
China-Albania Friendship Association, and Chu Tunan, met and spoke about the 
Cultural Revolution. 78  The perception was that Kang Sheng, and thus China, 
intended to engage Albania in supporting the Cultural Revolution more strongly. A 
persuasive policy was the great economic support that Albania received precisely 
during the Cultural Revolution, at a time when China had enormous problems with 
its own economy. China had sent clear signals to Albania during Shehu’s visit in 
April 1966 that stronger political support for China would correspond to stronger 
economic assistance. 79  Then in summer 1966, a delegation of oil extraction 
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specialists went to Albania, to help build one of the most important sectors in 
Albania’s economy. To the Albanian demand for an additional effort from China in 
assisting with extracting and refining the oil, China responded by approving a new 
long term loan of 14.3 million rubles without interest, which would be used 
exclusively as oilfield investments.80 
Later, in 1967, Enver Hoxha wanted to express once again his view on the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution. His opinion had not changed much from his first 
address. First, he reviewed for the participants the speech of Kang Sheng from 
which, Hoxha claimed to have learned exactly what he had suspected, that within the 
CCP was a very dangerous faction. The spirit of Hoxha’s speech was to highlight the 
correctness of his previous analysis, when ‘our plenum of the Central Committee, 
was right in its evaluation that people like Peng Zhen could not be an isolated case’. 
The PLA plenum he mentioned actually did not count at all when it came to 
decision-making. Nonetheless, he used these party institutions to give to his absolute 
personal power the semblance of collegiality, the appearance of legitimacy and the 
party’s democracy. Then he explained how the CCP, before the Cultural Revolution, 
was totally in the hands of revisionists, such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, and 
‘that is why slogans such as “Bombard the Headquarters” appeared and the masses 
were mobilized’. For Hoxha, the most important thing was that the army remained on 
Mao’s side, otherwise it would not have been possible to regain any control. The 
battle between the two factions was still ongoing and was a bloody fight because ‘the 
enemy knows it is fighting for life or death… creating confusion and anarchy all over 
China.’ Hoxha’s main concern was keeping China from a close up with the Soviet 
Union, as well as earning further Chinese economic and military assistance. Hoxha 
clearly linked the Albanian support for China with the Chinese aid, as the importance 
of this support was shown by, ‘their exemplary complaisance, and readiness in 
meeting our demand… [with the]… colossal aid they provide us’.81 
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In his first speech Hoxha had been very critical of the Cultural Revolution, and 
even Mao. Now, he argued ‘if we [privately] spoke sometimes a little bit too badly 
about Mao, about the Cultural Revolution’ that was ‘in our interest, in the interest of 
our great cause’. This seems to suggest that initial hesitations were a way to turn 
China more complacent towards Albanian demands; otherwise, how can one explain 
that once Albania turned to be a zealous promoter of the Cultural Revolution, ‘China 
in turn supported us more and more?’. It is true that, for Hoxha, some events were 
characteristic of China and he did not approve of them, but he came to believe that 
the overall line of the Cultural Revolution was a proper instrument for staying the 
revisionism in China. Albanian leaders considered that if Liu Shaoqi’s revisionist 
stable came to power, China would have approached the Soviet Union, and then 
Albania could have met pressure to improve relations with Yugoslavia. The same 
demand, years before, had come from Khrushchev and had been one of the main 
reasons for Albania to break with the Soviet Union. Now, for Hoxha it was vital that 
China should stay away from the Soviet Union, ‘this is the most important thing for 
our cause… which would not be possible if it was not for Mao’. Nevertheless, if 
mistakes persisted in Chinese politics, that was something they had to deal with, and 
we (Albanians) must ‘learn the lessons and not repeat them here’.82 
 
Prelude to Albanian Ideological and Cultural Revolution 
In China, the Cultural Revolution did not come unexpectedly.83 For MacFarquhar the 
origins can be traced back to the late 1950s, in the debates about the Great Leap 
Forward’s policies.84 In 1963 came the “Four Clean-ups” Campaign, to purify the 
country’s politics, economics, organization, and thought known as the Socialist 
Education Movement. 85  Then came the criticisms of “Hai Rui Dismissed from 
Office”, which led to the dismissal of Peng Zhen, the secretary of Beijing 
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Communist Party and Mayor of the city. Later came the creation of the group for the 
Cultural Revolution, the use of Dazibao and the Red Guards –and then the call of 
Mao to “Bombard the Headquarters” in his struggle against the line of Liu Shaoqi.86 
In Albania, similar developments arose, but the chain of events was shorter and 
less dramatic, and the leadership propagandized all policies under the label of the 
Cultural Revolution as a continuation rather than interruption of the revolutionary 
action for the building of socialism. At the beginning of February 1966, Enver Hoxha 
decided to address a letter to the people, preparing them for revolutionary measures 
necessary for the further development of socialism. 87  In the army, ranks were 
promptly removed and political commissars were introduced. Their power over the 
army was extended, in this way reinforcing Hoxha’s political control over the armed 
forces. State officials and employers of public administration were sent to participate 
in campaigns of physical work, collectivization started everywhere – including those 
areas economists knew to be unproductive.88 The decision to remove the ranks in the 
army initially did not earn enthusiasm, as shown in the discussions of the Council of 
Defense in February 1966. The political chief of the army, Sadik Bekteshi, accused 
the chief of the general staff, General Petrit Dume, of opposing the removal of the 
ranks.89 The dispute was among a professional general of the army and a political 
commissar. In this short debate, it is significant that the defense minister Beqir 
Balluku, in his private talks with Hoxha, defended the chief of the general staff, and 
attacked the head of the political directorate in the army.90 Hoxha did not take a side, 
perhaps not wanting to upset the army, but more likely, intending to later identify all 
those opposing the removal of the ranks. However, it was decided that before May 
1st, 1966, this decision had to be implemented.91 Nonetheless, Hoxha had thought of 
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removing the ranks years earlier. In his personal diary in 1964 he had noted that ‘I 
am afraid of the ranks in the army’, and ‘our army should not be an army of a 
military cast, a cast of marshals, generals, colonels… who one day can claim to have 
the political power through a putsch… it should be an army of proletarians, 
commanded by the party and an army of the party… the party should command the 
army, not the other way round’.92 It is highly plausible that part of these measures 
might have been undertaken following the Chinese model.93 
This, however, was not yet the launch of the Cultural Revolution in Albania. The 
Chinese authorities in Beijing expressed their happiness that similar steps to those in 
China were being taken in Albania. Chinese vice president Dong Biwu told the 
Albanian ambassador in Beijing, Nesti Nase, in April 1966 that ‘…we are happy that 
your party has undertaken a range of revolutionary steps… analogous with those 
undertaken here by our party’. 94  Yet they were only steps, perhaps towards a 
revolution, but not yet an Albanian Cultural Revolution. Some of these measures 
were met with limited resistance. A letter assumed to be written by the Head of the 
Army’s State Security Police (Sigurimi), Halil Xhelo, ‘in name of many officials’, 
expressed great dissatisfaction with these policies.95 He was immediately arrested, 
but it is worth noting the mood expressed in the letter – feelings likely shared by 
many in the country. The letter, addressed to Enver Hoxha, criticized the entire 
course of policies in Albania, ‘First were Yugoslavians… then came Soviets… now 
came Chinese. The Chinese put the physical work, we run to emulate it, the Chinese 
do gymnastics in the street, we run to copy it too. The Chinese remove ranks in the 
army we rush to remove them too… This is the peak of being servile, obsequious; 
this is the burial of everything national’. 96  This letter did not stop any of the 
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decisions taken to involve the masses in socialist education. They were extended to 
education and culture, copying aspects of Chinese socialism, which Albania had been 
observing carefully since the beginning of the relations with China.97 Every school 
and every office was obligated to participate in annual military training – called 
zbor98 – and the military education had to be integrated with physical education.99 
In December 1966, People’s Voice reprinted an article from Xinhua emphasizing 
the fact that art should serve ‘workers, soldiers, and peasants’.100 Shortly after the 
publication of this article, People’s Voice announced that a ‘revolution’ in the school 
was necessary, because ‘…in the context of deepening the Cultural Revolution101 is 
required a further “revolutionization” of our education and our school’.102 Now there 
was a link between the two events, one in China, and the other in Albania. In a call 
on 28 December, 1966, the PLA CC proclaimed the beginning of ‘revolutionary’ 
volunteer actions for the construction of a railway. In the past, Albania had mobilized 
the youth for such purposes, to accomplish their key economic objectives. On 5 
January, 1967, the People’s Voice republished an article first published in China, for 
the New Year in Renmin Ribao and Hong Qi (Red Flag), informing the readers that 
they were reading not the entire article but ‘that part of the editorial entirely 
dedicated to the Cultural Revolution’.103 It was the beginning of a long series of 
articles in People’s Voice ‘entirely dedicated’ to the Cultural Revolution in China. In 
an article published in early January 1967, Nexhmije Hoxha, the wife of Enver 
Hoxha and Politburo member, invited scholars in social sciences to no longer 
separate theory from practice, arguing that scientists should not ‘stay closed in their 
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ivory tower… disconnected from… the revolutionary practice’.104 To rely on the 
masses was always a slogan of Albanian communism, but here the point was 
different. The improvement of education and the founding of some universities had 
made many institutions able to do research and educate generations of scholars, who 
in their specific fields enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy, albeit limited. Now this 
autonomy was going to be permeated by the spirit of the communist party, by its 
ideology. In fact, ‘it is necessary that with the problems concerning social science the 
party cadres too should be involved… to apply the theory of M-L to the conditions of 
our country’.105  This meant that research in social science must conform to the 
Marxist interpretation of history. The censorship threatened works that did not 
conform to Marxist ideology because now, as the party used to say, ‘Ideology comes 
first’.  
In the People’s Voice, on 10 January, 1967, a party’s secretary of a small 
agricultural commune, labelled some local comrades as ‘bad elements’, a term taken 
from China.106 The next day, People’s Voice, for the first time, reported on the 
struggle within the CCP. Great debates ensued in the main factories and working 
centers, bringing the Chinese Cultural Revolution to the Albanian masses. It did not 
mention any specific names, only a ‘group of revisionists, capitalist roaders’.107 The 
implied leader of this faction, Liu Shaoqi, could not be mentioned explicitly, as he 
was still officially the President of China. On 15 January, 1967, People’s Voice 
opened with an editorial regarding an initiative from writers and artists in Shkodër, 
an important city in north Albania. They seemed to have drawn inspiration from the 
earlier article of Hoxha’s wife, and had taken actions ‘to revolutionize the entire 
artistic, cultural and literature movement’.108 The People’s Voice now associated 
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more strongly the events in China with those in Albania and promoted the Cultural 
Revolution with great zeal. Many factories organized meetings, open discussions, 
and even rallies to support the Chinese Cultural Revolution.109 On 24 January, 1967, 
open discussions were reportedly held in working units all over Albania, expressing 
great admiration for Mao and felicity for the working class in China ‘for keeping 
high the flag of Mao’s thought’.110 Now even Albania was joining the cult of Mao, 
probably the only foreign country to do so. Enver Hoxha, who had been very critical 
of Mao’s cult, now relented, when it served national interest. Hoxha knew his 
personal cult was not in danger, in any case, and knew very well that Mao’s cult in 
Albania, unlike in China, would be tame and expressed through small acts only: 
putting Mao’s photos in public celebrations, giving his name to some industrial 
projects, maybe citing Mao’s quotations. 
From December 1966 to January 1967, a delegation headed by Hysni Kapo and 
defense minister Beqir Balluku visited China. Their reports from Beijing were 
enthusiastic. Balluku, went to China with the specific aim ‘to present a new request 
to China for additional armaments’.111 The minister, in addition to being received 
with great honors, was also rewarded with all the expected assistance – a reward for 
Albania’s support of the Cultural Revolution. Balluku took with him a long list of 
requests for armaments, reaching a total weight of nearly 200 thousand tons, to be 
delivered in lots within the period 1967-71, with a value of 650 million rubles – but 
for Albania, free of charge.112 With this new plan, the leadership planned to extend 
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the number of the military forces to 400 thousand by 1970, from 229 thousand in 
1966.113 In Beijing, Balluku met Ye Jianying, a member of CCP’s Politburo who was 
assigned to discuss and deal with the Albanian requests. Balluku was surprised to see 
that his requests were accepted without hesitation, and his presentation of the 
military strategy was not disputed, as Zhou Enlai had done months earlier. On the 
contrary, Ye Jianying affirmed that ‘your cause, is our cause... we stand together, 
fight together, and win together’.114 
If Kang Sheng had left some doubts about the Chinese Cultural Revolution’s 
righteous purposes in his speech in Tirana in November 1966, Kapo’s talks with 
Chinese comrades during this visit were going to remove them all. He met with Kang 
Sheng many times and had one meeting with Mao, and the focus of their talks was 
the Cultural Revolution.115 Mao was happy to meet the Albanian delegation and for 
the photo-taking invited Kapo and others ‘to smile because the photo should be full 
of life, the proletariat should look like live but not dead people’.116 Mao then blamed 
Albania for attaching too much importance to his salute to the PLA Fifth Congress, 
in November 1966. He, probably unconsciously, touched upon Hoxha’s criticism of 
Mao’s cult. Mao blamed the Albanians for ‘having raised it [Mao’s salute to the PLA 
congress] too high, do you want to raise even higher my cult?’117 In China too, he 
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said people gave him many epithets such as ‘great teacher, great leader… but I have 
been a teacher, in primary school... being a professor, no way, I never went to 
university’.118 Mao then admitted, with a bit of irony, the confusion in China: ‘Look 
at the mess in China, see, things do not go well’.119 He said that since 1962 he had 
identified the problem, and then had warned that there was a revisionist threat in 
China. Now, Mao added, through the Cultural Revolution, ‘solving definitively the 
problem will require maybe one year… Many years ago I said we should purge 
millions… I had no other choice!’120 The Albanian delegation reported back that the 
struggle against revisionism in China was ‘as has never been before’, and this not 
only ‘will strengthen China… [But]… reduce definitely the possibility for capitalist 
restoration’.121 
Some diffidence, however, still persisted in Hoxha. Commenting on the reports 
from Beijing, he wondered, ‘if the [political] power exists in China today? Who are 
the Red Guards?... Who are the Rebels?’ Hoxha was also told about the role of the 
army, which was very active on the revolution’s side and sometimes supported the 
Red Guards. He, however, considered that this could be dangerous since it should 
always be the party that rules over the army, never the opposite. In Albania, the role 
of the army was subordinated to the rule of the party and no challenge to Hoxha’s 
power was impossible. But China, as Hoxha saw it, had become a ‘non-revolutionary 
democracy… and there is not anymore the party but just Mao… and the army that 
plays a great role’. Nevertheless, once back in Tirana, the delegation confirmed that 
‘Mao’s line has won strategically’, and this reassured Enver Hoxha that he stood on 
the right side, that his support for Mao was the support for the victorious faction.122 
In this way the relations with China, and its assistance, were not threatened. The visit 
of Kang Sheng to Albania and that of two Albanian delegations to China swept away 
any doubt of the Albanian leaders about the Cultural Revolution in China. Albania 
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had been courted to support China in exchange for extraordinary economic and 
military assistance, exceeding even what had previously been agreed. Enver Hoxha 
had prepared the public opinion through the People’s Voice on the importance of the 
Cultural Revolution and had announced small steps in that direction for Albania. The 
time was ripe for a similar revolution in Albania. 
 
The Ideological and Cultural Revolution in Albania 
On 7 February, 1967, People’s Voice published on the front page a speech Hoxha 
addressed to the entire nation. The Albanian Ideological and Cultural Revolution had 
begun. The ties with China had been strengthening for years, and though the Maoist 
Cultural Revolution had at first confused the Albanian leadership, Enver Hoxha was 
now convinced that the Chinese Cultural Revolution was a step forward in the 
struggle against revisionism, and as China increased its aid to his country, he decided 
to launch the Cultural Revolution in Albania. His speech tackled “Further 
Revolutionization of the Party and the Power”.123 This speech is assumed to be the 
official beginning of the Ideological and Cultural Revolution in Albania. The use of 
the word “further” in Hoxha’s speech, was not accidental, for two reasons: first, as 
mentioned, this was a continuation of the path of building socialism in the country – 
which started in 1944 when the communists came to power – not a rupture with the 
post liberation social and political order. Second, this was a “furthering” of all the 
steps undertaken in the very recent past, it was a continuation, more fervent, perhaps, 
of the measures adopted (but adapted) from China during the last years. Hereafter, 
the historical legacy (the rule of the party since the end of the Second World War) 
and the new opportunity (alliance with the Chinese) would be merge along a unique 
path. Yet intending to mark the differences from China, Hoxha’s speech welcomed 
the most representative strata of the country: students, soldiers, workers, and 
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intellectuals. This differed from China, where only young students had promoted the 
Cultural Revolution, at least in its early stages. China’s experience was not lost on 
Hoxha, who wondered where the working class was in this revolution. 
The Albanian Cultural Revolution performed three tasks: first, it displayed 
sympathy to an important ally – and in repaying the kindness, China was very 
generous with Albania; secondly, it was a good chance to remove any obstacles 
within the country that could challenge the party’s objectives for development, with 
particular reference to religion; third, it gave a great leap forward to the emancipation 
of women. Hoxha did not just use slogans and unleash the masses, like Mao had 
done, but gave precise indications of what he wanted people to fight for, what the 
role of the masses was, and what the limits were. The terminology he used, however, 
was nothing new. What was new was the increased pace of the policies; in building 
the country, sacrificing everything for the homeland, devoting life to that of the 
masses – and the role of the masses; in mobilizations to eradicate religion, 
emancipate women and increase productivity. Hoxha stressed the importance of 
“accountability”. This required open discussions in the party’s base-organizations, 
meaning the local parties of each economic unit, each factory or institution, and each 
commune. In these organizations, the masses could fulfill their true role, in collective 
criticism sessions similar to the Chinese “struggle sessions”. The difference was that 
in Albania these sessions did not result in collective violence. These sessions aimed 
only to seek the “truth”, because ‘only in these collective sessions, the truth can 
come into the open and the masses can have the control.’ However, Hoxha warned 
that these sessions must never become battlefields because ‘our party is not an arena 
for developing the class struggle. It is the party itself who leads the class struggle, it 
does not allow the existence of groups or factions of revisionists, Trotskyists, or 
liberals within it’. If, in Albania, revisionism did not come to power, according to 
Hoxha, it was because of these rules, and because ‘the party is not a den of people 
without ideology. ’It is clear, therefore, that in Albania the leadership defined itself 
as being above the masses, and not subject to their criticism, unlike in China, because 
‘our party has at its foundation… the democratic centralism… a central leadership… 
All the other organs must obey and apply its decisions’.124 It was impossible to be 
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clearer. The masses, instead, if a struggle was necessary, could sacrifice the local 
communist leaders, those of the party base-organization. The masses in China, 
incited by Mao, caused the removal and dismissal of almost the entire leading group 
of the CCP. Hoxha, on the contrary, had already achieved the goal years before by 
purging any groups or individuals who challenged or were merely suspected to 
challenge his political wishes. Hoxha simply did not have anyone left as a target 
within the leading organs of the party. 
The first step of the Cultural Revolution in Albania was the ‘struggle without 
compromise against religion and the old habits and consuetudes’.125 In Albania, the 
struggle against religion had some particularities considering the fact that the country 
had had a very active class of religious elites in the past. The clergy, Muslim and 
Christian, were involved in the national public life. The Ideological and Cultural 
Revolution was a good chance for the party to remove all these ‘ruins’ of the old 
society. The day after the publication of Hoxha’s speech, students of a high school in 
Durrës, the port city near Tirana, started their struggle against religion, opening a 
debate at school and attacking religious beliefs as remnants of the old society that 
must be eradicated. Enver Hoxha made no better efforts to preserve the traditions of 
his country than had Mao, whom he privately once criticized for making ‘tabula 
rasa’, the old religious monuments. In the context of the Albanian Cultural 
Revolution, hundreds of Churches, Mosques, and other worship monuments were 
razed to the ground. The work was meticulous because religion was an organized 
community of clergy and had deep roots in people’s conscience – it was precisely 
‘the opium of the people, that poisoned them and therefore their [party’s] task was to 
cure them’.126 It was, therefore, necessary to fight against religious philosophy, their 
everyday practice, and the links they had with people’s life. Everything had to be 
planned and ‘nothing should be left to chance’. In this struggle, the authorities made 
key differentiations. For them, ‘the clergy, except the Catholics, is very ignorant, and 
the practice of the religion is through an archaic liturgy in Arabic that no one can 
understand’, which made it easier to defeat. ‘The Catholic clergy’ however, was 
                                                            
125 People’s Voice [Zëri i Popullit], 07 February 1967, V.26, Nr.32, p.1, Periodiku, BK, SHG 32/1B. 
126 “Party of Labor of Albania, Central Committee: Top-Secret: Prot. Nr.133, Tirana, 27 February 
1967, To the District Party Committees. [Partia e Punes e Shqiperise. Komiteti Qndror. Top Sekret, 
Nr.133 Prot. Tiranë 27 February 1967, Komitetit të Partisë të Rretheve]”, in AQSH, F.511, Ministria e 
Arsimit dhe e Kulturës [Ministry of Education and Culture],V. 1967, D20, f.2. 
192 
‘richer’, highly educated and disciplined, the fruit of a long tradition, and so more 
difficult to eradicate.127 
Since the very beginning of communist rule in Albania, religious schools had 
been closed and education was totally in the hands of the state. The education of new 
generations of clergy was made further impossible because education abroad was 
prohibited without official permission – which the regime never gave. Therefore 
none of the clergy could go to Italy, traditionally the home of Catholic education, nor 
did the state allow any other member of other religions to pursue their religious 
studies abroad. Now, the only task for the authorities was a struggle against the 
institutions where people went to pray, against Churches and Mosques, and against 
the last generation of clergy yet living. The instruction for the local party committees 
was ‘to destroy churches, mosques, monasteries, temples, the only places where 
clergy can meet the faithful people.’ However, as the letter admitted, this would not 
be easy, because there was still part of the population that was practicing, thus, ‘the 
destruction of Churches… of course is more difficult because we must not go 
directly against that part of the people that still believes’. Nevertheless, the 
determination must be firm ‘until total disappearance [of the religion] from the 
earth’. Among its means, the party had used propaganda to direct nationalism as ‘a 
weapon in our hands against religion, because Islam has been the ideology of the 
Ottoman invaders, Christian Orthodox is the ideology of the Greek chauvinists and 
Catholic religion was the ideology of the Italian invaders’. By associating these 
religions with these “enemies”, the masses were closer to rejecting their religions. 
The leadership feared that people’s sentiments against this atheist policy may lead 
them to turn against the party, and so the leaders did not use the same space in mass 
media that they gave to other policies of the Cultural Revolution. In the above letter, 
they warned the local committees to be determined but, if possible, without 
provoking the people’s feelings, ‘not entering an open conflict with the population’, 
because this be an obstacle for generations to come. Hence, the party must treat the 
people that have religious feelings, ‘as the doctor who cures the disease, which turns 
people into the joys of life’.128 In the meantime, propaganda did prioritize the link 
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between religions and the oppressive practices of the past, the link between clergy 
and how they supported the property owners and moreover the exploitation of the 
masses, and to show how, for them, religion enslaved man by glorifying only God 
and diminishing man’s capacities and creativity.  
It is worth noting that People’s Voice largely omitted mass revolutionary actions 
against religion, despite a clear desire to promote other maneuvered public initiatives 
that was expressed in its writing almost daily in 1967. The struggle against religion 
had to continue without any leniency, but partially out of sight. This was very 
comprehensible because the population perceived the struggle against religion as an 
oppressive policy, and an extremist interference in a most intimate, centuries-old 
tradition. In addition, the religions had a long history of peaceful cohabitation and 
did not threaten the national unity. People simply did not see any concrete threats to 
national security that justified eradicating the religious influence. The older 
generation especially did not welcome this policy, despite the fact that they could do 
nothing but comply, and sometimes were even forced to support it. Aware of this, the 
party instructed the local districts to pursue this goal with determination but avoid 
‘…public discussions… everything must be done without fuss’.129 The destruction of 
some historical worship monuments met resistance from not only the people but even 
from the minister of education and culture, Thoma Deljana. He wrote a letter to 
Enver Hoxha demanding more care and eventually protection from ‘this desire 
without brakes to deepen artificially the Ideological and Cultural Revolution that is 
causing violent and extreme actions… In Vlora there is insistence to destroy the only 
ancient monument of the city, the Muradije’s Mosque. In Fier, trying to remove the 
cross in the Saint George Church, they destroyed all the architecture… in Saranda 
the Church of pre-Ottoman era was turned into fertilizer’s deposit… Is flagrant the 
case of the Church of Vau i Dejës [District of Shkodër) that was razed to ground with 
explosives.’130 Concluding the letter, he asked for these issues to be discussed within 
the highest organs of power. He was rewarded years later with a purge and long 
years of imprisonment. The anti-religious campaign, in only its first months, caused 
the closure of 2169 religious buildings, 740 Mosques, 765 Churches and 
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monasteries, and 530 monuments of other religions. The properties were promptly 
confiscated by the state.131 Some of these monuments were razed to the ground, like 
the monumental Orthodox Cathedral in the center of Tirana, where the state built 
“Hotel Tirana”, at the time famous for being the highest building in the country (15 
floors), still a landmark of the city. It was a way to show that socialism was rising 
higher from the ashes of the old world. A small fraction of these monuments, 
however, survived, and these are those monuments that had historical importance for 
their architecture, art, and national history. Of all the worship monuments surveyed 
in 1967, prior to the Cultural Revolution, a year and a half after the Cultural 
Revolution had begun, only 111 had the fortune to be put under state custody as 
national heritage in a second survey in 1969.132 The rest of them, if not literally razed 
to ground, were transformed into the army’s deposits, small theaters, or even stables 
for animals. 133  Some had the better fortune to serve as spaces for “Culture 
Houses”.134 The uses of some worship monuments for civil purposes were dictated 
not by the good will to preserve them but because the construction of new buildings 
was expensive. Most of the clergy’s members also had a sad destiny, many where 
executed after farce trials, and the rest were condemned to long years of work camps 
and prisons. When the regime fell, in 1991-92, of hundreds of clergy from various 
religions, less than a dozen were still alive. Curiously, during this campaign it was 
reported that many people expressed opinions linking this struggle with the Cultural 
Revolution in China. For instance, in the city of Fier someone was reported to have 
commented ‘Why do we imitate China?’. In Shkodër someone else said, ‘They [the 
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Albanian leadership] follow the way of China’, and in Gramsh, a small city, someone 
affirmed that ‘now entered a new religion, that of Asia’.135 
The second task of the Cultural Revolution in Albania was the emancipation of 
women. Women at this time, despite having been marginalized in the past, were not 
excluded from the public debate and life in the country. In Albania, women played 
an important role in history, for their contribution in the national struggle against 
foreign rule over the centuries. Strong women had acquired prominent positions in 
the national historical narrative – and myth. In the 15th century, for instance, when 
Scanderbeg – an Albanian national hero – was fighting against Ottoman Empire, his 
sister Mamica was alleged to be one of his bravest soldiers. She died fighting on the 
battlefield, passing into the legend as a great warrior. In the early Twentieth century, 
another woman became very famous. Her name was Shote Galica and her fame came 
from her fight alongside her husband against the Ottoman rule first, and Serbian 
incursions later. She became so well known that her fame eclipsed her husband’s. 
Then, in more recent times, there were dozens, if not hundreds, of women who had 
made great contributions to the arts, education, languages, and many other fields – a 
common pattern with the rest of European countries. Therefore, in shaping the new 
historical narrative, the regime knew that women would play an important role.  
But these were privileged women and not representatives of the society as a 
whole. The emancipation project of the Cultural Revolution, however, became a 
massive endeavor across the strata of society, focused not only on women’s 
emancipation, but also revolutionizing men’s views of women. The process can be 
traced back to the liberation war, when, as in the rest of Europe and world, women 
participated actively in the war. Now the process had to proceed a step further. 
Already in November 1966, during the Fifth Congress, Hoxha had mentioned the 
necessity for a leap forward in the emancipation of women. Two days after launching 
the “Ideological and Cultural Revolution”, the People’s Voice, reporting on a 
discussion in a small commune of Gjirokastra, noted that it was time ‘to remove the 
rope from the [women’s] back’.136 In another article, People’s Voice highlighted the 
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local actions for the emancipation of women all over the country.137 In accordance 
with the established public narrative of that time, every revolutionary action was 
reported to have started from the base, from the people. The party wanted to show 
that there was independence, autonomy, and democracy among the masses. After 
these first local actions, the propaganda massively publicized Enver Hoxha’s visits to 
factories and cooperatives, and his supposed correspondence with the people and 
organizations of the party that participated in demonstrative revolutionary actions, 
upgrading these actions from local initiatives into national policies.138 The masses 
were used as the actors in a movie, to play their part in actions promoted by the top 
leaders, by pretending to have initiated such actions.  
The primary motivation behind the women’s emancipation campaign was 
Albania’s economic development. Albania was building, with Chinese assistance, 
hundreds of industrial projects. The Chinese leaders wondered many times if this 
small country could muster a sufficient workforce for these projects. In some parts of 
the country, women were still excluded from public life and from access to many 
offices. This revolution intended to bring these women into the economic system. 
Despite the propaganda’s focus on gender equality, this was the primary reason for 
the emancipation project. There were other causes too, such as political control. In a 
regime where the only legitimate authority to lead the people and control them was 
the party, it was not acceptable to leave a large part of the female population under 
the rule of their family’s male members. In some remote areas of the country 
marriage was still arranged during childhood and women’s roles in society were 
established by these antiquated mores. This, for a part of the population, especially in 
the countryside, meant living in a parallel situation where old habits were more 
meaningful than state laws. This situation would not be tolerated any longer by the 
regime. The population, especially the young and the middle aged, welcomed this 
policy and actively supported the female emancipation campaign. The emancipation 
was, and is still deemed by some, a great achievement. Still though, even redeemed 
from their previous condition of servility, women were still denied many freedoms 
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due to persistent gender norms. The emancipation in Albania was far from what 
feminist movements protested for across Europe in the late 1960s, unbeknownst to 
many isolated and uninformed Albanian women. For instance, the family was 
incentivized to have many children, since the state claimed to take charge of all the 
basic needs for their growth. For this reason, despite the fact that abortion was 
sanctioned as a right, it was discouraged unless for life-saving measures. Similarly, 
the right of divorce, which on paper was fully guaranteed to women (and to men), 
was minimized by the courts of the time, which received political instructions to 
make every effort to pacify couples before granting any requests for divorce. The 
process, however, was successful in promoting equality of gender in the sense of the 
women’s participation in public life, and in their access of many important offices. 
Still today, Albanian women participate actively in politics, which most likely is a 
legacy of that regime.  
One of the ways of practicing the revolution in Albania was to use the Albanian 
Dazibao, known as Fletërrufe.139 It is a term composed by two words, fletë, which 
means page or sheet, and the word rrufe, which means lightning or thunderbolt. 
Fletërrufe, therefore, were pages written to criticize – sometimes attack – someone 
or something, and were posted in public spaces. The importance given to them was 
very high, as they served as‘powerful tools for the ideological-political and moral 
education of the masses’. 140  It is true that the mobilization of students and the 
fletërrufewere similar to the practices of the Cultural Revolution in China, however, 
the difference is that these fletërrufe did not become the instruments of different 
groups to struggle against each other, nor did they inspire violence like the Dazibao 
did in China. The students in Albania never held the power the Red Guards did, nor 
did they play so great a role. The similarity, therefore, was limited to their form. 
One of the outcomes of the Albanian Cultural Revolution was the increase of 
economic production. Contrary to China, where in the first wave of the Cultural 
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Revolution the economy greatly suffered, in Albania the economic production during 
this period drastically increased. In particular, many infrastructural works were 
completed. On the other hand, greatly affecting the households’ economy was the 
drastic reduction of family yards. These yards were the only private property left to 
the peasants after the expropriation and nationalization of the land since the 1950s. 
Now, officially, as a step towards the further “revolutionization” of the country, these 
yards were almost entirely nationalized because private yards were considered 
bourgeois remnants of the old society. These measures, sometimes extreme, were 
deemed necessary, because it was the only way ‘…to demolish the feudal-
bourgeoisie remain’. 141 The speech of Enver Hoxha that started the Cultural 
Revolution in Albania was the pretext not only to begin the revolution itself, but also 
to further raise the cult of Enver Hoxha. There was no day that widespread 
propaganda did not report the “greatness” of Enver Hoxha in supporting the 
revolution and the socialist cause. The first page of the Albanian Cultural Revolution 
concluded with a declaration of the Government and the Central Committee 
addressed to all the people through the People’s Voice, concerning certain measures 
decided in the context of the Cultural Revolution, like the reduction of the personal 
yards in the communes, the further participation of the state officials in the 
productive works and the reduction of the high salaries. While China’s Cultural 
Revolution came to an official conclusion in 1976 – and for Mao, 1969 – Albania’s 
Cultural Revolution had no such finale. In a way, it had never started either.  
 
Chinese Cultural Revolution: Strengthening Mao, Weakening the Anti-
Revisionist Front 
As usual, the PLA congress in November 1966 was an arena of meeting for many 
communist parties and groups coming from different continents. By now the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution had become a known event within the international communist 
movement – although with unknown dynamics. Kazimierz Mijal, the Polish exile in 
Albania and head of the PCP (m-l), told Albanian leaders that he would want to meet 
the communist groups during the congress but that he was concerned of what the 
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CCP could think about his activities, implying that his main aim probably was to 
enter the good graces of the CCP in addition to Hoxha.142 Initially he expressed his 
full support for the Chinese Cultural Revolution and appreciated Mao’s figure as a 
great Marxist leading to spur forward the world communist movement. Considering 
Albanian leadership’s suspicion of Mao’s cult and thought, most likely they did not 
appreciate Mijal’s pledges of admiration for Mao. Mijal proposed to support 
publically the Chinese Cultural Revolution, but the cult of Mao, to him, in the 
European context was unconvincing and hard to accept.143 Mijal met with Kang 
Sheng in Tirana on 31 October 1966. Kang offered all Chinese readiness to assist the 
PCP (m-l), and invited Mijal to visit China, which he did from 14 November to 29 
December, 1966.144 It is interesting that this trip was under cover, presenting Mijal 
not with his real name but as part of an Albanian delegation. With Mijal went Koçi 
Xengo, a high official of the PLA, who knew Polish after working as a diplomat for 
years in Warsaw.  
Mijal met with Chinese officials alone several times, Mao included. But he told 
his Albanian friend that he did not fully understand the Cultural Revolution – or 
perhaps he pretended as such. He affirmed that certain aspects of the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution were characteristic of China, and that Europe would always 
struggle to understand them. Hoxha, also very suspicious of the Chinese events, 
asked Mijal to set aside his concerns and support China for the time being. Still, after 
Mijal’s return to Tirana, he remained unconvinced of the real aims of the Cultural 
Revolution, and how could it impact the cause of international communism. He 
sustained two main objections: first, the prominent role of Mao and his personal cult; 
second, perhaps consequently, the diminished role of the working class.145 During his 
visit, Mijal was pressed continuously by Chinese officials to make any requests for 
assistance he might need. Mijal did not make material requests but only wanted 
recognition, asking China to publish documents of his party and make known in the 
propaganda that his party supported China and the CCP. The fact that Mijal was 
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based in Tirana for his activities, but sought Chinese recognition, shows the different, 
complementary, role Tirana and Beijing played for these parties. Tirana was 
geographically more appropriate, being in Europe, as a logistic base from which to 
organize political, legal, and in particular illegal, activities in the western 
hemisphere. Consequently the material assistance from Tirana was more effective. In 
addition, they could use Albania’s diplomatic network in the West for coordination 
with other groups. On the other hand, Mijal’s emphasis on Chinese recognition 
shows that China was for most of these groups the ultimate source of legitimation. 
Still, Hoxha had a strong hold over his guests, and tried to use them to get more 
credits from Beijing. Chinese authorities knew that the support for these groups, in 
particular those assisted directly by Albania, should go through the Albanian political 
filter and that Hoxha could influence either their support or their lack of support for 
China. Hence, when Mijal visited China, Chinese officials hastened to tell him that 
‘Enver Hoxha strongly supports the Cultural Revolution’.146 
Regardless the disagreements concerning some aspects of the Cultural 
Revolution, Albania used this period to accredit itself as China’s most precious ally, 
by trying to maximize foreign support through the establishment of a contact 
network and expanding the assistance to foreign communist groups everywhere. For 
instance, with the collaboration of Jacques Grippa in Belgium, strong ties were 
established with illegal communist groups in Congo Brazzaville, where Grippa had 
good connections with the revolutionary groups, and where Cubans had also 
intervened. To the allegations and the gossip about the possible participation of Che 
Guevara in the revolution in Congo, Grippa in Tirana said that Cubans, probably Che 
Guevara too, had entered the country, but had turned back because of conflicts with 
the Congolese groups.147 In late 1966 a meeting was organized in Rome, with the 
help of the Albanian embassy, and was attended by Congolese members of an illegal 
group.148 Secretly these members went to Albania for military and political training. 
Eventually, fighting among themselves for power in a very fragmented context, 
where the ideological boundaries were often hard to distinguish, these groups ceased 
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effectively fighting for the revolution.149 Consequently Albania, in coordination with 
China, did not train these groups with the exclusive goal of a communist revolution. 
What was most important was to challenge the Soviet power and influence in Africa. 
The two Congolese states, Congo Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, were emblematic in this. But did Albania really want to engage in armed 
conflicts over uncertain political returns? Most likely, had it not been for the Chinese 
support, Albania would not have had the power to finance parties and train illegal 
groups from four continents. It was acting indeed, not just in its own interests, but 
China’s as well, in cases when the latter went beyond Asia in competition with 
Soviet Union, seeking to become a revolutionary world power. The limit to China in 
this period was the turmoil caused by the Cultural Revolution, and its lack of 
international recognition. Precisely because of these two factors, Albania’s assistance 
to China became crucial in mitigating China’s (largely self-imposed) isolation. At the 
same time, very subtly, Hoxha used his contacts with foreign groups as a backup for 
the undesired event of a split with China. Hoxha wanted to make sure that if a split 
with China became reality, he would retain international political support and 
recognition. 
In November 1966, Jacques Grippa, the leader of the BCP (m-l), participated in 
the Fifth PLA Congress and met with the Albanian leaders on many occasions. He 
reported to have organized meetings in Belgium with students and other youths to 
inform them about the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Youth attendance at these 
meetings was high, but high also was the number of those who were not fully 
convinced of the good intentions of the Cultural Revolution.150 Even Grippa was not 
fully convinced. When he went on vacations with his wife in Albania in August 
1967, he vented his great dissatisfaction with certain Chinese policies. He had been 
in China during 1966, and lamented the fact that not only had he been kept 
completely uninformed about the Cultural Revolution, but he was also not allowed to 
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meet the Indonesian communist party officials in Beijing.151 Grippa was not alone in 
his frustrations over the lack of information. Kazimierz Mijal told similarly of his 
meetings with Chinese diplomats in Tirana, that the information provided about the 
Cultural Revolution was ‘very vague’, or sometimes clearly inaccurate, as it was 
when he was told the Cultural Revolution would be over within the year (1968).152 
China contributed very much to the communists’ suspicions in Europe about the 
Cultural Revolution, when for instance they refused to allow Mijal to visit China 
again in 1968, claiming the Chinese leaders were too busy.153 China might have 
thought that Mijal was used by Albania to extract information from China that it did 
not otherwise have.  
Grippa’s divergences with Chinese comrades dated back to 1964, mainly 
regarding the criteria upon which assistance was granted or denied to communist 
groups in West Europe. Grippa complained of China’s lack of distinction between 
authentic and imposter Marxist-Leninist groups. Furthermore, ‘in dealing with us, 
China’s representatives in Europe were not ideological comrades, but bureaucrats, 
who feared the consequences of contacting with us’. He brought as example the fact 
that China did not protest when French communists were arrested in Switzerland, 
‘just because they had visited Chinese embassy in Berna’. Grippa had thought that 
the Cultural Revolution in China would have positively impacted the CCP’s foreign 
relations, ‘but it did not happen instead’, lamenting that in 1966 China had impressed 
him negatively with respect to his visit in 1962.154 As he explained, when he visited 
China in August 1966, he had an overt polemic with Kang Sheng regarding which 
principles new Marxist parties in Europe should follow. Kang told Grippa that 
sometimes they should work even with groups that have different ideas, while Grippa 
showed more dogmatism. At the end Kang suggested Grippa to concentrate more on 
Belgian affairs, rather than expanding his contacts. This visit of Grippa, in a few 
words, was a complete failure, and divergences with the CCP seemed to be difficult 
to repair. It was about all this that he reported to Ramiz Alia, Hoxha’s close comrade, 
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in Tirana. Although CCP leaders used to inform Tirana often about their relations 
with other communist parties, regarding Grippa it seems that the CCP did not inform 
Tirana. This can be deduced from the warm welcome Grippa received in Tirana 
when he returned from China. Considering how he was later criticized for his 
standing against China, he would have not been so well-received had Albanian 
leaders known in advance his divergences with Beijing.  
Grippa criticized some of the slogans being promoted by the Cultural Revolution 
in China. For instance, he did not agree, and refused to publish in his newspaper in 
Belgium, the Chinese slogan “it’s right to rebel”, as he considered it too vague and 
could even be used to rebel against communists. He also criticized the little space 
Chinese propaganda had reserved for the communist struggle in Europe. This, for 
him, was due to China’s disregard for the urban working class in Europe, in favor of, 
he believed, rural mobilization. He was also disappointed with the marginal role the 
Cultural Revolution seemed to reserve for the working class, compared to the grand 
emphasis placed on students and peasants. On this point, Hoxha’s view was identical 
to Grippa’s. Grippa also opposed the Chinese slogan “one splits in two”. For him the 
Chinese comrades did not explain with this slogan the difference between the 
antagonist contradiction and the non-antagonist contradiction.155 Following his talks 
with Alia, Grippa planned a meeting with Hoxha. After learning of Grippa’s many 
criticisms of China, almost the same arguments Hoxha had made in private 
conversations with close comrades, Hoxha refused. Commenting on the conversation 
between Grippa and Alia, Hoxha rejected completely Grippa’s criticism of the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution, and a week later he sent to the Chinese embassy the 
records of the conversation between Alia and Grippa.156 But Grippa reminded Alia 
that, after all, the BCP (m-l) was not a branch of the CCP, and Grippa therefore had 
the right to publish whatever he considered appropriate. Hoxha noted that perhaps 
the message was also to the PLA, in a clear attempt to challenge Albania to rethink 
its position. What worried Hoxha most about Grippa was the latter’s defense of Liu 
Shaoqi. Although Grippa did not take Liu’s position in the internal CCP struggle, he 
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wondered, ‘are all the accusations against Liu well-founded?’.157 For Hoxha this was 
too much. Despite most likely sharing similar concerns, privately, Hoxha accused 
Grippa of taking Liu’s – meaning the revisionist – side, instead of defending Mao. 
He could not but reject Grippa’s position as anti-China.  
One week after sharing his sincere thoughts, Jacques Grippa was called in Tirana 
to meet Alia again. Alia read a note he claimed was written by Hoxha, which 
considered Grippa’s view on China, ‘deeply wrong, not based on arguments, was an 
attack to the great revolutionary Mao Zedong and completely anti-Marxist’.158 Alia 
told Grippa that Hoxha and the PLA considered the Cultural Revolution as a great 
contribution to the communist cause. He invited Grippa to call a meeting of the 
central committee of his party in Belgium, to hold a session of self-criticism and 
revise his position towards Beijing. Grippa, on the other hand, rejected Albanian 
accusations, and kindly warned that ‘If our party is mistaken the repercussions are 
limited, but if you instead are wrong the repercussions abroad are more severe, and if 
the CCP is wrong, then the repercussions internationally are even greater’.159 With 
this meeting Grippa was dismissed, and a letter from the PLA was sent to Paris to the 
Albanian ambassador (covering also Belgium) recommending him to keep an eye on 
Grippa. 160  If Grippa had warned Albanian leaders of repercussions, he had not 
imagined that he would be the first to suffer from them. Immediately after his return 
to Belgium, within his party emerged a group that opposed Grippa’s line. Eventually, 
not long after his sojourn in Albania, he faced a putsch and was expelled from his 
own party. Although there is no clear evidence that Albania was behind this, the 
timing and the accusations against Grippa by the new faction seem to leave little 
room for alternative interpretation. This is reinforced also by the fact that the new 
group rushed to send a letter to Hoxha after Grippa’s dismissal, in which they 
rejected entirely Grippa’s position on the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and fully 
supported it as a great event for the world communism.161 In December 1967, Grippa 
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was expelled from the party, mainly for having attacked the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution, as shown in the declaration of the central committee.162 
 
The Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Increasing Aid to Albania 
In September - October 1967, Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu visited China once 
again, this time at the peak of the Cultural Revolution, and Albania this time needed 
greater assurance that the Chinese Cultural Revolution would not affect negatively 
China’s economic assistance to Albania. Indeed, it did affect the assistance, but only 
positively for Albania. In his talks with Zhou Enlai, Shehu was surprised by Zhou’s 
willingness to increase the technological and economic assistance to Albania. In 
1965 Zhou had been critical regarding the building of hydropower plants, and 
recommended oil to generate electricity instead, now China agreed to accelerate the 
works on the hydropower plant of Vau i Dejës (Mao Zedong Plant) that was under 
construction, and to a bigger plant in accordance with the plans Albania had 
presented years earlier, but which had been postponed by China.163 China promised 
also to increase the production capacity of some existing factories. The Albanian 
premier also requested additional armaments that had been denied to Balluku during 
his visit in February of the same year. Zhou Enlai was ready to meet any Albanian 
requests.164 Although the Cultural Revolution caused enormous difficulties to the 
Chinese productive system and to the economy in general, Albania was assisted as 
never before, and as it never will be again. In 1967, an attempt was drafted for 
completing the industrial projects by the following year. 165  China began its 
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geological studies regarding the remaining hydropower plants along the Drini River, 
where Albania wanted to build 5 projects, with a capacity of more than 1.3 million 
kWh energy. 166  This, along with technology for the oil extraction, was very 
demanding for China to supply.167 
 During Shehu’s visit in China, September-October 1967, Beijing committed to 
anticipate the delivery of the military supplies they had promised to Balluku earlier 
in January 1967, and promised an additional 100 air fighters and around 130 tanks, 
after questioning Albania’s capacities in human resources to manage such large 
quantity of heavy armaments.168  As shown in the discussions of the Council of 
Defense, 80 percent of the entire military equipment, which was part of the 
agreement for the period 1967-71, was delivered in 1968, three years in advance of 
the schedule.169 This came due to two international events. First, in April 1967, a 
coup d’état led to the rise of the regime of the colonels in Greece, who in their 
rhetoric did not conceal territorial claims over southern Albania. 170  After the 
establishment of the military regime of the colonels, the Albanian leadership 
seriously feared an armed conflict. At the border with Greece a few Albanian 
casualties were caused as a consequence of the armed clashes. Hoxha did not want 
any further escalation, and ordered the border patrol troops to not react ‘to the Greek 
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provocation without authorization from the capital’. 171  Yet, the Albanian army 
drafted operational plans based on hypothetical attacks from Greece. Rather than an 
invasion, they thought that the colonels could launch a massive air attack, 
destabilizing the country and destroying its fragile economy.172 With its small ally in 
this precarious situation, China accelerated the delivery of military supplies to 
Albania.173  In 1967 alone, the value of the total amount of armaments Albania 
received reached 84 million yuan.174 Curiously, during 1967, China and Albania 
hired a Greek ship for the transportation of part of the armaments.175  This was 
intended to be a message to the colonels in Athens, despite the fact that Chinese 
military assistance to Albania was not a secret. Some years later, in 1971, the same 
colonels would ask Albania to establish diplomatic relations with Greece, and 
Albania agreed, not without first warning them that any aggressive policy towards 
Albania would fail. 
The second event was the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia to 
repress what has been remembered as the Prague Spring, and the subsequent 
proclamation by Brezhnev of the Soviet doctrine of the ‘limited sovereignty’.176 
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Following this event, in September 1968, Albania denounced the WPO and withdrew 
from it. The fear that incidents might give an excuse to Soviet Union for an 
intervention had always been high, and Hoxha seized this opportunity to make the 
step he had been waiting for. Albania was de facto expelled from the WPO in 1961, 
as the minister of defense had not been invited in the meetings of the member 
countries, nor had Albania been invited to participate in any common military 
maneuver since then. It was the right moment, according to the leadership, to break 
the juridical ties that still kept Albania in an alliance that in their view had become a 
hostile, Soviet-controlled stable. 177  Hoxha feared an extension of the conflict to 
Romania and Yugoslavia, Albania being more worried about the latter possibility. 
Operative plans to face an eventual attack from the Soviet Union were quickly 
drafted following the formal ousting of Albania from the WPO.178 The situation was 
further complicated when in autumn 1968, the Albanian population staged massive 
protests in Kosova, seeking better conditions and autonomy for their region. Tito was 
caught between two potential fires, the Soviet threat on one side, on the other was the 
nationalistic movement of the Albanian population in Kosova, whose claims were 
supported by Albania. But in this situation, Hoxha did not hesitate to stand on 
Yugoslavia’s side in case of Soviet attack, showing a clear conciliatory attitude 
towards Tito – whom he saw as the lesser of two evils. Through public speeches and 
indirect diplomatic contacts the message to Tito was that he could concentrate his 
troops on Yugoslavia’s eastern border, to defend his country from a possible Soviet 
invasion, rather than the southern border with Albania. Hoxha also knew that 
Yugoslavia was too precious for the western bloc and for NATO, and therefore 
would have been well defended, but in this eventuality, Albania would have been 
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trapped between the two biggest military alliances of that time, not sure at all that its 
borders would have remained immune from this possible conflict. 
The withdrawal of Albania from the WPO preceded another visit of the 
Albanian defense minister to China in September 1968, officially on occasion of the 
celebrations for the founding of the PRC. His real motivations were to review some 
agreements regarding new armaments from China. The last agreement had been just 
one year earlier, and the delivery of the military supplies was going according to 
plan. Therefore, Zhou Enlai, and the leadership in China, were not enthusiastic to 
review the agreements, nor to provide any further armaments. Shocked by Tirana’s 
new requests, China decided to send to Albania the chief of the general staff, Huang 
Yongsheng, to assess the situation.  
Zhou Enlai nearly caused an incident with Balluku – so perceived at least by the 
Albanian leadership. Balluku reported that Zhou Enlai had opposed Albania’s plans 
to heavily arm the country. Zhou argued that because of the size of Albania, in case 
of war the country ‘would be wiped out at the first attack’. Then later in another 
meeting, Zhou told the Albanian minister that ‘with Yugoslavia, in the present 
situation [Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia] you could establish a military 
alliance. The Romanians, Czechoslovakians, and Yugoslavians are now our indirect 
allies’.179 This conversation initially was not reported to all Politburo members in 
Tirana, but only to Hoxha. Eventually, he decided to share it with the others, 
although reminding them of its secrecy. Hoxha perceived Zhou’s invitation for a 
rapprochement with Belgrade outrageous. Zhou had indeed stepped on Hoxha’s 
Achilles’ heel. Balluku in his prompt response to Zhou Enlai considered Yugoslavia 
‘the biggest enemy of our country’. Zhou then moved quickly to other issues in an 
attempt to diminish the damage, but then, when Balluku was discussing Albania’s 
defense strategy, mentioning the Greek threat, Zhou again provoked Balluku by 
asking, ‘But don’t you think that the Soviet Union would defend you from a Greek 
attack’? These positions were deemed by Shehu in Tirana as ‘anti-Marxist, hostile, 
and anti-Albanian’, and by Hoxha as ‘harmful to the international communist 
movement, to the revolution and to the struggle against imperialism and modern 
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revisionism’. Hoxha drew the conclusion that Zhou Enlai was ‘a revisionist, and 
despite his active participation in the Cultural Revolution, he in fact is against this 
revolution’.180 
At the end Zhou Enlai accepted some of the new requests by Albania, including, 
among many materials, hundreds of tanks, tens of air fighters, many torpedo-
destroyers, missiles, and other equipment. Zhou agreed to provide immediately 200 
million shells (bullets and rackets), part of the plan for one billion shells, 10 thousand 
machine guns, 2500 anti-air strikes machine gunners and hundreds of artillery 
pieces.181 China also committed to provide, by 1969, 90 percent of all the armaments 
that it had agreed to provide by 1971.182 Huang Yongsheng stayed for one week in 
Albania, visiting many military garrisons.183 Following his visit, a load of 19,000 
tons of military supplies reached Albania that same month, and another load of 
around 80,000 tons of materials were delivered by the end of 1968. 184  Some 
problems did emerge with the Albanian officials, mainly pilots of fighter jets, who 
went to China for training. One report from the Albanian embassy in Beijing, 
complained about the poor discipline they showed, and the ‘immoral acts’ (trying to 
approach local girls, and even a case of rape), consequently, an entire group of 18 
pilots was called back to Albania in the first year of their study in China. 185 
Nonetheless, the military equipment continued to be readily and rapidly supplied. In 
celebration of the Albanian National Day, at the end of November 1969, Li Xiannian 
visited Albania, accompanied by a large number of officials of the Chinese army. It 
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is curious to see that by the end of 1969, Albania expected to have received a total of 
160 thousand tons in ammunitions (shells and bullets), which, according to the 
calculations, ‘requires a storage space of 16km tunnels, at least 7m large’.186 The last 
load for the year 1969 reached Durrës in December 1969, carrying more than 1400 
tons of materials. 187  At the beginning of 1969, the two governments signed an 
agreement to speed up the fortification process in Albania by sending a group of 
Chinese experts who had experience in constructing tunnels from their time in 
Vietnam.188 Meanwhile, regardless of Albanian leadership’s rhetoric aimed against 
Yugoslavia, by the late 1960s Albania’s foreign policy towards its northern neighbor 
had changed from unconcealed enmity to timid openness, and even to collaboration, 
accompanied by Yugoslavia with a substantial improvement of the status of the 
Albanian population in Kosova. Belgrade also changed its attitude towards Tirana, 
and in 1969 officially asked to raise the diplomatic representation from the level of 
legation to that of embassies. Albania, not completely trustful of Yugoslavia, waited 
until 1971 before accepting the Yugoslavian proposal.189 
In this context of Chinese enormous assistance to Albania, in 1968 the Albanian 
government initiated the study of an economic plan for the entire decade 1970-80, 
which would completely rely on Chinese assistance.190 Although most of the new 
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plan concerned the expansion of production capacities of existing industrial projects, 
the planned investments would cost the equivalent of 46 new projects.191 In July 
1968, Albanian Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu sent a letter to Zhou Enlai asking 
China to accept an economic delegation from Albania in order to negotiate a new 
loan. Zhou Enlai accepted and a delegation headed by vice Prime Minister Adil 
Çarçani went to Beijing in September 1968.192  
China eventually accepted most of the Albanian requests, including the building 
of another large hydroelectric power plant in Fierza, and the completion of the 
metallurgic plant in Elbasan – a gigantic project for Albania which required the 
participation of around 15 thousand workers during its construction, and a permanent 
workforce of 10 thousand workers employed in the production line.193  The two 
governments signed the agreement on 20 November, 1968, for a new Chinese loan, 
totalling 1.56 billion yuan (252.4 million rubles),194 and 35 million USD cash,195 
which was additional to the loan approved in 1965 for the fourth FYP 1966-1970.196 
The total amount of the loan China approved for Albania in November 1968 and then 
again in October 1970 reached almost 3 billion yuan, (697.8 million rubles).197 On at 
least two occasions, China used Albania for technological transfer purposes. First, 
the constructions of chemical fertilizer plants, and second the hydropower plants. In 
the second case, when the hydropower plant of Vau i Dejës (Mao Zedong plant) 
begun construction, it was necessary to import equipment that China could not 
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produce. China entered into talks with Italian companies regarding the production of 
particular trucks for the transport of the materials and equipment to build the dam. 
Those trucks were produced in China later. The delegation that had been in China to 
discuss the loan, managed to increase and modify in Albanian favor some of the 
agreements concerning the exchange of goods within the plan 1965-70. They also 
managed to assure most of the cables and wires needed for the electrification of the 
country. In fact, in the 1970s, in some remote parts of Albania, people still relied on 
candlelight. It was not surprising that China perceived paradoxical the Albanian 
determination to pursue heavy industrialization whilst in many respects Albania was 
still backward.  
The building of these industrial projects shaped the entire national life of 
Albania during the 1960s and 1970s, as it required a huge mobilization of the 
workforce and building from the ground of entire cities in the country. The city of 
Elbasan, which hosted the metallurgic plant, needed an additional workforce of more 
than twelve thousand people along with their families. This required the construction 
of additional six and a half thousand apartments for a new population of thirty-five 
thousand people. 198  This necessitated the building of related social and cultural 
institutions such as schools, theatres, libraries, and other facilities. In some places, 
this meant ancient and tiny villages became new-born cities overnight. The city of 
Laç that hosted the workers of the superphosphate plant was such a case. The same 
happened in the small city of Ballsh, where for the building of a large and complex 
plant for oil processing, it was necessary to employ more than three thousand people, 
and afterwards a permanent workforce of around two thousand people, plus another 
two thousand in smaller factories related directly to this plant. In all, an entire city of 
thousands of people was built around this factory, which still exists and is partially 
functional.  
In 1969, China faced many challenges. The tension with the Soviet Union along 
the border resulted in armed clashes, while internally China faced problems created 
by clashes between groups because of the Cultural Revolution.199 In this context, it 
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was expected that China might not fulfill the contractual obligations with Albania as 
scheduled. Instead, as shown in a report of the trade office at the Albanian embassy 
in Beijing, precisely during these conflicts, China accomplished more for the 
Albanian economy than in any previous period. With only some limited delays, all of 
the agreements were kept for this year.200 In 1970, the PLA Politburo assessed the 
achievements of the fourth FYP 1965-70, which was nearing conclusion. According 
to the discussions, most targets of the plan had been reached, and in many industrial 
sectors the targets were even surpassed.201 The national income in Albania increased 
by 30 percent in five years, certainly owing to the Chinese assistance. Because of 
these results, Albania’s economy in these years seemed relatively flourishing. 
Agriculture was the only major sector of the economy where the targets were not 
achieved, with many farmers lacking the necessary level of mechanization, but this 
did not cause any shortage of food, or primary goods in general. 
In the early 1970, the Albanian government had good reasons to celebrate these 
achievements; and good reason for optimism as they began preparations for the new 
FYP 1971-75. This new plan had some marked differences with those previous. First, 
since most of the heavy industry projects were still under construction, only eight 
new projects required complete Chinese assistance.202 In total, 36 new industrial 
projects were planned for construction – some new factories, and some 
enhancements to existing plants. That so few were put completely on Chinese 
shoulders indicated that Albania had acquired in these years, thanks precisely to the 
Chinese expertise, the capacities to develop its own industry. Another fundamental 
aspect was Albania’s planned diversification of its commercial portfolio with 
different countries regarding some specific equipment that China could not provide. 
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For instance, Albania decided not to ask for all the transportation trucks from China, 
but decided to purchase them from Czechoslovakia and Poland – an old Chinese 
suggestion. 
To finalize the assistance for the FYP 1971-75, a delegation visited China in 
August 1970, led by the head of the Albanian State Planning Commission, Abdyl 
Këllezi, who stayed in China for more than two months, until October of that year, 
for negotiations.203 During the stay the delegation toured many provinces in China, 
where they were told that the Cultural Revolution had won everywhere, and Mao’s 
thought had triumphed. By 16 October, 1970, the two sides signed the agreements 
regarding China’s new loan to Albania. Although it was less than Albania had asked 
– 1,880 billion yuan or, equal to 445 million rubles (534 million USD)204  – it 
included funds for the construction of the great hydropower project of Fierza.205 In 
addition, China approved a loan in foreign currency of 14 million USD cash to be 
used for importing goods China could not provide.206 In these agreements, Albania 
was granted two great advantages: first, it could start to repay this loan after 1990; 
second, the loan was without any interest. Curiously, while throughout Europe in the 
1970s, television was the most important means of propaganda diffusion and 
entertainment, Albania was still the age of the radio. Now, finally, with Chinese 
assistance, Albania had the possibility to build a powerful television station, together 
with the technological capacities to manufacture its own televisions.207 
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MITIGATING CHINA’S ISOLATION. SURROGATE DIPLOMACY 
China had delivered great economic and military assistance to Albania. To make 
good on its end of the bargain, Albania dramatically increased efforts to defend 
Chinese interests in international organizations. At sessions of the United Nations, 
Albania fought a determined battle over the legitimate seat of the PRC. It also 
strongly defended the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the international forums and 
organizations where it had its representatives. The entire diplomatic network of 
Albania was at China’s disposal. In November 1966, the Albanian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs instructed its diplomatic network to defend the Cultural Revolution 
and the ‘…international authority and prestige of China that has become a shield 
against imperialism and revisionism’.208 The Sino-Indian border clashes, the Sino-
Soviet territorial disputes, the issue of Tibet, and the question of China’s 
representation in UN were the main issues about which Albania lent support to 
Beijing. 
 In 1945, China had been one of the founders of the UN, but it was Chang Kai-
shek (Jiang Jieshi) who signed the Charter in China’s name. As the leader of 
Kuomintang (Guomindang - GMD), he was then internationally recognized as 
China’s leader. During China’s civil war, Chang Kai-shek was defeated, resulting in 
the foundation in 1949 of the People’s Republic of China.209 When, in November 
1949, the PRC claimed its seat in the United Nations, it was still occupied by the 
Republic of China (ROC), which as a consequence of the civil war de facto 
represented only the island of Taiwan. 210  The United States had assisted the 
Nationalists during the civil war, but eventually they realized that Chang Kai-shek’s 
cause was lost. Washington ‘affirmed the traditional open-door policy’ for China, 
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and the desire ‘for its unity’, but it maintained ‘recognition for the Nationalist 
(GMD) government’.211  
 More specifically, the United States managed to turn the issue of the PRC’s 
representation into an ‘important matter’ that required the vote of the two-thirds of 
UN member states.212 So the question was formally reduced to whose credentials 
were valid, those of Taipei or Beijing. Thus the issue became one of representation, 
not admission.213 From a larger perspective, the United States had hoped in vain that 
Mao’s China would embrace the Yugoslavian path, meaning friendly relations with 
the West without giving up the communist party’s rule, never blindly following 
Soviet dictates.214 Scholars have even sustained that without Chinese involvement in 
the Korean War, the United States would not have opposed the PRC’s representation 
in the United Nations.215 In fact, the United States’ closest ally, the United Kingdom, 
recognized Beijing’s government just months after the establishment of the PRC, in 
January 1950 – not without causing attrition between London and Washington.216 
 Beijing sustained that resistance to its participation in the UN ‘has not actually 
caused any damage to China, but has impaired the prestige of the United Nations and 
made it unable effectively to play its role in accordance with the Charter’. 217 
Nonetheless, as Byron Weng argued long time ago, although Beijing was not 
represented, the ‘UN has been a constant factor in Peking’s foreign policy 
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deliberations’.218 Because of its importance, China used Albania as a favored channel 
to transmit its messages to the UN, and every year sent explicative materials to the 
Albanian government presenting China’s views and policies. 219  The pivot of 
Beijing’s policy towards its representation in UN was represented in the “One 
China” argument, placing the Taiwan issue as strictly an internal affair of the PRC. 
The second axis of China’s policy was its rejecting any solution that would include 
their dual representation in United Nations – an option Beijing always rejected 
because it was clear that would legitimate Taiwan’s de jure independence. Therefore 
any resolution to admit the PRC in UN, had to go in parallel with one pushing for the 
ousting of Taipei from the organization. 
 Albania joined the United Nations on 14 December, 1955, and immediately 
participated actively in all its related agencies. At the beginning, Albania acted in 
accordance with Soviet directives, and passively supported decisions made in the 
Kremlin. Following the Sino-Soviet and Soviet-Albanian split, however, Albania 
became active in using the United Nations as a stage from which to loudly speak out 
on international relations and the division of the world in spheres of influence 
between superpowers. As one scholar has noted, during the Cold War, the United 
Nations was ‘the conspicuous and most highly publicized arena’.220 Albania’s voice 
in this arena became even louder after 1961, when the alliance with China was 
consolidated. Representing China also had many benefits for Albania. Beyond the 
Chinese assistance it received for its role, Albania also acquired certain notoriety in 
the international scene that it had not enjoyed in at least four centuries. In addition, 
Albania tried to position itself to carry the banner of the struggle for liberation of 
nations across continents as it strongly supported the decolonization process. This 
process helped enormously to increase, year after year, the support for China in the 
UN. The new states became so numerous that, at a certain point, the Albanian 
ambassador noted how the UN had turned into a ‘world exhibition’.221 This activism 
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of Albania came to be useful to China, which used the network Albania had been 
building in UN, and beyond, to promote its policies and eventually also to join the 
UN. Now, during the Cultural Revolution, Albania’s diplomatic network became 
almost the only channel to convey China’s voice in international organizations. This 
situation was caused by two factors: first, Albania was ideologically China’s closest 
ally; second, among China’s supporters, Albania was also the most stable, with a 
consolidated diplomatic network, and was internationally recognized. This situation 
enabled China to use Albania’s diplomatic network to promote its interests via what 
we can call surrogate diplomacy – although this term is not used by scholars in 
analyzing foreign policy and international relations, yet for a limited period and for 
some concerted tasks Albania did perform exactly as a surrogate for Beijing. 
Although China did not rely exclusively on Albania to promote its interests in forums 
where it was unrepresented, Albania remained the most active promoter of China 
until early 1970s.  
 The first time Albania presented a resolution in China’s favor in the UN was in 
October 1963, in conjunction with many African and Asian states.222 The Journal-
American, a newspaper closed in 1966, called the resolution a challenge to the Soviet 
Union, reflecting both, Sino-Soviet and Albanian-Soviet tensions.223 In this same 
session, Albania presented to the UN General Secretary a declaration from the 
Chinese government advocating the total destruction of nuclear arms, and proposing 
an international conference of world leaders.224 China had made great efforts in the 
1950s to possess nuclear technology, but the Soviet Union, which at the beginning 
had promised to help, eventually reneged its promise and withdrew all nuclear 
experts from China. Chinese declaration followed the meeting between the 
governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union, resulting in 
the agreement on the partial cessation of nuclear tests. China saw the agreement as an 
attempt by these countries to keep their monopoly of the world’s nuclear weapons, 
rather than a genuine effort for peace, proposing instead the total destruction of the 
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nuclear arsenals.225 The declaration included a frontal attack on the Soviet Union, 
describing it as a country that ‘aligns with the forces of war against the forces of 
peace, allies with the imperialism to oppose socialism, allies with United States to 
oppose China’. 226  The Soviet ambassador Andrei Gromyko and the American 
ambassador Adlai Stevenson had a long conversation, alleged to be very friendly, 
and allegedly to keep the Cold War outside the works of that session of the UN. 
When Albania raised the issue of China’s seat in the UN, in a speech on 16 October, 
1963, the Soviet delegation stayed in complete silence, neither approving nor 
opposing, a silence which the Journal-American called a ‘a sign that shows the depth 
of the quarrel between Beijing and Moscow, a path towards a complete split between 
them’. The same interpretation was given by New York Times.227 In another analysis 
The Post considered that Beijing and Moscow were in a race for the leadership of the 
anti-colonialist countries, but ‘the more Soviet Union would try to isolate Beijing, 
the more China would want to join the United Nations’.228 All the debates in the 
General Assembly devolved into attacks between the American ambassador in the 
UN, Adlai Stevenson, and the foreign minister of Albania, Behar Shtylla. Certainly, 
Albania’s standing was very radical, even more than China requested it to be. 
Albanian diplomats used extreme language, often with direct offenses to the United 
States, but this was not enough to call much attention from Washington, which did 
not see Albania as a threat on the international stage. The reason behind the furious 
reaction of the American diplomats, rather, was China, which they mentioned in 
nearly every attack they directed at Albania. Adlai Stevenson, in a declaration to the 
press in 1963, correctly affirmed that ‘the foreign minister of Albania in this case 
was absolutely China’s spokesperson’.229 
 In 1964 instead, China faced another challenge in UN. The UN Commission for 
Decolonization discussed the territories of Macao and Hong Kong. China asked 
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Albania to defend Chinese claims over these territories. Consequently, Albania 
opposed the interference of the members of this commission in the issue of the 
decolonization of Macao and Hong Kong.230 China was a great supporter of the 
process of decolonization, but it feared that on the wave of the process worldwide, 
territories that Beijing claimed under its sovereignty could proclaim their 
independence as well. When the Albanian vice foreign minister Vasil Nathanaili met 
with the Chinese ambassador in Tirana, Xu Jianguo, the ambassador asked Albania 
to oppose any claim that these colonies be treated as colonial countries – as such 
subject to a process of independence. China’s ultimate goal was their unification with 
the Mainland. It was a paradox: China preferred to keep Hong Kong and Macao 
under British rule, eventually negotiating later their return to China, rather than see 
Beijing’s control precluded by their becoming independent cities.  
 During 1964, Albania had tried to mediate on behalf of China on different 
issues. For instance, on Beijing’s request, Tirana asked the Turkish authorities to 
invite a trade delegation from China. This was a very sensitive issue, as Turkey held 
an important, delicate position in NATO, was a strong supporter of the United States, 
and had only recently improved relations with Tirana. In many other forums, Albania 
actively put forward China’s interests in the agenda, such as in April 1964, at the 
Geneva conference for trade and development. The Albanian minister of foreign 
trade, Kiço Ngjela, asked the immediate ousting of the representative of Taiwan, and 
the consequent representation of the PRC. In the same time at the Universal Postal 
Union Congress, the Albanian delegate protested because of the lack of 
representation of China. The same happened at the World Health Assembly, where 
the representative of Albania opposed the credentials of the representative of Taiwan, 
but in the end it had little choice but to relent.231 That same year Albania opposed the 
presence of Taiwan at the eighth conference of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA).  
 In November 1965, the Chinese ambassador in Albania, Xu Jianguo, alarmed by 
the decision of the UN to open a debate in the General Assembly on the question of 
Tibet, asked Albania to oppose both the United States and India, which had both 
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insisted on raising the issue, and to defend the PRC against attacks. The issue was 
not new for China. In august 1959, during the consultative preparatory meeting of the 
socialist countries in Sofia (Bulgaria), following the Tibetan turmoil, Chinese 
representatives brought the issue of Tibet to the attention of the entire socialist bloc. 
China was afraid that the United States might raise this question for discussion at the 
UN General Assembly. For China, behind all this was India, which according to 
Beijing had the full support of the United States. Beijing feared that the United States 
would also support India’s eventual effort to transform Tibet into an international 
conflict, potentially compelling the UN to act against China.232 The Albanian foreign 
ministry urged the Albanian diplomats in New York to make efforts to persuade 
Afro-Asian countries to oppose America, as China had expressly ‘asked us to assist 
on this issue’.233 
 The support of Albania became even more precious because of the 
disagreements within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The NAM was a sequel 
of the Bandung meeting of 1955. One of the most relevant members of the 
movement was Egypt, the most important North African country at the time, ruled in 
1960 by Nasser (Gamal Abdel). Nasser attempted to organize a second conference, 
after Bandung’s model, possibly in Cairo, and tried to convince Nehru, the Indian 
premier, to improve the relations with Zhou Enlai in order to involve China as well. 
But Nehru opposed the organizing of this conference, as it would be perceived as an 
anti-American event. Nehru instead promoted a movement of the non-aligned 
countries later the same year.234 This was confirmed only some months later by the 
Chinese ambassador in Berlin in a conversation with the Albanian ambassador.235 
Later, during 1961, this conference was organized in Cairo as a meeting of the 
neutral countries, which China, it seems, did not appreciate because of the 
contradictions among the participating countries. This meeting indeed served as a 
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preparatory meeting for the foundation of one of the most debated organizations 
during the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), founded in Belgrade in 
the meeting of the neutral countries in 1961.236 The only positive fact for China, at 
least according to Beijing’s ambassador in Berlin, was Cuba’s participation, since 
Cuba was clearly a country that opposed the United States.237 
 The disunity of this movement was noted by China’s diplomats, who divided the 
participants into three groups: first, those that served the American interests, such as 
India and Yugoslavia; second, those that could oppose the American policy but were 
weak, such as Cuba, Mali and Algeria; third, those countries that moved right and 
left according to different interests, such as Indonesia and Ceylon (Sri Lanka).238 In 
Belgrade, in the founding meeting of the NAM in early September 1961, the 
Egyptian correspondent noted that to have a joint declaration ‘not even 50 days 
would be necessary considering the very different content of each delegation’s 
speech’.239 The contradictions among the organizers were confirmed also by the 
Chinese diplomats in Cairo, who, speaking with the Albanian ambassador, confirmed 
NAM’s division into three groups: the right-leaning group headed by Tito-Nehru, the 
centrist group led by Sukarno-Nasser, and the small left-leaning group headed by 
Cuba.240 Some years later, in 1967, the Syrian diplomats in Paris, talking to the 
Albanian ambassador, affirmed that the non-aligned bloc was finished when ‘Nehru 
died, pushing India in America’s arms… and Nasser is trapped in the Yemenite 
war’.241 These contradictions often made the support of these countries for China 
uncertain – or if they were certain – weak. Even more so during the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution. 
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 In December 1965, during the Twentieth General Assembly of the UN, the 
question of Tibet was again included in the agenda. Following Chinese instructions, 
Albania rejected the mere existence of a ‘question of Tibet’ and any discussion on 
this issue was deemed meaningless.242 For Albania, Tibet was a place where ‘until 
recently people lived in conditions of total slavery and indescribable misery… but at 
that time the representatives of Nicaragua, Philippines and Salvador [promoters of 
the issue in UN, supported by the US] never showed any concern about the human 
rights in Tibet’.243 Then, the Albanian delegate warned that, by becoming American 
spokespersons, would not save these countries from eventual American aggression if 
any their policies would not align to American interests in the future.244 On the other 
hand, the Albanian minister praised China for its great achievements in improving 
the lives of the people in Tibet. He mentioned the agrarian reform and the 
investments in agriculture, education, and infrastructure, generally improving the 
living standards, specifically in the building of a network of health care centers, and 
increasing the number of Tibetan cadres. The minister declared that if there would be 
a country about which the UN should debate on human rights, ‘there is no need to go 
far since it is just in our face, here in the United States where 20 million black people 
are continuously discriminated against’.245 Since speculations over the human rights 
in Tibet proliferated, China allowed a number of foreign correspondents to visit the 
region in summer 1965. 246  They could visit only places where the Chinese 
government granted permission, and Albanian correspondents, aimed at disproving 
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what they called American defamations of China, wrote enthusiastic articles about 
Tibet. 
 During all these years Albania also strongly attacked the American intervention 
in Vietnam.247 In many meetings with Chinese officials Albanian officials talked 
about Vietnam and about the American aggression, but China did not ask for any 
Albanian concrete support on this issue. The reason might be the fact that Vietnam 
was also supported by Soviet Union, and in the UN, Moscow had more power than 
the other socialist countries. The Albanian speeches in favor of the Vietnamese 
cause, however, can also be explained as an attempt by China to accredit Beijing 
with a certain role, since China provided enormous assistance to North Vietnam, as it 
considered all Indochina to be of strategic importance for its own national security, 
because of geographical proximity, and historical links. The permanent 
representative of Albania in the UN, Halim Budo, in a speech addressed to the 
General Assembly on 17 December 1965, attacked American policy in Vietnam, 
using the same arguments reflected in Chinese documents relayed to Albania, but 
with a characteristic Albanian combative tone. The speech was full of contempt 
against the United States for ‘trying to use this tribune for their aggressive 
purposes… keeping away the public opinion from the serious problems of our 
time… concerned instead of reducing the wave of indignation for the barbarian 
aggression against Vietnam’.248 
 In June 1966, just some months before the Twenty-first UN General Assembly, 
Albania, Cambodia and Algeria, together with other countries, coordinated to 
promote again the inclusion in the agenda of the question of the PRC’s representation 
in UN.249 Although likely untrue, a Cambodian representative sustained that his 
government did not consult China about its initiative to promote China’s rights in the 
UN, and queried if Zhou Enlai during his visit to Albania, in June 1966, had 
expressed any change of policy.250 Indeed something new was expressed in Tirana 
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but not from Zhou Enlai, rather than it was from the Charge d'Affaires of China in 
Albania, who in a meeting with an official of the foreign ministry had said that China 
would not join the UN regardless of the result of this year’s vote, ‘as long as that 
organization would remain under American control’.251 In this way, he implied as 
well that any resolution in China’s favor would fail. This position however, reflected 
the self-inflicted isolation of Beijing from the first year of the Cultural Revolution in 
China. In any case, the Albanian delegation in the UN was instructed to defend the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution in accordance ‘with the speech of Enver Hoxha’, to the 
congress of the party.252 In 1966 information warned Albania of a coming Canadian 
initiative seeking proper resolution of the PRC’s recognition in the UN, without 
removing Taiwan’s seat, in harmony with the American plan for two Chinas.253 
According to the Canadian ambassador, their initiative was aimed at ‘provoking 
negotiations between China and the United States’, because ‘the situation is so tense 
that either they negotiate or there would be a war between China and America’.254 
Although the Albanian initiative was joined and supported by other countries, such 
as Cambodia and Algeria, their stances differed in modality and language. During the 
talks of the authors among the authors of the resolution, Albania claimed that the text 
of the “Memoire Explicative” was weak, so it pressured the group to make some 
changes, possibly using the strong language Albania was familiar with. In particular, 
the non-aligned countries, such as Cambodia, did not accept the Albanian suggestion 
to refer Taiwan as ‘the Chang Kai-shek Clique’, opting instead to adopt the formula 
of ‘the representatives of the pseudo regime of Chang Kai-shek’.255 Albania also 
lamented resistance from some countries – which in the document are mentioned as 
‘mainly African countries, Algeria included’ – to attack the American ‘aggressive 
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policy against China’.256 Albania, based on China’s arguments, sustained that the 
United States had invaded Taiwan, and therefore, had invaded China. Albania was 
not optimistic about the votes China would receive in this session, mainly because of 
‘the changes that have occurred in some African countries due to the military coups 
supported by the United States’.257 Ultimately, the resolution in favor of China was 
rejected, 46 countries voting for it, 57 against. It is interesting to note the remark of 
the Albanian ambassador to his ministry in Tirana after the vote. He considered the 
work of United States to oppose China easier that year ‘probably due to the internal 
situation in China’, alluding to the Cultural Revolution and all the inertia it had 
created in China’s diplomacy and foreign affairs.258 In this session, those that voted 
against China included some countries that had supported it the year before, such as 
Morocco, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Congo, Ruanda, and Libya. The 
newly admitted members, Lesotho and Guyana, also voted against China, while 
Burundi and Senegal, having abstained the previous year, supported China in 
1966.259 
 During 1967, China entered its second year of the Cultural Revolution, which 
further paralyzed its diplomacy. In June 1967, Pakistan and Mauritania joined as co-
authors of the resolution for China’s readmission into UN.260  In the discussions 
among the co-authors, Albania disagreed with Algeria which promoted the use of a 
conciliatory language. Albania proposed mentioning Taiwanese representatives as 
‘the clique of Chang Kai-shek’, rather than the Algerian version of ‘the regime of 
Chang Kai-shek’, but at the end, Albania had the support of Congo, Mali and Guinea 
and its proposal passed.261 Albania and Algeria also opposed each other over the 
Albanian suggestion to emphasize China’s respect for sovereignty of the other 
countries and its policy of non-intervention in their internal affairs. Algeria proposed 
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to avoid any similar mention in light of what had happened in Beijing, where as a 
result of the turmoil the British embassy had been set on fire, and a British journalist 
held hostage.262 But for Albania, precisely because of these events, China needed to 
be defended even more. Finally, the Albanian suggestion passed because of the 
support of the African countries. It is worth noting that among the communist 
countries, only Albania was active in defending China. Romania, which participated 
as a co-author of the resolution, barely said a word during the discussions between 
Algeria and Albania over the content of the documents. 263  Preparing for these 
meetings, the Albanian foreign ministry instructed the Albanian delegates to the UN 
that the documents (resolution and memoire explicative) should not leave space to 
any interpretation that alludes to a possible isolation of China in the international 
community. For this reason, the Albanian ambassador proposed to remove the part of 
the document in which China was described as a ‘victim’ of American expansionism, 
instead emphasizing that ‘our governments did not stop the denouncing of the 
aggressive policies against China’.264 By the end of the meeting, all the Albanian 
remarks had been accepted by the authors and incorporated into the documents, and 
the resolution. Yet, these small disagreements were a symptom of the larger divide 
that existed between Albania, as a communist country, and the Third World countries 
– although Albania never accepted the Three World’s theory. But they also show that 
through the first phase of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Albania remained 
faithfully on China’s side, supporting its interests internationally.  
 
Conclusion 
Although the Sino-Albanian relations during 1962-1970 saw some mutual distrust 
and persistent attrition, this was the most fruitful period of the alliance. The attrition 
came about due to China’s contradictory policy, at least in Albania’s eyes, toward the 
Soviet Union, at times conciliatory and at times inflammatory. If the change of 
leadership in the Soviet Union was seen as a chance for China to better relations with 
Moscow, Albania instead was determined to avoid any rapprochement. Moreover, 
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from Hoxha’s perspective, there was no reason for rapprochement with Moscow 
when there had already been efforts to breach the Soviet leadership of the 
international communist movement. In this sense, Albania had moved forward in 
capturing small movements and leftist parties that supported the Chinese line. 
Fortunately for Hoxha, the combination of the assertive policies of Brezhnev and the 
radicalization of China, which resulted in the Cultural Revolution, kept China and 
Albania tied together. Albania had decided to promote China as an alternative to 
Soviet leadership within the international communist movement. Although fully 
aware that this objective was difficult to achieve, Albania claimed an active role for 
China and defended China in international forums and international organizations – 
chiefly, the United Nations.    
The Chinese Cultural Revolution had initially confused Albanian leaders – for a 
moment they even feared China might turn revisionist – but when the domestic 
turmoil further isolated China, Albania clearly recognized, and seized, the 
opportunity for economic and political benefits. Yet this event did reveal some of the 
divergences between the two allies that would resurface later. Albania did not accept 
any revision of the Stalinist dogma, therefore any Chinese claim of Mao’s thought as 
an original contribution to communism was met with skepticism. Hoxha’s 
ideological inflexibility pushed China to look for common grounds to accommodate 
Albania’s expectations. Eventually, Albania and China found a common 
understanding: China assured Albania of its antirevisionist (anti-Soviet) course, 
Albania consequently supported more than ever China within the international 
communist movement, and on the international stage. In turn China provided Albania 
with an exceptional amount of economic and military aid. Nonetheless, Albania did 
not imitate China, and its Cultural Revolution was similar to the Chinese one in the 
shape and in terms of public discourse, but different in practice. The Albanian 
political system was dominated by one man, who had purged and executed most of 
his comrades, and who now had no rivals. His control over the party (and the 
country) was complete, and his ideology – a mix of nationalism and Marxism – faced 
no challenges by any other line within the power system. In Albania, with no 
revisionists to contend, the Cultural Revolution could address more practical goals. 
Albania’s Cultural Revolution was a struggle for total control of the party. The 
Chinese one instead was a struggle within the party, defined by an inter-party 
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ideological struggle. Therefore, the two cultural revolutions were connected, but had 
more differences than similarities. Although there is no evidence that China put 
pressure on Albania to promote the Cultural Revolution, certainly many facts show 
that China at least succeeded in persuading Albania that the Cultural Revolution 
would be beneficial. The Chinese Cultural Revolution put Sino-Albanian relations to 
the test, which they passed successfully, and the alliance lasted for another ten years.  
In this period, the Chinese assistance transformed Albania into a construction 
site, building hundreds of kilometers of railways, tens of new factories, industrial 
projects, and hydropower plants, and reshaping the agriculture. In a short period of 
time, Albania pursued, and attained forced economic industrialization, and 
paradoxically achieved higher living standards than even China, thanks to Chinese 
aid.  
China assured Albania’s military defense through the provision of an 
unprecedented amount of armaments. This assistance did not dictate any 
predetermined military strategy to Albania, because for Beijing, Albania was not of 
strategical military interest, therefore the Chinese leadership never went beyond 
providing some suggestions – at least partially aimed at containing the high requests. 
This is understandable considering the different role Albania played for China as 
compared to the Soviet Union. For the Soviets, especially after the Tito-Stalin rift, 
Albania was a strategic outpost of the communist bloc in Southeastern Europe, 
whereas for China, the alliance with Albania was important politically, but not 
militarily, or strategically. Therefore this different role, together with the 
geographical distance, shaped the alliance and the military assistance. Albania was 
interested in arming itself, and it did not serve the interests of China to assist in that 
process, whereas in the case of the Soviet Union, it was prudent to arm the Albanians 
and to maintain a military base in their country (the naval base of Vlora), for its 
proximity to the NATO bases in Italy. In this way, the Soviet Union had its only 
military base in the Adriatic coast. The Soviet Union, at least under Stalin, was 
interested in using Hoxha to balance Tito, whereas, to China, this aspect was 
irrelevant. Nonetheless, China showed great readiness to defend Albania from its real 
or perceived threats.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CHINA MOVES WEST, 1971-1974 
 
Introduction 
The first years of the Chinese Cultural Revolution were a golden period for Hoxha to 
maximize the benefits of his relations with China by exploiting China’s isolation 
from the international community. Economically, the period from 1966 to 1974-5 
was the most fruitful for Albania. Politically, the Chinese Cultural Revolution 
seemed to guarantee the continuation of the left turn in Mao’s policies in China. This 
had, in Hoxha’s eyes, reinforced the revolutionary path in China. No matter mass 
mobilization used to purge adversaries, Mao, the Albanians were convinced, had 
pursued the Marxist line and defeated revisionism in China. For Hoxha, this meant a 
further radicalization that reaffirmed their common ideological struggle against the 
Soviet Union’s revisionism. Albanian leaders could all but have expected the drastic 
turn in China’s foreign policy at the beginning of the 1970s, least of all normalization 
with the United States. Hoxha was shocked by hearing of the direct communication 
between Chinese and American leaders. He would not accept Mao’s policy of 
balancing the Soviet Union with the United States. In fact, he did not believe what 
Chinese leaders then seemed convinced of – the Soviet military attack against China 
following the border military clashes between the two countries.  
 The Chinese decision to engage in direct talks at the highest level with United 
States came without notifying Hoxha. Once he came to know of Henry Kissinger’s 
secret trip to Beijing, and the decision to receive the American President Nixon in 
China, Hoxha realized that Albania had begun losing the importance it had for China, 
together with all this implied. Hoxha’s disappointment, which reflected a veiled 
despair, was expressed in his letter addressed personally to Mao – a plea to 
reconsider receiving Nixon. To Hoxha’s dismay, Mao completely ignored the letter, 
deigning not even to return correspondence. Hoxha’s letter can show how far 
removed from the realities of international relations he was at this time, in abject 
denial of his country’s isolation. Mao’s response (lack of it) to the letter, meanwhile, 
shows how strongly he had started to embrace openness, in a way, rectifying his 
mistakes and missed opportunities as the leader of the world’s largest population. 
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Mao’s decision not only balanced the Soviet threat, but shaped China’s policy for 
decades to come, although only after his death would China fully open its doors. Yet 
for the time Mao was alive, a feeble hope remained in Albanian leadership for 
another possible “turn left” for China. The Tenth CCP Congress, which praised the 
Cultural Revolution, and the campaign against Lin Biao, were interpreted in this 
sense in Tirana. However, even though the political relations between China and 
Albania begun deteriorating, China’s openness to the West obligated Hoxha to revise 
Albania’s priorities. In fact, seeing that China was losing the ideological Marxist 
solidity Hoxha so dearly treasured, he prioritized the economic relations with China 
– at least as far as China’s reorientation of its international relations did not 
negatively affect Chinese economic assistance to Albania. 
 
From Tension to Distension in China’s International Relations 
In May 1969 the newly appointed Chinese ambassador in Albania, Geng Biao, 
visited Enver Hoxha during the latter’s vacation in Vlora. China could not have 
chosen a better person for such role in Albania in that period. Geng Biao was an old 
revolutionary who had fought in the war against Japan, and was untouched by the 
purges of the Cultural Revolution.1 In his long meeting with Hoxha, including also a 
lunch, the conversation between Biao and Hoxha centered on the struggle against 
Soviet revisionism, American imperialism and Yugoslavian Titoism. Hoxha’s 
lingering obsessions with these issues reflected Albania’s political stagnation. The 
ambassador informed Hoxha that the Cultural Revolution in China ‘is over, but 
perhaps needs one year to definitively triumph’. Hoxha reinforced that ‘we consider 
this experience [the Cultural Revolution] a great treasure, a colossal experience from 
which we all should learn’.2 Hoxha panegyrized Mao and China, and Geng endorsed 
this adoration in his notes. But Hoxha seized again the opportunity to remind the 
ambassador of Albania’s support in the Sino-Soviet territorial disputes. These 
disputes nearly brought the Soviet Union and China to war when they resulted in 
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armed clashes at the Ussuri River in March 1969.3 The tension was high because, 
among others, Moscow ‘encouraged the belief that it was ready to launch war with 
China that could begin with a nuclear strike’.4 Following the first border clashes, 
Albania denounced the Soviet Union as the instigator of the disputes and the 
aggressor of China.  
 The first step in resolving these disputes was a short meeting at the Beijing 
airport between the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin and Zhou Enlai. Kosygin stopped 
at Beijing’s airport on 11 September 1969, on his way back to Moscow from the 
funeral of Ho Chi Min in Vietnam. This meeting coincided with the Beijing meeting 
of Rita Marko, an Albanian Politburo member, with Kang Sheng, who informed 
Marko that ‘while we are speaking here, at the airport should have arrived Kosygin 
to speak with our officials’.5 Later, Zhou Enlai also briefed Marko on his meeting 
with Kosygin. Marko, reflecting both Albania’s fear of any Sino-Soviet distension, 
and political inflexibility in international relations, affirmed that ‘I think this meeting 
was completely inappropriate’. Zhou Enlai, who was not new to opposing Albanian 
officials, retorted ‘you [Albanians] are too much extremists… Stalin talked even to 
Ribbentrop’. Zhou’s remark on Albanian extremism was relatively accurate, if so 
was Marko’s report to Hoxha. Marko had gone to Beijing at the invitation of Li 
Xiannian, after they had met in Hanoi at the funeral of Ho Chi Minh. After landing in 
Hanoi, Li Xiannian requested to meet Marko, to warn him that they each would 
likely come face to face with Kosygin during the funeral ceremony, and in that case 
perhaps they should shake hands with the Soviet leader. Marko opposed firmly even 
this simple gesture, claiming that ‘considering the events [border clashes] Soviet 
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Union is your enemy, therefore shaking hands with them is unjust’. On 9 September, 
1969, the day of Ho Chi Minh’s funeral, Li Xiannian and Kosygin did come face to 
face during the ceremony. Kosygin stretched his hand to Li, who refused to shake it 
and instead turned the other direction, under the vigilant eye of Marko – this is at 
least what Marko reported to Hoxha.6 
 In Beijing, however, Zhou Enlai assured Marko that in his meeting with Kosygin 
at the airport, ‘there was nothing of party questions, but interstate issues… our 
polemic in the field of ideology will continue’, in a way alleviating Albanian 
concerns that the Sino-Soviet tension on border disputes could turn into an 
opportunity for a revision of the Sino-Soviet relations altogether, possibly resulting 
in rapprochement.7 So high was the fear of such possibility that Hoxha instructed one 
of his secretaries that was about to visit China in September 1969, to air his many 
grievances over the Zhou-Kosygin meeting.8 Hoxha opposed any and all talks with 
the Soviets, although he affirmed ‘it is right to have talks, but not at this high level’. 
To the Chinese argument that this was a tactical meeting, he countered his vague one 
that ‘history has proved that those that are fascists [the Soviets] cannot be tricked 
with tactics’. Moreover, Hoxha doubted also of the Chinese claims that Soviet Union 
could unleash war against China, and that, already, 70 Soviet divisions had been 
moved to their border. ‘Soviet Union has in all 150 divisions, some of its divisions 
are in Europe, some in Soviet Union, how could be possible to move war to China 
with 70 divisions?’. Hoxha concluded that ‘Chinese leaders are predisposed to help 
the Soviet revisionist traitors, they are in favor of large scale friendly relations with 
Soviet Union’. Yet Hoxha warned that in talking with Chinese leaders ‘we should 
consider the great socialist interests, but also our internal political economic 
interests… We have not been in agreement with Chinese leaders even in the past, but 
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we thought that things improved. The way how Zhou Enlai poses these questions 
means that our disagreements with them are deep, therefore if they continue on this 
way we will certainly confront with them because these are essential questions of 
line’. In the past Hoxha had also criticized Zhou Enlai and, as discussed in previous 
chapters, the two had debated important ideological issues. However, Hoxha had 
then rested assured that Mao remained the ultimate decider of China’s political 
course. Now instead, Marko reported that ‘from what I could see, Zhou Enlai is in 
charge in all fields’.9 This could have raised suspicions in Hoxha – who allowed 
nothing without his personal approval – that Zhou could pursue a proper agenda in 
China’s relations with Soviet Union.  
 The fact is that Mao remained strongly in command of China’s agenda, but he 
had left in the capable hands of Zhou Enlai the everyday goings-on of the country, 
trusting him to mitigate the negative impact of the Cultural Revolution’s turmoil. 
Zhou Enlai eventually reassured Albania, in his talks with Haki Toska in Beijing, 
that ‘we [China] will continue the struggle against modern [Soviet] revisionism’.10 In 
June 1970, the minister of security of Albania, Kadri Hazbiu, met with Zhou Enlai 
and Kang Sheng in Beijing. Some days earlier, they had also met with a Romanian 
delegation. According to Zhou Enlai, the Romanians had asked the Chinese to assist 
them in building their military industry, in a cooperative effort that would include 
Albania. This came after Hoxha, in a tour of northern Albania, bordering Yugoslavia, 
had affirmed that in case of Soviet attack to Yugoslavia or Romania, Albania would 
not hesitate to stand at their defense. The Albanian minister noted how Hoxha’s 
speeches have been understood ‘as a larger policy of openness and collaboration with 
these countries… [but] these [are] illusions’.11 Had such policy been pursued by 
Albania, Zhou Enlai would most likely have seized the opportunity to disengage 
from Albania’s requests for military supplies, if not their collaboration as a whole. 
But Zhou might have also interpreted Hoxha’s speeches as a reorientation of 
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Albania’s foreign policy towards a feeble openness. Eventually no steps were taken 
in this direction anyway.  
 China did not pursue any rapprochement with the Soviet Union that Hoxha had 
feared; in fact the two remained inimical toward one another. However, and because 
of the tension with Soviet Union, Beijing drastically reoriented its policy towards 
United States – which to Hoxha came as a complete shock. Regardless of the 
meeting between Zhou Enlai and Kosygin, China continued, from 1969 to the early 
months of 1970, to believe that the Soviet Union posed a nuclear threat. For this 
reason, Mao had instructed his four marshals, Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, 
and Nie Rongzhen to evaluate the possibilities of war. In this context, the United 
States sent some signals of overture to China, in particular, resuming their 
ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, but also of normalization of the relations in 
general.12 Initially, the Chinese marshals put the United States and Soviet Union on 
the same front as equally serious enemies.13  But when the Soviets followed the 
Zhenbao Island incident (eastern Sino-Soviet border) in March 1969 with an attack 
on the border in Tielieketi in August of that year, (in the western Sino-Soviet 
border), it ‘pushed the four marshals, as well as Mao and other Chinese leaders, to 
reconsider the necessity of playing the American card’. Subsequently, they 
differentiated their enemies, and discussed the necessity ‘to ally with the less 
dangerous enemy in order to confront the more dangerous enemy’.14 In the United 
States, President Richard Nixon arrived at the same conclusion that ‘…in the existing 
circumstances, the Soviet Union was the more dangerous party’.15 This was the most 
radical departure in Chinese foreign policy since the PRC’s foundation, but also a 
departure in American policy from the 1960s when following the Sino-Soviet split, 
Washington had ‘considered forming an alignment with the Soviet Union against 
China’. For the American policy under Richard Nixon, the rapprochement with 
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China served to ‘end the war in Vietnam, and promote détente with Soviet Union’.16 
Talks between the United States and China had been taking place since 1953 at 
irregular intervals in Warsaw. 17  But for Henry Kissinger, who was the key 
protagonist of the Sino-American rapprochement, before the early 1970s, due to 
Mao’s radicalism – his refusal of the peaceful coexistence, and his concept of 
continuous revolution – rapprochement with China had been impossible.18 
 In the early 1970s, Kissinger, initiating the first direct talks with the PRC, 
ordered the American ambassador in Warsaw ‘to approach Chinese diplomats… the 
occasion was the Yugoslav fashion show in Warsaw’.19 Eventually two teams of 
negotiators met in Warsaw on 20 February, and on 20 March, 1970. These talks did 
not result in major changes but they opened the door to further developments 
resulting in Nixon’s call, during his trip to Pakistan and Romania in July 1970, for 
‘high level exchanges with China’.20 In September 1970, the Albanian vice Premier 
Abdyl Këllezi met with Mao. Mao, at a certain point in talking about Nixon’s visits 
in Europe stated that ‘before dying, Nixon wants to visit China’. Këllezi did not 
grasp Mao’s remark, and affirmed that ‘if he comes here he would be beheaded’. 
But, for Mao, was ‘not exactly what would happen, because if he comes here means 
he wants something. The Americans say that Warsaw is not anymore the appropriate 
location where to have talks… Then we told them to come here to Beijing’. Mao was 
trying to dig into Albania’s thought on what he already had decided would happen in 
the near future. He continued querying his country’s closest ally, asking Këllezi ‘do 
you think there is more contradictions or more possibility for collaboration between 
United States and Soviet Union?’. But Mao realized that there was not much to glean 
from his Albanian friend’s mind when Këllezi responded that ‘in the struggle against 
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China, against Albania and the revolution, their collaboration is clear’.21 The events 
that followed showed that the opposite was true. 
 China signaled its openness in October 1970, when Mao gave an interview to 
Edgar Snow, who had been granted occasional preferential access to Mao since 
1936, followed by Snow’s book on Mao.22 Mao, according to Kissinger, pronounced 
revolutionary words in his interview to Snow, which was published months later, but 
Kissinger admitted that the United States did not grasp the meaning of Mao’s words. 
Mao in fact stated that even Nixon ‘would be welcome, either as a tourist or as a 
president’.23  However, beyond ideological considerations, the biggest obstacle to 
Sino-American direct talks was the question of Taiwan, which eventually China and 
the United States chose to put aside. In Washington, in January 1971, a message 
through Romania arrived from Zhou Enlai, affirming that President Nixon would be 
welcomed in Beijing.24 The United States ignored the invitation for the President, but 
welcomed direct talks. But then it was China which, for some time, did not respond, 
until an American table tennis (Ping-pong) team participated in an international 
tournament in Japan. Mao seized this opportunity and invited the American team to 
visit Beijing, which eventually they did in mid-April 1971, giving life to what 
became known as the “Ping-Pong diplomacy”.25  Then, in late April 1971, Zhou 
Enlai, through Pakistan, sent a message to Washington inviting an American 
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emissary to visit China, naming Henry Kissinger, ‘the Secretary of State William 
Roger, or the President himself’.26 Eventually was Henry Kissinger who made two 
trips to Beijing, one secretly on 9 July 1971, and the other publicly in October 1971 
which concluded with the Shanghai Communiqué.27 
 Zhou Enlai called the Albanian ambassador in China, Xhorxhi Robo, on 17 July, 
1971 to inform him of the secret visit of Kissinger days earlier, and of the decision to 
welcome Nixon in China. Not dissimilarly from the Soviet’s attitude towards 
Albania in its rapprochement with Yugoslavia in mid-1950s, China decided to not 
inform Albania of any of the steps leading to Kissinger’s visit. The new ambassador 
of China in Albania, Liu Zhenhua, had met Hoxha in February 1971, but in their 
conversation the ambassador did not touch upon any of these questions, preferring to 
explain the purge of Chen Boda instead.28 The ambassador met also with the PLA 
member responsible for external relations, Pirro Bita, twice in April 1971 and foreign 
minister Behar Shtylla once in June 1971, but he did not provide any information on 
these events. He only mentioned in April that Mao appreciated the American writer 
Edgar Snow, and that he had decided to open China for visits to rightists, centrists, 
and leftist elements.29 
 But Albania also failed to recognize the importance of some signals it had 
received earlier. For instance, in a conversation between the Albanian ambassador in 
the UN and his Romanian counterpart, Diakonesku, in the UN in September 1967, 
the latter said that very soon China will be in the UN, but that this ‘will be 
accompanied by major changes in the American foreign policy, and they are 
preparing for this’. He revealed also that China and the United States were having 
talks not only in Warsaw, but also ‘in other locations’, without specifying where. 
These talks would have the intention to normalize the bilateral relations between 
China and the United States, as after all for America ‘the question of Chang Kai-shek 
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is not important at all, and America would be ready to sacrifice it for the relations 
with China, which for them is much more important... the Americans do not want a 
war with China, I can assure you for this’.30 The Romanian ambassador’s words 
could be a message addressed to Beijing, but most likely instead, they are the best 
evidence of how China had kept Albania away from the insights of the Sino-
American talks that led to the normalization. Yet, in 1967, with the fervent left 
radicalism unleashed by the Cultural Revolution, for Albania was effectively hard to 
perceive the possibility that soon China would reshape its foreign policy. Another 
sign of China’s slow openness came in June 1971, when the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs organized a tour outside Beijing for foreign journalists, including 
those from the West. The Albanian reporter noted how in Xi’an, the journalists ‘were 
allowed to take any picture they wanted, without any restriction’.31 To Albanian 
leadership’s dismay, their allies’ openness extended as far as the White House.  
 When Zhou Enlai called the Albanian ambassador on 17 July, 1971, Kissinger’s 
visit was no longer a secret, as two days earlier, both Beijing and Washington had 
issued simultaneously the declaration that had been drafted during Kissinger’s visit 
in Beijing. What Zhou Enlai told the Albanian ambassador is quite similar to the 
account that Henry Kissinger gives of these events. Zhou affirmed that ‘Nixon for 
three years has been asking to visit China… he will not come as a tourist but as a 
president… we have been talking to the Americans for sixteen years in Warsaw but 
with no progress… this is a continuation of those talks in another level… an overall 
escalating of the talks [and relations]… Nixon immediately after taking office 
authorized Kissinger to take contact with us… in December 1969 the Yugoslav 
embassy in Warsaw organized an exhibition where the American diplomats called 
our diplomats but they refused to respond and left the room avoiding the 
Americans… the main problem to discuss is Taiwan, but also other issues’. Then 
Zhou justified these steps not as consequences of the Soviet threat, which seemed to 
serve as the main catalyst in this rapprochement, but other reasons. For him ‘the 
situation in United States is worsening, there could be a revolutionary storm in the 
near future… we need to be in contact as much as possible with the American 
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masses, of all elements… hence the visit of the Ping-Pong team… United States is 
sincere in these talks because is interested to end the war in Indochina [Vietnam]’. 
Then Zhou explained that Kissinger’s visit had two objectives: preparing the visit of 
President Nixon, and preparing high level discussion on many issues.32 In a meeting 
in Cairo, between the Chinese and Albanian ambassadors, the Chinese ambassador 
argued that the American talks with China ‘demonstrates the American isolation.33 
 After the meeting with Zhou Enlai, the Albanian ambassador returned to Tirana 
and personally briefed Enver Hoxha on these talks. Hoxha, who had feared Sino-
Soviet rapprochement, now saw that China was instead reshaping its relations with 
the leader of the “imperialist” camp. He expressed his discontent in a letter addressed 
personally to Mao:  
‘We should have been consulted on these important issues… In particular for 
such steps that largely resonate internationally… For us is understandable that 
for the sake of the people, and of the revolution, China should develop 
diplomatic relations with all the nations, included with the United States… Yet 
the American imperialism is the number one enemy of the peoples… in 
particular of the Vietnamese people…’. [In this way Hoxha was suggesting that 
China, pursuing normalization with the United States, was betraying the 
Vietnamese people’s war]. ‘Therefore your decision to welcome Nixon is for 
us unjust, undesirable, we do not approve it, we do not support it… If you 
really had to open talks with President Nixon, then at least these should be on 
an equal footing, with the United States recognizing the PRC, and removing 
the obstacles to its readmission in UN, removing the troops from Taiwan, 
withdrawing the troops from Indochina, and moreover removing the threats 
from China’s borders… Under these circumstances there could be talks, but 
without necessary pass from a very low level to a very high level… Nixon’s 
visit could have many negative impacts on the revolutionary movement, and on 
our cause… This will even lower the internal resistance in United States to 
Nixon’s policies, which he seizes as an opportunity for re-election… The visit 
will encourage the centrists and opportunists, the various Togliattists [the 
reference is to Palmiro Togliatti, head of the Italian Communist Party until 
1966 when he died, considered revisionist] and the Romanians, who are 
already speaking of the new unity in the international communist movement, 
that now new perspectives are opened also for the settlement of the Sino-Soviet 
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divergences... The talks with Nixon gives strength to the revisionists to devalue 
all the struggle of China against the Soviet renegades… Perceiving the Sino-
American talks as against Soviet Union, Moscow will strengthen even more the 
revisionist cliques, and try to debilitate the revolutionary position of China… 
The American imperialism will never give up its strategic objectives, the war, 
and aggression. Otherwise it would not be imperialism… When it comes to 
issues regarding the Soviet Union, we think we should have a common 
standing regarding possible Soviet actions against China and Albania… The 
view of the American imperialists towards the Soviet Union, expressed by 
Kissinger, should not be kept secret to us… Now that the Cultural Revolution 
triumphed everywhere in China, that China came out of it stronger than ever, 
suddenly the fake friends pretend to be your sincere friends… China has 
always been standing as an invincible castle of socialism and revolution… This 
[revolutionary policy] is in contradiction with the decision to welcome 
Nixon’.34 
China never replied directly to this letter, but Beijing’s message was clear when, 
in November 1971, at the PLA Sixth Congress, China, for the first time, refused to 
send a delegation. This put Hoxha in a difficult situation, who had to justify the 
Chinese absence to many foreign small communist delegations. His excuse was that 
‘the great tasks they [Chinese leaders] are carrying on in China did not allow them to 
participate… But the CCP is always among us, in full unity with our parties in the 
struggle for the full socialist triumph’.35 Although Albania remained committed to 
oppose the Soviet Union, this could never be pursued through a close up with United 
States, according to Hoxha’s regime, for the leader of the imperialist camp demanded 
similar opposition. In a way, Hoxha sent a public message to China through his 
speech to the congress. Despite praising China and Mao as the main support for the 
world revolutionary forces, and differently from his speeches in previous party 
congresses, where he concentrated on the evils of Soviet Union, throughout this 
speech, Hoxha now attacked the United States with the same fervor. He concluded 
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that ‘the standing towards American imperialism is the test for all the political forces 
[Marxist] in the world’.36 Significantly, with regard to the kind of standing towards 
the United States, Hoxha mentioned frequently in his speech the Vietnamese 
resistance to American occupation.37 Nonetheless, Mehmet Shehu, in his report on 
the FYP’s achievements, and the coming FYP’s objectives gave vast credit to 
Chinese assistance for Albania’s economic progress. More specifically, he mentioned 
that in ten years from 1960 to 1970 the gross domestic product (GDP) of Albania had 
more than doubled. In 1970, the national income was 55 percent higher than in 1965, 
the agriculture output 1.8 times higher, and the industrial production 2.5 times.38 The 
government, in its report, gave direct credit to Chinese assistance for all this growth, 
and blamed the Soviet Union for what they called an attempted blockade against the 
Albanian economy. The industrial production from 1965 to 1970 increased by 83 
percent, but the agricultural production in the same period increased only by 33 
percent.39 
 
The Communist Parties’ Reactions to Sino-American Talks, and China’s Seat in 
the UN 
During the informal meetings with many foreign communist delegations that that 
occurred at the Sixth PLA Congress in November 1971, China’s absence did not pass 
without comments, some of which indicated dissatisfaction with China’s acts within 
the communist camp. The Austrian delegate, Franz Strobel, commenting on Nixon’s 
visit, wondered rhetorically, ‘when is Nixon coming to Albania?’. He labelled the 
Chinese decision to not send a delegation to foreign party congresses as 
‘extraordinary, as the same internal situation in China… Nixon’s visit to China has 
caused confusion within communists’. Some of these delegates met in Tirana with 
the Chinese ambassador in Albania, Liu Zhenhua. One of them, David Benkis, 
representing the communist party of Chile (m-l), lamented the lack of financial 
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assistance that Geng Biao had promised to give him in Albania during this congress. 
In another meeting, he complained of the treatment that the CCP had reserved for 
certain parties, which he alleged was not based on the equality among parties. The 
Australian delegate also met with the Chinese ambassador, and then asked the 
Albanians to host a communist activist, wanted by the Australian police, named 
Armstrong who sought to leave China for Albania. The Belgian delegate, after 
meeting Hoxha, is reported to have said, ‘You are different from China’, without 
further elaborating. Kazimierz Mijal, representing the PCP (m-l), in presence of the 
Brazilian delegate, affirmed that the ‘Chinese refusal to send a delegation leaves 
room for speculation by the revisionists that there is no unity between China and 
Albania’.40 Mijal reinforced his contrariety to China’s decision to not participate at 
the congress, when on 5 November he told the Chinese ambassador in Tirana, Liu 
Zhenhua, ‘I am against Chinese decision to not participate at the congress, which 
itself has raised debates and speculations of a possible disunity between China and 
Albania’.41  A meaningful comment came from the Chilean delegate on Chinese 
policy when he affirmed in an informal meeting that ‘China now prioritizes the inter-
state relations, rather than inter-party relations’.42 This offered the best explanation of 
the departure in Chinese foreign policy from its ideological radicalism, to state 
pragmatism in international relations. 
 During the congress, Albania accredited itself with the restoration of the PRC’s 
rights in the United Nations. All the foreign delegations praised Albania’s efforts in 
New York to promote China’s interests. This work had continued since the very 
founding of the Sino-Albanian alliance and was pursued with great determination. 
The PRC, however, did not owe its admission to the UN, to Albania’s efforts, but to 
the Sino-American rapprochement. Yet, even after the visit of Henry Kissinger to 
China, Albania dutifully promoted China’s interests in United Nations. Even after 
being informed of Kissinger’s visit, Albania worked hard during the Twenty-sixth 
General Assembly in 1971 to restore China’s rights in the organization. At the 
beginning of the session no one was sure that this would become so crucial a year in 
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that sense, not even China. The key issue at that time was how best to deal with 
Taiwan, and the risk that many countries which might not otherwise oppose China’s 
seat, would recoil from the ousting of Taiwan, and only accept in full a solution that 
included two Chinas. In the meeting with Kissinger, the issue had been left to future 
discussions, which itself was already a step forward from the previous Chinese 
policy towards Taiwan.  
As far back as 1955, China and the United States had discussed renouncing the 
use of force in Sino-American relations, and during the Bandung conference Beijing 
had stated that it was against a war with United States.43 However, China claimed 
that the tension, which implied eventual war, was due to what China called 
occupation of Taiwan by American forces. Therefore, the preclusion of the use of the 
force implied the withdrawal of the American military support to Taiwan. China 
considered that ‘to what means China will use to liberate Taiwan, this is entirely a 
matter of China’s sovereignty and internal affairs. Therefore, any Sino-American 
announcement must not interfere with this matter by no means’.44 At that time and 
for long after, Albania fully supported Beijing’s stance, and in October 1962, the 
Albanian ambassador in the UN called the Taiwan representatives ‘private citizens 
representing nothing’.45 
In 1971, Albania tried to coordinate and incite some countries to influence others 
in their regions to vote against separating the admission of the PRC from the ousting 
of Taiwan. For instance, Algeria could exercise a certain influence over its neighbor 
Tunisia, which had supported the two Chinas solutions. The other obstacle to 
overcome was the Americans’ eventual resolution requiring a supermajority (two 
thirds of the votes) for the PRC’s admission, which was seen as very difficult, 
despite Albania’s coalition already representing a simple majority. To address this, 
Albania wanted Algeria to launch the initiative to include the PRC, in order to 
maximize the support among the African and NAM countries.46 China, however, 
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preferred Albania as its spokesperson in the UN. In a meeting with the Albanian 
foreign minister, the Chinese ambassador in Tirana expressed the idea that, in this 
session, the issue of the PRC seat would be more complicated than usual, saying – 
without fully explaining the reasons for this complication – that United States had 
been pressuring Taiwan to accept the PRC as a member of the UN, eventually 
preserving the Taiwanese seat as well.47 On the other hand, China did not seem to 
expect any surprises this year, and did not even want to join UN this year, and their 
authorization to Albania, rather than to Algeria, to present the resolution speaks to 
this. Albania was an isolated member of the international community, in continuous 
verbal tension with both the West and the East, whereas Algeria had friends in both 
blocks and probably could have garnered more support for China. Yet neither of 
these countries necessarily could have changed the balance of power within the 
United Nations General Assembly.  
Signs of the balance tipping in China’s favor in the UN had appeared since 1966, 
when a member of the Austrian delegation confirmed to Albania, certainly sending a 
message to Beijing, that Canada in ‘six months will recognize China’, and Austria 
would follow.48  From the talks of the Albanian representatives in the UN with 
foreign diplomats and representatives of different countries, it became quite apparent 
that, in principle, many European countries of the western bloc, at least those that 
claimed neutrality, such as Austria and some Scandinavian countries, would 
willingly vote for China; they were just waiting the right moment – a moment of 
lower tension between China and the United States. Canada, on the other hand, had 
asked Cambodia in 1969 to encourage China to establish diplomatic relations with 
Canada, in the spirit of the talks they had in Stockholm.49 The Canadian step was 
followed by Italy, which in 1969, for the first time, did not dispute the existence of 
only one China. Italian diplomats in the UN told Albanian diplomats that they were 
watching the Sino-Canadian talks, and would possibly take similar steps.50  This 
change in the Italian attitude towards the PRC was a consequence of the changes of 
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the internal politics of Italy in 1969, wherein Pietro Nenni became the foreign 
minister, and then Aldo Moro assumed the post later the same year, both of them 
prone to the normalization of the relations with the PRC.51 This line was reinforced 
by the Italian ambassador in the UN, who in a conversation with the Albanian 
ambassador, said that Italy had not decided yet how to vote, but had decided to ‘not 
vote against China’. 52  He then added that Italy was most welcomed to normal 
relations with China among the ‘trade circles’.53 
Eventually, by mid July 1971, Albania, together with all the other authors, 
presented the request to the UN to introduce in the agenda of that session the 
question of China’s restoration to its seat. The United States, just one month later, 
presented the same request. For the first time, the United States proposed accepting 
the PRC in the UN, but the second part of the American resolution opposed the 
ousting of Taiwan from the organization, by asking instead that the vote to expel 
Taiwan should require two thirds of the UN General Assembly members. Indeed, 
according to Albanian informal surveys, the United States saw could no longer afford 
to keep China out of the UN, but at least, at that precise moment, wanted to avoid the 
ousting of its small ally, therefore asked that the second part of the Albanian 
resolution – which concerned the ousting of Taiwan – should be valid only if voted 
by two thirds of the General Assembly members.54 The American move put Albania 
and the United States on the same front regarding the admission of the PRC, but at 
odds over Taiwan, with Albania in a serious dilemma. The initiative to grant Beijing 
a seat,  and deny any to Taipei, was imperiled, as its authors estimated that the 
United States could get the necessary votes against the ousting of Taiwan, but at the 
same time, by not opposing the supermajority threshold for restoring China’s seat, 
Albania’s main task would become much more achievable. This, however, would 
mean no less than the division of China, and the acceptance of Taiwan as a separate 
entity in the UN.  
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To respond to this challenge, Albania prepared to withdraw its resolution in case 
the United States did not step back on its support for Taiwan. In the worst case 
scenario, Albania prepared a declaration in the name of the People’s Republic of 
China, stating that Beijing would never take its seat in UN, regardless of the votes, 
before the ousting of Taiwan. More concretely, Albania prepared a resolution that 
would see the General Assembly vote on the American request to apply the two 
thirds rule for the ousting of Taiwan: meaning that the American demand for the two 
thirds supermajority would be valid only if previously authorized by two thirds of the 
UN General Assembly members. This aggressive move by Albania invited an 
unexpected reaction from China. By late September 1971, in a run of consultations 
with China, the Charge d’Affaires in Tirana, Li Xiaolin, asked Albania on behalf of 
his government to modify the Albanian position on the United States’ initiative. 
Albanian diplomats in New York were furious about this request, proposing to the 
government in Tirana to persuade Li that the Albanian initiative was the only one 
capable of challenging the American’s two Chinas policy. Albania did not know, 
however, that China and the United States were agreeing to set aside this matter, and 
the rapprochement between them was proceeding in this sense, implying that the 
United States would not challenge China and at the right moment, soon, would agree 
to accept PRC and accept in the meantime the ousting of Taiwan. Now, Albania’s 
position was seen as a challenge to both China and the United States.55 The end of 
the deadlock came to the surprise of Albania, and probably many other countries, 
which could not see backstage in this situation, when Taiwan announced its 
unilateral withdrawal from United Nations.56 The ROC ambassador to the United 
Nations, Liu Chieh, in his own words, admitted ‘defeat with dignity’.57 Perhaps with 
dignity also for Washington, although the vote of admission of the PRC ‘signified 
the first major defeat of the United States in the General Assembly, and marked the 
emergence of the Third World as a dominant force’.58 China’s admission ‘marked a 
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real watershed in the evolution of the United Nations… and China emerged as the 
self-appointed champion of the new actions initiated by the Third World’.59 
China not only avoided consulting Albania on any of its steps leading to its 
rapprochement with the United States, but also of Lin Biao’s death, of which Albania 
was not informed officially until almost one year later. In fact, the death of Lin Biao 
had occurred in September 1971, when trying to escape to the Soviet Union, his 
plane crushed in Mongolia. Only in mid-July 1972 was the Chinese ambassador in 
Tirana informed of this event, explaining it as an escape from justice after Lin had 
been unmasked in his attempt to kill Mao and seize political power.60 In 1972, Prince 
Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia visited Albania. Hoxha met with him four times. 
After the restoration of China’s rights in the UN, and in particular the process of 
distension with the United States, Albania had lost its role as China’s spokesperson 
on the international stage. Sensing that he was no longer needed, Hoxha assumed that 
China would be less inclined to support his country militarily and economically, and 
that such aid would not last long unless he reshaped his policy too – a step he had no 
intention to take, not at least to the extent China had. Consequently, during Hoxha’s 
four meetings with Prince Sihanouk, he emphasized China’s great role for him in 
helping the Cambodian people. Hoxha was trying to play the card of the interlocutor, 
trying to find a role to Albania in its alliance with China. Sihanouk, in fact, had no 
need for Albania’s intermediation in his relations with China.  
Yet Cambodia’s relations with China, as Richardson has shown, were 
complicated at times, and the role of Sihanouk controversial.61 Sihanouk stopped in 
Tirana after visiting Yugoslavia, where he endured treatment as a Chinese satellite by 
some Yugoslavian ministers. Albanian leaders emphasized instead that China was 
Cambodia’s best ally, but Sihanouk had no need for such a message because Beijing 
was his second home.62 
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The Last Economic Benefits 
Although Richard Nixon’s visit to China ‘changed the world’, as at least one scholar 
has affirmed, those days were not followed with particular interest in Albania, if 
anything, perhaps with some embarrassment.63 Hoxha did not want any such change, 
but from archives, it seems the event was not accompanied in Albania by any 
Politburo meetings. After all, the visit concluded an ongoing crescendo of events 
which had enabled Albania to absorb their initial shock at this drastic change in 
China’s policy. The Sino-American normalization, however, from Albanian 
perspective changed the patterns of the Sino-Albanian relations. Hoxha understood 
that the Sino-American rapprochement was the beginning of China’s integration into 
the international system. Therefore, from this moment onward, he prioritized more 
the economic rather than the ideological aspects in Albania’s relations with China, 
although Albania continued its revolutionary rhetoric. Since Hoxha had made up his 
mind to avoid any drastic openness in Albania’s foreign policy – on the contrary, to 
close the country even more – he decided to extract whatever economic and military 
assistance he still could from China, predicting, correctly, that the opportunity to do 
so would not last forever. Albania’s refusal to follow China’s path of openness is 
shown by what Hoxha told the Chinese ambassador in Albania, Liu Zhenhua in 
September 1972. During this meeting, to the Chinese announcement that West 
Germany had decided to recognize China, Hoxha replied that Albania would not take 
such steps to establish relations with that country before receiving German war 
reparations. He made clear that China could now purchase from West Germany the 
equipment needed for its work on the industrial projects in Albania – showing how 
far from the West Hoxha wished to stay while maximizing his Chinese aid.64 Two 
more factors contributed to Albania’s relative trust in the continuity of China’s 
assistance. First, Hoxha was conscious that however Chinese foreign policy may 
change, the country would remain under Mao’s leadership. Second, the Tenth CCP 
Congress, in August 1973, had fundamentally reconfirmed the communist course 
                                                            
63 Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World, 1st ed., (New York: 
Random House, 2007); For the conversation between Nixon and Mao on 21 February 1972 in Beijing, 
see William Burr, ed. The Kissinger Transcript. The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow, (New 
York: The New Press, 1999), 59-66. 
64 “Minutes of Conversation between Enver Hoxha and the Chinese ambassador in Albania, Liu 
Zhenhua, 29 September 1972, on occasion of the celebrations for the Twenty-third anniversary of the 
PRC foundation”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1972, D5.  
252 
under Mao’s leadership, offering an umbrella of legitimacy that included the alliance 
with China.65 This convinced Hoxha that during Mao’s lifetime, China’s openness to 
the United States was a strategic move in China’s international relations, but not a 
drastic revision of its internal economic and political course. Hoxha continued 
portraying Albania still, as ‘China’s most faithful ally’.66 And China responded by 
continuing its economic and military assistance for Albania. Curiously, China 
provided also medical treatment for Enver Hoxha. From October 1973 to March 
1974, a group of doctors from China stayed in Tirana where they provided 
specialized medical treatment to the aging Albanian dictator for his heart and 
diabetes problems.67 
In September 1971 China approved a new loan of 30 million rubles (70 million 
yuan) for the years 1972-75, entirely dedicated to the agricultural investments in 
Albania.68 The general staff of the army in Tirana had proposed in April 1971 new 
requests of military equipment from China, for a total of 229.000 tons, with an 
estimated value of 1.165 billion yuan.69 Regarding the FYP 1971-75, the Albanian 
government predicted a GDP in 1975, around 55 percent higher than in 1970, in 
particular an industrial production that in five years would be, they said, 62-66 
percent higher than in 1970, with particular emphasis on the increasing of the heavy 
industry while the light industry would increase only by around 40 percent.70 In 1971 
the two governments agreed to make minor change to the FYP by increasing the part 
of the loan that goes for the industry by 184 million yuan.71 This was due to new 
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calculations for those industrial projects that were in delay and required updated and 
more careful calculations regarding the equipment.72 
 In November 1972, the Albanian defense minister Beqir Balluku, for the last 
time in his life, visited China.73 He stayed almost 45 days, met often with Chinese 
leaders, and presented a new, long list of requests for military supplies for the period 
1973-77.74 In Albania, in his meeting with the commander of the Beijing garrison, 
Hoxha had stressed that his country was surrounded only by enemies, regardless of 
what he called conjectural normalcy. He highlighted more what divided Albania 
from, rather than what had in common with, the other Balkan countries.75 Balluku 
attempted the same in China, but the Chinese generals disproved the Albanian 
minister’s alarms with the fact that he had already, in 1968, presented the same 
situation to Zhou Enlai, while now in 1972, ‘with all its neighbors Albania had gone 
through an improvement of the relations’, to which the minister replied that this was 
only to gain time needed for challenges that might come in the future.76 One such 
challenge for Balluku, following Hoxha’s instructions, was Yugoslavia. For 
Albanian leaders, seemingly prophetic in this, ‘once Tito will die, will bring a war 
for hegemony between Serbs and Croats’, which could threaten Albania.77 Fearing 
the consequences of a possible Yugoslavian disintegration, Hoxha, in many speeches, 
expressed a preference for Yugoslavia ‘exactly as it is’, defending its status quo as a 
Federation.  
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 Zhou Enlai suggested including the military supplies in the commercial channels 
as a loan. This idea was reiterated by Huan Yuanbing, director at the Chinese defense 
ministry, who estimated the Albanian requests to total 3 billion yuan, which he said 
‘should be considered as a loan, based on the same criteria China grants credits to 
other countries’. 78  After meeting firm opposition from Albanian officials, China 
stepped back and approved most of the Albanian requests for armaments, but made 
clear that Albania was being treated in a privileged way. According to Zhou Enlai, 
Albania was placed second after Vietnam in Chinese military assistance to foreign 
countries. In total China committed to provide 884 artillery pieces, 36 military 
aircrafts, 200 tanks, and 18 different military ships for the navy, 1872 different 
vehicles, and 20 thousand tons of ammunition.79 China provided also construction 
materials for the further fortification through the building of hundreds of thousands 
of bunkers that soon started to become part of the landscape across Albanian territory. 
Today, those yet resisting the ravages of time are a famous, and infamous, touristic 
attraction. This would be the last important agreement regarding the military 
assistance China provided to Albania.  
 Yet complications surged in the implementation of this assistance. Some 
industrial projects took far longer than expected.80 For instance, the biggest industrial 
project, the metallurgic plant, presented problems beyond what Albanian and 
Chinese experts had expected, and its construction in 1972 was in a complete 
stalemate, almost a failure.81 China sent to Albania a delegation headed by the vice 
minister of industry who tried to deal personally with the difficulties that the Chinese 
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experts encountered.82 From December 1972 to January 1973, this industrial project 
was visited also by the Chinese minister of metallurgy, and the director of the 
institute for research on iron, in Beijing, Lu Da. Lu blamed the followers of Lin Biao 
as saboteurs, who became an excuse, in Albanian eyes, for any failure in their 
economy.83 In meeting with workers in the city of Elbasan, where the plant was 
located, the Chinese minister apologized for ‘the delay of seven years’, and promised 
the full mobilization of the energies to finish the plant successfully.84 Once back in 
Beijing, he tried to accelerate progress by radically changing some aspects of the 
projects.85 The Albanian minister of industry, Koço Theodhosi, asked China to make 
possible the first production of iron in this plant by the end of 1975 at the latest.86 
This case shows that Albania relied too heavily on China’s capacities, and China 
agreed too readily to build what Albania demanded, even when those demands would 
be impossible to meet.  
 In April 1973, the Politburo in Tirana analyzed a plan by the government 
regarding the economic development of the country until 1990, including the FYP 
1976-80. In this document, for the first time the government considered that, in the 
early 1980s Albania would pass from an agricultural to an industrial country. For the 
government, industrialization promised to narrow the differences in living standards 
and income per capita between the cities and the countryside. 87  None of these 
objectives – the modern industrialization and the increase of income – were achieved. 
So unrealistic was the plan that it affirmed the objective to study and eventually build 
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the first nuclear reactor, with the long term goal of building a nuclear center to 
produce electricity, together with the electronic industry. 88  The spirit of this 
document was completely disconnected with the real economic possibilities and 
situation of Albania. In late 1973, almost all of the big industrial projects, including 
those started in 1962, were still under construction. By 1974, only 9 out of 31 
industrial projects China had committed to in 1968 were built, the remaining being 
either under construction, or had yet to start. 
 
Conclusion 
The end of the 1960s, beginning of the 1970s, corresponded to a turning point in 
China’s international relations. Among many, two main factors convinced Chinese 
leadership that the path of confrontation with the world’s great powers would lead at 
best to a further isolation of China, but could lead also to war. The first factor (not in 
order of importance) was China’s internal situation, related to the mass mobilization 
and the Cultural Revolution, which had made possible for Mao to regain total control 
of the party, and marginalize potential competitors. Therefore, Mao did not 
necessitate any longer radicalism and mass mobilization to defeat power challenges. 
But Mao also came to understand that, beyond the official narrative, China could not 
base only on the ideology its claims to have a strong voice on the international stage. 
The second factor concerned the Soviet Union’s threat to China’s national security. 
The border conflict, in fact for the first time since the end of the Second World War, 
pushed Chinese leaders to think of the possible war between the two countries, with 
uncertain outcomes, except the fact that perhaps for China would have brought 
tremendous sufferings. Mao could not risk losing what he had gained through 
internal political struggle because of an external enemy which could have tried to 
annihilate Mao’s rule. Moreover, the world revolution rhetoric, so much 
propagandized by Mao, had lost its zeal because the decolonization process was 
towards its end. China must have realized that most of the new born countries did not 
exchange nationalism for communism, and China’s influence over these countries 
was not a permanently achieved goal. This tells much of China’s world weight 
altogether. Definitely, Chinese leaders understood that China could not challenge 
forever the world order without first being part of it. Hence the normalization with 
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the United States suddenly became part of the new Chinese strategy of pursuing 
coexistence with, and integration in, the international system. Chinese leaders were 
far sighted enough to see how their ideological struggle with both the Soviet Union 
and the United States, did not bring any concrete benefit to Chinese people. 
Therefore, the Chinese leaders, tried to find a common understanding between the 
communist ideology and the economic and political objectives of their rule. 
 For Albania this turn came unexpectedly. The Chinese leaders under any 
circumstance bothered to consult, or simply let know, the Albanian leaders of part of 
the backstage which led to their decision to normalize the relations with the United 
States. In hindsight, perhaps they were right to not do so because Albania’s reaction 
of total disagreement was predictable, which eventually is what happened. On this 
point, China’s behavior towards Albania was quite similar to the Soviet Union’s 
treatment of Hoxha regarding Khrushchev’s decision of rapprochement with 
Yugoslavia. Hoxha disapproved of China’s change in its foreign policy because it 
undermined Hoxha’s political legitimacy. He had been propagandizing for more than 
a decade how China was the leading country in the struggle against United States. 
Not only Sino-American normalization undermined Hoxha’s political rule but also 
he correctly understood that this change might impact also China’s foreign aid. 
Indeed, as the next chapter shows, Albanian leaders’ suspicion of this were 
confirmed when in power was shortly rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping. His rehabilitation 
was a clear sign that not only China’s foreign policy had changed, but that this 
change was accompanied by China’s internal policy changes affecting the power 
cupola of the country and rectifying part of the policies recently pursued. Yet, until 
1974 China did not give up assistance for Albania.  
 Consequently, since China’s normalization with United States, did not 
immediately, and drastically affect Chinese assistance to Albania, Hoxha decided to 
prioritize the economic collaboration with Beijing. Partially this was also due to the 
fact that the most important industrial projects planned with Chinese assistance were 
still under construction. Therefore, any political decision to ditch relations with 
China, because of ideological disagreements concerning Chinese foreign policy, 
would have had an enormous negative impact on the Albanian economy. On the 
other hand, despite the beginning of the process of normalization with the United 
States, the CCP Tenth Congress, in a way alleviated Hoxha’s suspicion that China’s 
258 
change would be drastic. In fact for the time Mao would lead, Hoxha came to think 
that China’s course, at least its main patterns, would resemble and reflect some of the 
Marxist ideology. In that way he could still use the Albanian friendship with China in 
its internal politics. Nonetheless, the years 1971-74 were a shifting sand period for 
the Sino-Albanian alliance which would not resist very long the death of Mao 
Zedong and the second rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE END OF THE ALLIANCE, 1974-1978 
 
Introduction 
The Tenth Congress of the CCP was followed with interest in Albania, although no 
delegation had been invited to participate. Hoxha deemed it an important moment in 
the Sino-Albanian relations because apparently it upheld the political line of the CCP. 
It actually seemed to strengthen Mao’s position – dogmatic opposition to revisionism 
– and highlighted the Cultural Revolution. This perception was reinforced further 
with the launch of the campaign against Lin Biao, and the anti-Confucius campaign. 
Denouncing Lin as a traitor and revisionist assured Hoxha that China still was 
struggling against revisionism. All this seemed a sort of revival of the first phase of 
the Cultural Revolution, which Wang Hongwen called it the ‘second Cultural 
Revolution’. For Teiwes and Sun ‘…in 1973 Mao’s emphasis shifted to strident 
reaffirmation of its [Cultural Revolution’s] 70 percent achievements… this was the 
essence of the Tenth Congress’.1 At least, this is also the light in which the Albanian 
embassy in Beijing assessed it.2 As Maurice Meisner has argued, ‘yet, the “criticize 
Lin, criticize Confucius” had less to do with Lin Biao or Confucius, than it did with 
conflicting evaluations of the Cultural Revolution and the question of who was to 
lead China into the post-Cultural Revolution era, and in what direction’.3 Although 
Deng Xiaoping was reinstated in state offices in 1973, he, initially, kept a low profile, 
and it was not yet possible for the Albanian leadership to understand the political 
meaning of Deng’s rehabilitation, that China’s period of left radicalism would soon 
end.4 
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 Finally, in 1975, China drastically reduced the economic assistance to Albania, 
although both countries claimed strong relations. This, however, put Hoxha in a 
difficult position. From Albania’s perspective, the Sino-American normalization had 
jeopardized the ideological axis upon which Hoxha built its narrative of China as the 
leading country of the struggle against both the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Yet, for the time Mao was alive Hoxha thought that there would be perhaps benefits 
by keeping the good relations with China. When in 1976 Zhou Enlai first, and Mao 
Zedong later died – which were followed with the definitive emergence of Deng 
Xiaoping – Albania lost any sympathy within the CCP. At this point Hoxha would 
understand that his country either adapts to the changing world, following the 
Chinese path of openness and reformation, or ditch definitely the alliance with China. 
Hoxha, again, thinking of the best for his personal power, and not the best for his 
country, found easy the choice.  
 
Changing Winds. Purges in Albania 
Following the visit of Kissinger first, and Nixon later, foreign diplomats had been 
alluding to the deterioration of the Sino-Albanian relations. They were not wrong as 
shown by China’s response to Albanian leader’s request to send a high political 
delegation for talks.5 To test Chinese intentions towards Albania, in summer 1973, 
Hoxha mentioned the idea to send a high delegation to China, possibly headed by the 
Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu. Shehu’s last visit had been in 1967, and no high 
delegation, if we exclude ministers, had been exchanged between Albania and China 
since then. Hoxha’s step was discussed only with Shehu and Kapo, which shows that 
they were suspicious of the Chinese response. Only on 23 January, 1974, did Shehu 
propose such a visit to the Chinese ambassador in Albania, Liu Zhenhua. Liu 
responded enthusiastically, but his enthusiasm was shadowed by the lack of 
enthusiasm of the Chinese leaders in Beijing, followed by weeks of silence. Then in 
mid-February 1974, the Albanian ambassador in China, Behar Shtylla, in a meeting 
with Geng Biao solicited a response, but Geng Biao only affirmed that they had 
received the proposal and the CCP CC would soon decide. Liu, in Tirana, received 
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word of the decision on 20 February 1974. China agreed in principle but wanted such 
a visit to take place during the second half of 1974. For Albania this postponement, 
and the feeble response given, were a clear sign that China was not intending to 
strengthen relations with Albania.6 
 In February 1974, in meeting an African delegation, Mao launched the theory of 
the “Three Worlds”: in the first world were United States and Soviet Union, in the 
second world were Japan, Canada, and Europe, and in the Third World, almost all 
Asia (China included), Latin America and Africa. This theory was Mao’s re-
elaboration of the older theory of the intermediate zone, which had appeared in 1964 
in Renmin Ribao.7 In April 1974, Deng Xiaoping, who led the Chinese delegation at 
the annual UN General Assembly, emphasized the theory to a world audience.8 
Hoxha later would vehemently oppose this theory, clinging to the classical division 
of the world between socialist and capitalist countries. But Hoxha’s attack reveals to 
have been clearly orchestrated in conjunction with his country’s split from China. 
From documents emerges that Albania did not initially oppose this theory. Asked by 
He Ying, Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs, if he agreed with Deng’s speech, 
the Albanian ambassador in China Behar Shtylla affirmed to ‘completely agree’.9 
The meeting took place on 12 April, 1974, one day after Renmin Ribao published 
Deng’s speech in UN.  
 Deng’s rehabilitation in 1974 was followed with concern by Albania because 
when Deng had been purged, he had been attacked also by the Albanian leadership. 
His rehabilitation left room for concern over possible revision of policies previously 
promoted in China. Information arrived in Tirana from a Chinese source, affirming 
                                                            
6 Records of the Politburo, 22 February 1974: “Verbal information of Mehmet Shehu on the proposal 
made to China on 24 January 1974, for a visit to China of a high level delegation of the party and the 
government”, in  AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1974, D4, f.185-188; “Top-Secret: Letter of the Albanian 
ambassador in China, Behar Shtylla, sent to the minister of foreign affairs in Albania, Nesti Nase, 26 
March 1974, on the relations of Albania with China, and the last events: the postponement of the visit 
of the high level delegation to China, the tendency to postpone the construction of the Metallurgic 
Kombinat of Elbasan, and the tendency to not support the plan for the hydropower plant of Fierza, the 
lack of publicity of our campaign in Albania against Lin Biao, and others”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-
MPKK, V. 1974, D7.  
7 Chen, China and the Three Worlds, 3. 
8 Here is the speech of Deng Xiaoping addressed to the UN General Assembly in April 1974. The axis 
of all his speech was around this theory. In ibid., 85–98. 
9 “Information on the meeting of comrade Behar Shtylla with the Chinese vice minister of foreign 
affairs, He Ying, in Beijing on 12 April 1974”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1974, D8, f.20. 
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that ‘many mistakes had been made during the Cultural Revolution’, with particular 
emphasis on the purge of old comrades ‘who have given great contribution to the 
Chinese revolution’, mentioning the case of Deng Xiaoping. Moreover, the source 
affirmed that most of the people in China did not approve of such policies. 10 
Although not approving of many aspects of the Cultural Revolution, Hoxha 
ultimately fully supported it because it had purged the revisionists (pro-Soviets) 
within the CCP, at least, so he was told. Now one of the most prominent revisionists 
purged during the Cultural Revolution emerged again as a prominent political figure 
in China. Worse yet, for Hoxha, this revisionist was also bringing forward political 
ideas regarding the world division that did not entirely correspond to the communist 
dogma. In November 1974, Yao Wenyuan, heading a Chinese delegation in Albania, 
tried to assure Hoxha on this issue, affirming that ‘Including China in the Third 
World does not mean we are like the nationalist countries [decolonized], but we do 
this to help them from the hegemonic countries’.11 Deng’s rehabilitation in 1973 had 
not been discussed in any PLA forum; or if it was, no evidence of such a discussion 
was recorded. 
To the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping, corresponded in Albania instead, the 
furthering of the politics of isolation and repression – which in fact begun already 
before Deng’s return in office. In late December 1972, in the annual national song 
competition, many artists performed music clearly influenced by modern jazz and 
soul, which in Albania was expressly forbidden. The new year, 1973, began with a 
purge of nationally known artists including, but not limited to, those musicians. Tens 
of artists went into long years of detention, some died in prison, others executed. The 
same fate befell the PLA Politburo members in charge of culture, Fadil Paçrami and 
Todi Lubonja, only the latter surviving the regime. Another purge, involving less 
people, but resonating much more, followed in 1974 in the army, which included the 
defense minister Beqir Balluku, the chief of the general staff, Petrit Dume, and the 
generals of the general staff Hito Çako and Rrahman Parllaku. Only general Parllaku 
                                                            
10 Beijing, 24 July 1974: “Information regarding the conversation between Jovan Andoni [Albanian 
employee at the embassy in Beijing], and a Chinese employee of the Ministry of Communication”, in 
AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1974, D9, f.2-4. 
11 “The talks between the delegation of the party and the government of Albania, headed by the Prime 
Minister Mehmet Shehu, and the delegation of the People’s Republic of China, headed by the member 
of the CCP Politburo, Yao Wenyuan, 30 November 1974”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1974, D16, 
f.13. 
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survived.12 It all began with the study of the thesis of the Council of Defense. This 
purge is still subject to disputes among Albanian historians, concerning why Hoxha 
promoted it. However, it seems that is not due to a struggle for the leadership of the 
party, as Balluku, the highest ranked victim, was only third in the line of succession, 
after Hysni Kapo and Mehmet Shehu. In 1973, the defense minister had promoted 
updating a strategic document, the defense thesis, but disputes emerged between the 
minister and the chief of the general staff, Petrit Dume, concerning aspects of the 
new document. Substantially, the minister did not promote the drafting of new thesis, 
only a review of the war doctrine that had been approved by Mehmet Shehu, and by 
the Council of Defense (Enver Hoxha) in 1967. Eventually his review turned into 
revision, hence he was purged as revisionist, defeatist and traitor. The minister took 
such step without informing Enver Hoxha. The extent to which the minister 
promoted changes in the document was overall limited – even the difference in the 
terminology is minimal – and it did not completely reject the previous document’s 
conclusions.13 The crucial point for Hoxha, however, was that the minister could 
mobilize the armed forces, its general staff, put them under his orders, and use for his 
personal purposes for years without even informing Hoxha.14 If he could do this to 
prepare and review an important document, he could possibly have also used this 
influence to foment consensus to overthrow the leadership. Hoxha’s suspicions were 
reinforced also by information about Balluku’s misappropriation of funds. In his 
                                                            
12 I interviewed general Parllaku in Tirana in August 2015. 
13 The discussion and criticisms to Beqir Balluku were done during the PLA Fifth Plenum 25-26 July 
1974. Hoxha accused him of treason, sealing definitely his condemn. In: “Records of the Plenum… 
On the expulsion of Beqir Balluku from the Central Committee and from the party”, in AQSH, F.14, 
OU, V. 1974, D1, f.228-443. 
14 When minister Balluku met with Hoxha in June 1974, he first said that the study was partial, 
concerning only the defense strategy of the coastal border, but pressed by Hoxha he then admitted that 
his study was parallel to that of the Council of Defense, and in part not compatible with it. In, 
“Records of the meeting of comrade Enver Hoxha with comrade Beqir Balluku on some important 
issues concerning the People’s defense, 15 June 1974”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V.1974, D8/1. It seems 
to have been limited more to the change of some tactics rather than the entire strategy, as for instance, 
in case of foreign attacks from the sea, it promoted the “counterstrike”, rather than the “counterattack”, 
in the first case implying that the enemy would penetrate into the territory, while the second term 
meant the counterattack when the forces of the enemy where still at bay. In addition, and would be 
one of the main accusations moved against him, he promoted what was called the “Theory of Sliding”, 
combining the initial counterattack with the withdrawing of the forces deep into the territory trying to 
avoid the destruction of the soldiers and the armaments for then passing into the partisan’s war. This 
for the leadership implied to accept that at a certain point would have been impossible to reject the 
landing of foreign troops, which implied to accept the defeat. 
264 
personal diary Hoxha noted that Balluku had used his position to access public funds 
for the wedding of his son, and to buy expensive gifts abroad with and for his wife.15 
Although there was no apparent connection to the relations with China, this 
purge in a way was a message to the past objections of Zhou Enlai to the Albanian 
war doctrine. Beqir Balluku had visited China three times, and one of the accusation 
against him during the debates in the party’s plenum, was his acceptance of Zhou 
Enlai’s suggestions to adopt a strategy of guerrilla war, rather than a conventional 
confrontation with modern armaments.16 These accusations were contradictory as 
Albania then still considered itself a close ally of China, and no anti-Chinese policy 
was promoted yet by the leadership. Albanian leaders actually made this purge seem 
to the Chinese officials that it was against those who ‘had been anti-Chinese, and 
against the Chinese Cultural Revolution’. In the talks with Chinese officials, Beqir 
Balluku was continuously associated with Lin Biao.17 
 In October 1974 a sensitive issue was raised for Hoxha – Chinese criticism of 
Stalin. Behar Shtylla was called by Yu Zhan, Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs, 
who levied serious accusations against Stalin, different from those Hoxha had 
already heard from Chinese leaders since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. 
Yu Zhan in fact went back in time, to the 1940s when the leader of the CCP had been 
Wang Ming. For Zhan, because of Stalin’s support for the leftist line of Wang Ming, 
‘in the first civil war the CCP lost ninety percent of its forces’. Then Yu Zhan 
accused Stalin of not having supported strongly enough the struggle against Chiang 
Kai-shek, which, Yu claimed, had damaged the party. Yu then called Stalin’s line 
‘dogmatic… of leftist opportunism… in Yalta Stalin recognized Chiang Kai-shek as 
China’s leader’, concluding that Stalin ‘wanted to control the war [its outcomes] in 
China’, but most importantly that ‘for the revolution it should not be any center’, and 
                                                            
15 Enver Hoxha, “Notes on the issues to discuss with Beqir Balluku”, March 1973, personal diary 
(document in my posses). 
16 Records of the Politburo, 02-03 July 1974: “On some important issues concerning the situation in 
the leadership of the People’s Defense Ministry”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1974, D8, f.169. 
17  This is what Mehmet Shehu told Yao Wenyuan during their official meeting in Tirana, 30 
November 1974: “The talks between the delegation of the party and the government of Albania, 
headed by the Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, and the delegation of the People’s Republic of China, 
headed by the member of the CCP politburo, Yao Wenyuan, 30 November 1974”, in AQSH, F.14, 
AP-MPKK, V. 1974, D16, f.38; “Notes from the meeting of the politburo member Hysni Kapo with 
the Charge d’Affaires of the PRC in Albania, Ang Po, 29 July 1974”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, 
D10; AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1974, D16, f.37-38. 
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each country should follow its own proper way.18 This was followed by a string of 
discussion points which stretched the affinity between Albania and China further yet.  
 On 29 November 1974, on occasion of the celebrations in Albania for thirty 
years of liberation from Nazism, Hoxha asked the head of the Chinese delegation, 
Yao Wenyuan, about Tito’s possible visit to China, because ‘we have heard about 
this’ Hoxha said. Yao Wenyuan did not deny the visit happening, but simply and 
shortly affirmed that ‘Tito hasn’t asked for any visit of high level delegation’.19 The 
Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement had been one of the motivations of the Soviet-
Albanian split, and Tito’s presence in Beijing certainly could lead Albania to distrust 
China’s course, regardless of the recently-relaxed relations between Tirana and 
Belgrade. One day after Hoxha’s conversation with Yao, during the official meeting 
between the Chinese and Albanian delegations on 30 November, Mehmet Shehu 
made clear the Albanian disagreement with China regarding the Sino-American 
normalization. For Shehu, ‘although on strategic issues we agree with you, when it 
comes to the tactic instead we have some differences’, bringing as an example the 
fact that ‘you have talks with the Americans, whereas we have decided to not have 
any relations with United States’. Yao Wenyuan responded curtly that ‘we do not ask 
you to follow our policy’. Shehu, highlighting the supposed threat to Albania’s 
national security, was underscoring China’s rapprochement with Albania’s enemy, 
and how this policy undermined the Sino-Albanian relations. Nonetheless, for 
Albania, according to Shehu, ‘the most precious thing on the international stage for 
us has been and still is the friendship with the Chinese people’.20 
 In May 1975 another purge concerned the head of the State Planning 
Commission, Abdyl Këllezi, and the minister of the industry and mines, in charge 
                                                            
18 “Notes form the conversation of the Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs, Yu Zhan, with the 
Albanian ambassador in China, Behar Shtylla, 27 October 1974, regarding the relations between 
China and Soviet Union at the time of Stalin (Stalin’s mistakes towards China)”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-
MPKK, V. 1974, D13, f.3-11. 
19 Tirana, 29 November 1974: “The meeting of Enver Hoxha with Yao Wenyuan, head of the Chinese 
delegation that has come [in Albania] on occasion of the celebrations for the anniversary of the 
liberation”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1974, D15, f.8. Part of the delegation were also Geng Biao, 
head of the CCP International Liaison Department, and Yu Zhan, vice minister of foreign affairs of 
China. 
20 “The talks between the delegation of the party and the government of Albania, headed by the Prime 
Minister Mehmet Shehu, and the delegation of the People’s Republic of China, headed by the member 
of the CCP politburo, Yao Wenyuan, 30 November 1974”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1974, D16, 
f.29-34. 
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also of the oil fields, Koço Theodhosi. Both of them had been several times to China, 
and both were severely criticized, dismissed from all offices, expelled from the party 
and a few years later executed.21 These events were a paradox considering that the 
annual oil extraction had surpassed the two million tons, more than ever before in 
Albanian history. But their problems were political rather than economic, as Abdyl 
Këllezi was also the head of the China-Albania Friendship Association. His disgrace 
in China was perceived as politically meaningful, the same as the disgrace of Qazim 
Kapesyzi, military attaché in Beijing, and Pirro Gusho who had served as official in 
Beijing, and after the purge committed suicide. An Albanian student in Beijing, 
Hajdar Muneka, reported to the Albanian embassy, that his Chinese roommate, and 
also one of his Chinese professors, told him that the purging of some officials in 
Albania, including the defense minister Beqir Balluku, was perceived in China as a 
political message and sign of the break of the friendship.22 One year later, in 1976, 
the minister of agriculture, Pirro Dodbiba, and the minister of education and culture, 
Thoma Deljana, were both purged – eventually both survived to the fall of the 
regime.23  
 These purges are still subject to disputes in Albania over why Hoxha condemned 
people that never challenged him. An explanation may lay in Albania’s relations with 
China. This wave of purges came once China’s path of openness was traced, and it 
deeply undermined Hoxha’s power’s legitimacy. Albania was about to remain 
completely isolated while its closest ally moved West, and the economy would be the 
first to suffer the consequences. By 1974 Hoxha had already understood that the 
possibility of relying on China for much longer was becoming remote. The split with 
the Soviet Union had been accompanied by concerned voices, but Hoxha silenced 
                                                            
21 “Record of the PLA Seventh Plenum, 26-29 May 1975: On some conclusions and tasks resulting 
from the hostile work and sabotage in the oil industry”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1975, D1. 
22 Tirana, November 1977: “Letter of the Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu to Enver Hoxha… and the 
information of the foreign ministry about the meeting of the vice minister Reis Malile with the 
Chinese ambassador Liu Xinquan, 24 November 1977, regarding the Chinese failure to implement the 
agreement for the building of the deep refining oil plant of Ballsh, Information, 27 January 1977”, in 
AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1977, D6, f.3-5. In my interview with Hajdar Muneka, in summer 2015 
in Tirana, he affirmed that “many reports from the Albanian embassy in China sent to Tirana, were 
written in the way the officials of the embassy and the ambassador knew Tirana wanted to hear from 
them”, implying the little reliability of these reports. On the other hand, it could have been also a 
deliberate move of the Chinese authorities to send a message to Albania but through an informal low 
profile channel. 
23 Records of the PLA Ninth Plenum, 19-20 July 1976, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1976, D37. 
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these by painting China as a better alternative. Now, with a break from China in the 
horizon, and with no alternatives, those voices related to the real problems Albania 
would be facing: its economy and defense. Silencing them enabled Hoxha to avoid 
any challenge within his party over the impending split with China. They might even 
had gone further, asking to intensify economic relations with the West – something 
Hoxha himself eventually limitedly, but unsuccessfully, attempted. 
 
Prelude to the Break 
The events of the last two years prior to 1975 saw continued reductions in Chinese 
assistance for Albania. The leadership in Tirana sensed that the alliance with China 
was coming to a conclusion. Because of these feelings of distrust, when the FYP 
1976-1980 was drafted, the debate on the request for assistance from China captured 
Hoxha’s personal attention more than its predecessors had. Mehmet Shehu had sent a 
letter asking Chinese leaders for economic assistance for the FYP, and China 
accepted an Albanian economic delegation to negotiate the request. Nonetheless, 
Hoxha personally supervised the details of the delegation’s trip, their speeches, and 
the priority of economic projects. The fact that Albanian leaders doubted China’s 
willingness to assist Albania is shown by Hoxha’s preparation of three alternative 
decrescendo requests, accompanied with three respective speeches depending on 
Chinese reaction. Interestingly Hoxha suggested the delegation praise Deng 
Xiaoping in its speech. It is also meaningful that he suggested the removal from the 
prepared speech of the delegation any reference to specific names of the recently 
purged officials in Albania.24 Those ministers and officials had been to China many 
times, and had negotiated many agreements with Beijing in the past. This confirms 
that their purging had some political connotation in Albania’s relations with China, 
and that such a connotation could be perceived also on the Chinese side. 
 In Albania the government had discussed a first plan requiring 813 million 
rubles. But Hoxha deemed it unrealistic and three alternatives were prepared. The 
first two included 665 and 600 million rubles respectively. In the worst case scenario, 
                                                            
24 “Top-Secret: Notes from the meeting comrade Enver Hoxha, 15 June 1975, with the main comrades 
of the economic delegation that will visit China, headed by the first vice Prime Minister Adil Çarçani, 
where are given some suggestions regarding the new loan to be asked China for the FYP 1976-1980 
and some remarks regarding the speeches to be hold in China”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1975, 
D2.  
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Albania expected from China to approve the third option, that of 550 million 
rubles.25 To Albanian leadership’s dismay, China granted only 225 million rubles, 
and financed 10 out of the 20 industrial projects Albania had requested.26 For the first 
time, the delegation was expecting to negotiate exclusively with Deng Xiaoping. 
Eventually Deng did not receive the delegation, and was Li Xiannian who negotiated 
with the Albanians. When, during the Cultural Revolution, Deng had been purged 
alongside Liu Shaoqi, Hoxha on many occasions had attacked Deng publically as a 
capitalist roader and betrayer of the socialist revolution in China. Before the 
departure of the Albanian delegation, Hoxha admitted that the economy for the next 
five years would grow very modestly, suggesting the delegation to delete the part of 
the speech that depicted a flourishing economy, ‘when instead we neither predict, nor 
expect it at all’.27 The delegation met with Zhou Enlai in mid-June, for only fifteen 
minutes at a hospital, where Zhou was recovering, while the economic issues were 
negotiated with Li Xiannian.28 Li had been in Albania at least twice, and knew very 
well not only the situation of the industrial projects in Albania, but also how to 
negotiate with Albanian officials.  
 The records of the meetings in Beijing between Li Xiannian and Adil Çarçani, 
shows that despite initial courtesy, the talks were very tense, and China’s attitude had 
drastically changed towards Albania. Moreover, this time China showed to not cede 
to the Albania’s requests as had done in the past. During the first meeting, Li 
Xiannian told Çarçani the amount of the loan that China could grant to Albania, 
arguing that China was a poor country. The departure from previous Chinese 
economic policy toward Albania became clear in reading the specific reduction of 
Chinese aid. First, China, Li Xiannian said, ‘will not provide any longer wheat for 
your population which we have always imported from other countries for you… 
                                                            
25 AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1975, D4. 
26 Tirana, 11 July 1975: “Information provided by Adil Çarçani, on the work of the delegation in 
China and the conclusion of the economic agreements”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1975, D6, f.3-
7. 
27 Tirana, 11 June 1975. “Top-Secret: Notes from the meeting of comrade Enver Hoxha, with the main 
members of the Albanian economic delegation headed by... Adil Çarçani, that will visit China, where 
are given instructions for the new loan to request from China for the sixth five-year plan 1976-80, and 
some remarks to the speech the delegation has prepared”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1975, D2, 
f.4. 
28 “Notes form the meeting of the Albanian economic delegation with the head of China’s Council of 
State, comrade Zhou Enlai, 15 June 1975”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1975, D6, f.8-11. 
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second, we will commit to build only 10 industrial projects, and third, the military 
supplies will be included in the loan’. The head of the Albanian State Planning 
Commission, Petro Dode, doubted that its alleged backwardness motivated China to 
reduce the aid, arguing how ‘China today is much more powerful than has been in 
the past’. The Albanians asked Li to revise this decision by submitting it again to the 
leadership, mentioning Mao.29 After a week, in the second and last meeting with Li 
Xiannian, following instructions from Tirana, Adil Çarçani affirmed ‘all the 
dissatisfaction of our leadership… this is an unexpected decision which drastically 
reduces your assistance to us’. Adil Çarçani asked Li to reconsider their decision and 
asked to transmit to Mao their complaint. Li instead affirmed that ‘our party, Mao 
included, has already seriously considered this issue… that our assistance to you is 
already very big… Chinese assistance per capita to Albania has been higher than to 
any other country’. Adil Çarçani insisted to have a response ‘from the CCP Central 
Committee [Mao] on this issue’, but Li Xiannian responded back that ‘what I told 
you is not just my personal opinion… no other response will be given to you’.30 
Albania, with no other choice, accepted the small loan, and the economic agreements 
regarding the FYP 1976-1980 were signed at the beginning of July 1975 – the last 
Chinese economic grant for Albania.31  
 The problem was clearly of political nature. Deng Xiaoping offered Chinese 
assistance to foreign countries no longer on the basis of ideological affinity but on 
practical calculations. First and foremost, Deng wanted, and began pursuing, China’s 
modernization, where foreign policy decisions ‘...have to be based on anything other 
than practical considerations…’.32  In fact for Deng, ‘all the policies were to be 
judged by the economic criteria’, and the foreign aid made no exception.33 He surely 
knew very well the criticism he had received from Albanian leaders, and now he 
                                                            
29 “Minutes of conversation on 17 June 1975 in Beijing, between the Albanian economic delegation 
headed by Adil Çarçani, and Li Xiannian, CCP Politburo member and vice head of China’s Council of 
State”, in ibid., f.29-52. 
30 “Minutes of conversation on 24 June 1975 in Beijing, between the Albanian economic delegation 
headed by Adil Çarçani, and Li Xiannian, CCP Politburo member and vice head of China’s Council of 
State”, in ibid., f.53-74. 
31 Agreements are in, ibid., f.75-93. 
32 John F. Copper, China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy, Vol. 1. Nature, Scope and Origins, 
(New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 63. 
33 Meisner, Mao’s China And After, 401. 
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could have his revenge, although most likely, he was motivated by political and 
economic considerations rather than personal feelings. China, however, intended to 
preserve relations with Albania, but on a new basis, which required a political 
adaptation of Hoxha’s regime to China’s new course of openness. This would prove 
difficult for Enver Hoxha to agree to, though he certainly wished also to maintain 
good relations with China.34 
 This friendship was to be tested again when Albanian leaders forwarded to 
China a new request for armaments in November 1975.35 The request contained a 
long list of new armaments for a total of 380 thousand tons of equipment.36 Albanian 
leaders did not expect a complete acceptance of their requests, but neither did they 
expect a near interruption of the aid. For Hoxha, it was significant that among all the 
countries relying on Chinese military assistance, Albania was the only one 
exclusively dealing with China, whereas both Vietnam and North Korea received 
military assistance also from the Soviet Union. Regarding the Chinese assistance to 
Third World countries, Albania argued that China should give priority first of all to a 
socialist country like itself, and then to the rest of the world.37 At the end, in late 
December 1975, an agreement was signed. China not only rejected the Albanian 
requests, but ‘the Chinese military assistance practically was interrupted’, as Mehmet 
Shehu wrote to Hoxha of the conclusion of the negotiations.38  
 According to a document of the Council of Defense in September 1976, Chinese 
military assistance had reached an amount of more than 450 thousand tons of 
                                                            
34 Hoxha told the Chinese ambassador in Tirana that Albania had only one great friend, and that was 
China. In, “Notes from the conversation of Enver Hoxha with the Chinese ambassador in Albania Liu 
Zhen Hua, 30 September 1975, on occasion of the reception of the ambassador for the 26 years of the 
PRC”s foundation”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1975, D8. 
35 AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1975, D10. 
36 “Top-Secret: Letter of the PLA CC, signed by comrades Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, sent on 
12 November 1975 to the CCP CC, regarding the situation of the army and its further strengthening 
with new Chinese armaments”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1975, D8. In the letter the requests 
included 800 new tanks, 65 air fighters, 38 helicopters, 42 ships of different kind, billions of rackets 
(more than two billion, combined shells for guns and machine guns), hundreds of missiles (8 groups 
in total), thousands of cannons, thousands of submarine torpedoes, etc. 
37 AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1975, D12. 
38 This is what the Premier Mehmet Shehu wrote to Hoxha to inform him about the conclusion of the 
negotiations, in “Letter of comrade Mehmet Shehu to comrade Enver Hoxha about the Chinese 
response to the military delegation”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1975, D13, f.3. Similarly to the 
negotiations for the economic assistance, for the delegation were prepared in advance three speeches: 
if the requests were accepted at 80% then express gratitude, at 40-50% not happiness, and less than 30% 
a speech of protest. 
271 
armaments over the years.39 In particular, the amount of ammunition provided had 
been so large that decades later Albania had to build four factories in order to 
dismantle them due to the obligations resulting from its membership in NATO. 
Albania joined NATO in 2009, but only in 2015 did the process of dismantling the 
old armaments finish, and not before an accident in one of the plants near Tirana, a 
blast which caused 26 deaths after an accidental explosion on 15 March 2008.40 
Despite the cessation of military assistance, however, it should be noted that China 
did invest enormously in Albania’s industry, totalling 132 industrial projects with its 
assistance.41 
 
The End of the Alliance with China, 1976-78 
In early January 1976, Zhou Enlai died. Chinese leaders decided to not receive 
foreign delegations at his funeral. In fact, in Albania, Mehmet Shehu and Ramiz Alia 
prepared to participate at Zhou’s funeral, but Deng called the Albanian ambassador 
and asked to cancel their visit, affirming that they had asked the same to other 
diplomatic representatives.42 After the death of Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping came 
under attack once more in 1976. This campaign was followed with great interest in 
Albania because Deng’s rehabilitation two years earlier corresponded to a drastic 
change in Chinese attitude to Albania, which in turn was a consequence of the more 
pragmatic and less ideological turn Deng was trying to give to Chinese policy 
                                                            
39 This emerged during the meeting between the Albanian ambassador in China and the Deputy Chief 
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altogether. Considering that Enver Hoxha had publically attacked Deng Xiaoping as 
a revisionist, affirming Hoxha’s support for Mao during the Cultural Revolution, 
then Deng’s rehabilitation was a negative signal for Tirana regarding the Chinese 
course. Therefore, news of Deng being purged once again should have been received 
with relief in Tirana, were it not for information from the Albanian embassy in 
March 1976 that affirmed the campaign against Deng had not impacted China’s 
foreign policy, but was only for ‘internal purposes’ of the party. According to the 
information, Mao had stated that despite the campaign against Deng, ‘the possibility 
for revisionism to succeed in China is higher’.43 To further criticize Deng, were 
summoned also the foreign teachers in Beijing. They were told that Deng had 
opposed the class struggle, and this was shown by ‘his theory that the main moving 
forces of the society are the productive forces, not the revolutionary forces’.44 Other 
documents were relayed to Albania by Chinese officials where Deng Xiaoping was 
accused of pursuing the restoration of capitalism.45 
Small signals of the deterioration of relations emerged on many occasions. For 
instance, talking to an Albanian diplomat in Beijing in March 1976, an Egyptian 
diplomat affirmed to have heard voices in the diplomatic circles about divergences 
between China and Albania, and that the relations had deteriorated.46 An information 
reached the Albanian embassy in Beijing that one of the Albanian students in 
Shanghai had been put under observation by Chinese authorities, eventually though, 
this proved false.47 In early April 1976, the military attaché of the Albanian embassy 
was approached by a man introduced with the name of Fang Zhan, who claimed to 
have been in Albania in 1964. He told the attaché that there was a struggle in China 
between two lines. He then sustained to have suffered during the Cultural Revolution 
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because he had been in the Soviet Union studying Russian, and often worked as 
translator for them. Referring to the campaign in the press against the rightist 
deviationism, the man affirmed that, in fact ‘it was addressed against Deng 
Xiaoping’, anticipating what next happened to Deng. 48  When the new Chinese 
ambassador in Albania Liu Xinquan, wanted to hold a reception for the Albanian 
leadership, upon his arrival in Tirana in late September 1976, he was told that the 
leadership could not attend because ‘they are busy’.49 In Buenos Aires (Argentina), 
the Chinese ambassador asked the Albanian ambassador ‘when the Albanian 
population did migrate to Kosova?’ The Albanian ambassador responded with 
irritation that there were no migrations in Kosova because that area had always been 
inhabited by an autochthonous population of Albanians.50 The Hong Kong based 
newspaper, Far Eastern Economic Review, was reported to have written an analysis 
on the Chinese politics, alluding to the possible improvement of Sino-Polish 
relations, ‘corresponding to the deterioration of the Sino-Albanian relations… now 
that China does not need any more Albania, the dogmatic standing of the Albanian 
leaders put in difficult position Chinese leaders’.51 
After Mao’s death Albanian leaders waited anxiously to see what next will 
happen regarding China’s course. On 28 October, 1976, Li Xiannian told the 
Albanian ambassador that the criticism of Deng will continue – which for the 
Albanian leaders meant that Deng ‘will not be rehabilitated very soon’.52 This was 
reassuring for Albania, at least regarding the Chinese economic assistance, which 
albeit having been substantially reduced, remained Albania’s main economic source. 
On this point, Albanian leaders had good reasons to fear a reshaping of the Chinese 
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foreign aid by Deng Xiaoping. In April 1976, information arrived at the Albanian 
embassy attributing to Deng the claim that ‘Now Albania has already a solid 
economic base, let it then walk on its own feet’.53 Other similar signals came from 
the diplomatic circles. In the reception of the Swedish foreign ministry in Stockholm 
the Chinese ambassador was openly asked by the Swedish officials if ‘there would be 
changes in China’s foreign policy after Mao’s death’. The ambassador denied such 
voices affirming that ‘China will follow Mao’s line’.54 A similar story came from the 
Albanian embassy in Vienna, where the Chinese ambassador went so far as to affirm 
that ‘China will never change Mao’s line… the CCP will not improve the relations 
with the revisionist parties, neither will China take any initiative to improve relations 
with the revisionist countries’.55  On the other hand, the direct contacts between 
Chinese leaders and Albanian officials and leaders became an occasion to show all 
the divide that was created between the two countries. In October 1976, the planned 
courtesy visit of the Albanian ambassador in Beijing to the new Chinese leader, Hua 
Guofeng, was postponed.56 The preparations for the celebrations of the anniversary 
of Albania’s liberation, on 29 November 1976, organized by the Albanian embassy 
in Beijing, resulted in a harsh confrontation between the ambassador and the vice 
minister of foreign affairs of China Yu Zhan. The cause was the decision of the 
Albanian diplomats to put three portraits during the celebrations in the reception of 
the Hotel Beijing. The Albanian ambassador was not allowed to put the portraits of 
Mao Zedong and Hua Guofeng next to that of Enver Hoxha.57 
The political divide was reflected, expectedly, in problems with the economic 
collaboration. In October 1976, only 22 percent of the goods listed in the barter 
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agreements for that year had been exported from China to Albania.58 This also can be 
explained with the fact that 1976 was a difficult year for China. Politically, there was 
the death of Zhou Enlai in January, then during the year two major earthquakes 
devastated some areas, in particular Sichuan province. Later, in September 1976, 
died Mao Zedong. Therefore, is understandable that these events may have certainly 
affected the economy. Chinese leaders instead blamed the “gang of four” for the 
delays in delivering supplies to Albania.59 
In November 1976 at the Seventh PLA Congress, China again for the second 
time refused to send a delegation, although affirming that ‘this does not harm the 
fraternal relations between the two parties and countries’.60 But the relations were 
harmed when Hoxha, during his speech to the congress, subtly attacked China’s 
policy of openness. He had told the Politburo that during the congress he would not 
conceal the political disagreements with China, which for him were a consequence of 
the anti-Marxist standings of Chinese leaders ‘supporting every sort of fascist 
organization such as the European common market, or NATO’. For Hoxha ‘political 
and ideological contradictions existed, and continue existing, between us and the 
Chinese comrades’. China had become, for him, an opportunist country, because 
‘when China was isolated on the international stage, it did support Albania’. But 
during these years, ‘we have succeeded to not fall into their line, and keep our own 
path’.61 Importantly, Hoxha thought that ‘after the death of Mao the situation [Sino-
Albanian relations] will deteriorate… but perhaps Mao also did know of this, or 
perhaps he did not, or perhaps he allowed deterioration to balance the opposite 
groups within the leadership’.62 Albanian leadership made the decision to underline 
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divergences with China in October 1976, just before the opening of the congress, but 
after the arrest of the Gang of Four.63 
Hoxha might have looked with increasing interest to the possible seizure of 
power by Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen – called 
the Gang of Four – whom he hoped capable of reversing China’s path of openness. 
To Hoxha’s expectations regarding Mao’s succession had contributed also Mao some 
years earlier, when at the Tenth CCP Congress, in 1973, ‘Mao had chosen him 
[Wang Hongwen] to be the leading candidate to succeed him as head of the party’.64 
Eventually Wang Hongwen lost Mao’s trust in 1975, but Albanian leaders did not 
know of this.65 Hoxha firmly defended them [the Gang of Four] once they were 
arrested at the beginning of October 1976, and years later convicted in a public 
trial.66 Their arrest was for Hoxha the end of the Cultural Revolution, and he well 
understood that was also the end of the entire revolutionary path China had claimed 
to have followed under Mao. Immediately after receiving a report from the Albanian 
embassy in Beijing, which informed of their arrest and the accusations of conspiracy 
against them, Hoxha summoned a restricted number of people to discuss the issue. 
This shows that the Albanian leadership correctly understood the arrest of the Gang 
of Four as the end of an epoch for China. Hoxha defended Wang Hongwen, and 
rejected the accusations against him as ‘baseless’. He considered the four of them 
revolutionaries, overthrown by counter-revolutionaries behind which for Albanian 
leaders stood Deng Xiaoping, and also Zhou Enlai. But Hoxha blamed also Mao, and 
considered him responsible, ‘because he supported the rightist elements within the 
party… such as Deng Xiaoping’. Basically Hoxha was blaming Mao for not having 
assured continuity of his line before dying. For Hoxha, they were arrested because 
they had opposed the rise to power of Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng, and in 
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general had opposed the policy of openness pursued by China. Behind all this action 
for Hoxha, had been Zhou Enlai ‘who supported by Mao, brought around him all 
reactionaries and revisionists… placed them in key positions in the state and the 
party… plotted to purge all the adversaries, first Lin Biao… then Chen Boda… and 
finally reinstated Deng Xiaoping’.67 Hoxha concluded that the four had been the last 
real Marxists within the CCP who were arrested by a group of revisionists. A few 
months later, in December 1976, Hoxha argued that ‘Hua Guofeng is a transitory 
leader of compromise, who is trying to get the support of the rightist elements left by 
Zhou Enlai’.68 
In the PLA Seventh Congress that year participated more than 19 foreign 
delegations, mainly members of small communist parties. 69  During the informal 
talks, they discussed also the events in China. From Asia came communists from 
Laos, Vietnam and North Korea. Some delegations, such as those of Peru, Ecuador 
and Brazil, asked to meet the Chinese ambassador. 70  The main topic of their 
discussion in Albania was the extent of the reformation in China. These small parties 
were concerned about their futures, of the ideological axis upon which they had built 
their action. Among these groups, Reginald Birch, a British communist, affirmed to 
have a confidential document for Hoxha regarding a meeting he allegedly had with 
Chinese comrades, with whom he had discussed the current situation in China.71 No 
such document was found in the archive, nor is it clear if he relayed it to Hoxha. 
Chinese events reflected also in a rally organized at the end of the congress in Tirana, 
in particular among the European delegations. Since not all of them could address 
greetings to the people gathered in the rally, they were suggested to choose one 
representative to stand in the name of all the European communist (m-l) parties. 
Albania suggested the representative of the Marxist party of Germany, Ernst Aust, 
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but the Scandinavian parties opposed him, with the motivation that the German 
communists did not recognize the new leadership of China, Hua Guofeng, as a 
communist leader, choosing instead to support the ‘Gang of Four’.72 Hoxha did not 
react to this seeming provocation, as with his closest comrades, he too had expressed 
all his disappointment about the treatment the gang of four had received.  
After the congress, the message of Hua Guofeng for the celebrations of the 
anniversary of the Albanian independence in late November ‘for the first time was 
not published’ in the Chinese press.73 On 8 December, 1976 the CCP sent an official 
letter of protest for the accusations of the Albanian leaders during the congress, 
which, it claimed ‘were against the ideas of Mao Zedong’. 74  Information was 
collected by the Albanian embassy in Beijing indicating certain distance the Chinese 
officials kept from the Albanians in China, mainly students and diplomats.75 A report 
of the Albanian embassy in Beijing in late 1976, affirmed that ‘here are rehabilitating 
everything that has been attacked during the Cultural Revolution’. 76  Hoxha 
concluded that ‘now with China we are ideologically enemies’ because for him now 
China had become a ‘social-imperialist country’. 77  Then, in June 1977, Hoxha 
permanently abandoned the alliance with China, affirming that ‘China has deviated 
from Marxism-Leninism, and is preparing a regressive turn like Yugoslavia and 
Soviet Union’, and went into a long analysis of the theory of the Three Worlds, 
rejecting it as non-conformant to Marxist division of society and the world.78 This 
came after a Chinese parliamentary delegation had visited both Romania and 
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Yugoslavia, two countries which Chinese leaders had suggested Hoxha to intensify 
relations with, but which Hoxha had continuously deemed revisionists and enemies. 
In May 1977, two musical groups, one from Romania and the other from Yugoslavia 
toured China. In the official reception, the Romanian group was received by Ji 
Pengfei, secretary-general of the standing committee of the Chinese National 
Assembly (Parliament), but the Yugoslavian group was received by Wu De (Li 
Chunhua), a closer collaborator of Hua Guofeng. After asking about this 
differentiation, Albania’s embassy reported to have been told ‘now the relations [of 
China] with Yugoslavia are very important… they will be strengthened even more in 
the future…’.79 
The turning point however came on 7 July 1977, when the People’s Voice in 
Albania published the article “The theory and the practice of revolution”. The article 
was a frontal attack to the Chinese theory of the Three Worlds. It stressed the 
importance of Lenin’s works and the characteristic of the current epoch as one of 
contradiction between capitalism and socialism, and the necessity of proletarian 
revolution. Then the article, after praising Lenin and mentioning neither China nor 
Mao by name, but referring to ‘the authors’, attacked Mao’s theory of the Three 
Worlds. The theory was an attempt ‘to hide the class character of the political 
forces’. Furthermore, ‘the world is definitively divided between two camps: socialist 
and capitalist. The struggle between these two camps is the axis of the entire life of 
our epoch… the so-called theory of the three worlds, ignoring socialism as a social 
system, it ignores the fundamental contradiction of our time, that between capitalism 
and socialism… this theory is aimed at preventing revolution and defending 
capitalism’.80 In this way Hoxha went public in his disagreements with China, and 
vehemently attacked China and Mao’s idea of world division as anti-Marxist. In a 
long elaboration, he alluded to the rise of China as just a superpower among other 
superpowers, competing for influence and world markets, but not the cause of 
revolution. Curiously, the article appeared just when Deng Xiaoping was about to be 
reinstated.  
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The article was soon publicized worldwide by the daily press, as it was 
Albania’s first and most violent, public, and dramatic attack of China. But different 
sources would interpret the attack differently. The Greek daily Kathimerini wrote of 
‘unexpected Albanian action’, motivated by the decrease in Chinese economic 
assistance to Albania. The Japanese Kyodo News connected the article to divergences 
in foreign policy. The Sunday Times wrote that ‘Albania is seeking new friends’. 
Very accurate seems to have been the analysis of Daily Telegraph in mid-July, 
which, among others, stated that ‘Hoxha was mistaken to think and hope that the 
gang of four would take over the political power after Mao’s death’, and linked the 
disagreements also with Tito’s planned visit to China. For the British Times, this was 
the signal of the ‘complete interruption of the special relations between China and 
Albania’ due to ideological divergences, but also due to Chinese invitation for the 
Yugoslavian leader Tito.81 To Albania’s dismay and anxiety, in August 1977, Deng 
Xiaoping received in Beijing Josif Broz Tito, the Yugoslavian leader and Hoxha’s 
oldest enemy. What a blow for Hoxha to see the honors with which Tito was 
received in Beijing, when Hoxha’s request to send Mehmet Shehu three years earlier 
had been postponed by Chinese leaders sine die, eventually never taking place.  
In addition to the press, this article also caused a vivid debate in the diplomatic 
circles.82 But it caused also the first public reaction of Deng Xiaoping. During an 
interview with the France Press Agency (known as AFP/Agence France-Presse), on 
21 October, 1977, he was asked what he thought of the Albanian attacks on the Three 
Worlds theory. He responded that ‘this criticism is irrelevant to us… in the future the 
theory of the three worlds will be the foundation of our foreign policy… the most 
fanatic opponent of this theory is Soviet Union’.83 This was a clear message for 
Hoxha regarding the Chinese course. A more interesting piece of information for the 
Albanian leaders came from Paris. In December 1977, the Albanian ambassador in 
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Paris met with the journalist of the AFP that had interviewed Deng Xiaoping in 
Beijing. According to the journalist, Deng had affirmed that ‘I am not interested’ in 
Albania’s considerations of Chinese policies. According to the French journalist, 
Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng were in a rivalry, ‘and soon Deng will replace Hua 
Guofeng’ he affirmed.84 China’s reaction towards Albania, however, was generally 
cautious, and perhaps calculated, trying to avoid direct and open tension. In fact, had 
Chinese leaders reacted through a public polemic, Albania’s role in this dispute 
would have been highlighted. In that case Albanian leaders would have had an 
undeserved space and attention. Indeed, the European and American press did 
publicize Albania’s article, highlighting it as a turning point for Sino-Albanian 
relations.85 Therefore China decided to lower the profile of the disputes, through 
small steps, such as the slow interruption of the economic supplies. 
Information from the Albanian embassy, from unspecified sources, mentioned 
the possibility for China ‘to interrupt completely the military supplies’, and that 
‘within the general staff of the Chinese army there have been disagreements 
regarding the standing towards Albania…’.86  The source did not clarify in what 
specifically these disagreements consisted. Foreign newspapers speculated of a wave 
of arrests of pro-China elements in Albania, which were reproduced in China in the 
party cadres’ newspaper. Albania submitted an official note of protest, claiming their 
publishing as an attack on the Sino-Albanian friendship.87 The Chinese response 
came through a verbal note in mid-October 1977, which considered the Albanian 
note an interference in China’s internal affairs since they were not published for the 
public but for the party cadres’.88 Reis Malile, Albanian vice minister of foreign 
affairs, who had also served as ambassador in China, met on 29 October, 1977, with 
the Chinese ambassador in Tirana Liu Xinquan, and demanded a definitive response 
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about the completion of construction works in the integrated oil refinery, and the 
metallurgical project, which had been continuously postponed due to technical 
problems. The ambassador replied in a meeting one month later, when he protested 
the way Albania was dealing with this problem, and expressed his indignation for the 
interferences of the Albanian minister of mines and industry, Xhafer Spahiu, who 
according to him, ‘has accused the Chinese experts of delays without any base’. He 
said that all the recent delays were due to the sabotage of the “gang of four”, who 
damaged the economy and created great turmoil, and China expected Albania to 
understand this situation. Malile rejected the Chinese statements and asked for a 
response specifically concerning the delays of that industrial project, affirming that 
issues such as the sabotage work of the gang of four were internal affairs, which 
should not impede China from respecting the agreements signed between the two 
countries. Hence the consideration that this statement of the Chinese ambassador, full 
of political notes beyond the issues about which they had met, ‘have specific and 
determined purposes’, alluding that China was using the quarrel on one industrial 
project as an excuse for escalating the tension of its relations with Albania. From 
Albania’s standing however, the impression may be that Albania was similarly 
guilty, stressing the economic issues to find a political way out of its alliance with 
China, which by now had become an uneasy partner. The Albanian vice minister 
noted that the indefinite postponement of the projects ‘is damaging very bad the 
economy of the country’, an affirmation full of implied notes of sabotage of the 
economy.89 Between October 1977 and May 1978 Albania addressed other notes of 
protest to the Chinese ambassador in Tirana, urging the completion of some pending 
industrial projects. Difficulties were encountered also during the visit to China of an 
Albanian trade delegation in November 1977. The delegation went to China to 
conclude the trade agreements for the year 1978, but disagreements soon surged 
                                                            
89  Tirana, November 1977: “Letter of the Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu to comrade Enver 
Hoxha…and the information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the meeting of the vice 
minister Reis Malile with the Chinese ambassador Liu Xinquan, on 24 November 1977, about the 
Chinese failure to implement the agreement for the building of the deep processing oil plant of Ballsh. 
Information Nr.24, 25 November 1977”, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V. 1977, D6, f.14-20. 
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regarding the currency in the bilateral trade between China and Albania, eventually 
resolving it by adopting the American dollar.90 
On 7 July, 1978, China decided to interrupt economic and military assistance to 
Albania, and withdraw its many specialists from Albania. The official notice of the 
decision, delivered to the Albanian embassy in Beijing by the vice minister of 
foreign affairs of China, Yu Zhan, came exactly one year after the People’s Voice’s 
article published on 7 July 1977 had attacked the Chinese Three Worlds theory.91 
After 24 years of intense relations, and 17 of effective alliance, China and Albania 
downgraded their fraternal relations to ‘normal relations’. Unlike the split with the 
Soviet Union, Albania’s split with China was not radical. In fact, both countries 
maintained their embassies and ambassadors in the respective countries, and trade 
and communication, although on a lower scale, continued between the two countries. 
 
Conclusion 
The period from 1974 to 1978 saw the end of Albanian leaders’ feeble hope that 
China would never become so open that it would question, and consequently 
reshape, the entire course of history since the founding of the PRC. Hoxha’s hope 
lied, at first, in Mao’s hold of the leadership, and after Mao’s death, on those close to 
him who had promoted the Cultural Revolution. This mass movement, aspects of 
which had been severely criticized by Hoxha, remained the reference to which 
Hoxha attached his hope regarding his ally’s future. But the arrest of the Gang of 
Four extinguished his expectations to see China reverse the policies of openness. 
That Hoxha found China’s openness reversible shows how desperately he lacked the 
realism during this time – a time when China’s strategic interests on the international 
stage required Chinese integration into the international system. Hoxha’s distance 
from political reality in analyzing Chinese policies is shown also by his attention to 
the Gang of Four, and the fact that he considered it possible for the Gang to seize 
political power. In fact, with the purges of 1972-74, Hoxha had proven determined to 
                                                            
90 Ministry of Trade, November-December 1977: “Report of the working group that went to China for 
the trade agreements for the year 1978, and the graphs of the delivering of the goods that were not 
delivered for the years 1975, 1976, 1977”, in AQSH, F.503, V. 1977, D74. 
91 “Top-Secret: Radiogram of the Albanian ambassador in China, Behar Shtylla, sent on 07 July 1978 
to the minister of foreign affairs of Albania Nesti Nase, and relayed to Enver Hoxha and Mehmet 
Shehu, regarding the Note of the Chinese Government on the interruption of the economic and 
military assistance to Albania”, in AMPJ, Kina, V. 1978, D283, f.3-45. 
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walk in the opposite direction of China. He would not concede any sort of isolation, 
nor allow any degree of openness. On the contrary, those purges were precisely signs 
that he would follow, at all costs and alone if need be, the path of Stalinism. He had 
worked for this continuously, and the purges were aimed at preventing any reversal 
of these policies in Albania. 
 On the other hand, with the second and definitive rehabilitation of Deng 
Xiaoping, China opened even further to the West, and solidified the steps taken since 
the visit of Kissinger to Beijing. Slowly, but irreversibly, what would remain of 
Mao’s revolutionary policies were only symbols, which for Albanian leaders were 
not enough to justify the existence of solid political relations between China and 
Albania. Eventually, Albania lost the most impacting ally it had during the post war 
period. Although Hoxha called for increasing the economic relations with European 
countries, his country had been so deeply isolated that after 1978 it lacked any 
serious initiative to open to the world. Hoxha remained a Stalinist until the day of his 
death. And he had created the conditions that even after him, there would not be any 
sort of Albanian Deng Xiaoping to open Albania’s doors. In fact, the only survivors 
of Hoxha’s purges in the Politburo had been Hoxha’s lackeys, who even after his 
death in 1985 faithfully carried out his orders.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Before the communist regime established its rule in Albania, following the Second 
World War, the country had never enjoyed guaranteed sovereignty, although it had 
international recognition. Between the two wars, both Yugoslavia and Italy had 
strongly interfered with the internal policies of Albania, competing for its control, 
until Italy invaded it at the beginning of April 1939. The war and the geographical 
location of Albania decided its political fate for the coming half century, as the 
communists were the only force that organized a strong resistance to the foreign 
invaders during the war, assisted in this first by the British officials and later by the 
Yugoslavian emissaries, whose role was determinant in opening the path to Enver 
Hoxha to reach the position of the military commander first, and  political leader 
second, a position he kept until he died, ruling the country with an implacable iron 
fist. 
During the war period, with his astute tactics, Hoxha led the Yugoslavs that 
sponsored him to believe he would be easily maneuverable, that he could be used 
against those in the Albanian intelligentsia that were given to strong nationalism, 
which had openly claimed the province of Kosova – mainly inhabited by Albanians – 
into post war Albania. After the war, Yugoslavia not only managed to keep Kosova, 
but almost to annex Albania as its seventh republic. I have showed in the first chapter 
that Hoxha survived because he maximized the newly-emerged Tito-Stalin disputes, 
and so consolidated both his regime and his personal power. Yugoslavia’s threat to 
Albania and to Hoxha’s personal rule, accentuated Hoxha’s nationalism, which, 
before the split with Belgrade, had been shadowed by the socialist brotherhood 
narrative. Subsequently, Hoxha, in his public discourse, resumed the threat 
historically the neighbors represented for Albania’s existence, and so nationalism 
together with ideology (Marxism), became determinant factors in Albania’s foreign 
policy after the Second World War.1 It is precisely in this context of national (in-) 
security and ideological implications that the Albanian-Soviet alliance was forged. 
The Warsaw Pact became a good umbrella in this sense, had the Soviet Union 
                                                            
1 Elez Biberaj, Albania. A Socialist Maverick, (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 
1990), 85. For Biberaj “Nationalism no doubt was the most important determinant”. 
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interfered not with the internal affairs of Albania – until attempting to change the 
leadership – showing that its aims were to treat Albania simply as its satellite, good 
enough to protect the Southwestern flank of its empire by using it as a base, but 
subject to Soviet impositions. As far as Soviets did not threaten the power position of 
Hoxha, they were courted to assist Albania, which they did, but once Stalin died, and 
Khrushchev initiated a policy of revising Stalin’s policies and place in history, 
Hoxha grew wary. Khrushchev not only rectified Stalin’s policies, but openly 
promoted (at least he tolerated) similar revisions in all the other communist countries 
of East Europe, with the consequence of pushing towards the change of the 
leadership. He did not conceal that Albania too should undertake reformative steps 
toward total destalinization. Hoxha felt his personal power threatened, and so he 
sought new allies, and for a safe way to disengage from his now burdensome ally. As 
shown in the first part, the East European turmoil in the aftermath of Khrushchev’s 
reformation brought both China and Albania on the same line of resistance, for 
different reasons, to this course. Therefore, Albania found soon a friend in China, 
who offered economic and military assistance, and unlike the Soviet Union, did not 
manifest any intention to interfere with the internal policies of Albania, with Hoxha’s 
Stalinist manners. The successful management of the Albanian-Soviet split, made 
Hoxha a good survivor and offered to his people the image of a leader that could 
guarantee the national sovereignty and the economic sufficiency. In addition, he 
made clear to the new allies that he was seeking more a partnership, based on mutual 
benefits and built over a solid common ideological ground, not a top-down servile 
alliance.  
In the second part of this research I have shown how from 1960 until the end of 
Albanian communism, Albania’s history was inextricably related to Chinese 
vicissitudes, its foreign and internal policies. Since Albania had won independence, 
no other foreign power impacted Albanian life and history as China did with its years 
of great assistance; and no other small communist country in Europe played such a 
particular role for China as did Albania during the Cold War. As shown in my 
research, its particularity lies in its exclusive relationship, its common ideology, but 
most importantly in the fact that Albania more than any other country supported 
convincingly and dogmatically China’s alternative to the Soviet power as a leading 
actor of the international communist movement. Their respective leaders managed to 
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intersect idealism with realism, both in China and in Albania, and successfully build 
an alliance that for more than a quarter of the Cold War period resisted internal and 
international challenges. The leaders manipulated the masses, by convincing the 
people of their respective countries of the idealist and sincere communist reasons 
behind the friendship, hiding the disputes that came to emerge at times, when 
instead, this alliance often corresponded to practical necessities experienced by 
China when trying to expand its influence in competition with the Soviet Union, and 
by Albania when seeking new suppliers and its own eventual autonomy. An 
autonomy that derived first of all from its geographic distance with China, but also 
by internal considerations of Hoxha’s regime that following entirely China’s path, 
economically and politically, would have undermined his power and Albanian 
regime’s consolidated policies. Consequently, Albania took from China what most 
suited Albania’s regime.  
Nonetheless, as I have shown in the second and third part of my research, Hoxha 
refused to reconsider his established communist ideology. He criticized aspects of 
the Chinese revolution, such as the centrality of the peasantry and the nature of the 
class struggle, and also refused to acknowledge in full the Chinese claim that Mao’s 
thought was a novel and vital contribution to communist ideology. In fact, beyond 
public appraisal, Hoxha hardly digested Mao’s thought. This, however, reflected 
Hoxha’s linearity in internal and international policies, which did not allow much 
flexibility. In fact, as far as the communist ideology remained the driving axis of 
China, Hoxha did not hesitate to fully support Beijing. Indeed, Albania became the 
most – and only – fervent supporter of China and Mao, in particular through Mao’s 
most leftist policies, essentially throughout the 1960s. It is in this period that Albania 
partially replaced Chinese diplomacy in the international organizations, and became 
China’s spokesperson in United Nations. In this role, Albania’s diplomatic network 
was at complete China’s disposal. Albania’s international interests converged with 
China’s interests, making possible the pursuit of common agendas.  
In the final part I have shown how the Sino-Albanian split also was as particular 
as the alliance itself had been. When, in 1961, the Soviet-Albanian split occurred, the 
two countries had interrupted even their diplomatic relations. This did not happen in 
the Sino-Albanian split. In fact, amid the notes of mutual protest and accusations 
between Beijing and Tirana, the two governments maintained diplomatic relations 
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and continued to trade together, although now based on international trade rules and 
laws, and no longer based on ideological principles. The economic exchange after 
the split remained very limited. In the Balkans, China decided to increase relations 
with Yugoslavia instead, and later continued supporting Serbia – a policy that 
continues today. If China would have continued approving Albanian requests, most 
likely, Albania would have prioritized its economic ties with China, setting aside all 
the political divergences about the new policy of openness promoted by Deng 
Xiaoping. After all, China’s open doors policy did not begin in 1978, when China 
interrupted the assistance to Albania, but was a process that had started with 
Kissinger’s visit in 1971. Since then, Albania had had the time to interiorize and to 
find a way to adapt to this new situation. The new requests sent to Beijing after 1971 
were a sign of the fact that Albania had already prioritized the economy in its 
relationship with China, but it was too late, as for Beijing the alliance with Albania 
had now become obsolete.  
Here lies the answer to a fundamental question; who benefitted more from this 
alliance? Because of the Chinese assistance, Hoxha’s regime survived the Soviet 
threat, and also managed to gain support due to the relative economic progress of 
Albania. Thus, it is possible to argue that it was Hoxha’s Albania to mostly benefit in 
the short-term. However, in the long-term, China reaped great fruits from this 
friendship. China managed to break out of international isolation thanks to countries 
that did not align with the Soviet-American exclusive predominance in their 
respective areas of influence. Albania, for a relatively short period, was almost the 
only open door for Beijing in Europe, and certainly the only to support Mao, and an 
indefatigable voice in the United Nations. This helped China’s engagement with the 
world in a long-term process, one China started then, and is still carrying out today, 
whereas China’s interrupted assistance to Albania led to the complete collapse of the 
Albanian economy. Chinese leaders, and China, did not lose from the alliance with 
Albania, nor from the break of it. On the contrary, China did use this alliance for the 
time it was necessary to its own interests on the international stage, and dismissed it 
once it became an obstacle to the new course undertaken, in particular after Mao’s 
death. If Hoxha had been farsighted to seek an alliance with China after the split with 
Soviet Union, he had not been thereafter farsighted enough to find alternatives, 
should the alliance with China dissolve. On the contrary, he had prohibited any 
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economic concession or grant with ‘revisionist, or capitalist companies or countries’ 
– sanctioned in the new constitution that had been approved in 1976.2  
Hoxha had decided to keep Albania away from any possible openness, included 
away from any economic collaboration that would include credits from foreign states 
or companies. During the communist period, China was, in fact, the last country from 
which Albania received credits. Thereafter, the Albanian leaders, in complete 
contradiction with the reality, sustained that their country was among the fewest in 
the world to flourish thanks to the socialist economy. How much Hoxha had decided 
to ignore the reality is shown better by his own assessment. For Hoxha, in a time 
‘when the inflation, unemployment, and other negative phenomenon affects the 
living standards of the working people in the capitalist and revisionist countries, in 
Albania, on the contrary, … there is no inflation, no unployment and no economic 
migration’. 3 In 1982 Hoxha would further reinforce affirming that ‘the great 
economic crisis, and consequently the political one, is further deepening in all 
worlds’ continents and all states, with the only exception of Albania’.4 But after the 
Sino-Albanian split the reality for Albania, however, became quite dark. The break 
of the Chinese aid was a huge blow that caused Albania enormous problems, 
plunging its small economy into full crisis from which did not recover until the end 
of the regime in 1991.5  
The interruption of Chinese assistance was immediately reflected in the 
economic development plan for the years 1980-85, where, although with a language 
full of optimism, the regime expected a very modest growth.6 Another consequence 
of the interruption of the assistance was the fact that Albania, although it had 
developed its industries greatly, lacked the technological equipment to produce and 
use new machinery. In some cases, this could not even be supplied by western 
                                                            
2 Biberaj, Albania. A Socialist Maverick, 67-83. 
3 Records of the PLA Tenth Plenum 15-16 June 1981, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1981, D109-109/1, f.86. 
4 Records of the Politburo, 24 February 1982, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1982, D6, f.122. 
5 For Albania’s transition from dictatorship to multiparty system see, Fred C. Abrahams, Modern 
Albania. From Dictatorship to Democracy in Europe, (New York and London: New York University 
Press, 2015). For an account of the transition process from the death of Hoxha to the establishing of 
the first democratic government see in particular pages 15-110; Elez Biberaj, Albania in Transition. 
The Rocky Road to Democracy, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998). 
6 Records of the Politburo, 25 September 1978: “On the preliminary plan for the economic and 
cultural development for the seventh five-year economic plan 1981-85”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1978, 
D12, f.9-72;  
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sources, as those parts would not be compatible with the entire chain of the unit, and 
since there were no available funds to purchase full equipment, many Albanian 
factories ceased work altogether. Some industrial projects were inefficient because 
the technology they used was obsolete. For instance, the metallurgic plant 
(Kombinat) in the city of Elbasan, once the “feeding plant” of all the industry, as the 
regime used to call it, became instead the source of the worst pollution in the 
country, and remains so to this day. It worked only for 12 years, but it impacted the 
health of the local population for decades, causing many casualties, and its 
consequences for the environment were catastrophic. 
Moreover, China assisted Albania, providing every sort of armament and all of 
them without demanding any payment in turn. This assistance did not dictate any 
predetermined military strategy to Albania, because for Beijing, Albania was not of 
strategic military interest, therefore the Chinese leadership never went beyond some 
suggestions regarding the war strategy Albania should build with the Chinese 
armaments, in case of war. When Chinese military assistance struggled to meet the 
overwhelming requests, in addition to Chinese internal impediments in production, it 
became necessary to pressure Albania to come to terms and accept eventual 
restrictions in the amount of supplies. This is understandable considering the 
different role Albania played for China compared to the Soviet Union, and in this lies 
the main difference in Albania’s relations with these two countries. If for the Soviets, 
especially after the Tito-Stalin rift, Albania was a strategic outpost of the communist 
bloc in Southeastern Europe, for China instead, Albania was an important political, 
not a military geo-strategical ally. Therefore, this different role, together with the 
geographical distance, shaped the alliance and the military dynamic therein. Albania 
was more interested to arm itself, rather China being so interested to arm Albania, 
whereas in the case of Soviet Union it had been also the interest of the Soviets to arm 
the country and to have a direct military base in Albania (the naval base of Vlora - 
Pashalimani), for its proximity with the NATO bases in Italy. Albania managed to 
play well the role of a tiny ally, in particular during the years of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution, extracting concessions and, according to China, placing Albania only 
second to Vietnam in Chinese military assistance to foreign countries. The entire 
country was fortified during those years, building hundreds of thousands of bunkers 
with Chinese aid, still today visible in many parts of the country.  
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Ignoring Chinese calls for a diversified trade network, Albania had chosen the 
exclusive link to China. This worked for the time that relations among the two 
countries stayed stable, but once disputes came to the fore, Albania was unprepared 
to open towards international trade market, and not having a big country on which 
rely, it had to adapt (unsuccessfully) to international trade rules. The main base for 
trade was to sell minerals – chrome in particular – that Albania had at its disposal. 
The problem however was that the technology to process the minerals was backward, 
revealing how obsolete, inefficient, and unprofitable some investments in the heavy 
industry had been, making it difficult for foreign markets to accept many Albanian 
products. Albania reacted to the break up with China trying to approach 
economically Yugoslavia and improved its relations also with Greece and Italy, and 
strengthened contacts with Turkey.7 All of these measures proved insufficient to 
replace the huge assistance China had provided during all those years. After 1980 the 
country entered into the list of the poorest countries in the world, with people in long 
queues for hours for very basic goods. The crisis ended with protests and the fall of 
the regime in 1991, and the embracing of an opened capitalistic system, which did 
bring more wealth to the country, but also discomfort and pain for many citizens, 
caused by the savage use of the resources and the huge gap between the rich 
oligarchs and the rest of the population.8 Not very differently has been the course of 
Chinese capitalism, or its socialist market economy, (officially, neo-liberalism with 
Chinese characteristics),9 but at least China retained, on the international stage, the 
centrality that, in Mao’s era, it had achieved through its ideological struggle. 
It is a fact that no other country could have played such a big role as China 
played for Albania, no other country was ideologically so close and geographically 
                                                            
7 One railway was built appositely to facilitate the trade, and it led from Tirana to the border with 
Montenegro, at the time one of the republics of Yugoslavia. At the beginning it was planned the 
building of a railway to connect some industrial projects in the south, but once China interrupted the 
assistance, this plan changed and it was prioritized the connection with Yugoslavia. See Records of 
the Politburo, Tirana, 06 December 1978, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1978, D13, f.129-135; “Daily 
meeting of the Secretaries of the PLA CC, 21 June 1979”, in AQSH, F.14, OU, V. 1979, D72. 
8 Biberaj, Albania in Transition, 114-222; For the understanding of the fall of communism and the 
transition to the free market in East Europe see Anders Aslund, How capitalism was built: the 
transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); Thomas Blanton, Svetlana Savranskaya,Vladislav Zubok, Masterpieces of 
history: the peaceful end of the cold war in Europe, 1989, (New York: Central European University 
Press, 2010). 
9 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 120–
51. 
292 
so far. A perfect combination for Tirana to maximize the profits from such an 
alliance, and to get the maximum benefits from its big ally without fearing it in case 
of a split. The Soviet Union had been a direct threat to Albania, because it was 
hypothetically able to sustain a war for its relative geographic proximity and had 
already intervened in Budapest and in Prague. Albania managed to avoid the Soviet 
threat with Beijing’s support. China was for Albania exactly as the Sun stands to the 
Earth; not too close to burn it. But Albania chose to burn anyway, through a harsh 
self-imposed isolation shown most visibly in the massive bunkerization of the 
country. At a certain point, particularly in the late 1970s, this fortified Albania was 
very similar to the situation described in the famous novel of the Italian novelist 
Dino Buzzati, ‘The Tartar Steppe’, in which a military garrison is kept permanently 
into a mobilized state waiting to face the tartar invasion, which will never take 
place.10 It transformed instead the self-sieged into a collective state of paranoia. That 
garrison in Buzzati’s novel, is the most authentic metaphor for what Albania, and in 
particular Enver Hoxha, had become towards the end of the Cold War. 
                                                            
10 Dino Buzzati, The Tartar Steppe, (London: Paladin Grafton Books, 1990, c1952). 
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